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The design of appropriate institutional arrangements to satisfy the demands for legal 
accountability has been a pervasive challenge since the emergence of the modern 
administrative state. While some commentators have celebrated the development of 
increasingly searching judicial techniques to control bureaucratic power, others have 
expressed their preference for nonjudicial forms of administrative justice. Recent 
literature has explored the development of a rich accountability landscape inhabited by 
numerous institutions that complement and sometimes substitute for courts in the task of 
securing administrative compliance with the rule of law. This study examines the Chilean 
Office of the Comptroller-General as one of these nonjudicial institutions of 
administrative justice. The contribution of this legal accountability institution is 
particularly remarkable considering the Latin American context, which is characterised 
by strong presidential government, authoritarian experiences, and fragile bureaucratic 
capacities. This thesis suggests that this organisation represents an attractive institutional 
incarnation of the idea that legal accountability, and particularly administrative justice, 
could be realised through non-court arrangements. Adopting a socio-legal approach, this 
case study uses historical and archival data along with in-depth interviewing methods to 
explore the evolution and current performance of the Chilean Comptroller-General as an 
instance of nonjudicial administrative justice. 
 
The thesis looks at historical and current uses of legality within the administrative process 
in Chile and also its use in the interaction of public bureaucracy with other branches of 
government, as well as private affected parties. Addressing the historical evolution of the 
institution, the emergence, consolidation, and critical junctures for the Chilean 
Comptroller-General are analysed. In addition, the current contribution of the office to 
legality within the administrative process, and the delimitation of its role from the judicial 
function are examined. Overall, the thesis aims to shed light on the possibilities and limits 
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This thesis is about the influence of legality on the administrative process in the complex 
and large-scale modern state. Ever since the emergence of the administrative state, there 
has been contention about the desirability of imposing legal, and particularly judicial, 
constraints upon public bureaucracies.1 To an important extent the debate has revolved 
politically around whether commentators display enthusiasm or distrust in respect to ever-
expanding administrative powers. The debate is also linked with conflicting preferences 
for legal or political forms of accountability for the executive branch. This thesis focuses 
on the institutional aspect of this debate; that is, it explores the question of on which 
arrangements and procedures we should rely in order to secure administrative action that 
is simultaneously effective and law-compliant. 
 
Going beyond traditional court-centred approaches, this debate on the interactions 
between law and administration has been recently enriched by a growing interest in 
mapping and researching a broader range of accountability bodies, encompassing an ever-
growing accountability landscape. Remarkably, this includes a number of nonjudicial 
institutions of legal accountability and administrative justice.2 These studies, which are 
on a variety of institutions of administrative justice, have enabled researchers to engage 
fruitfully in comparative institutional analysis of judicial and nonjudicial forms of 
accountability in order to assess their influence upon the administrative process. 3 
Furthermore, some recent studies have focused on the development within administrative 
agencies of practices, measures, and processes of legal accountability, which could be 
labelled as internal administrative law.4 Arguably, these institutional arrangements and 
practices could offer additional channels to realise traditional legal values such as 
                                                 
1 See for instance the discussion on red and green light theories of administrative law in Carol Harlow and 
Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, CUP 2009) ch 1. See also Donoughmore Committee, 
‘Report of the Committee on Minister’s Powers’ (1932) Cmnd 4060; Gordon Hewart, The New Despotism 
(Greenwood Press 1975); James Landis, The Administrative Process (Greenwood Press 1974); Jerry 
Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims (Yale University Press 1983); 
Cass R Sunstein, ‘Lochner’s Legacy’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 873. 
2 This body of scholarship goes from classics such as Walter Gellhorn, Ombudsmen and Others. Citizens 
Protectors in Nine Countries (Harvard University Press 1966) to contemporary studies such as Peter Cane, 
Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Hart 2010). 
3 See for example Marc Hertogh, ‘Coercion, Cooperation, and Control: Understanding the Policy Impact 
of Administrative Courts and the Ombudsman in the Netherlands’ (2001) 23 Law & Policy 47; Jeff King, 
Judging Social Rights (CUP 2012) ch 3. 
4 Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (n 1); Nicholas R Parrillo (ed), Administrative Law from the Inside Out: 
Essays on Themes in the Work of Jerry L Mashaw (CUP 2017). 
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consistency, predictability, and reasoned argument in administrative decision-making.5 
Departing from exclusive emphasis on external control of bureaucracies, these studies 
argue that robust democratic government in modern societies require a mix of outside-in 
and inside-out accountability arrangements. 6  Certainly, courts have been a key 
component in the enterprise of enquiring into the sources of legitimation for the growth 
of the modern administrative state. But it is sometimes overlooked that this task has been 
complemented by a combination of further internal and external institutional 
arrangements.7 The literature has undertaken the mission of updating the legacy of legal 
functionalists, legal realists, and critical legal scholars who have emphasised the plurality 
of legal forms that exist in the contemporary state.8  
I. THEMES AND CLAIMS 
Drawing upon the above-mentioned public law tradition, this dissertation aims to 
introduce further nuances in the existing literature on securing administrative justice and 
legal accountability through nonjudicial institutions. It will do so by empirically 
exploring the role played by the Chilean Comptroller-General as a nonjudicial 
institutional device for legal accountability in the Latin American context. This thesis sets 
out to give an account of the historical evolution of the Comptroller-General as a 
safeguard against executive abuse of power and also a mechanism to promote 
administrative efficiency, and to explain its distinctive function as a legal accountability 
arrangement operating alongside courts. Adopting a broad institutional approach, I will 
explore whether the institution has provided genuine legal accountability and which 
features account for this. I will argue that a long-term perspective provides a generally 
positive image of the institution’s contribution to the rule of law and sound governance, 
and that this portrait can be confirmed by looking at current practices of government in 
Chile. Despite several low points in its 90 years of operation, the institution has had an 
overall positive impact on the country’s institutional stability and culture of legality. I 
                                                 
5 Gillian E Metzger and Kevin M Stack, ‘Internal Administrative Law’ (2017) 115 Michigan Law Review 
1239. 
6  Sidney A Shapiro and Ronald F Wright, ‘The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning 
Administrative Law Inside-Out’ (2011) 65 University of Miami Law Review 577. 
7 Adrian Vermeule, ‘Bureaucracy and Distrust. Landis, Jaffe and Kagan on the Administrative State’ (2017) 
130 Harvard Law Review 2463. 
8 Harry Arthurs, ‘Without the Law’: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century 
England (University of Toronto Press 1985); Robert W Gordon, ‘Book Review: Without the Law II - 
“Without the Law:” Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England, by Harry 
W.Arthurs’ (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 421. 
 17 
will suggest that several institutional features explain this. Among others, I will look at 
factors such as the capacity to mediate the competition between the executive branch and 
Congress for the control of bureaucracy, the development of an internal bureaucratic 
culture, the embeddedness in administrative processes, the acquisition of expertise in 
administrative matters and its proximity to primary administrators, and the facilitation of 
independent forums for external contestation of administrative action. 
 
Some of those features suggest the Comptroller-General’s family resemblance to the 
French Conseil d’Etat. The latter institution has traditionally been a focal point for 
studying alternative institutional forms of subjecting administrative power to legality.9 Its 
mixture of legal and non-legal features along with its quasi-judicial and quasi-
administrative location and its balance of expertise and independence have attracted the 
attention of legal theorists and public lawyers interested in non-court arrangements for 
securing legality and sound governance in the modern state.10 It is not only the formal 
arrangements that govern the Conseil that have attracted the attention of commentators, 
but also its adaptive historical evolution and the distinctive legal culture it has promoted.11 
Its study has thus encompassed both legal functions and powers and the actual operation 
of the institution. In this thesis, I will attempt to place the Comptroller-General in the 
comparative accountability landscape as a relevant institution that shares some of these 
features with the Conseil d’Etat but is less well known and whose contribution is still a 
matter of debate. 
 
The Office of the Comptroller-General is a relatively opaque and unknown institution, 
even for contemporary Chilean legal and political commentators. Political and legal 
observers often overlook bureaucratic or administrative institutions and processes, 
tending to focus on more visible institutions such as legislatures, presidents, or high 
courts. Moreover, the sui-generis character of the Comptroller-General conspires against 
                                                 
9 CJ Hamson, Executive Discretion and Judicial Control: An Aspect of the French Conseil D’etat (Stevens 
1954); Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Rev ed, Yale University Press 1978); Mashaw, Bureaucratic 
Justice (n 1); Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (n 2). 
10 Christopher F Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy (Yale University 
Press 1992); Stephen G Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard 
University Press 1993); John WF Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective on English Public Law (Rev ed, OUP 2004). 
11 Charles Freedeman, The Conseil d’Etat in Modern France (AMS Press 1968); John Bell, French Legal 
Cultures (Butterworths 2001); Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat 
(Polity 2010). 
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making insightful comparisons with counterpart bodies elsewhere. Even more 
importantly, however, two prevalent narratives have obscured the importance of this 
institution in the Chilean political system. On the one hand, observers’ excessive reliance 
on formal rules and procedures downplays the importance of a body that works in less 
visible settings and whose influence is evident in informal and everyday interactions. This 
narrative could also be linked to a characteristic liberal predisposition to make a narrow 
equation of legality with courts and adversarial processes and to focus on constitutional 
frameworks.  
 
On the other hand, there is a narrative that emphasises the obstructive role played by the 
Comptroller-General in political controversies. From this critical-left perspective, the 
office is merely another legal artefact for protecting individualistic interests against 
progressive social policy driven by the executive branch. Of course, the experience during 
the Allende presidency in which the Comptroller-General was fiercely accused of 
obstructionism was a key moment for this critical approach towards the institution. 
Adopting a socio-legal approach that favours digging behind the formal surface but 
simultaneously takes seriously the value of legality, this thesis attempts to mediate 
between these two competing narratives on the Comptroller-General. It will reveal an 
institution that, on the one hand, has played a consequential role in promoting 
governmental action under the rule of law beyond what the formal rules could suggest. It 
will also show an institution that, with all its defects, has had a role that cannot be 
described as a mere obstruction to administrative action and as protective of private 
interests. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
In terms of methodology, this in-depth study of law, politics, and public administration 
adopts a socio-legal approach. In traditional legal empirical research fashion, the study 
touches upon crucial dimensions of public law scholarship: institutional mapping, and 
actual operation and effectiveness of accountability mechanisms.12 This study could also 
be described as an example of the rising interest in institutional theory in public law.13 
                                                 
12 Simon Halliday, ‘Public Law’ in Caroline Hunter (ed), Integrating Socio-Legal Studies into the Law 
Curriculum (Palgrave Macmillan 2012). 
13 Rogers M Smith, ‘Political Jurisprudence, The “New Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public Law’ 
(1988) 82 The American Political Science Review 89; Philip Selznick, ‘Institutionalism “Old” and “New”’ 
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This research uses institutionalism in two senses. On the one hand, the historical sections 
draw inspiration significantly from historical institutionalism and its concern with 
diachronic studies on development, continuity, and change of institutions over time. In 
this study I place special emphasis on long-term timeframes to avoid myopic conclusions 
derived from a narrow focus on particularly controversial events during single historical 
periods.14 Adopting a historical institutional perspective, I explore the evolution and 
actual operation of institutions focusing on formal documents and also on culture and 
practices.15 
 
This study also uses institutional realism as a methodological framework.16 It will explore 
the interconnection between the Comptroller-General as a legal institution and its broader 
social context. Therefore, empirical research will be a crucial element in this enquiry. 
Rather than ideal-types and abstract institutions, I will examine an actually existing 
institution operating in a real-world setting. Although I use comparative institutional 
analysis to assess the advantages and shortcomings of alternative accountability 
arrangements – the Comptroller-General and courts – this will be done in an empirically 
informed manner using history and qualitative data to contextualise the examination 
adequately. In other words, I will be drawing upon categories and ideas developed by 
institutional theorists such as Neil Komesar, 17  but I will attempt to overcome the 
persuasive criticism raised about him based on his lack of realistic accounts of actually 
existing institutions by taking into account real institutional performance.18 
 
My research design consists of a single-case study in which the unit of analysis is the 
organisation and processes of the Office of the Comptroller-General of Chile, that is, a 
public organisation responsible for the legal oversight of administrative action and 
                                                 
(1996) 41 Administrative Science Quarterly 270; Edward Rubin, ‘The New Legal Process, the Synthesis 
of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1393. 
14 Smith (n 13) 99. 
15 Peter Cane, Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison (CUP 2016) 13–5. 
16 Richard H Pildes, ‘Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law’ (2014) 2013 
The Supreme Court Review 1. 
17 Neil K Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy 
(The University of Chicago Press 1994). 
18 Thomas Merrill, ‘Institutional Choice and Political Faith’ (1997) 22 Law & Social Inquiry 959; Gregory 
Shaffer, ‘Comparative Institutional Analysis and New Legal Realism’ (2013) 2013 Wisconsin Law Review 
607. 
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process.19 In terms of time-boundaries, this thesis will focus on two periods combining 
synchronic and diachronic approaches. On the one hand, it will adopt a diachronic 
approach to the study of the development of the institution since its inception in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. On the other hand, a closer inspection will be made of 
the operation of the Comptroller-General and its impact on public administration under 
recent democratic rule. 
 
The research strategy has been chiefly of a qualitative nature.20 At the data collection 
stage, I used many data sources to secure triangulation and to capture a broad range of 
experiences. I conducted fieldwork in Santiago, Chile, at two different opportunities 
during my research. I first visited Santiago between October and November 2015, and 
then between April and May 2016. During my fieldwork, I conducted archival work in 
the National Public Library and the Comptroller-General Library. These archives have 
provided me with Annual Reports containing summaries of cases and statistical figures, 
media reports of key events, and academic work. I have also had access to materials held 
in the Library of the National Congress such as official records of congressional 
proceedings recording discussion of crucial pieces of legislation, impeachment debates, 
and other legislative congressional procedures. 
 
I also conducted 40 semi-structured elite interviews with key actors about the 
Comptroller-General Office and related institutions.21 Anonymity was secured for all of 
them. Due to the process-tracing nature of my research, I used purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques. My interview sample comprised the following subjects: 
(a) Individuals with experience as legal advisors for the Presidency and 
Ministerial Departments with large-scale interaction with the Comptroller-
General in rulemaking processes; 
                                                 
19 Robert Yin defines a case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real-life context’. See Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods 
(4th edn, SAGE 2008) 18. See also Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press 2005) ch 1, 6 and 11. 
20 Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M Kritzer 
(eds), The Oxford handbook of empirical legal research (OUP 2012). 
21 For a definition of semi-structured interviews, see Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (4th edn, OUP 
2012) 471. For the use of elite interviewing in case-study methods, see Oisín Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and 
Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling’ (2007) 40 PS: Political Science & Politics 765. 
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(b) Individuals with experience as officials or authorities within the Comptroller-
General – three of these had served in the highest office within the institution; and 
(c) Individuals with experience of giving advice to public and private 
organisations (NGOs and private law firms) dealing with Comptroller-General 
adjudication.  
 
Some of those professionals were also law professors with an interest in public law. It is 
also worth mentioning that three interviewees had experience serving as Justices in the 
Constitutional Tribunal or the Supreme Court. For a detailed record of the interviewees’ 
profiles, see Appendix I. 
III. CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis sets out to make contributions in three areas. In the first place, it aims to 
introduce new insights into the relationship between law, politics, and the administrative 
process in general. Contemporary administrative law systems show a variety of 
institutional arrangements designed with the aim of ensuring that public bureaucracies 
comply with legality. They usually combine courts in an array of institutional forms with 
other agencies of legal accountability such as ombudspersons, prosecutors, and 
Comptrollers-General. This ‘administrative justice landscape’ raises pressing questions 
about the virtues and shortcomings of legal and political accountability models; external 
and internal forms of administrative justice; and global and local models of 
accountability. Against this backdrop, this study purports to provide empirical insights 
that will facilitate discussions across these dimensions, as well as comparative 
institutional analysis on alternative machinery of administrative justice and its proper role 
and location within the accountability networks that characterise modern government.  
 
Secondly, this thesis seeks to offer useful materials for broadening the lively ongoing 
discussion of judicialisation or legalisation of politics in Latin America. In this region, 
public bureaucracies and legal institutions have traditionally been perceived as weak, 
ineffectual, and even corrupted. Moreover, public agencies have inherited an 
authoritarian legacy that still endures. In this context, along with an agenda of judicial 
reform, nonjudicial agencies have been operating for the last two decades. Prosecutors 
and ombudspersons in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Peru are well-researched 
instances of this phenomenon. Against the background of legal and political science 
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scholarship, recent studies have explored the extent to which these agencies can foster 
democratic practices and advance rule of law values. This study aims to contribute to this 
vibrant debate by examining what may well be one of the strongest illustrations of a 
horizontal accountability institution in Latin America: the Chilean Comptroller-General. 
This might help broaden the debate on judicialisation of politics in Latin America. 
 
Finally, this study aspires to make a contribution in relation to previous studies on law 
and politics in Chile. Excellent investigations into law and politics in Chile have been 
published in recent years. Faúndez has focused on the dysfunctional character of the legal 
institutions (the Comptroller-General and the Supreme Court) in Chile in the 1970s.22 
Hilbink, in turn, has concentrated on the performance of the judiciary, revealing its 
political conservatism behind a disingenuous apoliticism.23  Focusing on the Chilean 
dictatorship, Barros has polemically argued that there were legal limits on the operation 
of the Military Junta that ruled until 1990.24 Finally, Siavelis has examined the relations 
between the President and Congress after the return to democracy.25 However, the role of 
the Office of the Comptroller-General has not been adequately examined. Even for 
academics and practitioners within the country, it remains a source of ‘closed, dark, 
windowless procedures’ that might need fresh air and light, to paraphrase JAG Griffith’s 
opinion on the mandate to the Franks Report in Britain.26 The current accounts of law and 
politics in the country are inevitably unsatisfactory since they neglect the considerable 
reliance of the Chilean public law system on the role of this institution of legal 
accountability. In fact, while there have been recent studies on the financial accountability 
dimension of the Comptroller-General,27 the legal accountability side of the institution 
has been mostly neglected. This investigation addresses that deficit. In fact, this piece of 
research attempts to fill a gap in the study of the system of public law in the country, 
                                                 
22 Julio Faúndez, ‘The Fragile Foundations of Administrative Legality - Chile between 1932 and 1973’ 
(2007) 2 Journal of Comparative Law; Julio Faúndez, ‘Chilean Constitutionalism before Allende: Legality 
without Courts’ (2010) 29 Bulletin of Latin American Research 34. 
23 Lisa Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile (CUP 2007). 
24 Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (CUP 
2002). 
25 Peter Siavelis, The President and Congress in Postauthoritarian Chile: Institutional Constraints to 
Democratic Consolidation (Pennsylvania State University Press 2000). 
26 JAG Griffith, ‘Tribunals and Inquiries’ (1959) 22 The Modern Law Review 125, 127; Richard Rawlings, 
Grievance Procedure and Administrative Justice: A Review of Socio-Legal Research (Economic and Social 
Research Council 1987) 8. 
27 Carlos Santiso, The Political Economy of Government Auditing: Financial Governance and the Rule of 
Law in Latin America and beyond (Routledge-Cavendish 2009); OECD, Chile’s Supreme Audit Institution: 
Enhancing Strategic Agility and Public Trust (OECD 2014). 
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casting light on previous contributions concerned with the traditional three branches of 
government. 
IV. STRUCTURE 
The thesis is divided into three parts. In Part I, I set the scene by introducing the 
conceptual and legal background that will guide the subsequent chapters. Chapter 1 will 
examine how the notion of accountability and the idea of administrative justice have been 
used to understand the emergence and functions of nonjudicial accountability institutions. 
I discuss three main functions that connect nonjudicial accountability bodies with elected 
authorities, primary decision-makers in public bureaucracies, and the public at large. The 
operation of nonjudicial accountability institutions within various accountability channels 
and the increasing interest in internal legality developed within administrative processes 
will be stressed. Chapter 2 also has an introductory character. It will explain in some 
detail the legal setting in which the Chilean Comptroller-General currently operates, 
focusing on the organisational arrangements and the legal powers of the office. Once the 
contextual materials are presented, I turn to the in-depth analysis of the case study.   
 
Focusing on the case study, Part II of the thesis traces the historical evolution of the office 
and comprises the following three chapters. Chapter 3 reconstructs the emergence of the 
Comptroller-General Office in the 1920s as an executive tool for the modernisation of 
public administration and presidential control of bureaucracy. It will show how this model 
of the executive-centred Comptroller-General moved towards a more autonomous 
location as a result of the rise of congressional political pressure on the executive branch 
of government. Following this, chapter 4 will examine the operation of the office during 
the socialist government of Salvador Allende in the early 1970s – a critical juncture in 
the evolution of the institution. Here, I will assess the accusations of politically biased 
obstructionism that were raised against the Comptroller-General at the time. Chapter 5, 
in turn, will look at its role during the military dictatorship that governed the country 
between 1973 and 1990. This chapter reveals a complex relationship between the 
Comptroller-General and the Military Junta. It can be characterised by the office’s initial 
collaboration, its attempt to set constraints, and its eventual focus on mere survival. In 
contrast to what a narrow reading of constitutional and legal provisions might suggest, 
these historical chapters reveal the operation of an influential institution that represents a 
distinctive understanding of administrative legality. 
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Finally, in Part III I will examine the role of the office in contemporary practices of 
government in Chile. In Chapter 6 I will examine the channels of communication between 
the Comptroller-General and public officials in the central government in the ex-ante 
review of administrative rulemaking. In fact, drawing on studies about the impact of legal 
accountability machinery, this chapter assesses the influence of the institution on 
bureaucratic behaviour. Based on interviews with key actors in these processes, I discuss 
a number of functions that the Comptroller-General is performing through its power of 
ex-ante legal scrutiny, such as promoting deliberation, facilitating coordination within the 
executive branch, preventing litigiousness, among others. Chapter 7 will look at the 
Comptroller-General as a litigation forum, exploring how the office has constituted a site 
in which private individuals and groups can challenge administrative action. Contrasting 
it with ordinary courts, I discuss the extent to which the office meets pressing demands 
of independence, expertise, accessibility, and finality. The final chapter –Chapter 8- 
analyses the pervasive problem of delimitation of jurisdictional boundaries between the 
Comptroller-General and courts. After considering recent precedents and analysing the 
comparative advantages of both institutions, I suggest a principle of coordination that 
recommends judicial restraint when reviewing Comptroller-General determinations. 
 
 PART I CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
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CHAPTER 1. NONJUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUSTICE 
 
This chapter outlines a conceptual framework for exploring the role of the Chilean 
Comptroller-General as a nonjudicial institution for holding bureaucracies to account in 
the Latin American context. In this region, a vibrant debate on the best way to promote 
governmental accountability through legal institutions has been going on for the last 30 
years. This discussion on legal accountability and institution building has had to face a 
challenge posed by the peculiarities of the state and public bureaucracies in the region. In 
fact, from its emergence during the first decades of the twentieth century, the Latin 
American administrative state has developed somewhat paradoxical features. On the one 
hand, it has been characterised by frail bureaucratic institutions unable or unwilling to 
cope with intolerable levels of inequality and poverty. Yet on the other hand, the region 
has also witnessed an at times brutal and powerful authoritarian state that has mainly 
targeted the vulnerable population. Too weak to benefit its communities adequately, but 
aggressively authoritarian when it comes to oppression and political persecution, the 
Latin American administrative state represents a challenge to institutional design that 
purports to enhance accountability through law. In general terms, here the aspiration 
should be to design legal machinery that promotes strong, but not authoritarian 
administrative states and, simultaneously, to make them capable of protecting rights but 
not susceptible to capture by vested interests. 
 
The larger aim of this study is to bring to light the phenomenon of nonjudicial bodies of 
administrative justice in Latin America and assess their features as an institutional 
alternative to courts. In a region where legality and the judiciaries have often been viewed 
with scepticism and distrust, it does not seem to be a mere coincidence that a myriad of 
nonjudicial legal machinery has emerged. When compared with research on courts, 
nevertheless, the nonjudicial terrain is relatively uncharted. Indeed, nonjudicial actors 
such as comptrollers, auditors, ombudsmen, defensores del pueblo, and public 
prosecutors have had functions in the politics of the region that still need to be further 
examined. This research attempts to contribute to the mapping of non-court 
accountability institutions in the region, adding a new layer of experience to that provided 




This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section will briefly set out the 
discussion about the role of law in the development of the administrative state in Latin 
America. The section closes by discussing the work on horizontal accountability by 
Argentine political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell. The second section explains that 
nonjudicial accountability arrangements have been traditionally set up in order to pursue 
three kinds of goals, namely the facilitation of processes of political accountability, the 
enlargement of access to dispute resolution forums, and the enhancement of effective 
administrative action. The last section discusses the notion of administrative justice. This 
is a contested concept in the literature on law and public administration. Although 
different approaches to the notion can be found, ambiguity, circularity, and overlap seem 
pervasive. The aim of the section is to briefly review this literature, and indicate how it 
could guide research about the Chilean Comptroller-General. 
I. LAW AND BUREAUCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 
Diverse perceptions of the proper relationship between legality and a growing 
administrative state have appeared in Latin American debates. Unsurprisingly, discourses 
about legal accountability mechanisms have also emerged as a response to the 
dysfunctional political institutions of the past and present. The main aim of this section 
is to highlight that despite the lively debate during the last few decades, further research 
regarding nonjudicial legal accountability institutions is much needed. 
 
An infamous aspect of Latin American state apparatuses is their authoritarianism.28 It has 
been suggested that, perhaps paradoxically, Latin American administrative states may be 
characterised by bureaucracies that to a large extent have been ineffective in delivering 
public goods but are ‘efficacious repressive machines’.29  Yet there have been some 
connections between the cognitive capacity of the public administrations and their 
repressive powers.30 In fact, the countries where the most advanced Latin American 
                                                 
28 Guillermo A O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism; Studies in South American 
Politics (Institute of International Studies, University of California 1973). 
29 Guillermo A O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent (OUP 
2010) 149. 
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modern state to monitor and interpret the impact of its measures, and to adjust them or reformulate them 
when they prove ineffective or counter-productive’. See Laurence Whitehead, ‘State Organization in Latin 
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bureaucracies existed at the beginning of the century, that is, those of the Southern Cone 
(in particular Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile), were the very same countries where 
repression was most effectively performed.31 In other words, there was a gloomy shift 
from a relatively robust Latin American administrative state towards an authoritarian 
national security state. Indeed, Whitehead has pointed out that ‘processes internal to the 
pattern of state expansionism were very important in contributing to the emergence of the 
“national security” form of state organisation, and also to its subsequent disintegration’.32 
In this context, the introduction of legal accountability mechanisms should take very 
seriously the risk of the authoritarianism that exists even in bureaucracies with limited 
capacities. 
A. Distrust of Legality 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, legal accountability – understood as 
institutional arrangements to render the executive accountable to legal bodies such as 
courts – was viewed with distrust by the Latin American supporters of stronger state 
institutions including administrative apparatuses. Their main interests were economic 
development and broadening the channels of political participation, particularly through 
labour unions.33 Legality was not seen as a tool for achieving social justice, but rather as 
an obstacle.34 They looked with particular suspicion at the judiciary due to its record of 
support for conservative policies. As Hilbink notes, in the Chilean case, judges ‘opposed 
the government’s actions towards more social justice and egalitarianism from the 1930s 
forward’. 35  Similarly, another observer remarks that ‘the rule of law and formalism 
legitimated judicial decisions limiting state intervention in the economic field aimed at 
achieving substantive justice’.36 It is probable that because of this, progressive forces 
viewed legal accountability as playing a minor role in their plans to build an 
administrative state in the region between the 1930s and the 1970s. Liberal legality was 
                                                 
America since 1930’ in Leslie Bethell (ed), The Cambridge History of Latin America., vol 6 Latin America 
since 1930: Economy, Society and Politics (CUP 1994) 46–7. 
31 ibid 48–50. 
32 ibid 92 [Emphasis in the original]. 
33 See Julio Faúndez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende (Yale University 
Press 1988). 
34 See for instance Eduardo Novoa, El derecho como obstáculo al cambio social (4th edn, Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores 1980). 
35 Hilbink (n 23) 66. 
36 Hugo Frühling, ‘Law in Society: Social Transformation and the Crisis of Law in Chile, 1830-1970’ (PhD 
diss, Harvard University Law School 1984) xxii. 
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seen as a symbol of the very type of organisation over which they wanted to prevail. As 
Laurence Whitehead has pointed out: 
[L]iberal mechanisms of public accountability and restraint had never been 
very strongly developed. In some cases they were identified with the 
protection of pre-1930 oligarchies, and it was therefore considered 
“progressive” to sweep them away, in order to extend opportunities to a 
wider array of social forces. Moreover, they were simply seen as obstacles 
to the necessary processes of state-building.37 
 
Similarly, Javier Couso has claimed that during the first half of the twentieth century, 
‘[there was] a perception within progressive circles of law and courts as mostly irrelevant 
– if not hostile – to social transformation’.38  This situation was exacerbated by the 
emergence of radical politics in the 1960s. In fact, it has been suggested that ‘the 
penetration of Marxist thought during the second half of the century transformed this 
indifference [towards liberal legality] into outright hostility’. 39  What is more, legal 
machinery was viewed with scepticism not only by radical left wing activists. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this attitude was shared even by reformist lawyers sponsored by the 
American government. During the 1960s, Law and Development, a ‘movement 
comprising a group of US legal academics concerned with understanding the role of law 
in developing countries’,40 was more interested in law as a tool of social and economic 
progress than as a machinery for rendering the government accountable. As David Trubek 
succinctly explains: 
Development policy stressed economic matters not because planners were 
uninterested in political democracy or social development, but because 
those who cared about such matters thought they would follow from 
economic growth. This meant that within this vision it was possible to accept 
– if not favour – various forms of bureaucratic authoritarian rule while 
professing allegiance to ideas of democracy and promotion of individual 
freedom.41 
 
                                                 
37 Whitehead (n 30) 91–2. 
38 Javier Couso, ‘The Changing Role of Law and Courts in Latin America: From Obstacle to Social Change 
to a Tool of Social Equity’ in Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo, and Roux Theunis (eds), Courts and 
Social Transformation in New Democracies. An Institutional Voice for the Poor? (Ashgate 2006) 63. 
39 Couso (n 38).  
40  Julio Faúndez, ‘Law and Development Lives On’ (2011) 2011–12 Legal Studies Research Paper 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950125>. 
41 David M Trubek, ‘The Rule of Law in Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future’ in David M 
Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP 
2006) 75. 
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During this period, Chile, in particular, combined strong democratic practices with a 
fragile institutionalisation of legal machinery. Between 1932 and 1973 there were 
uninterrupted presidential and parliamentary elections in the country. Notably, writing 
about the political scene in 1960, Robert Dahl classified Chile as an inclusive polyarchy 
together with Uruguay and Costa Rica, in contrast to Colombia and Venezuela (near-
polyarchies), and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru (non-polyarchies).42 This 
democratic practice nonetheless contrasted with the strength of Chile’s legal 
accountability arrangements. Faúndez asserts, for instance, that ‘the political elite 
consistently refused to establish an effective system of administrative justice’. 43 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the Chilean political regime combined ‘a meticulous 
concern for administrative legality, a ruthless style of governance, and an absence of 
effective judicial remedies to protect citizens from abuse of power by the executive’.44 
Hence, although the Chilean administrative state was one of the more robust in the Latin 
American context during the period,45 apparently the same could not be said about its 
judicial institutions in public law matters. 
B. Legal accountability in the Latin American return to democracy 
The debate about legal accountability took on new force with Latin America’s return to 
democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s. Under the umbrella notion of ‘rule of law 
promotion’, discourses about democratisation and human rights coincided with the 
economic liberalisation agenda. Indeed, to an important extent, awareness of the 
importance of legal accountability mechanisms was raised by the brutalities of the Latin 
American dictatorships.46 Certainly, courts and other bodies could hardly have prevented 
the coming to power of terrible dictators, but it was agreed that after their demise, it was 
necessary to put in place strong institutional safeguards for the protection of human rights 
and democracy. On the other hand, actors within the business sector, supported by 
powerful international financial institutions (IFIs), pressured for more efficient protection 
of property rights, greater stability of contracts, and keeping state intervention at arm’s 
length. In a similar vein, global economic liberalisation and internationalisation of 
                                                 
42 Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (26 print, Yale Univ Press 1998) 84–5. 
43 Julio Faúndez, Democratization, Development, and Legality: Chile, 1831-1973 (Palgrave Macmillan 
2007) 3. 
44 ibid 8. 
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capitalist development has represented a source for promotion of legal reforms in the last 
few decades.47 Consequently, from the 1990s onwards, many Latin American countries 
have viewed the confluence of the project of democracy and human rights with the project 
of free markets with a common value: the rule of law.48 Their shared emphasis on the rule 
of law was then a key prompt for reform and creation of new legal accountability 
machinery in the region. 
 
Thus, in the last two decades, significant action has taken place in the area of legal 
accountability at both the academic and the policy level in Latin America. From the point 
of view of policy, along with judicial reforms in areas such as criminal justice, 
professionalisation of the judiciary, and alternative dispute resolution, there have been 
initiatives aimed at reinforcing the role of courts in holding state actors accountable.49 
The tools for this have been the enhancement of the independence of high courts by new 
appointment and tenure rules, the creation of constitutional courts, and the expansion of 
judicial review powers, among others. In academic debate, increasing attention has been 
paid to the role of courts as political actors.50 The literature has emphasised the role courts 
play in arbitrating inter-branch conflicts and protecting individual rights at the 
constitutional level.51 Moreover, the significance of judicial review for social change has 
attracted the interest of a number of scholars.52 Attention has also been paid to the less 
formalised, cultural dimensions of legal and judicial phenomena.53 As can be seen, both 
academic and policy debates have emphasised court-centred initiatives for strengthening 
legal accountability in the region. Remarkably, the previous scepticism about the 
compatibility of strong judicial constraints with the development of a progressive 
administrative state seems almost forgotten. This might explain why the role of 
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alternatives to judicial accountability has remained largely under-theorised and little 
understood. 
C. O’Donnell’s horizontal accountability 
One important exception to the above-mentioned disregard for the non-court side of legal 
accountability in Latin America is the work of political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell. 
Indeed, since the return to democracy, the Latin American debate on accountability 
institutions has been largely influenced by O’Donnell’s work on horizontal 
accountability. What is important for this study is his emphasis on the relevance of 
nonjudicial institutions of accountability, which should operate alongside traditional 
branches of government. 
 
O’Donnell argues that horizontal accountability comprises traditional bodies such as 
courts, legislatures, and executive bodies, yet it also particularly extends to an array of 
monitoring agencies, such as ombudspersons, accounting offices, comptrollers, Conseils 
d' Etat, fiscalías, contralorías, and the like.54 Interestingly, O’Donnell asserts that the 
latter institutions rank higher than the traditional machinery when it comes to the 
accountability challenges that Latin American countries currently have to tackle. In fact, 
he claims that ‘[t]hese agencies, unlike the older ones, were invented not so much having 
in mind overall balances of power but rather specific, but still quite general, risks of 
encroachment and/or corruption’. 55  In terms of process, traditional branches act 
reactively and intermittently, whereas mandated agencies proceed in a proactive and 
continuous manner. Additionally, the former’s interventions are costly and trigger highly 
visible conflicts, while specialised accountability bodies focus largely on prevention and 
deterrence. In terms of expertise, moreover, traditional branches are seen as partisan in 
political conflicts and appear to be a deficient accountability device, whereas new 
accountability agencies act upon professional criteria, and possess ‘capabilities to 
examine complex issues of policy’. 56  In sum, O’Donnell states that benefits can be 
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expected from the operation of agencies of horizontal accountability, since they work in 
a more flexible, efficient, and expert manner. 
 
In O’Donnell’s view, specialised accountability agencies are not necessarily court 
substitutes. They should operate within a broad network of agencies that oversee 
executive action at different levels and with different purposes. Some agencies, for 
instance, should aim to collect and disseminate information, while other bodies can use 
that information and take action against agencies that have contravened legal boundaries. 
O’Donnell claims that effective horizontal accountability requires ‘a whole network of 
state agencies, culminating in high courts, committed to preserving and eventually 
enforcing horizontal accountability, if necessary against the highest powers of the state’.57 
As a result, designers of horizontal accountability frameworks need to pay special 
attention to coordination issues in order to avoid excessive overlap and unforeseen 
loopholes. 
 
The importance of O’Donnell’s ideas lies in his emphasis on non-traditional institutions 
of accountability in the Latin American context rather than in his originality. 58  He 
detected the absence of discussion on such agencies in the region, provided a definition 
for them, and pointed out some contributions that they could make to democratic 
governance and the rule of law. His insights coincided with the broader phenomenon of 
new interest in legal accountability institutions once democracy had returned to most of 
the countries of the region. Yet not enough attention has been paid at either theoretical or 
descriptive level to the nonjudicial agencies of accountability. Given the explicit stress 
placed on these agencies by the influential work of O’Donnell, this may appear surprising. 
Moreover, these agencies also seem significant at the institutional design level. Indeed, 
as David Landau has recently stated while discussing the Colombian case, ‘[t]he 
proliferation of an array of institutions and actors other than courts and designed to temper 
or improve democracy may be one of the most important recent developments in 
constitutional design’.59 
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Perhaps to some extent following the path opened up by O’Donnell, other voices have 
recently advocated for more research in the area. For instance, after surveying the 
literature on Latin American judicial politics, Kapiszewski and Taylor suggested some 
topics for future research. Importantly, they recommended examining a broader set of 
actors, such as public prosecutors, ombudsmen, auditors, and councils of state in judicial 
politics.60 They also recommended that research shift from the traditional area of high 
courts and constitutional courts towards ‘“everyday” or “routine” justice carried out by 
lower courts, which can be more socially relevant and certainly influence judicial 
politics’.61 In a similar vein, in connection with the study of social accountability in Latin 
America, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz suggest that further and systematic investigation is 
needed regarding agencies such as the Brazilian public prosecutor and recently created 
ombudspersons, because they are interestingly broadening the channels for popular 
oversight over public authorities.62 Another push for research in the area of nonjudicial 
actors of accountability comes from Couso, Hunneus, and Sieder, as they invite us to 
move beyond court-centric studies in order to capture a fuller picture of the legal cultures 
in the region.63 
II. NONJUDICIAL LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND ITS GOALS 
The central interest of this study is nonjudicial oversight agencies such as comptrollers, 
corruption commissions, prosecutors, and ombudspersons. Usually constitutionally 
entrenched and sometimes even regarded as fourth branches of government, nonjudicial 
accountability agencies challenge traditional notions of the separation of powers. 64 
Moreover, especially in presidential regimes, they are situated at arm’s length from 
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judicial, executive, and legislative bodies alike. Thus, they have an unclear status within 
political and legal accountability channels. In these circumstances, how do they 
contribute to the endeavour of holding public bureaucracies accountable? What types of 
public accountability functions – political, administrative, or legal – do these institutions 
perform? 
 
Mark Bovens’ narrow notion of accountability as a specific social relation will guide the 
following discussion. He defines accountability as ‘a relationship between an actor and a 
forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, 
the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences’.65 This concept offers an appropriate synthesis of what can be seen as an 
increasing convergence in the literature of some basic elements that can be found in every 
accountability arrangement.66 It must be highlighted that I also adopt the view that the 
institutional arrangements that we label as ‘accountability’ are instruments for the 
achievement of certain goals. Indeed, these arrangements are not usually seen as intrinsic 
goods, but as means for accomplishing valuable ends. 
 
In particular, in this section I will claim that, perhaps due to their hybrid character, 
nonjudicial institutions usually operate within political, legal, and administrative 
accountability arrangements. From this viewpoint, they are expected to facilitate political 
processes of political accountability, to strengthen and broaden channels of legal 
accountability, and finally to enhance efficiency and accuracy in administrative decision-
making. In the following section I will examine these goals in more detail. 
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A. The Political Accountability Function 
Political accountability is often considered as promoting democracy, that is, popular 
control of those holding public office. In other words, accountability ‘provide[s] 
democratic means to monitor and control government conduct’.67 From this perspective, 
accountability regimes should generate enough information about administrative 
agencies’ performance to facilitate monitoring by their political principals. They should 
also stimulate the agents to adhere willingly to the goals and means defined by the elected 
actors.  
 
Particularly in Westminster political systems, nonjudicial accountability agencies 
perform an auxiliary role in respect to legislatures. In this sense, it may be asserted that 
they operate within political accountability networks. They may indeed play a useful role 
in detecting administrative failure and also in providing expert advice and reliable 
information in order to strengthen the monitoring functions of political entities such as 
parliaments or parliamentary committees. Although these institutions do not usually have 
powers to exert direct control over administrative agencies, bodies such as 
ombudspersons or auditors intervene in accountability processes by wielding partial 
powers such as seeking and verifying information.68 This is clearly the case with the 
British National Audit Office (NAO). This agency is usually regarded as an auxiliary 
institution acting on behalf of its political principals either the legislature 69  or a 
combination of parliament and the treasury.70 Something similar can be said of at least 
some forms of ombudspersons. As Elliot argues, they may be viewed as ‘part of the 
political as opposed to the legal arrangements for holding government to account’.71 
Accordingly, from this perspective the importance of nonjudicial agencies of 
accountability resides in their collaboration with elected, political branches of 
government in holding administrative agencies to account. 
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Being partially administrative bodies, the relationship of nonjudicial accountability 
agencies with the executive and its head, the President, is particularly difficult to grasp. 
Presidential ambitions of controlling these agencies have been grounded on their 
administrative character. Since presidents are usually endowed with powers over the 
whole public administration, it has been argued that these agencies cannot be completely 
autonomous from presidential oversight. In the US, for instance, the independence of such 
administrative bodies has triggered controversy. In the 1970s and early 1980s, ‘oversight 
frameworks’ laws enacted to endow agencies such as the Comptroller-General with 
powers for checking abuse in the executive branch were unsuccessfully challenged on 
constitutional grounds. 72  In Latin America the presidential influence may be even 
stronger, since some of these agencies have or have had an historical role as internal 
control machinery. Additionally, comptrollers and prosecutors have played a role in 
ensuring that bureaucratic channels of vertical accountability are respected. As a result, 
they may be seen as instruments of presidential control over sometimes fragmented 
bureaucracies, preventing detrimental decentralisation.73 
 
In sum, from the point of view of political accountability, nonjudicial agencies might play 
an instrumental role in collaborating with political or elected bodies – legislatures and/or 
presidents – in monitoring the behaviour of unelected bureaucrats. But as we will 
immediately see, they can also be viewed as a means for safeguarding the interests of 
private individuals and groups. 
B. The Contestability Function 
Accountability mechanisms can be understood as means to uphold legality or the rule of 
law. They are expected to prevent corruption, the development of concentrations of 
power, and the infringement of rights. According to Jerry Mashaw: 
[i]n a legal accountability regime, public officials are responsible to 
individuals and firms, about their respect or lack of respect for legal 
requirements or legal rights through processes of administrative and judicial 
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review, judged in accordance with law, resulting in either validation or 
nullification of official acts (and sometimes compensation for private parties 
affected by official illegality).74 
 
Similarly, focusing on the institutional features of the processes of legal accountability, 
Jeff King identifies the following attributes: opportunity to challenge a decision or the 
lack thereof, independence of the adjudicator, obligation to apply public rules, a duty to 
give determined reasons, and the existence of remedies which are final. 75   
 
Nonjudicial agencies have a role to play in those arrangements. Although legal 
accountability is usually associated with courts, several agencies may actually be put in 
place to make sure that abuse of power is prevented or, if boundaries are crossed, 
punished. As Patrick Birkinshaw puts it, since justice may be achieved by judicial and 
nonjudicial bodies, the question is ‘how the values which inform the idea of law such as 
fairness, equal protection, integrity, decency and deprecation of arbitrariness are given 
fuller [institutional] expression.’ In other words, according to him, the task is to find 
devices to best express the ideals [of legality, fairness, accountability, and 
responsiveness] in a changing state structure’.76 
 
From the legal accountability perspective, a difference between judicial and nonjudicial 
mechanisms may be that the latter promise broader access to complaints, since there are 
various factors that may block access to courts: financial reasons, willingness to litigate, 
justiciability issues, and narrow conceptions of legal entitlements.77 Nonjudicial agencies 
may perform better in a number of those aspects since fewer financial and technical 
hurdles are usually encountered in their procedures. As a result, people who are unable to 
resort to courts may have smooth access to this alternative justice machinery. 
 
It may be argued that as they have developed in the context of the administrative state, 
nonjudicial institutions are also better equipped to address grievances based on technical 
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and massive impact regulatory schemes, such as environment, planning law, health care, 
social security, public employment, and so on. Furthermore, their closer contact with 
administrative agencies may make them better attuned to the intricacies of these 
regulatory regimes. Consequently, larger numbers of people potentially affected by these 
schemes are natural users of the ‘bureaucratic’ nonjudicial agencies of legal 
accountability.78 
 
Finally, in a typically Latin American development, these agencies may contribute to 
public interest cases. Indeed, as demonstrated by the experience of some Latin American 
nonjudicial agencies of oversight, the social accountability dimension is vital in their 
functioning. In this sense, the representation of excluded interests may be a prime role of 
agencies in the region.79 Notably, the internal ethos of the institution could also have a 
relevant impact. For instance, evidence shows that the public prosecutor’s staff in Brazil 
– a key player in the judicialisation of politics in the country – has embraced an activist 
political culture.80 
 
One of the most pressing problems for nonjudicial agencies of accountability is the lack 
of clarity regarding their position and function in the broader legal accountability 
landscape. 81  For instance, whether they are expected to substitute, complement, or 
compete with courts is often a disputed matter. Although some degree of overlap may not 
be undesirable,82 the absence of clear jurisdictional boundaries can provoke confusion in 
the public. Thus, aggrieved people can find it difficult to identify the court or agency that 
will provide the best remedy for their problem. Also, a cacophony of legal authorities 
may cause uncertainty as to what the law requires from public administration. Convoluted 
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legal frameworks might be particularly damaging to Latin American administrative 
bodies that are characterised by their limited bureaucratic capacities. Even worse, it opens 
up gaps that could enable paralysing strategic litigation by powerful actors defending 
vested interests. 
 
As Elmendorf has pointed out, nonjudicial accountability agencies may play a 
particularly interesting role alongside constitutional courts.83 In his view, ‘[i]t is worth 
asking what problems or synergies might arise from courts and counterparts working side 
by side’.84 One of the problems that may arise is the emergence of an overly intrusive set 
of accountability bodies losing the nuances offered by nonjudicial bodies.85 Yet there are 
also opportunities for complementarities. Constitutional courts could ensure that elected 
bodies do not encroach upon the competences of nonjudicial accountability agencies, and 
that these bodies in turn do not exercise their investigatory powers in a disruptive manner. 
Furthermore, constitutional courts may well take advantage of the findings and 
recommendations of these nonjudicial bodies. Lastly, the very existence of constitutional 
courts could remind nonjudicial agencies of their lower level of operation, preventing 
them from playing an unjustifiably high political role.86 
 
To sum up, whereas from a political accountability perspective nonjudicial agencies 
might be seen as connecting bureaucrats and their elected principals, from the point of 
view of legal accountability they are viewed as opening channels of communication 
between administrators and the public in general. In contrast with these two perspectives, 
I now turn to the final goal of nonjudicial accountability arrangements, which has to do 
with the internal operation of bureaucracies. 
C. The Pedagogic Function 
Accountability arrangements can promote effective and accurate administrative policy 
implementation. In other words, they are expected to ‘enhance the learning capacity and 
effectiveness of public administration’.87 Indeed, these arrangements should encourage 
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publicity, openness, and reflexivity in the administrative process, because their features 
can improve administrative capabilities in the long run. From this perspective, the main 
concern is ensuring the permanent delivery of adequate service by administrative 
agencies. As Bovens puts it, accountability ‘offers a regular mechanism to confront 
administrators with the information about their own functioning and forces them to reflect 
on the successes and failures of their past policy’.88 
 
Accordingly, auditors, inspectors, and comptrollers are sometimes viewed as instances of 
mechanisms of administrative accountability.89 What makes them administrative rather 
than political or legal is nonetheless not completely clear. The reason may lie in the 
standards they apply, since these agencies not only apply legal rules and principles, but 
also assess administrative behaviour against broader standards of probity, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. Another explanation may derive from the fact that the procedures they 
conduct are neither trial-type (courts) nor deliberative (parliaments). Rather, they conduct 
some form of what might be called inspectorial or investigative procedures.90 The term 
‘administrative’ might also refer to the internal position of the checking agency within 
the public bureaucracy. Thus, unlike external monitoring developed by courts and 
parliaments, what seems to characterise them is internal or quasi-internal supervision. 
Furthermore, these watchdog agencies may be termed ‘administrative’ because they do 
not take place within principal-agent relations or, in other words, vertical or upwards 
accountability relationships. This means that they do not intervene as superiors to the 
accountable actor. From this viewpoint, they are administrative because they ‘stand in no 
direct hierarchical relationship to public organizations and have few powers to enforce 
their compliance’.91 In short, here the account is given ‘to a broadly parallel institution’.92 
In my view, the administrative nature of these bodies derives primarily from the 
inspectorial procedures they conduct and their location in proximity to administrative 
structures. 
 
Indeed, the prime reason for creating nonjudicial legal accountability agencies has not 
only been the restriction, but also the enhancement of administrative capacities in light of 
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the enlargement of governmental responsibilities. The purpose of establishing bodies 
such as comptrollers and ombudspersons has traditionally been to subject administrative 
action to legal rules and principles, without impairing the classical bureaucratic values of 
efficiency and accuracy in policy implementation. They have historically operated with 
the aim of making administrative and rule of law values compatible.  
 
Considering the enabling orientation of these institutions, in a context of public 
bureaucracies of limited capabilities and dysfunctional judiciaries such as Latin America, 
the attractiveness of nonjudicial agencies of accountability is apparent.93 For instance, 
their hybrid character – sharing elements of both judicial and administrative bodies – may 
translate to a more fluid dialogue with bureaucracies. In other words, these agencies may 
possess enhanced capacities for understanding administrative procedures, and more 
suitable powers to collect arcane information, detect systematic malfunctioning, and 
single out situations of corruption. In this regard, although institutionally detached, they 
may even be embedded within public administration, facilitating their prophylactic role. 
 
Additionally, in the face of poor judicial performance, they can supply more reliable legal 
interpretations of highly technical regulatory schemes. Pilar Domingo has pointed out 
that a damaging problem in judiciaries in Latin America is the lack of ‘predictability of 
legal proceedings’.94 This may undermine the capacity of bureaucracies to anticipate 
legal challenges to their policies, and equally the capacity to learn from previous legal 
failures in litigation. In contrast, specialised nonjudicial bodies with better legal and 
managerial capacities could provide more consistent and predictable legal precedents. 
 
Nevertheless, the proximity between administrative and accountability bodies also 
generates risks. First, these agencies may be prone to authoritarianism. Certainly, this is 
an especially corrosive objection in the Latin American context. Crisp, Moreno, and 
Shugart, for instance, have argued that these agencies do not enhance accountability for 
the public because they do not provide additional channels for representation of politically 
                                                 
93  Gellhorn (n 77) 44 [‘without exception, every country that leans heavily on ombudsmen or other 
administrative critic has strengthened its civil service in the process of solacing those whom civil servants 
have offended’]. 
94 Domingo (n 47) 155. 
 44 
neglected interests.95 Instead, due to their lack of real independence from executives, they 
usually function as a façade of democratic accountability. Thus, in their view, nonjudicial 
accountability agencies are an instrument for nondemocratic, authoritarian rule. 96 
Similarly, Ginsburg has referred to nonjudicial bodies such as the Chinese Censorate and 
the Russian Procuracy as illustrations of authoritarian tools of hierarchical control over 
public bureaucracies.97 
 
A second important danger is excessive intrusiveness. As Gellhorn has claimed, 
‘awareness that someone is constantly peering over their shoulders causes some public 
servants to become too timid instead of too bold’.98 As a consequence, one of the perils 
of the working of accountability being too close to administrative officers is ‘insipid 
administration’. 99  This risk is particularly acute in the context of Latin American 
Comptrollers-General, who are frequently too scrupulously concerned with ‘legalism and 
frugality, sometimes maintained at the expense of rationality and fairness’.100 This could 
easily result in a sluggish administration impacting negatively on the transformative role 
that should be expected from them, particularly in contexts of poverty and inequality.  
III. ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE INSIDE-OUT 
Administrative justice is another key concept in discussing institutional arrangements to 
hold executive power to account. Generally conceived, this concept refers to the 
normative idea that administrative actions must correspond with fairness or justice 
requirements. However, a distinction between substantive and institutional approaches to 
administrative justice can be drawn. Whereas the former emphasises the principles or 
values that constrain and structure administrative procedures and action, the latter 
perspective additionally includes reflections on the institutions and procedures that are 
more likely to achieve those goals in certain contexts. In the following section, I will offer 
a typology of approaches to the concept of administrative justice, identifying substantive 
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and institutional views. Within the latter category I examine approaches focusing either 
on judicial and nonjudicial redress mechanisms (external approaches), or on the primary 
decision-maker (internal approaches). 
A. Substantive Approaches 
Substantive approaches focus on administrative justice as a set of values or principles that 
should guide administrative behaviour in its interaction with citizens. Denis Galligan, for 
instance, claims that the notion of administrative justice ‘refers to a set of values and 
principles that have come to be accepted by the mature democracies of Europe and 
beyond, and aspired to by the less mature’.101 He goes on to claim that 
[a]dministrative justice consists of a set of principles designed specifically 
to regulate the relationship between the citizen and the state in the context 
of government administration… They deal with notions such as the right to 
be heard and to be treated in accordance with fairness and due process; they 
draw on ideas of participation in a variety of contexts and insist on openness 
and transparency; they stipulate a legal basis for the actions of 
administrative bodies, require equal treatment, and prohibit certain forms of 
discrimination; and they impose restrictions on the exercise of discretion.102  
 
As can be seen, from this perspective, the idea of administrative justice overlaps 
considerably with the entire notion of administrative law. In another piece, Galligan sees 
administrative justice as a normative model of administrative action that emphasises fair 
treatment of individuals – in opposition to bureaucratic administration.103 According to 
this viewpoint, while bureaucratic administration aims to maximise the common good, 
administrative justice pursues fairness in the treatment of each person. In other words, 
Galligan seems to regard bureaucratic administration as reflecting a utilitarian perspective 
focused on the promotion of the general or collective interest, whereas administrative 
justice aims to protect counter-majoritarian individual rights or dignity. Criticising this 
dignitarian approach, Michael Adler claims that ‘[a]lthough Galligan accepts that the 
bureaucratic administration model is the “natural and dominant” model, he argues that 
efforts should be made to curb its natural hegemony in order to support the (morally 
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superior) administrative justice model’.104 Furthermore, Adler has rejected Galligan’s 
notion ‘because of its normative commitment to one, among several, competing 
conceptions of administrative justice and because of its failure to recognise the 
opportunity costs associated with its realisation’.105 
 
Harlow and Rawlings have also shown scepticism of this substantive orientation. They 
argue that this perspective goes beyond the traditional top-down approach (focusing on 
courts and tribunals) and the new bottom-up approach that focuses on primary decision-
making. Indeed, they point out that ‘[t]his already broad remit is complicated by the view 
of administrative justice as a set of values, which far exceed the simple Franks formula 
of openness, fairness and impartiality’.106 Persuasively, Harlow and Rawlings conclude 
critically, remarking that ‘[t]hese often conflicting values set an impossibly wide 
agenda’.107 
B. Institutional Approaches 
Institutional approaches emphasise the institutions that at different stages either make 
first-instance decisions or review them. Although these approaches still consider 
administrative justice as a substantive goal, they broaden the inquiry by ascertaining the 
institutions or mechanisms to which the responsibility for promoting administrative 
justice should be allocated. In other words, the authors who follow this approach ask 
which institutions perform better and in what settings, in terms of making administrative 
justice more likely. 108  Following this orientation, Halliday and Scott assert that 
‘[a]dministrative justice may be conceived as comprising the norms, processes, and 
institutions governing the exercise of [delegated] administrative powers’109. The notion, 
accordingly, embraces both substantive principles and the design of institutional 
arrangements for materialising them. 
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Research on the institutional dimension of administrative justice tends to focus on either 
the primary decision-makers or the reviewing institutions. Adler, for instance, 
distinguishes two approaches. 110  For him, whereas justice in administration ‘sees 
administrative justice in terms of the justice of routine administrative decisions’, the 
administrative law approach ‘sees administrative justice in terms of the principles 
formulated by courts and other redress mechanisms’.111 Adopting a syncretic position, 
Adler views administrative justice as combining both perspectives. Halliday and Scott 
also see the division between decision-making (comprising production and application of 
rules) on the one hand, and review (including judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms) on 
the other, as a starting point. They claim that this divide ‘helps us understand two discrete 
ways in which the notion of “administrative justice” is employed […] as referring to the 
justice of the primary administrative process [and] as referring to a subsystem of dispute 
resolution within the overall architecture of the legal system’.112 As we will see in the 
following section, these two aspects have generated quite distinctive pieces of research 
that can be examined on their own. 
1. The external perspective 
A traditional locus for discussing the institutional aspect of administrative justice is in 
respect to review or complaint-handling mechanisms including courts and other 
accountability entities. The starting point here has been the typical green-light 
dissatisfaction with court-centred mechanisms of legality review of administrative action. 
As a response to this unease, new channels for airing grievances were opened during the 
twentieth century, which often operated as an alternative to classic judicial review. Under 
the banner of administrative justice, particularly in Britain, numerous studies have 
examined and assessed these non-court mechanisms that have arisen in many policy 
areas.  
 
Research on this external dimension has focused on the following aspects: first, it has 
charted the variety of institutions located in the administrative justice landscape.113 
Secondly, it has attempted to go beyond the formal description of their procedures and to 
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examine the dynamics and operation of these entities using quantitative, qualitative, and 
ethnographic work.114 A third line of research in respect to reviewing mechanisms relates 
to the decisions of citizens about whether to use administrative justice devices. Attention 
has been paid to the practical and attitudinal obstacles users face, and to their motivations 
when seeking redress. 115  Fourthly, research has focused on the impact of external 
arrangements on primary decision-makers.116 As Adler puts it, external approaches to 
administrative justice tend to assume that adjudicatory decisions have direct influence on 
bureaucratic behaviour.117 Focusing on impact, external approaches might address this 
criticism by scrutinising the extent to which review judgments influence primary 
decision-makers, the extent to which primary decision-makers are prone to external 
authority, and whether the organisational environment enables them to conform to review 
decisions. 
2.  The internal perspective 
As a reaction to an apparently excessive reliance on external mechanisms of 
administrative justice, since the early 1980s there has been a new interest in viewing 
primary decision-making as the central location for administrative justice. A crucial 
influence in this shift in orientation was Jerry Mashaw’s seminal work, Bureaucratic 
Justice.118 The distinction between internal and external approaches to administrative 
justice is of critical importance for this perspective. Indeed, the most salient feature of 
Mashaw’s contribution is his search for an internal law of the administration, in contrast 
with the set of external controls called administrative law. According to Mashaw, the 
latter is not only irrelevant to what happens inside administrative agencies, but also 
ineffective in terms of symbolic guidance for administrative behaviour. 119  Mashaw 
emphasises instead ‘an internal law of administration that guides the conduct of those 
who make routine decisions more effectively than the external controls so beloved of 
administrative lawyers, who look to courts and – to a lesser extent – to tribunals and other 
forms of accountability, such as ombudsmen, for judgments that will secure the 
achievement of administrative justice’. 120  Ambitiously, Mashaw concludes that ‘the 
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challenge is…to view the administrative process, like the judicial and legislative 
processes, as somehow in pursuit of justice and the general welfare; to see 
“administration”, like “democracy” and “the rule of law”, as a motivating ideal’.121 
 
As a result, Mashaw’s definition of administrative justice looks not only to external legal 
controls, but also focuses on primary decision-making. He defines administrative justice 
as ‘those qualities of [an administrative] decision process that provide arguments for the 
acceptability of its decisions’.122 Mashaw identifies three models from which he derives 
these justice arguments: a bureaucratic rationality model according to which decisions 
are legitimated by showing that they are ‘accurate and efficient concrete realizations of 
the legislative will’; a professional treatment model that suggests that decisions are 
legitimate when they ‘provide appropriate support or therapy from the perspective of 
relevant professional cultures’; and a moral judgment model that focuses on whether 
decisions were ‘fairly arrived at when assessed in the light of traditional processes for 
determining individual entitlements’.123 His final suggestion is to seek an appropriate 
mixture of these different models.124 
 
In the concluding chapter of Bureaucratic Justice, Mashaw returns to his search for 
internal administrative justice by discussing how to design a bureaucratic institutional 
alternative to external controls. This arrangement should deliver ‘technical competence 
plus the comfort of legitimating symbolism’.125 He wonders whether this extraordinary 
office could produce an internal body of law superior to external legality in terms in 
coherence, effectiveness, and legitimating symbolism. Mashaw describes the institution 
he has in mind with these words: 
Suppose, for example, that there were a superbureau: an institution that 
combined a ‘judicial chamber’ with something like the functions of the 
General Accounting Office, the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Administrative Conference, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel, and the (now defunct) regulatory office. Functionally, this bureau 
would supervise the drafting of administrative legislation, review the 
competence of agency policy analysis, audit administrative performance in 
the field, provide binding counsel on managerial technique and hear in the 
final instance complaints of maladministration. And suppose this bureau 
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became the aspiration of the crème de la crème of the public managerial 
class and was also populated occasionally by academic students of 
administration and highly regarded private managers, that it gained a 
reputation for competence and integrity as well as for ultimate deference to 
statutory expression of democratic political power. In short, a symbol of 
ideal administration. […] But we have as yet no clear vision of such a 
superbureau or how its symbolism might reorient the meaning of justice or 
the rule of law.126 
 
In this study on the office of the Comptroller-General in Chile, I will be exploring the 
extent (if any) to which this institution might be seen as an illustration of this Mashawean 
administrative justice superbureau that can remedy the practical and symbolic limitations 
of external forms of administrative law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I began this chapter by stressing my concern about the traditional authoritarianism of the 
Latin American administrative state. Assuming that we embrace some of the ideals of 
social justice behind the administrative state, what are the institutional safeguards that 
can be adopted against actual or potential authoritarianism? And which legal 
arrangements make it more likely that public bureaucracies will be directed towards the 
purposes democratically mandated by the people? 
 
We have seen that in Latin America, as elsewhere, the builders of the administrative state 
were sceptical of the legal constraints imposed by courts upon administrators. However, 
after the tragic experience with the dictatorships in the region, a more receptive attitude 
to the values of the rule of law has emerged. Yet although adherence to values such as 
fairness, due process, participation, transparency, reasonableness, and so on seems to be 
greater now than in the mid-twentieth century, the distrust of courts and their 
compatibility with the administrative state in some circles remains. In this context, 
nonjudicial accountability institutions promise to complement, and sometimes substitute 
for, judicial arrangements. Some enthusiastic commentators emphasise their potential 
contribution to processes of political accountability, broadening access to grievances, and 
the enhancement of the quality of administrative process. These nonjudicial bodies may 
even be viewed as a superior form of accountability to that provided by courts. O’Donnell 
                                                 
126 ibid 226–7. Notably, Mashaw describes an idealised organisation with striking resemblance to the 
French Conseil d’Etat. 
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in Latin America and many others elsewhere have asserted that nonjudicial bodies might 
operate with acute bureaucratic expertise and more proactively and flexibly, and can 
intervene in a less partisan manner than their judicial counterparts. These organisations 
would be, as a result, less prone to encroaching on the development of a progressive 
administrative state. 
 
Are nonjudicial accountability institutions a better remedy for administrative 
authoritarianism? Or are they merely a suitable complement to courts? In this latter case, 
when should we employ them instead of courts? Although I do not provide answers to 
these questions, in this thesis I attempt to offer some empirically informed insights based 
on the actual operation of a nonjudicial accountability institution that may help to respond 
to them. Indeed, the case of the Chilean Comptroller-General seems a suitable case study 
for testing many assumptions in administrative justice literature about the role of judicial 
and nonjudicial forms of legal accountability.  
 
The preceding discussion – based on the accountability and administrative justice 
literature – has set out the potential benefits and also the potential setbacks of nonjudicial 
accountability bodies. When all is said and done, whether the benefits or the weaknesses 
of these dimensions are more likely to hold in practice can only be determined in a 
concrete context considering the agency’s actual institutional features, its historical 
background, and its role in the broader political system. In this thesis, through an 
empirical study of the Chilean Comptroller-General, I intend to identify some of the 
factors that make more likely the manifestation of the above-mentioned benefits and 
dangers. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL AND ITS LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter is primarily concerned with explaining the current Office of the Comptroller-
General from a legal perspective. To do this, it introduces the current distinctive 
institutional features of the Comptroller-General as a nonjudicial institution for the 
promotion of administrative justice. By examining the formal arrangements of the office, 
I will set the scene for the enriched, contextual analysis offered in the core chapters of the 
thesis, where I will place the office in its historical and political contexts. In this sense, 
this chapter provides the legal background necessary to move on to the following 
chapters. 
 
What is revealed by this preliminary analysis is a hierarchical and monocratic institution 
whose institutional features are secured by quite rigid rules; it is an organisation that 
enjoys a high degree of formal independence, and possesses a variety of accountability 
powers. In addition, the office’s distinctive legal powers will be introduced. These powers 
comprise ex-ante review of administrative decision-making and dispute resolution 
powers consisting of issuance of binding legal opinions interpreting administrative 
legality. 
I. BASIC PROVISIONS 
A. Constitutional regulation 
The basic provisions governing the Comptroller-General are entrenched in the Chilean 
Constitution. In contrast to other accountability agencies in Latin America, this is not a 
recent feature of Chilean constitutional law. 127  Indeed, the agency was given 
constitutional status in 1943, that is, 15 years after it was founded. The current 
Constitution – enacted in 1980 – introduced a complete new chapter governing the 
Comptroller-General. These provisions regulate the main tasks of the institution, the 
appointment and prerogatives of the head of the office, and the procedure of ex-ante 
legality review of administrative action (toma de razón procedure).  
                                                 
127 For instance, the influential Brazilian Public Prosecutor was created in 1934 as an auditing and oversight 
institution, but was only granted constitutional status in 1988. See Maria Teresa Sadek and Rosangela 
Batista Cavalcanti, ‘The New Brazilian Public Prosecution: An Agent of Accountability’ in Christopher 
Welna and Scott Mainwaring (eds), Democratic Accountability in Latin America (OUP 2003) 203. 
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The Constitution also mentions the Comptroller–General elsewhere, such as in the 
provisions regulating the impeachment procedure against the office-holder (Articles 
52[2c] and 53), the review of legislative decrees enacted by the President (called ‘decrees 
with force of law’, Art 64) and the review of unauthorised payment or expenditure decrees 
in case of emergency (Art 32 number 20). Finally, the Constitution establishes that any 
further detailed regulation of the internal organisation, procedures, and powers of the 
agency requires a super-majority law (Art 99[4]). This entails that legislation regarding 
the agency has to be approved by a majority of 4/7 of the elected senators and deputies, 
respectively (Art 66[2]). Furthermore, to make changes to the legal framework of the 
office, a mandatory ex-ante review by the Constitutional Tribunal must be performed (Art 
93 n.1). As can be expected, this means that it is rather cumbersome to pass new 
legislation in this area. 
B. The Organic Law 
As mentioned above, the 1980 Constitution provides that an Organic Law will establish 
the organisation, procedures, and powers of the Comptroller-General Office. Yet 
contemporary legislatures have been unable to pass a body of law regulating the 
institution in a systematic manner. Indeed, the current organic law regulating the 
Comptroller-General is contained in decree with force of law 2421, of 10 June 1964.128 
This piece of legislation was enacted long before the current Constitution entered into 
force in 1980, and consequently, a super-majority did not approve it, as is now mandated. 
This old Organic Law is still valid because the Constitution provides legal validity to 
previous statutes that regulated matters in respect to which a super-majority is now 
required.129 But its dated nature is widely regarded as undesirable, reflecting a lethargic 
legislature incapable of providing basic legislation governing administrative action and a 
lack of political consensus as to the Chilean model of administrative justice.130 
 
Containing more than 100 provisions, the 1964 Organic Law regulates the agency in 
detail, especially in relation to financial practices and formalities. Many of these rules 
                                                 
128 This decree systematised the previous law 10336 of 1952, and the subsequent modifications thereof. 
129 See Fourth Transitory Provision of the Constitution. 
130 Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, Tratado de derecho constitucional, vol IX (Editorial Jurídica de Chile 1997) 
190. 
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have become obsolete. While hundreds of detailed provisions regulate payments and 
expenditure, there are only a handful of provisions that succinctly regulate the essential 
legal powers of the office. As a result, this law offers little guidance when it comes to 
resolving interpretive problems regarding the scope of the Comptroller-General’s mission 
and powers. 
 
A number of other statutes regulating public administration refer to the Comptroller-
General and grant it additional powers. For instance, the Civil Service Act 1989 grants 
public employees the right to complain to the Comptroller-General in the case of their 
rights being encroached upon by an illegal action.131 This entails that the office is the 
natural forum for public employment adjudication. Another example is the Organic Law 
of the National Congress, which imposes on public entities and public enterprises a duty 
to provide information to congressional committees or individual members of Congress, 
upon request. This piece of legislation provides that the Comptroller-General will decide 
whether a public enterprise can refuse to release information, and will impose disciplinary 
sanctions in case of infractions.132 The recent Regulation of Lobby Act also gives powers 
to the Comptroller-General in case authorities fail to comply with disclosure requirements 
imposed by the law. While in the case of central government officers the office can just 
propose the imposition of a disciplinary sanction, in the case of municipal authorities the 
Comptroller-General can impose the sanction himself.133 A final example among many 
is the Law on State Financial Administration, which contains the rules governing the 
Comptroller-General’s powers of financial oversight and auditing.134 In short, there is a 
complex web of laws regulating the institution that complement and update its 
obsolescent Organic Law. 
                                                 
131 Article 160, Law 18834 Concerning Civil Service Regulations. 
132 Articles 9 and 10, Law 18918 Organic of the National Congress. 
133 Articles 15 and 17, Law 20730 on Lobby Activities. 
134 See Articles 52 and 53, Decree Law 1263 Concerning the Financial Administration of the State. 
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II. ORGANIC STRUCTURE 
A. Hierarchical arrangements 
The office is a single-headed institution presided over by the Comptroller-General of the 
Republic (Art 2 Organic Law). In this sense, it is comparable to some ombudspersons and 
Comptroller-General offices elsewhere. It departs from the collegiate model of 
institutions such as the French Conseil d’Etat. Below the office-holder, the institution’s 
arrangements follow a hierarchical pattern. The second highest authority within the office 
is the Deputy Comptroller-General, who is a subordinate official appointed by the 
Comptroller-General and must replace him during absence (Art 2, 4, 27). The law requires 
that both authorities hold a law degree (Art 2), and the Comptroller-General in particular 
needs legal experience of at least ten years (Art 98 Constitution). Moreover, under the 
office’s organic law, both authorities are entitled to the rights and tenure secured to judges 
by the laws of the country (Art 4). In other words, the two highest officers of the 
institution are isolated against political pressure from the other branches of government. 
 
The single-headed character of the office entails a strong reliance on the personal traits 
of its chief authority. This organisational feature is usually associated to the need for 
institutional energy and increased levels of activity.135 This assumedly ‘active virtue’ of 
the institution –shared by the tribune model of ombudspersons- seems to suggest a more 
vigorous approach to the office’s supervisory functions. But it may also invite 
administrative lethargy and, even worst, personalism or cult to personality.136 
 
Below the Comptroller-General and his deputy, a variety of specialised departments have 
been established. These units are subordinated to the Comptroller-General, as the law 
defines them as dependent on him (Art 2.6), and their holders and all employees of the 
office remain in their posts as long as they have the exclusive confidence of the 
Comptroller-General (Art 3.2). In other words, the head of the office has the power to 
appoint, promote, or remove any officer within the institution, with independence from 
any external authority. This feature imprints in the organisation its characteristic 
hierarchical nature. Although some departments are mentioned in the Organic Law, the 
                                                 
135  The classical locus is Federalist 70. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The 
Federalist (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2009). 
136 Gellhorn (n 77) 48–50. 
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Comptroller-General has the broad discretion to create new units, rearrange the existing 
ones, and define their tasks and operative conditions (Art. 2.2, 2.7, and 5.4). 
 
In addition, the operation of the office is geographically decentralised through local 
offices in every region of the country. Currently, there are 16 such regional offices. These 
have no autonomy and must strictly follow the precedents set out at the central level. If 
any novel question of law arises, they have to refer it to the respective department at the 
central level. Regional Comptrollers are not required to have legal training. Thus, 
although most of them currently hold law degrees, some have other professional 
backgrounds such as public management or accountancy.137  
 
A two-tier Court of Accounts is also embedded within the office. The Deputy 
Comptroller-General constitutes the Court of Accounts in First-Instance and hears 
indictments against public functionaries that have misused public funds (Art 107). A head 
of department or head of regional office acts as prosecutor (Art 107 bis). The affected 
party can appeal first-instance decisions to the Court of Accounts in Second-Instance, 
composed of the Comptroller-General and two external ad-hoc judges.138 Despite being 
within the Comptroller’s Office, commentators view this two-tier tribunal as pertaining 
to the judiciary and subordinated to the Supreme Court.139 The main reason for this is 
characteristically formalist, as it is argued that the institution is performing a typically 
adjudicatory function. 
 
Membership of the institution reached 2,000 employees in 2013 (1,992 in 2016), with the 
majority of them holding a university qualification, and 68.2% of the staff holding a 
professional degree. Although the institution possesses a characteristic multi-disciplinary 
nature, lawyers compose almost a quarter of the office’s professional staff. In 2013, the 
office had 1,375 professional staff, of which 23% were lawyers (321 officers). Public 
managers constituted the second largest group, comprising 17.5%, while business 
managers followed in third place with 7.7%.140 Other professions represented in the office 
include architects, civil engineers, and accountants. As will be seen, the distribution of 
                                                 
137 Information as of 28 September 2017. 
138 The ad-hoc judges are proposed by the Comptroller-General and appointed by the President of the 
Republic for a four-year term (Art 118). 
139 Silva Bascuñán, Tratado de derecho constitucional (n 130) 215. 
140 Contraloría General de la República, ‘Cuenta Pública 2014’ (2015). 
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these professions varies according to the different departments and sub-departments 
within the institution. 
B. The Head of the Office 
Both the executive and the legislative branches of government participate in the 
appointment of the Comptroller-General as head of office. According to Article 99 of the 
Constitution, the President of the Republic appoints the head of the office, with agreement 
from the Senate if supported by three-fifths of its active members. A constitutional 
amendment in 2005 increased the quorum for this decision, which used to require only a 
simple majority. The current provision forces the President to seek inter-party and inter-
branch agreement before appointing the Comptroller-General. As we will see in the 
Introduction to Part III, it has been the case in recent times that the office is presided over 
by a candidate favoured by the opposition parties. 
 
Until recently, it was suggested that there was a political convention stipulating that 
Comptroller-General appointment should be based on seniority.141 Between 1952 and 
1997, Comptroller-Generals were largely appointed according to this convention. In fact, 
with the exception of the appointment of Sergio Fernández in 1978 for three months 
during the Pinochet dictatorship, all office-holders during this period were serving as 
Deputy Comptrollers-General when appointed as head of the office.142 The rule was 
broken when, in 2002, the President decided not to appoint the deputy Comptroller-
General but instead the head of the Legality Review Department, the centre-left Gustavo 
Sciolla. Thus, even in this case, it was a senior officer who was promoted to the highest 
post within the office. Yet, as we will see in the Introduction to Part III, for the last two 
appointments the convention has been totally discarded, as outsiders have been selected 
to lead the institution. 
 
The 2005 Constitutional Reform also reduced the tenure of the office-holder to a non-
renewable eight-year period. Before the amendment, the Comptroller-General served 
until reaching 75 years of age. Yet the current timeframe is in line with the historical 
record, which shows that office-holders have generally remained in the post for 
                                                 
141 Silva Bascuñán, Tratado de derecho constitucional (n 130) 196. 
142 This includes five Comptrollers-General: Enrique Bahamonde (1952), Enrique Silva Cimma (1959), 
Hector Humeres (1967), Osvaldo Iturriaga (1978), and Arturo Aylwin (1997). 
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approximately eight years each. Also, the eight-year period is apparently designed to 
detach the Comptroller-General tenure from the presidential period, which is four years 
without the right to stand for re-election. 
 
According to the Constitution, the Comptroller-General is required to have held a law 
degree for at least ten years. Since the establishment of the office, most of the office-
holders have been lawyers and, more specifically, administrative law experts. Indeed, a 
number of them have developed careers as scholars as well as attorneys. Although some 
have attempted to pursue political careers after their service in the office, generally 
Comptrollers-General have been viewed as apolitical, bureaucratic authorities. The 
Constitution also states that to be appointed as head of the office, a person has to be over 
40 years of age and hold the right to vote. 
 
The Constitution stipulates strict removal rules. The office-holder can be removed only 
by impeachment commenced in the Chamber of Deputies for notorious dereliction of 
duties (Art 52.2.c) and decided by the majority of the active members of the Senate (Art 
53.1). These provisions regulating proceedings and charges are the same ones that apply 
to the members of the superior courts of justice, including Supreme Court justices. At the 
inception of the office, the President had the power to remove the Comptroller-General 
as he was regarded as a dependent officer. However, the protections favouring this officer 
were strengthened in 1943 when the institution was granted constitutional status. Only 
once have impeachment proceedings against a Comptroller-General taken place, and on 
that occasion they resulted in the removal of Agustín Vigorena in 1945. 143  This 
exceptional case suggests that these provisions have secured strong protection against 
attacks from the political branches of government. 
 
Therefore, the Comptroller-General enjoys a high degree of independence from the 
President and Congress. The Constitution also provides functional mechanisms to resolve 
disputes between the Comptroller-General Office and the judiciary. According to current 
rules, it is for the Senate to resolve jurisdictional disputes between the office and the 
higher court of justice (Art 53.3), while disputes between the office and lower courts are 
                                                 
143 Impeachment proceedings against judges have been exceptional as well. There have been fewer than a 
dozen cases and only once was a judge eventually removed from office. This occurred in 1992. 
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to be adjudicated by the Constitutional Tribunal (Art 93 number 12). In the few cases that 
have arisen thus far, the position of the Comptroller-General has always been upheld by 
either the Senate or the Constitutional Court. 
 
Current constitutional and legal provisions do not secure budget independence for the 
office. This entails that the executive and the legislature have to define the budget 
allocated to the office every year. Yet between 1959 and 1977, the Comptroller-General 
enjoyed a budget protected by law. These rules ensured the office a budget of 0.42% of 
the Annual National Expenditures Budget. These protections were eliminated by the 
Pinochet government amid neoliberal reforms reducing the size of the state and following 
a series of clashes with the Office, as we will see in chapter 5. 
C. Sub-Departments 
The Office of the Comptroller-General covers a variety of functions such as auditing, 
disciplinary investigations, and accounting, among others. In order to carry out these 
tasks, the organisation is divided into a series of departments and committees. To 
illustrate the point, I will focus on its main regulatory review function, which is 
concentrated in two sub-units within the office: the Legal Department, particularly its 
Committee IV, and the Infrastructure and Regulation Department. The importance of 
these units derives from the fact that they perform the most important functions in terms 
of legal interpretation. 
 
The primary unit in charge of legality review tasks is the Legal Department. Two senior 
lawyers – the chief and the deputy chief of the division – head this department. They, in 
turn, supervise the work of specialised internal committees, each of them having an 
independent docket. The Comptroller-General directly appoints these senior officers. 
Aside from its chief officers, this department comprises approximately 40 lawyers 
assigned to six Committees, each of which has responsibility for one or more specific 
areas of public administration. Unlike other units within the institution, in this department 
no other professions, such as economists, accountants, public administrators, or civil 




Figure 2: Legal Department Structure 
 
Among the seven committees that comprise the legal division, Committee IV has 
historically been the most prestigious. Importantly, this reputation is well reflected in the 
salaries of the approximately seven permanent members. Traditionally, this office was 
conceived as a sort of elite unit, where the most experienced officers would arrive after a 
long career serving in different posts within the institution. These officers thus used to 
have a panoramic view of the operations of the Comptroller-General, as well as the 
functioning of the public bureaucracy they oversaw. In other words, this unit represented 
the pinnacle of a successful career inside the institution. However, that tradition has to an 
important extent lost its force, and nowadays the unit’s staff mixes senior and junior 
officers in a more balanced manner. This change was triggered by changes introduced by 
Comptroller Ramiro Mendoza during his tenure. 144  Moreover, some contemporary 
members of this office have had experience outside the office as primary decision-makers 
in ministerial and other agencies in the executive branch. 
 
While other committees review more routine decisions, such as employment and public 
procurement cases, Committee IV is primarily in charge of the most complex cases. The 
difficulty of the cases assigned to this committee explains the leading character that it still 
embodies. Consistent with this, they have primary responsibility for the scrutiny of 
                                                 
























administrative rulemaking and also for delivering legal opinions upon the request of other 
departments and outsiders. Therefore, the members of this committee simultaneously 
exercise preventive review of executive rulemaking and a-posteriori adjudicatory 
functions. 
 
Another department that importantly engages in legal review is the Infrastructure and 
Regulation Department (DIR). This is a specialised department, independent of the Legal 
Division, which also includes a number of internal committees. A multi-disciplinary 
organisation in nature, this body combines lawyers and other professionals. The primary 
task of this office consists of checking a wide range of regulatory processes, such as price 
setting procedures in utility industries (telecom, water, electricity, and so on) and urban 
planning processes. Like Committee IV, DIR is also highly regarded as a result of the 
technical competence of its members and the complexity of its caseload. 
 
 























III. MANDATE AND POWERS 
A. Multi-tasking 
Generally speaking, Comptroller-General Offices operate in a number of jurisdictions, 
performing auditing tasks.145 They are usually members of the Commonwealth Model of 
financial oversight institutions – as opposed to the Court Model.146 Their main aim is to 
ensure financial regularity in governmental activities. Operating within political 
accountability networks, these institutions also channel information to the legislature in 
order to facilitate political scrutiny of executive action. However, as will be seen, the 
Chilean Office of the Comptroller-General departs from this model, since it is entrusted 
with the additional mission of ensuring compliance of the administrative agencies with 
legal standards.147 In other words, in contrast with its counterparts elsewhere, the Chilean 
agency is not only a supreme audit institution, but also a legal accountability body. 
 
Concretely, the Constitution sets out a number of tasks to be performed by this institution. 
Indeed, five main tasks for the Comptroller-General are indicated in Art 98 of the 
Constitution. The first task involves legality review. Using broad language, the 
constitutional provision states that the Comptroller-General shall exercise the review of 
the legality of the acts of the public administration. The second task relates to financial 
control. The Constitution provides, in particular, that the Comptroller-General is to 
oversee the collection of revenues and the expenditure of public funds by the central 
government, municipalities, and other public agencies. Thirdly, in a related matter, the 
institution is charged with examining and judging the accounts given by individuals who 
administer public funds. Fourthly, the Comptroller-General is responsible for keeping the 
general accounting of the nation. Lastly, in a final open clause, the Constitution stipulates 
that the organic law of the agency might provide for new tasks to be performed by the 
Comptroller-General. In short, it might be said that the institution has two main functions: 
legality review on the one hand, and financial control on the other. 
 
                                                 
145 For an overview of similar institutions in the UK – the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the 
National Audit Office – see Daintith and Page (n 70) 194–5; Prosser (n 69) 51–7. 
146 Santiso (n 27). 
147 A similar case is found in Israel’s State Comptroller. See Suzi Navot, The Constitution of Israel: A 
Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing 2014) 175–80. 
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The latter category includes, among others, oversight of the collection of revenues and 
expenditure, auditing the budget process, and producing and registering financial 
information. In general terms, the aim of these powers is to ensure financial regularity in 
the budgetary process. The former category refers to powers of legal interpretation and 
adjudication. These powers encompass, among others, the power to decide on the legality 
of administrative action prior to its final enactment, the power to issue interpretive rulings 
when a legal provision with an impact on administrative agencies is ambiguous, the power 
to intervene in disciplinary proceedings against public servants, and the power to 
adjudicate financial maladministration cases. The aim of these powers is to provide an 
authoritative decision about the content of the law regulating public administration in a 
particular situation. 
B. Powers of financial oversight  
Before examining in some detail the legal powers of the office, I will briefly outline the 
financial aspect of the Comptroller-General. At its inception, it was conceived exclusively 
as a financial oversight institution.148 As is still the rule elsewhere, the Comptroller-
General was above all a specialist agency in charge of monitoring the financial behaviour 
of government departments. Its foundational statute in 1927 brought together two 
different models of auditing. The financial character of the institution is illustrated by the 
fact that the constitutional amendment that granted it constitutional status in 1943 
mentioned only its financial powers. 
 
Audit agencies can be defined as ‘autonomous state organisations tasked with scrutinising 
public spending and overseeing government finances, usually on behalf of the 
legislature’. 149  Their positive function consists of ensuring ‘the robustness and 
effectiveness of financial management, government accounts and control systems’. 150 
Additionally, they also perform preventive functions by deterring ‘government abuse and 
misuse of public resources’.151 In short, audit agencies take place as part of efforts to 
strengthen administrative capabilities and to discourage corruption. In the context of the 
audit institutions, the Chilean Comptroller-General appears to be a hybrid institution, 
                                                 
148 See Chapter 3. 




adopting features from both the Anglo-American monocratic model and the French court 
model of auditing.152 On the one hand, like the Anglo-American model, a single superior 
authority heads the Chilean agency. But the Chilean Comptroller-General differs from its 
common law counterparts in terms of the aim of its oversight functions. Unlike traditional 
comptrollers that focus on ex-post auditing and performance auditing, the Chilean agency 
focuses on ex-ante control and emphasises compliance control. Furthermore, the Chilean 
Comptroller-General diverges from the French Court of Accounts model, which is based 
on a collegiate body that operates as an administrative tribunal. But it resembles the 
French model in two aspects. First, it privileges legal and financial compliance over 
performance auditing, and secondly, its links with the judiciary and the legislatures 
remain ambiguous.153 
 
Currently, the office’s financial powers are regulated in some detail, but in an untidy 
manner, in its Organic Law. Here, it suffices to mention the main provisions. According 
to the Organic Law, the Comptroller-General has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate, 
examine, review, and make determinations regarding every public credit and public debt 
(art 7). According to this provision, it is also within his remit to examine and to make 
judgments about the accounts given by public servants that keep, manage, collect, or 
spend public funds or goods, or about the accounts given by any other individual under 
oversight. The statute mentions a number of tools available to the Comptroller-General 
to perform its financial powers. For instance, Article 9 establishes that the institution has 
the power to require any authority, or public servant, to provide relevant information. It 
also states that the office can give instructions to administrative agencies regarding the 
exercise of its monitoring powers. The same provision further adds that the Comptroller-
General can impose sanctions on any authority that does not comply with its requests or 
instructions. Similarly, Article 15 stipulates that any person that gives false testimony to 
the office will be punished according to the Criminal Code. A final example may be found 
in Article 21, which provides that the Comptroller-General can request reports, 
statements, or information from any public officer under its supervision. 
 
                                                 
152 ibid 49ff. 
153 There is a third model that is hybrid in a different sense. This is the German and Scandinavian model, 
where there is ‘an agency with collegial decision-making similar to that found in tribunals, headed by a 
board of auditors, but without jurisdictional authority or quasi-judicial powers’. See ibid 50. 
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The Comptroller-General can carry out audit examinations in order to ensure compliance 
with legal provisions, and to protect the public treasury and administrative probity 
(Article 21A). Yet the Organic Law introduces considerable nuance by declaring that, in 
exercising its legality or auditing functions, the Comptroller-General ‘must not evaluate 
the merit or convenience of political or administrative decisions’ (Article 21B). As we 
will see, this limitation was the price paid by the Comptroller-General in order to see its 
audit functions recognised in the statute book in an amendment to its organic legislation 
in 2002.154 
 
Unsurprisingly, experts have recommended the Chilean government to reform the 
Comptroller-General, adopting a focus on ex-post and performance auditing.155 This is in 
line with New Public Management ideas about public sector reform. As Santiso explains, 
‘[t]he trend in public policy is to move away from rigid compliance with formal 
bureaucratic rules, to the achievement of policy objectives, reflected in the increased 
focus on performance auditing over compliance control’.156 A recent OECD report, for 
instance, has placed ‘attention on possible changes to the functional focus on ex ante 
control of legality (toma de razón) and the concentration of ex post audit on legal 
compliance’.157 These voices have been increasingly considered in Chilean academia, 
and might possibly influence future reform. However, these ‘technocratic concerns’ have 
had a more sceptical reception from scholars who have pointed out the political role 
performed by the institution in its recent history.158 
IV. EX-ANTE LEGALITY REVIEW 
A. Basic provisions 
Legality review (toma de razón) is the most characteristic power of the Chilean 
Comptroller-General. This is the only power of the office regulated in some detail in the 
Constitution. It is a scrutiny process of executive rules or decisions before their 
promulgation based on abstract legality. Abstract, here, means that the scrutiny is not 
dependent on concrete litigation or controversy involving the administrative action at 
                                                 
154 See Introduction to Part III. 
155 Santiso (n 27) 119–20. 
156 ibid 15. 
157 OECD (n 27) 17. 
158 Faúndez, ‘The Fragile Foundations of Administrative Legality - Chile between 1932 and 1973’ (n 22) 
93–4. 
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stake.159 It is currently enshrined in Article 99 of the Constitution, which provides that in 
exercising its function of legal control, the Comptroller-General Office will check on 
decrees and administrative resolutions in the cases provided by legislation. 
 
In brief, the formal mechanics of this checking procedure are as follows. Once an 
administrative department has adopted a written decision, the respective authority has to 
submit it to the Comptroller’s Office for legal review.160 Within a 15-day period (unless 
an extension is given), the checking institution has to review and approve (or decline to 
approve) the proposed executive action. If the Comptroller-General considers it 
compliant with the law, it will uphold the decree or resolution and return the 
accompanying file to the respective agency, enabling it to officially promulgate the rule 
or decision. However, if the Comptroller-General concludes that the rule is unlawful, it 
will turn it down and the administrative agency will not be able to promulgate the decision 
under review. In this latter scenario, the administrative procedure will simply conclude at 
that point. 
 
However, under Article 99 of the Constitution, the President is allowed to state her 
disagreement with the Comptroller’s judgment, and insist on the decree or resolution.161 
In this case, the procedure will continue, but the final outcome will depend on further 
considerations. At this point, we have to distinguish between two situations. If the decree 
or resolution was originally rejected on legality grounds (that is, violation of statutes), the 
executive will prevail with finality. In this case, the Comptroller-General ought to uphold 
the decision, but the office must refer the entire file to the Chamber of Deputies, which 
can in turn scrutinise the action on policy grounds. If, however, the measure was rejected 
on constitutionality grounds, the President is not allowed to insist, and only the 
Constitutional Tribunal can make the final decision. In this latter case, the President can 
react to an adverse Comptroller-General determination by referring the dispute to the 
Constitutional Tribunal, which will have the last word on the matter. 
                                                 
159 Here, I am adapting the terminology of Alec Stone Sweet. See Alec Stone Sweet, The Birth of Judicial 
Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective (OUP 1992). 
160 See Articles 12 and 17 of the Decree 7912 Concerning the Organisation of Secretaries of State. 
161 See more details below. 
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B. Types of administrative actions under review 
The constitutional provisions that govern this procedure indicate what kind of 
administrative actions the Comptroller-General must review. The most important group 
includes ‘decrees and resolutions that, according to the law, shall be handled by the 
Comptroller-General’ (Article 99). These are different forms of secondary or 
subordinated legislation. The distinction between decrees and resolutions refers to 
decisions adopted by the President of the Republic or on its behalf (decrees) and decisions 
adopted by executive agencies (resolutions), respectively. Decisions of both individual 
and general effect are included in the review procedure. A typical example of a decision 
that has to be submitted for this review is a regulation (reglamento) that implements the 
provisions of a statute. 
 
However, there are a number of exceptions. 162  In fact, it must be noted that the 
Constitution does not itself establish which decrees and resolutions should be reviewed 
by the Comptroller-General. The Constitution merely states that the regulation of this 
matter is for the Organic Law governing the institution. As a result, the specific definition 
of the rules to be submitted to the Comptroller-General for examination is determined by 
legislation. The office’s Organic Law defines a first important filter. Article 10.5 declares 
that the Comptroller-General may exempt from review any decrees and resolutions that 
it sees as ‘not essential’. In practice, for efficiency reasons, since the 1960s the 
Comptroller has exercised this power with the purpose of exempting the generality of 
administrative decisions from review, excluding those related to topics explicitly singled 
out by the office.163  This entails that only the most important decisions adopted by 
administrative agencies have to undergo the Comptroller’s legal scrutiny. Still, it has been 
estimated that over 50% of administrative regulations and orders are not exempted from 
this checking mechanism.164 
 
                                                 
162 For a traditional explanation of the exempted actions, see Enrique Silva Cimma, Derecho administrativo 
chileno y comparado. Introducción y fuentes (4th edn, Editorial Jurídica de Chile 1996) 194ff. For a 
contemporary discussion, see Luis Cordero, ‘La Contraloría General de la República y la Toma de Razón: 
Fundamento de Cuatro Falacias’ (2007) 69 Revista de Derecho Público (U. de Chile).  
163 Currently, exclusions from revision are regulated by Resolution 1600/2008 of the Comptroller-General. 
164 Enrique Rajevic and María Fernanda Garcés, ‘Control de Legalidad y Procedimiento de Toma de Razón’ 
in Visnja Tomicic and Cristián García (eds), Un Mejor Estado para Chile: Propuestas de Modernización 
y Reforma (Consorcio para la Reforma del Estado 2009) 618. 
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A second group of exemptions derives from statutes that exclude the Comptroller’s 
review regarding specific administrative agencies.165 A case in point is the significant 
exclusion of municipalities from this review mechanism.166 It is not easy for the executive 
to pass legislation ousting this legality check. In fact, according to the Constitutional 
Tribunal, a statute excluding a decree or resolution from the Comptroller-General’s 
review has to be approved by a 4/7 super-majority.167 A third group does not consist of 
actual exclusions, but of exceptions to the preventive character of the Comptroller’s 
check. In fact, Congress – again, by super-majority vote – may postpone legality review, 
enabling the administrative authority to enact with immediate effect an administrative 
order in case of emergency. This is the case with the so-called ‘urgency decrees’, whose 
promulgation does not prevent the Comptroller’s check, but only entails delayed scrutiny, 
as the review will take place after the administrative decision at stake enters into force.168  
 
The discussion so far has concerned administrative actions, i.e. individual orders or 
general regulations whose effects are subordinated to statutory law. However, the 
Comptroller-General can also examine presidential regulations that have the ‘force of 
statutory law’, that is, those that can exceptionally regulate matters falling within the 
legislature’s domain.169 The particularity of these so-called ‘decrees with force of law’ is 
that they have the same legal force as regulations passed by Congress. 170  They can 
actually repeal or modify congressional legislation.171 The power to enact this sort of 
legislation is entrenched in Article 32 n. 3 and Article 64 of the Constitution.172 These 
                                                 
165  Carlos Carmona, El principio de control. El control externo, jurídico y no jurisdiccional de la 
administración (Universidad de Chile 2005) 11. 
166 Article 53 Organic Law of Municipalities. 
167 See Constitutional Tribunal Decision (1987) Rol 45; Constitutional Tribunal Decision (1988) Rol 63; 
Constitutional Tribunal Decision (2003) Rol 384. 
168  For an explanation of ‘decrees of urgency’, see Silva Cimma, Derecho administrativo chileno y 
comparado (n 162) 230–3.  
169 For an examination of this kind of power, see, John M Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, ‘Calling out 
the Tanks or Filling out the Forms?’ in John M Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart (eds), Executive decree 
authority (CUP 1998). They define decree as ‘the authority of the executive to establish law in lieu of action 
by the assembly’. 
170 Bermúdez (n 146) 47–8. 
171 These powers to make ‘decrees with force of law’ are comparable to the Henry VIII powers in Britain, 
but in Chile there is no parliamentary scrutiny regarding the exercise of these powers. Even closer to 
Chilean arrangements are the French ordonnances. See Catherine Elliott, Catherine Vernon, and Eric 
Jeanpierre, French Legal System (2nd edn, Pearson Longman 2006) 72–3; L Neville Brown and John Bell, 
French Administrative Law (5th edn, Clarendon Press 1998) 12–3. 
172 The current Constitution explicitly authorises Congress to delegate to the President the power to enact 
decrees ‘with force of law’, but this was not the case before 1980. At that time, the Constitution was silent 
regarding this legislative practice. As a result, it was unclear if the Comptroller-General had jurisdiction 
for reviewing this type of regulation. For that reason, when Congress delegated regulatory powers, it often 
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provisions stipulate that the executive can request congressional authorisation to regulate 
matters that otherwise could only be regulated by congressional legislation. In any case, 
the delegation cannot cover certain topics such as individual rights, issues that require 
super-majority approval, and the internal organisation of institutions that have 
constitutional status, such as the Comptroller’s office. 
 
Although there is no congressional scrutiny of the decrees enacted under these delegated 
powers, under Article 99 of the Constitution the Comptroller-General must examine these 
decrees, rejecting them if they exceed or contravene the legislative delegation or infringe 
the Constitution.173  There is no presidential power of insistence if the Comptroller-
General turns down a decree with force of law. If the President disagrees with the adverse 
determination, she has to refer the dispute to the Constitutional Tribunal (Article 93 n. 4). 
If, on the other hand, the decree was unlawfully upheld by the Comptroller-General, 
members of Congress could also bring the case to the determination of the Tribunal. 
 
In short, the Comptroller-General’s legality review concentrates on major pieces of 
secondary legislation. Executive decrees regulating matters of legislative domain are also 
included in the jurisdiction of the office. In this sense, this scrutiny process is the primary 
mechanism for ensuring the legality of government rules.174 But it also includes other 
administrative decisions such as appointments, urban plans, environmental permits, 
disciplinary sanctions, and even constitutional declarations of emergency, among others. 
C. Participants 
The paradigmatic institutional actors that participate in the procedure are administrative 
agencies, which seek to enact the rules or decisions under review. These administrative 
authorities include the President of the Republic and all the bodies that comprise the 
                                                 
provided explicitly that the Comptroller was endowed with powers for checking whether the secondary 
legislation was consistent with the enabling statute. For an account of this practice, see Manuel Daniel, El 
Control Jurídico de la Administración. Nociones Fundamentales (Editorial Universitaria 1960) 36ff. For a 
brief overview of the constitutional debate about the constitutionality of the delegation of legislative powers 
under the former 1925 Constitution, see Federico Gil, The Political System of Chile (Houghton Mifflin 
1966) 100–1. 
173  Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, Tratado de derecho constitucional. Congreso Nacional. La función 
legislativa, vol VII (Editorial Jurídica de Chile 2000) 84–5. 
174  There are remarkable parallels with the scrutiny performed by the Joint Committee on Statutory 
Instruments. See Edward C Page, Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-
Making (Hart Publishing 2001) ch 8. 
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central administration. However, a number of other authorities do not fall within the 
purview of this legality review procedure. Indeed, some regulatory agencies, such as the 
Central Bank and the municipalities among others, are excluded. But it is still the case 
that most of the components of the Chilean public administration fall under the 
Comptroller-General’s oversight via this checking mechanism. 
 
An interesting aspect of the legality review procedure is whether affected parties can 
challenge or offer support to administrative decisions in this forum. In other words, the 
issue here is whether non-governmental organisations have a say. Neither the 
Constitution nor the Comptroller’s Organic Law explicitly regulate the issue of private 
party access. Yet a long-standing practice recognises the possibility for affected parties 
to intervene. As early as the 1960s, a leading commentator explained that ‘there is no 
procedure for this remedy, but in practice it is accepted, and on occasions the 
Comptroller-General has adopted decisions rejecting administrative decisions on grounds 
raised precisely by interested parties’.175 The commentator pointed out that when it comes 
to regulations of general interest – that is, administrative rules – it is very difficult when 
directly affected parties only come to know through the media that a procedure of this 
kind is being conducted. 
 
Currently, both officers and litigants report that affected parties’ participation is just a 
matter of informal contacts between the regulators, the regulated, Comptroller officers, 
and third parties. However, in legal terms, the right to make petitions in the legality review 
process is remarkably weak.176 For instance, the Comptroller-General has decided that 
the lodging of ex-parte briefs does not interrupt the process, and that neither his office 
nor the regulators have to meet the concerns raised by affected third parties.177 Thus, 
private parties can be heard, but there will not necessarily be an adversarial process. This 
discouraging attitude to private party participation is explained by the fear of excessive 
judicialisation of this legality review process.178 
                                                 
175 Daniel (n 171) 43–4. 
176  Luis Cordero, ‘La jurisprudencia administrativa en perspectiva: Entre legislador positivo y juez 
activista’ (2010) Anuario de Derecho Público UDP 165, 183. 
177 Ruling 27272 (2008). 
178 Alejandro Vergara, ‘El rol de la Contraloría General de la República: Desde el control de legalidad a los 
nuevos estándares de buena administración’, Contraloría General de la República. 85 años de vida 
institucional (1927-2012) (Contraloría General de la República 2012) 106–7. 
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D. Standard of review 
The decrees or regulations examined by the Comptroller-General through this procedure 
are judged under legal and constitutional standards. This implies that administrative 
decisions are assessed in light of statutory and constitutional provisions (Constitution, Art 
99). Underpinning its nature as an independent legal check and not an advisory body, the 
Comptroller-General is not allowed to review the merits of the decision under 
examination (Organic Law, Article 21 B).179 However, there is a long-standing view that 
the check of the Comptroller-General must go beyond mere legality. An influential 
scholar, for instance, has argued that in this procedure the administration is required to 
demonstrate not only the legality of the measures but that the outcome is the right solution 
for addressing the social problem at stake.180 Thus, from this viewpoint, the scrutiny 
should encompass both legality and merit. More recently, some scholars have argued that 
the examination under the legality review procedure should embrace broader notions of 
good administration, and not only formal legality.181 
 
The Comptroller-General lacks investigatory powers during the legality review 
procedure. Yet it can request officers of any administrative department to provide 
information related to the service (Organic Law, Article 9). Additionally, it is a well-
established practice that the office can require supporting factual evidence before 
deciding on the legality of an administrative decision.182 
E. The insistence mechanism – the presidential override 
The influence of the Comptroller-General over public administration is significant. One 
reason for this is that it works very closely with administrative agencies. But its main 
source of power resides in the fact that it can paralyse administrative action, including 
presidential regulations. This may be surprising, because this checking body does not 
have the last word on the legality of administrative acts. As already mentioned, if the 
                                                 
179 See Andrés Bordalí and Juan Carlos Ferrada, Estudios de Justicia Administrativa (Lexis Nexis 2008) 
34–5. 
180 Eduardo Soto-Kloss, ‘La toma de razón y el poder normativo de la Contraloría General de la República’, 
La Contraloría General de la República. 50 años de vida institucional 1927-1977 (Contraloría General de 
la República 2012) 203. 
181 Vergara (n 178) 106. 
182 See, for instance, cases mentioned in Javier Millar, ‘Alcance del control de legalidad. Su evolución a 
propósito de los actos administrativos requisitorios, durante 1970-1973’ (2000) 11 Revista de Derecho 
(Universidad Austral de Valdivia). 
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Comptroller-General rejects an executive decision on legality grounds, the President can, 
under certain conditions, insist on overriding the Comptroller’s determination. This 
mechanism is often called ‘presidential insistence’. If the rejection is based on 
constitutionality grounds, the President can request that the Constitutional Tribunal 
adjudicates the dispute. 
 
Currently, presidential insistence is regulated at both the constitutional and the legal level 
(Constitution, Article 99; Organic Law, Article 10). In particular, Article 99 reads: 
In the exercise of the function of control of legality, the Comptroller General 
will register [tomará razón] all decrees and resolutions that, in accordance 
with the law, must be processed by the Office of the Comptroller General of 
the Republic or will object [representará] to the illegality which they may 
display; but he will have to process them when, despite his objection, the 
President of the Republic insists with the signature of all of his Ministers, in 
which case he shall send a copy of the respective decrees to the Chamber of 
Deputies. In no event will he process the decrees of expenditure that exceed 
the limit specified in the Constitution and he will submit a complete copy of 
the record to the same Chamber.  
It shall also correspond to the Comptroller General of the Republic the 
register [tomar razón] of the decrees with force of law, having to object 
them [representarlos] when they exceed or contravene the delegatory law 
or are contrary to the Constitution.  
If the objection has place with respect to a decree with force of law, a decree 
that promulgates a law or a constitutional reform for departing from the 
approved text, or a decree or resolution for being contrary to the 
Constitution, the President of the Republic will not have the power to insist, 
and in the case that he is not satisfied with the objection of the Office of the 
Comptroller General of the Republic, he will have to forward the records to 
the Constitutional Court within ten days, so that this Court resolves the 
dispute.183 
 
It has been argued that this procedure expresses a non-legalistic conception of political 
disagreements.184 While a legalist conception conceives a disagreement as a technical 
controversy to be solved in a technical forum, a political or reflexive conception claims 
                                                 
183 Translation by constituteproject.com 
184 Fernando Atria, ‘Legalismo y reflexividad: La contraloría como modelo’, La Contraloría General de la 
República y el Estado de Derecho. 75 años de Vida Institucional 1927-2002 (Contraloría General de la 
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commonwealth constitutionalism. For this discussion, see Stephen Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth 
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that political controversies must be decided – in the last instance – by political bodies 
such as presidents or parliaments. 185  From this viewpoint, the importance of the 
presidential override is that it makes it politically costly for the President to take her 
preferred course of action. But the device does not prevent her from having the last 
word.186 Therefore, if the President insists, she will escalate the conflict, transforming it 
from a technical legal controversy to a political disagreement in which public opinion and 
other political actors might be engaged. This new dimension of the conflict, however, 
will be informed and enriched by the perspective of the Comptroller-General and other 
technical instances that may have been heard in the meantime. 
 
In concrete terms, in politically controversial times, the President has intensively 
exercised her powers to prevail over the Comptroller’s opposition by insisting on its 
previous determinations. One such period was Salvador Allende’s socialist government 
in the 1970s.187 However, this complex institutional device has not been used in the last 
few decades. Indeed, the last time a decree of insistence was enacted by the executive 
was in 1990, just after the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, when the President of the 
Republic intended to remove the head of a public university. An explanation for the 
President’s unwillingness to exercise his override power may lie in the relative consensual 
politics that have been commonplace in Chile since Pinochet’s dictatorship. Unlike in 
previous decades, disagreement among the political elites concerning the boundaries of 
legality has not reached critical levels. An alternative explanation may simply be that it 
is very rare for the Comptroller-General to reject administrative decisions.188  In the 
historical chapters of this thesis, these changes in the interactions between the executive 
and the Comptroller-General will be examined and the institutional and political reasons 
for these transformations explored.  
 
                                                 
185 Atria (n 184) 331. 
186 ibid 333. 
187 See Chapter 4. 
188 Garcés and Rajevic (n 1) [the authors link the low number of rejections and the absence of decrees of 
insistence in the last few decades]. 
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Figure 4: Insistence Decrees, 1933-2013 
 
V. THE POWER OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. Basic provisions 
The dispute-resolution function of the Office of the Comptroller-General is based on its 
power to provide legal opinions interpreting administrative legality. The office’s 
interpretive power (potestad dictaminante) might be defined as the power to issue binding 
legal opinions in case of doubts or uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the 
statutes that regulate public services. Unlike the ex-ante power of legality review (toma 
de razón), there are no constitutional provisions regulating this interpretive power. 
Nevertheless, although with different language, it has been regulated in the Comptroller’s 
Organic Law since the inception of the institution. However, as will be seen in chapter 3, 
the contemporary features of this power only crystallised in the 1950s.  
 
It is currently primarily contained in Article 6 of the Comptroller’s Organic Law in the 
following terms:189 
It is only for the Comptroller-General to report about salaries, rewards, 
allocations, evictions, pensions, retirements […] and in general about the 
matters related to the statute of public employees, and about the functioning 
of public services under its oversight, in order to ensure the proper 
application of the statutes and the regulations that govern them. 
                                                 
189 See also articles 5.3, 9, and 19 of the Organic Law. 
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Equally, it is for the Comptroller-General to inform about any other issue 
related to or that may relate to the expenditure or commitments of public 
funds, as long as doubts arise over the proper application of the respective 
statutes. 
The Comptroller-General shall neither intervene nor report on issues that 
either by their nature are of litigious character or that fall under the domain 
of the courts of justice, or that fall under the remit of the State Defence 
Council, notwithstanding the powers that, regarding judicial matters, this 
law grants to the Comptroller. 
According to the foregoing, only the decisions and reports of the 
Comptroller-General of the republic could be invoked as administrative 
jurisprudence in the matters referred to in Article 1. 
 
This somewhat confusing provision has been interpreted in the following manner. On the 
one hand, it ensures an interpretive domain for the Comptroller-General in matters 
relating to public administration. It conceives the institution as the primary interpreter of 
administrative legality. Its determinations, moreover, are binding on administrative 
officers and institutions – they constitute ‘administrative jurisprudence’. On the other 
hand, the interpretive powers of the office must not invade the judicial domain. Although 
it offers no guidance for drawing boundaries, the provision assumes the separation 
between administrative issues and judicial disputes. Certainly, there are historical reasons 
for interpreting the provision in this way. As said, for decades the Comptroller-General 
has acted as a court substitute due to the restricted regime of judicial review in the country, 
and the ambiguity of this legal provision has allowed political actors to justify the office’s 
adjudicatory functions.190 
B. Aims and functions 
In principle, this power operates regardless of any concrete administrative decision. 
Originally it was not designed as a power to challenge administrative action directly, but 
instead a power to give authoritative interpretations of the statutes that govern the use of 
administrative power. Over the years, though, the function has become more complex. 
Currently, through its statements, the Comptroller-General can render interpretative 
opinions about the rules that regulate the civil service, solve conflicts of jurisdiction 
among public bodies, coordinate internal control procedure of administrative agencies, 
and, importantly, adjudicate disputes between public bodies and private parties. 191 
                                                 
190 See Chapters 7 and 8. 
191 Raúl Letelier, ‘La Contraloría General de la República’ in Christian Viera, Jaime Bassa and Juan Carlos 
Ferrada (eds), La Constitución Chilena. Una revisión crítica a su práctica política (LOM 2015). 
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Beyond academic disagreement about boundaries, today the Comptroller-General 
operates as a site for the protection of rights against administrative action on a daily 
basis.192 
 
According to the literature, the aim of this power is to ensure that public law is properly 
and uniformly interpreted and applied across administrative agencies. In exercising this 
power, the Comptroller-General operates as a centralised interpretive forum.193  As a 
consequence, this institution may reduce with general effect the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of legislation, avoid further litigation, and make administrative action more 
predictable.194 In addition to its interpretive role, the institution has also performed more 
ambitious, creative tasks. For instance, some commentators have explained that the 
Chilean Comptroller-General office has acted as a ‘positive legislator’, filling the gaps 
left by a legislature unable to provide enough basic general regulation for the public 
administration.195  
 
An illustration of this creative power is the role of the Comptroller-General in 
administrative procedures.196 Indeed, through its interpretive function, the office filled 
numerous gaps of the Chilean regime of administrative procedures before the 
promulgation of a general piece of legislation in 2003. According to some commentators, 
the institution has played a ‘generalising role’. 197  By adjudicating complaints from 
individuals or answering requests from agencies asking for clarification of questions of 
law, the Comptroller-General constructed a complete regime of administrative procedure 
in the absence of statutory legislation. Drawing upon the constitutional right of petition, 
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it has developed a right to obtain a response from administrative agencies. According to 
the office, the administrative bodies have a duty to provide a proper response to petitions 
filed by citizens. 198  Furthermore, the administrative response has to meet certain 
requirements such as being written, timely, and conclusive. It also has to be serviced to 
the affected party. Other important areas developed by this body have been publicity, 
means of internal review, and due process in disciplinary proceedings and in public 
procurement.199 More recently, when the legislature has intervened providing statutory 
legislation, it has taken inspiration from the rules and principles already elaborated by the 
office. Even after the enactment of the Chilean Administrative Procedure Act 2003, the 
Comptroller-General has continued to play a leading role in the clarification of alleged 
obscurities in the law. 200  Further areas of involvement are local government, 201 
government information and advertising,202 urban planning,203 probity and conflict of 
interests,204 state enterprises,205 and public procurement,206 among many others. 
 
This feature echoes the function performed by the Conseil d’Etat in France. Bell explains, 
for instance, that ‘the role of the Conseil d'Etat has very much been to supplement the 
rules laid down by the legislator’ since ‘[its function] is both to create and enforce 
standards’.207 Similarly, Hamson indicates that the French institution has created a body 
                                                 
198 ibid 77. 
199 ibid 70. 
200 Jara (n 196). The Comptroller-General has issued interpretive statements regarding matters such as the 
scope of the law, the content of the principles of procedure, the means of invalidation by the administration 
itself, internal complaints procedures, administrative inaction, and so forth. 
201 José Fernández, ‘La Contraloría General de la República en relación a las Municipalidades’, Contraloría 
General de la República: 85 Años de Vida Institucional (Contraloría General de la República 2012). 
202  Cristobal Osorio and Gerardo Ramírez, ‘La comunicación y difusión de las políticas públicas de 
gobierno. Aspectos constitucionales, legales y presupuestarios’ (2016) 85 Revista de Derecho Público (U. 
de Chile) 141. 
203 José Fernández, ‘Contraloría y urbanismo’ (2013) 78 Revista de Derecho Público (U. de Chile) 51; 
Camila Boettiger, ‘El principio de la buena fe en la jurisprudencia de la Contraloría General de la República 
en materia urbanística’ (2009) 19 Actualidad Jurídica 309. 
204  Flavio Quezada, ‘Los conflictos de intereses en la jurisprudencia de la Contraloría General de la 
República a la luz de los tratados internacionales contra la corrupción’ in Manuel Nuñez (ed), 
Internacionalización del Derecho Público. Actas de las XLII Jornadas de Derecho Público. (Legal 
Publishing 2015); Julio Pallavicini, ‘El principio de probidad administrativa en la jurisprudencia de la 
Contraloría General’ (2013) 78 Revista de Derecho Público (U. de Chile) 117. 
205 Diego Pardow and Rodrigo Vallejo, ‘Fiscalización y transparencia en las empresas del Estado: ¿Es más 
sinónimo de mejor?’ (2009) 71 Revista de Derecho Público (U. de Chile) 220. 
206 José Luis Lara and Carolina Helfmann, ‘La contribución de la jurisprudencia contralora al desarrollo y 
delimitación de los principios de la contratación administrativa’, Contraloría General de la República. 85 
años de vida institucional (1927-2012) (2012); Claudio Moraga, ‘La Contraloría General de la República 
y la contratación administrativa’ (2013) 78 Revista de Derecho Público (U. de Chile) 79. 
207 Bell, French Legal Cultures (n 11) 156. 
 80 
of precedents ‘to secure a proper and decent standard of behaviour in the French 
administration’.208  As Edley put it, the Conseil d’Etat has developed ‘extrastatutory 
doctrines of quasi-constitutional administrative law’.209 
Policy Areas 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Civil service issues 5802 7087 6335 7679 7494 
Administrative organisation and 
powers 
1420 1914 2346 2602 2680 
Public employment and social 
security 
2055 2196 1542 1821 1970 
CGR powers 1302 1078 1282 1348 1466 
Public works, housing, and urban 
planning 
759 759 708 732 898 
Economic, financial, and tariff issues 302 626 343 309 301 
Public property and land 193 195 223 320 357 
Budget and accounting regulations 95 122 106 101 135 
Access to information 
 
127 65 53 68 39 
Other issues 
 
2195 1809 1479 1449 1601 
Total 
 
16260 17862 16429 18442 18955 




Unlike the Chilean judiciary, the Comptroller-General has a strong doctrine of 
precedents.211 Based on a narrow reading of the Chilean Civil Code, the courts usually 
maintain that their rulings apply only to the case under consideration. Judicial decisions 
thus do not have general application, and courts in their reasoning do not abundantly cite 
them. This implies that it is not difficult to find contradictory decisions within the same 
court. The Comptroller-General, in contrast, usually makes constant and profuse 
references to its previous decisions on the same issue. It also declares explicitly when a 
criterion has changed. This practice is based on a reading of the office’s organic law, as 
                                                 
208 Hamson (n 9) 126–7; Edley (n 10) 242. 
209 Edley (n 10) 242. 
210 Source: Comptroller-General Annual Reports 
211 Urbano Marín, ‘La jurisprudencia administrativa de la Contraloría General y su relación con la de los 
tribunales y de otros organismos estatales’, Contraloría General de la República: 85 Años de Vida 
Institucional (Contraloría General de la República 2012); Gastón Astorquiza, ‘A propósito de la Contraloría 
General de la República y de su quehacer interpretativo del ordenamiento jurídico. Criterios’ in Contraloría 
General de la República (ed), La Contraloría General de la República y el estado de derecho. 75 años de 
vida institucional (1927-2002) (2nd edn, Contraloría General de la República 2012). 
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Article 6 states that only its decisions could be invoked as binding administrative 
precedents. For the purpose of keeping its precedents up to date, it administers an 
enormous database containing its previous decisions on a range of topics.212 As a result, 
practitioners usually consult the office’s database in order to anticipate the Comptroller-
General’s and administrative agencies’ action. 
C. Access 
As for access, Organic Law Article 5[3] provides a general clause that allows for 
intervention by public and private parties. It stipulates that the Comptroller-General will 
issue ‘interpretive statements’ (dictámenes) upon the request of affected parties, heads of 
public services, or any other authorities. A well-established reading of this regulation is 
that both public agencies and private parties can ask the Comptroller-General to issue 
statements whereby it provides authoritative interpretations of administrative legality. 
Also, the office usually issues statements about the legality of administrative decisions if 
it detects an illegality. In these cases, it intervenes upon its own initiative.213 
 
This interpretive power has become increasingly important in the last few decades 
because it further allows private avenues to challenge administrative decisions. Thus, 
while ex-ante legality review is conducted mainly through a procedure with limited 
private party participation, the exercise of this interpretative power enables private 
individuals to voice grievances and complaints against the administration. 214  For 
instance, as Table 2 shows, between 2007 and 2014 over 70% of the cases involving 
interpretative powers were initiated by petitions from private parties or public employees. 
 
Petitioner 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
National Congress 186 227 220 146 161 136 137 98 
Jurisdictional bodies or collaborators  232 369 457 242 113 108 96 148 
                                                 
212 The origin of the use of precedents in the office is essentially bureaucratic rather than judicial. Former 
Comptroller-General Enrique Silva Cimma reports that as a result of internal bureaucratic needs, a crucial 
device for the institution’s doctrine of precedents was created in the 1950s. Roberto Benfeld, a European 
immigrant, developed an inventory of the legal decisions adopted by the office and cross-references in 
order to avoid contradictions that were hitherto occurring, since no such system existed. Until then, it was 
impossible to know what the body had decided on a particular issue. See Enrique Silva Cimma, Memorias 
privadas de un hombre público (Editorial Andrés Bello 2000) 119; see also Marín (n 30) 149. 
213 For a critical discussion of cases involving municipalities, see Samuel Tschorne, ‘Comentario de la 
jurisprudencia del año 2004: Derecho administrativo’ (2005) 2 Revista de Derecho (Universidad Adolfo 
Ibáñez) 844, 844–61. 
214 Bermúdez (n 170) 403ff. 
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Ministries, public services, universities, 
and state companies 
1068 1274 1747 1746 2160 1788 1949 2117 
Municipalities and mayors 1277 1497 1451 1116 1446 1351 1528 1807 





































Private access to the Comptroller-General’s remedies through this procedure is not only 
a matter of fact, but also a matter of law.216 Since 1974 the Comptroller-General has 
accepted jurisdiction to intervene if the request is based upon a previous refusal or a 
delayed response by an administrative agency.217 In other words, the affected party first 
has to seek relief before the primary decision-maker, and only subsequently before the 
Comptroller-General. Of course, this criterion echoes the rule of the ‘prior decision’ in 
French administrative law.218 Today’s access, however, is even greater. In March 2013, 
Comptroller Mendoza issued a new statement determining the rules governing standing 
to request an interpretive opinion from the Comptroller-General.219 According to the new 
scheme, government bodies can request the office’s legal opinions only in respect to 
matters that fall under their jurisdiction or that have a direct impact on their powers. 
Moreover, they must previously submit a legal report drafted by their internal advisors 
and clearly and precisely state their request. Private parties and administrative officers, in 
their personal capacity, on the other hand, can only request legal opinions in respect to 
affairs in which they have rights or specific interests, either individual or collective, at 
stake. Although this represents a narrow view of locus standi, it entails the abandonment 
of the need for a previous complaint against the administration in order to lodge a request 
with the Comptroller-General. Moreover, the new regulation gives discretion to the 
institution to issue a legal opinion – when the nature and the circumstances of the case 
                                                 
215 Source: Comptroller-General Annual Reports. 
216 For a narrow approach to direct private access, see Marín (n 211) 150–1. He argues that, unlike public 
bodies, private parties cannot file abstract inquiries to the office, but can file complaints in case of an 
adverse decision. Civil servants in turn can complain by invoking Article 154 Law 18834. 
217 Ruling 24841 (1974). A contemporary application of the same criteria can be found in ruling 61598 
(2011). 
218 Brown and Bell (n 171) 165–6. 
219 Ruling 24143 (2015). 
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call for it – despite the failure of the complainant to meet the previously mentioned 
conditions. Hence, this last provision opens up the possibility for public interest standing 
before the office. 
D. Legal authority and limits 
Compliance with the Comptroller-General’s rulings is mandatory for administrative 
agencies. They are not mere guidance or advisory opinions. Indeed, Article 9 of the 
Organic Law states that the Comptroller-General’s ‘interpretive opinions are binding to 
the respective officers, in the case or cases they refer on’. Also, Article 19 states that 
lawyers, and in-house counsel in every department of the public administration or in 
institutions under the oversight of the Comptroller-General, that do not represent the 
government in courts will be subjected to the technical supervision of the office, whose 
jurisprudence and resolutions must be observed. Disobedience of the legal interpretation 
issued by the office may result in disciplinary or even criminal proceedings.220 In other 
words, they cannot be enforced directly, but through disciplinary proceedings.221 
 
In practical terms, the Comptroller-General’s statements consist of clarifications of legal 
provisions. According to the office’s doctrine, these rulings merely declare what is 
already implicit in the law. As they are mere interpretations, they do not change the law.222 
As a result, it has been argued that these interpretations have retroactive effect. In other 
words, they merely declare the proper interpretation that the statute has possessed ever 
since its enactment.223 Nevertheless, the office can quite flexibly reconsider its own 
interpretive opinions.224 Thus, in contrast to the judiciary, the principle of res iudicata 
does not apply the interpretations issued by the Office of the Comptroller-General. As a 
commentator put it in 1963, the office has the duty to actively seek the right interpretation 
                                                 
220 Cordero, ‘La jurisprudencia administrativa en perspectiva: Entre legislador positivo y juez activista’ (n 
176) 170. It has been argued that this mandatory effect is narrower than what is usually asserted by the 
office. See Eduardo Aldunate, ‘La evolución de la función de control de la Contraloría General de la 
República’ (2005) 26 Revista de Derecho (Pontificia U. Católica de Valparaíso). 
221 Marín (n 211) 153.  
222 Luis Cordero, ‘Nulidad y dictaminación de Contraloría. Nuevas formas de declaración de ilegalidad. 
Comentario a las sentencias del caso CMPC’ (2013) Anuario de Derecho Público UDP 256, 264–5. 
223 Julio Pallavicini, ‘Control de constitucionalidad de la Contraloría General de la República’ (2010) 72 
Revista de Derecho Público (U. de Chile) 108, 127; Iván Aróstica, ‘Notas sobre los dictámenes de la 
Contraloría General de la República’ (1989) XX Jornadas de derecho público (U de Valparaíso) 531, 541. 
224 However, Soto-Kloss has adopted the extreme position that Comptroller-General cannot depart from its 
prior opinions. See Eduardo Soto-Kloss, ‘Acerca de la obligatoriedad de los precedentes en la actividad 
administrativa del estado’ (1999) 26 Revista Chilena de Derecho 399. 
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of the law and address reconsideration petitions filed by affected parties because ‘it is not 
possible to persist in error if subsequently one becomes fully aware of it’.225 To avoid 
harming legitimate expectations, the office has recently developed a doctrine according 
to which its reconsiderations only apply prospectively. 
 
The Organic Law states an important limit to the otherwise very extensive powers of the 
Comptroller-General. Article 6.3 states that the office shall neither intervene nor report 
on issues that either by their nature are litigious in character or are subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of justice. These issues, the provision adds, fall within the remit 
of the Council of Defence of the State, the agency in charge of the legal representation of 
the treasury before the courts. According to the traditional interpretation, this provision 
sets the boundaries within which the Comptroller-General office can act. Beyond that, it 
would be interfering in the other branches’ remit.226 The boundaries between the courts 
and the Comptroller-General will be discussed in detail in chapter 8. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided an overview of the structure, functions, and powers of the 
Office of the Comptroller-General. I will highlight the main points that have emerged in 
my account of the office. First, we have seen that the institution is governed by rigid legal 
arrangements – difficult to modify without a high degree of political and inter-
institutional consensus. This has also entailed the survival of old-fashioned legal 
structures with little room for adjustment to new circumstances. Secondly, the institution 
enjoys a high degree of independence from the other branches of government. Although 
a component of the executive branch, it is conceived as autonomous from the President 
of the Republic. This independence is reflected in the appointment, tenure, and everyday 
operation of the institution. The Comptroller-General is equally independent of the 
judiciary and Congress. Its constitutional status has prompted some commentators to 
regard it as a fourth branch of government within the Chilean political system. Internally, 
the office displays a hierarchical structure, concentrating power in the head of the office. 
Yet a large bureaucracy works within the institution. For historical and functional reasons, 
some departments possess a greater reputation. Among these, I have mentioned the Legal 
                                                 
225 Ruling 62927 (1963) cited by Marín (n 211) 153. 
226 Enrique Silva Cimma, Derecho administrativo chileno y comparado. El control público (Editorial 
Jurídica de Chile 1995) 172. 
 85 
Department and the Infrastructure and Regulation Department. They illustrate the weight 
of legal functions in the institution and the specialisation and expertise of its units.  
 
Thirdly, the Comptroller-General can be described as a multi-tasking institution. It 
performs financial and legal accountability functions, and its role as a financial oversight 
body is a feature shared with comparable organisations elsewhere. What is distinctive 
about the Comptroller-General is its legal accountability role. It intervenes in reviewing 
major government rules and other administrative decisions before their promulgation, 
wielding a remarkable veto power. To avoid the risk of administrative deadlock, under 
certain conditions, the executive branch can override adverse Comptroller-General 
determinations. The institution also performs adjudicatory functions, acting as an arbiter 
in disputes among public bodies or between them and private parties. This dimension of 
the office has been developed by interpreting its ambiguous organic legislation with the 
view of broadening access to the limited forms of administrative justice existing in Chile. 
 
In brief, the Office of the Comptroller-General has developed as a hybrid institution that 
has adapted to demands for legality in a context of dysfunctional administrative justice 
arrangements. The body has operated in order to serve distinctive legal values such as 
consistency, rule interpretation, impartiality, publicity, and access to aggrieved parties, 
among others. Its unplanned growth has given the office some distinctive organisational 
and functional features that make it an institutional creature worth of closer inspection. 
Such an inspection will be carried out in the rest of this thesis. 
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PART II HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY
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CHAPTER 3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CUSTODIAN OF EXECUTIVE 
LEGALITY, 1927-1970 
 
Adopting a historical institutional perspective, this chapter examines the transformation 
of the Comptroller-General Office over half a century. The institution developed 
alongside the growth of the administrative state in Chile. Indeed, it emerged as a by-
product of the development of modern, executive-centred forms of government. Yet it 
cannot be conceived as a mere tool of executive power. This chapter shows that the 
emergence of the Comptroller-General as a main actor in the Chilean political 
arrangement can only be explained as an unintended consequence of institutional 
competition between the executive branch and the legislature. 
 
The chapter examines the functioning of the institution during a period in which Chile 
resumed relatively stable practices of government after some years of institutional 
turmoil. It is revealing that, although it began with an institutional crisis, seven 
uninterrupted presidential terms followed. Yet this does not mean that these were 
completely peaceful times for the institution. On occasion, the office was under strain and 
even came under outright attack from both Congress and the executive. This feature 
allows an examination of the office both in routine contexts and also in situations in which 
the political stakes were high. 
 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section examines the origins of 
the office in the context of political crisis that triggered the enactment of the Constitution 
of 1925 and the establishment of the Office of the Comptroller-General in 1927. This part 
covers approximately the first decade and a half of the institution. The second section 
explores the transformation of the Comptroller-General into a custodian of legality in 
partnership with Congress. This part focuses on the role of the institution from the 1940s 
to the 1960s, just before the socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1970, which will 







A. The Constitution of 1925: strong executive and accountability gap 
To understand the origins of the Office of the Comptroller-General, it is necessary to 
examine briefly the political background of its establishment. The institution was created 
against the backdrop of the transformation of the Chilean political regime from quasi-
parliamentarian practices to a strong Presidential government. The main instrument for 
bringing about these new arrangements was the Constitution of 1925. Two features of the 
Constitution are particularly important for understanding the subsequent role of the 
Comptroller-General: the concentration of power in the executive branch and the lack of 
adequate mechanisms against abuse of executive power. 
 
Indeed, two years before the establishment of the Comptroller-General in 1927, a new 
Constitution replaced the old Constitution of 1833, which had been in force for almost 
100 years, since the beginning of the Republic. The new 1925 Constitution was brought 
about by a political and economic crisis that triggered profound institutional instability in 
the early 1920s. At the time, public opinion regarded the relationship between the 
President and Congress as unbalanced and reflecting an irregular form of 
parliamentarianism.227 As a commentator put it, ‘the crisis and the final breakdown of the 
oligarchic state in the early 1920s had produced a deep feeling of discontent among 
Chileans about the parliamentary system, the politicians, and the so-called aristocratic 
frond [sic]. Parliamentarianism was morally, intellectually, and politically completely 
discredited, according to most testimonies’.228 In addition, this dysfunctional political 
process was hampering the capacity of an already weak public administration to deliver 
the services that the new urban population was urgently demanding. The offices of the 
executive were completely ‘deranged’.229 Under the influence of party politics and the 
relentless involvement of Congress, ministries had no authority to correct faults, and they 
lacked the stability and continuity needed to carry out their tasks effectively. 
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Against this backdrop, in 1920 Arturo Alessandri was elected as President of the 
Republic, leading a broad platform representing popular and middle-class interests.230 His 
programme incorporated a number of policy innovations, such as social legislation, a 
Labour Code, income tax, and, generally, the strengthening of the executive branch. 
Alessandri also promised a constitutional reform that would put an end to oligarchic 
practices, shifting power from Congress to the Presidency.231 In his annual addresses to 
Congress in 1921, 1922, and 1923, President Alessandri reiterated his intention of 
conferring more powers to the executive so that the interaction with Congress would be 
in ‘harmony’.232 
 
After months of deep political emergency and two unsuccessful Military Juntas, 
Alessandri was called back to power in March 1925 with the mandate of implementing 
comprehensive institutional reforms including the enactment of a new Constitution, 
which was finally approved in a referendum on 30 August 1925.233 The main driving 
force behind the arrangements of the 1925 Constitution was the concentration of power 
in the executive branch and, consequently, the strengthening of the bureaucracy.234 In 
fact, reacting against a relatively lengthy period of irregular parliamentarianism that 
triggered factionalism and political paralysis, the new Constitution set out to restore 
presidential government.235 The executive branch was granted large legislative powers. 
The President was also confirmed as the head of government and as the ultimate chief of 
public administration. Any trace of parliamentarian power to tinker with ministerial 
appointments, and any leeway for incursion into executive territory, was removed from 
the Constitution.236 
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As to mechanisms for checking executive abuse, the regulation of the judiciary deserves 
special mention.237 The Constitution of 1925, importantly, strengthened the judiciary, 
especially by reinforcing its independence from the executive in the appointment, 
monitoring, and removal of judges. The Constitution placed the Supreme Court over the 
rest of the courts and tribunals of the country as the highest court of the land. Yet the 
judiciary were endowed with no powers to scrutinise administrative action. Indeed, 
although the Supreme Court was granted a narrow power to declare that a legal provision 
was inapplicable in a particular case on constitutionality grounds, in general the judiciary 
were confined to criminal and civil disputes only. In other words, they were excluded 
from the more politicised area of judicial review of administrative action. Instead, the 
Constitution set out an exclusive administrative jurisdiction in charge of entertaining 
complaints against political or administrative authorities.238 Article 87 provided for the 
establishment of special administrative tribunals, in the following terms: 
Article 87. Administrative Tribunals will be formed with permanent 
members, to settle claims brought against arbitrary acts or decisions of the 
political or administrative authorities and whose cognizance is not conferred 
on other tribunals by the Constitution or laws. Legislative Acts shall define 
their organisation and powers. 
 
The decision to establish administrative tribunals in the 1925 Constitution can be 
understood as a political compromise between those supporting a stronger state and those 
opposing it and demanding legal safeguards for the protection of private interests. Indeed, 
the latter position was emphasised when Article 87 was discussed in the drafting 
committee. During the debate, the author of the motion asserted that private individuals 
and public servants needed more protection since executive power was increasing on a 
daily basis.239 
 
However, the institutional position of these administrative tribunals remained unclear. It 
was uncertain whether they were envisaged as independent or subordinate to the Supreme 
Court. Under a particularly strong conception of the separation of powers principle, the 
more accepted interpretation was that ordinary courts were banned from interfering with 
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administrative decision-making unless legislative provisions explicitly empowered them. 
Therefore, without legislative implementation of Article 87, there was no other 
independent check on executive action. 
 
Legislation implementing Article 87 was nonetheless never enacted, bringing about a 
situation in which ordinary courts held that they lacked jurisdiction for adjudicating 
disputes between private parties and administrative bodies. In fact, according to well-
established judicial doctrine, tribunals available for adjudicating those public law disputes 
could only be created by special legislation. While Congress enacted a few statutes setting 
out specialised tribunals responsible for dealing with specific disputes between 
administration and private individuals, generally Article 87 became a dormant clause, 
bringing about a huge accountability gap in the Chilean system of control over 
administrative power that persisted throughout most of the twentieth century.240 Bearing 
this in mind, it is not at all surprising that, as we will see, the Office of the Comptroller-
General would assume a role as a legality reviewer in order to fill the accountability gap 
left by the inactivity of the legislature.241 
B. Kemmerer’s financial reforms242 
The Comptroller-General Office was an Anglo-American legal transplant onto Latin 
American soil. Although it is true that the statute governing the office’s organisation and 
procedures incorporated ‘practices stretching back to the colonial period’243, the main 
influences on the initial design of the Chilean Comptroller appear to have come from the 
British Comptroller-Auditor General and its counterpart in the United States.244 In fact, 
the office was established after hearing advice from a mission of US advisers. They 
recommended a number of institutional reforms, including the creation of a new auditing 
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office that loosely followed the blueprint of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 that 
had established the General Accounting Office of the United States.245 
 
Between 1923 and 1931, the Kemmerer Missions – composed of US economic 
consultants and headed by Professor Edwin Kemmerer from Princeton University – 
advised various Latin American governments in Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
Peru on monetary, banking, and fiscal reform. The main motivation for these Andean 
countries to request Kemmerer’s financial advice was to improve their credit profile. 
 
The Kemmerer Mission visited Chile between July and October 1925 in the middle of 
debates about the new Constitution. The economic crisis was the main reason for the 
Chilean government to request Kemmerer’s services. The reform proposals submitted to 
the government were specifically directed at both the banking and the fiscal systems. As 
the proposals put forward by the US economists received cross-party support, it is not 
surprising that most of the pieces of legislation were rapidly enacted without relevant 
amendments. The organic bill of the Comptroller-General, though, was the most 
remarkable exception. Kemmerer conceived the creation of the Comptroller-General 
from the perspective of financial auditing; the mission never actually viewed it as a legal 
accountability body. The explicit purpose pursued in the creation of the institution was to 
oversee the operation of the new arrangements put in place with respect to the budget 
process. Additionally, the Comptroller-General was expected to purge the untidy 
previous organisational setting in the field, in which ‘several uncoordinated institutions 
with overlapping functions and jurisdictions had exercised tardy and haphazard fiscal 
control’.246 Since introducing a single, powerful monitoring institution had been a policy 
under consideration even before Kemmerer arrived, the mission’s recommendations just 
added more force to previous governmental initiatives.247 The Comptroller-General was 
also expected to generate additional and more reliable financial information. This would 
optimise governmental policy-making and implementation, particularly in the economic 
                                                 
245 For overviews of the US office at the time, see Roger R Trask, Defender of the Public Interest: The 
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domain. Furthermore, data produced by the agency would facilitate access to foreign 
credit by the Chilean state. 
 
The approval and setting in motion of the Office of the Comptroller-General was a 
particularly intricate business.248 In fact, ‘the comptroller, of all Kemmerer’s projects, 
took the longest to come into being’.249 The main reason for this seems to be the distrust 
with which the traditional bureaucracy looked at the newly proposed agency. Paul Drake 
indicates that ‘some commentators and government officials called for a return to the old 
fiscalizing system’.250 Anticipating criticism that would be voiced throughout the life of 
the institution, ‘critics complained that the comptroller was too powerful, complicated, 
and unwieldy’.251 Walter Van Deusen, a North American advisor who helped to adapt the 
original draft to Chilean law, nicely illustrates the challenges faced by the initiative in a 
postal communication with Kemmerer: 
The translation [of Kemmerer’s project] was so poor that some parts none 
of us could understand. I have heard that the poor translation was intentional 
to make more difficult the passage and putting into effect the law, as many 
of the government officials were very much opposed to the law. It would 
have been impossible to have passed the law through Congress. Fortunately 
the present government wants to clean house, and they can dictate this 
project under the authority of a law recently passed by Congress authorizing 
the consolidation of offices.252 
 
It was only in February 1927, almost two years after the mission’s visit to Chile, that the 
first regulation of the Comptroller-General was enacted.253 This law was not directly 
enacted by the legislature, but it was established by presidential decree as delegated 
legislation. The decree followed Kemmerer’s proposal, though a commission headed by 
the superintendent of banks adapted it to national legislation. 254  However, further 
refinement was needed. Thus, on Kemmerer’s advice, the government hired the services 
of US public accountant Thomas Lill with the mandate of collaborating in the practical 
activation of the institution. His work enabled the enactment of a second regulation in 
December 1927 that gave the agency a more stable legal framework.255 Finally, additional 
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regulations in 1932 and 1933 provided the office with its final legal structure for the 
decades to come.256 
 
Therefore, by the beginning of the 1930s, the constitutional and economic arrangements 
of the country had changed remarkably, underpinning a new model of government 
dominated by the President. The executive had been notably strengthened in its 
interaction with Congress, and also possessed more effective tools to exercise leadership 
over the bureaucracy. As we will see, the Comptroller-General reflected new 
constitutional understandings. 
C. The technocratic ethos 
The Comptroller-General emerged as a by-product of the growth of the modern Chilean 
developmental state in the early decades of the twentieth century.257 The institution was 
established under the influence of a developmental and technocratic ethos. This period 
witnessed a genuine constitutional moment not only because it coincided with the 
enactment of a new Constitution, but also because of long-term institutional and cultural 
changes that were taking place at the time. One of the assumptions was that the state had 
a protective role that could only be fulfilled through administrative action and 
organisation.258 This entailed a new conception of the state and politics. 
 
In the context of the new 1925 Constitution, the tendency to grant the executive – instead 
of the legislature or the judiciary – broad oversight powers over the bureaucracy is no 
surprise. A commentator writing at the time, for instance, argued in favour of setting out 
ex-ante and ex-post financial control over the bureaucracy in the Comptroller-General as 
a component of the executive branch.259 In his view, the executive branch represented 
capacity, intelligence, responsibility, and continuity of judgment. According to this 
observer, the legislature, on the contrary, embodied delay, incompetence, and 
irresponsibility. The task of the judiciary, in turn, was to adjudicate disputes between 
private parties and should be confined to that task. Courts’ expertise rested in adjudicating 
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disputes between conflicting private interests. Affairs concerning public funds, however, 
had to do with the public interest, and this was a type of task beyond judicial capacities. 
 
This new technocratic, pro-executive ideology is well illustrated by the figure of the 
Chilean lawyer and politician Pablo Ramírez.260  He headed the Comptroller-General 
Office at its inception in 1927. Even more importantly, he directly influenced the 
appointment of his successors until the early 1950s. Ramirez’s ideological commitments 
help explain the institutional culture of the office at the time. These commitments may be 
summarised by the project of ‘building a strong and efficient state [by isolating] public 
administration completely from political activities in order to avoid its subordination to 
parliamentary debates and party interests’.261 
 
Ramírez studied law at Universidad de Chile, where he was a disciple of Professor 
Valentín Letelier – a leading public law scholar. Early on, he joined the more collectivist 
side of the centre-left Radical Party. In 1912, Ramirez was elected deputy, obtaining his 
first relevant political job in Congress. Being highly critical of the traditional bureaucracy 
of the parliamentary regime, he strongly promoted wide-ranging administrative reform.262 
In his opinion, the government ‘lacked essential powers for ruling’.263 In 1925, taking 
advantage of his fluency in the English language, he began collaborating with the 
Kemmerer Mission. The same year, he started advising the Minister of Interior Carlos 
Ibáñez, who was convinced that a team of young, professional, middle class, apolitical 
technocrats was needed in order to implement Kemmerer’s proposals and state reform at 
large.264 Aged 40, Pablo Ramírez was appointed as Minister of Finance, with the mandate 
of implementing a financial reorganisation and the overhauling of public administration. 
In this position, he reorganised numerous administrative services, introduced private 
management techniques, implemented new financial legislation, and set in motion the 
Comptroller-General. 265  As can be seen, Ramírez’s ideas echoed the ‘scientific 
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management’ approach to bureaucracy developed in the US in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, which conceived public administration as ‘a form of 
management analogous to private-sector management’.266 
 
Pablo Ramirez’s most important project was to mastermind the setting in motion of the 
Office of the Comptroller-General.267 His preference for technical personnel is reflected 
in the subsequent appointments in the institution, showing a marked preference for 
engineers over ‘the lawyer element which previously monopolized [administrative] 
offices’. 268  At the very outset of the institution, he served in the joint positions of 
Comptroller-General and Minister of Finance (between March and July 1927). As 
minister, he then recommended the appointment of Kenneth Page, the second officer 
heading the institution, and continued the installment of the office on the advice of 
Thomas Lille.269 Page, who was previously a broker in the Valparaíso stock exchange, 
occupied the office for only five months between July and December 1927. He resigned 
after entering into controversy with Minister Ramírez, and returned to the private 
sector.270  The third head of office to be appointed was Rodolfo Jaramillo, a young 
professional close to Ramírez.271 An engineer specialising in railways and with ample 
experience in the public sector, he stayed in office for one year between 1928 and 1929. 
Afterwards, between January and November 1929, the office was headed by Edecio 
Torreblanca, who had also studied engineering, was a member of the Radical Party, and 
occupied a number of high posts in public administration.272 In turn, he was succeeded 
by Miguel Solar, who had a long career in public bureaucracy before joining the 
Comptroller-General as head of office between 1929 and 1932. 273  A lawyer was 
appointed after Solar’s resignation in 1932. This was Gustavo Ibáñez, who had vast 
experience in the Ministry of Finance and headed the Comptroller-General Office for six 
and a half years between 1932 and 1938.274 Thus, in its initial years, the Comptroller’s 
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Office was staffed by people who shared a technocratic mindset that contrasted with the 
generally more legalist socialisation of their counterparts in the judiciary. 
Comptroller-General Term in office Background 
Pablo Ramírez  26 March 1927 - 21 July 1927 Lawyer – Finance Minister 
Kenneth Page 22 July 1927- 14 Dec 1927 Stock market broker 
Rodolfo Jaramillo  5 Jan 1928 - 8 Jan 1929 Engineer – Civil servant 
Edecio Torreblanca  9 Jan 1929 - 5 Nov 1929 Engineer – Civil servant 
Miguel Solar  7 Nov 1929 - 22 Feb 1932 Civil servant  
Gustavo Ibáñez  23 Feb 1932 - 31 Dec 1938 Lawyer – Civil servant 
Agustín Vigorena  5 Jan 1939 - 18 Dec 1945 Lawyer - Law professor 
Table 3: Heads of the Comptroller-General Office, 1927-1945 
 
As the 1929 economic crisis shocked the country, Ramírez had to resign and was even 
impeached by Congress for political harassment against members of the Council of 
Defence of the State – the office representing the state before the judiciary. Thereafter, 
the influence of Ramírez over the Chilean bureaucracy somewhat faded. However, a 
decade later, when his close friend lawyer Agustín Vigorena was appointed as 
Comptroller-General in 1939, Ramírez resumed his position of influence.275 As we will 
see, in a critical event, Comptroller Vigorena was successfully impeached in 1945, and 
Pablo Ramírez again managed to influence the appointment of his successor. Indeed, 
former Court of Appeal Judge Humberto Mewes, who was brother-in-law to Ramírez and 
a fellow member of the Radical Party, was convinced by Ramírez to accept the position 
despite the fact that he was rather inexperienced in administrative law.276 Comptroller 
Mewes remained in the highest position within the office between February 1946 and 
June 1952, when he resigned after being threatened with impeachment by the 
opposition.277 
 
In conclusion, the influence of the technocratic ideology of the time could be perceived 
during the initial years of the Comptroller-General from the late 1920s onwards. 
According to some historians, the foundations of a system of presidential statism were 
laid in this period. 278  In other words, an entire administrative structure under the 
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immediate control of the President was created, concentrating power in the executive 
branch. Hence, technocracy and authoritarianism appeared to be well imprinted in the 
institutional culture of the organisation in its early years. This also helped the office to 
gain acceptance and credibility in the eyes of the executive branch, and arguably 
facilitated further expansion of its influence in the coming decades.  
D. The formation of the key features of the office 
After examining the context of the establishment of the office and the institutional and 
personal forces that drove its initial years, it is time now to look briefly at the manner in 
which legal regulations shaped the institution and its main procedures. I will focus here 
on three aspects: the appointment and removal of the head of the office and the rest of his 
personnel; the power of ex-ante legality review; and the interpretive power of the office. 
This section will focus mainly on regulations enacted between 1927 and 1932, since they 
provided the legal foundations of the office. These provisions were enacted during 
tumultuous times, and, predictably, they were the result of practically unfettered 
executive discretion. In other words, Congress did not participate in the making of any of 
them. As expected, there are no records of the debate surrounding these pieces of 
legislation and, additionally, the institutional context of their enactment explains their 
marked pro-executive bias. In line with my previous remarks, then, the picture that 
emerges is one of an institution that is conceived as a tool of presidential control of the 
bureaucracy. 
1. Independence and recruitment 
The office’s independence, including its institutional location, appointment, tenure, and 
removal of its head, has been a crucial aspect in the design of Comptroller-General offices 
elsewhere. The regulation on which the Chilean office was modelled – the US Budget 
and Accounting Act of 1921 – has been described as ‘the culmination of a movement to 
ensure that the nation’s auditing officers were independent of executive control’.279 In the 
nineteenth century, independence was a contested aspect of the office’s organisation 
because of its special quasi-judicial authority. This function required a ‘complex balance 
among presidential power, congressional prerogative, and the need for agency 
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independence’.280 In other words, because of its legal accountability role, since its origins 
the institution has always had some sort of relative independence from presidential 
control. 281  Later, the 1921 Act also sparked controversy in this respect. During the 
legislative debate there was serious disagreement about the degree of independence 
granted to the office and its institutional location. Eventually, provisions were approved 
establishing that the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, would appoint 
the head of the office; it was also set out that there would be a fixed term for the 
Comptroller General and a strict procedure – involving Congress intervention – for 
removing him from office.282 
 
In contrast, under the original model, the Chilean Comptroller-General Office – contained 
in the Decrees of 1927 and 1928 – was not conceived as an independent institution. 
Rather, it had a position subordinate to the President. The rules concerning the 
appointment and removal of the Comptroller-General and his staff are instructive in this 
regard. They represent the highest level of presidential control over the office. At that 
point, the power to appoint the Comptroller-General rested exclusively with the President, 
and the regulations explicitly stated that he was directly accountable to the President for 
the due performance of his duties.283 Echoing a rule contained in the act governing its US 
counterpart,284 the 1927 decree nonetheless stated that the Comptroller-General ‘shall be 
independent of every ministry and any other state departments’.285 Yet it is worth noting 
that this rule did not confer the office with independence from the President. 286  Its 
purpose was merely that of shielding the office from the influences of other executive 
departments, and ensuring a direct, unmediated relation with the President. The status of 
the Comptroller-General was intended to be that of a ministry but sheltered against 
political instability.287 Therefore, the entire scheme reflected intense presidential control. 
 
                                                 
280 Jerry Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American 
Administrative Law (Yale University Press 2012) 40–2. 
281 Lessig and Sunstein (n 72) 17–8; Cane, Controlling Administrative Power (n 15) 163. 
282 Trask (n 245) 41–2. 
283 See Article 2 DFL 400bis; and Article 2 DFL 2960bis. 
284 See Section 301.  
285 Article 1. 
286 See Art 12 a) Decree 7912, Concerning the Organisation of Secretaries of States, which stipulates that 
the Comptroller is directly dependent on the President of the Republic. 
287 Correa (n 244) 157–61. 
 102 
Presidential influence was not confined to the head of the office. Under the 1927 decree, 
the power to appoint, suspend, or remove any employee of the office was held by the 
head of the office, who had to give an account of its exercise to the President.288 The 1928 
decree went even further. It provided that the Comptroller-General, the Deputy 
Comptroller, and the Inspector-General would be presidential appointees. Additionally, 
it was stated that the Comptroller had the power to appoint the rest of the staff ‘with the 
written approval of the President’. 289  Clearly, this latter decree represented a legal 
framework meaning that less autonomy was conceded to the office.290 In fact, the 1932 
decree returned to the original regulation, eliminating the requirement for written 
presidential approval to hire staff.291 
 
The decree of 1927 stayed silent on the removal of the Comptroller-General, entailing 
that the President could remove the officer at will. Later, evidencing loose American 
influence, the decree of 1928 provided that the Comptroller-General would remain in 
office for six years, and could be reappointed.292 However, generally, the officer was to 
serve at the President’s discretion as in the previous arrangement. The 1932 regulation 
considerably altered the tenure and removal provisions. It repealed the fixed term for the 
officer and, furthermore, it innovated the shielding of the Comptroller-General with the 
protections against dismissal accorded to the justices of the higher courts of justice. 
Indeed, the 1932 decree indicated that ‘the Comptroller-General and the Deputy 
Comptroller-General shall enjoy the privileges and tenure that the laws ensure for the 
members of the Highest Courts of Justice’.293 This meant that these officers would be 
guaranteed to hold office during good behaviour and could be removed only through a 
judicial procedure initiated by presidential petition. In this way, this regulation weakened 
the control of the President over the office, and strengthened its independence. 
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In short, despite the original divergence with its US counterpart, by 1932 the office 
exhibited a fair degree of independence, although it did have strong links with the 
President as he exclusively appointed the office-holder. However, the Comptroller-
General had the power to appoint the rest of his staff without external influence. This 
officer would remain in office during good behaviour and could only be removed for 
cause through a judicial procedure. Therefore, like its American counterpart, these latter 
institutional arrangements started to recognise the quasi-judicial authority of the 
institution. 
2.  Ex-ante legality review 
The most characteristic power of the modern Comptroller-General is its power to exercise 
mandatory ex-ante review of executive decision-making, together with the power of the 
President to override a negative ruling by the office. Although it exhibits some vestiges 
of nineteenth century regulations, the modern form of this power was predominantly 
shaped by piecemeal evolution during the years under study. 
 
Certainly, some sort of ex-ante review procedure preceded the creation of the 
Comptroller-General. 294  Indeed, three of the main legal statutes governing financial 
scrutiny of administrative activity in the nineteenth century contained a version of this 
mechanism.295 All these rules conferred the Comptroller’s predecessors with the power 
of legality clearance, though it was confined to expenditure and appointment decrees. 
This checking device entailed the authority to paralyse (‘representar’) the 
implementation of the administrative decision at stake. The President, in turn, had the 
counter-power to override the veto by insisting on his original decision. The reviewing 
body had also a duty to report to the legislature in case the President exercised his 
insistence power, in order to enable the assembly to hold the executive politically 
responsible for a potential infringement of the law. In contrast with the contemporary 
mechanism, however, the laws governing the insistence power did not require the 
President to be supported by his entire cabinet of ministries in order to override a veto. 
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Until 1891 the insistence power was scarcely used, if ever, probably because of the non-
existence of real controversies between Presidents and overseers.296 From that point on, 
however, the Court of Accounts adopted an activist approach, going beyond control over 
payment decrees by expanding its examinations to every decree.297 This attitude caused 
a series of constitutional clashes with ministers and Congress as the Court was accused 
of invading the political sphere.298 Then, in 1920, Congress passed law 3620, which 
reformed the Court of Accounts. The law officialised previous practice establishing that 
the Court must control the legality of decrees in general – not only payments – and 
required the signature of the entire Cabinet to issue a decree of insistence.299  
 
Unsurprisingly, the decree of 1927 that created the Comptroller-General departed from 
this traditional scheme, and reinforced the binding nature of the legality check on 
presidential decision-making. In fact, reflecting the influence of Kemmerer, this decree 
did not contain a mechanism for presidential override.300 As they wanted to reinforce the 
technical over the political aspects of government, the Kemmerer Mission advisers were 
against insistence.301 Thus, this regulation merely stated that every payment required 
prior authorisation by the Comptroller-General, and that this had to take into account both 
legality and the justification of the expenditure.302 Yet the regulation did not mention 
legality review, veto, insistence, or the involvement of Congress. 
 
In October 1927, however, French public law professor Gastón Jeze visited Chile, and 
had a notable impact on the future regulation of the legality review procedure.303 His 
views diverged from Kemmerer’s in key aspects. Among other things, he suggested that 
drafters make the Comptroller-General’s veto a relative device instead of an absolute one. 
This entailed that the President could override the office’s veto in exceptional 
circumstances. Jeze argued that a technical body would be realistically unable to go 
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against the presidential political power. As the absolute veto would end up eroding the 
overseer’s public standing, this relative veto was actually a better tool for keeping the 
technical and political spheres clearly separated. As expected, these suggestions were 
welcomed by executive officers but were strongly opposed by Kemmerer’s 
representatives.304 
 
Reflecting some of Jeze’s views, the decree of 1928 returned to the traditional model but 
with some remarkable variations.305 First, the scope of the legality review was broadened, 
encompassing not only payment decrees but also every sort of presidential decree.306 Of 
course, this was consistent with the solution arrived at in the 1920 law. Secondly, it 
expressly provided that the Comptroller-General had to check the constitutionality and 
legality of the decrees. Thirdly, by requiring the President to sign the insistence decision 
together with all his ministries, the law confined his self-defence power. In other words, 
the President had to show that she possessed enough political support to override the 
Comptroller’s vetoes. Yet it would be wrong to deduce from these modifications an 
intention to tame the powers of the executive. In fact, they were complemented by 
changes that made the power of the Comptroller-General negligible. In order to reject a 
presidential decree, negative decisions had to be endorsed simultaneously by the 
Comptroller-General and the Deputy Comptroller-General, both of which were appointed 
and removed directly by the President. Thus, the veto power of the office was 
considerably weak. Moreover, the 1928 decree did not incorporate the engagement of 
Congress in case of use of the power of insistence by the President. It only demanded the 
office to register in its Annual Report to the President the cases in which the power was 
utilised. 
 
The 1932 decree in turn kept the main features of the previous regulation. Apparently, it 
contained no radical changes.307 Nevertheless, as we have seen, this decree had enlarged 
the independence of the office from executive interference, so the institutional context 
against which this review power was now operating was different and actually somewhat 
reinforced its legal authority. By then, legality review consisted of a procedure conducted 
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by a semi-independent institution encompassing all decrees, involving legality and 
constitutionality scrutiny, subject to presidential override, and entailing duties to report 
to Congress in the case of insistence. 
 
In 1935, for the first time, impeachment procedures were initiated against ministries for 
unlawful use of their insistence powers.308 Although the impeachment was eventually 
unsuccessful, it reveals the importance of use of ‘pre-emptive insistence’ (decretos 
nonatos) at the time, as this was the indictment’s main ground. Pre-emptive insistence 
was a mechanism used by the executive branch to shield decrees from Comptroller-
General review and thus accelerate administrative action. Aware of the probable legal 
objection of the office, the respective ministry sent the original decree together with an 
insistence decree. Thus, the Comptroller-General was ordered to uphold the executive 
action immediately without further scrutiny. More than 100 pre-emptive insistence 
decrees were enacted between 1933 and 1943, as the Comptroller-General supported the 
practice.309 Observers, however, criticised this pattern, depicting it as a subversion of the 
rule of law and the system of legality review.310 In their view, the proper operation of the 
mechanism required a genuine disagreement over the legality of the decree. Therefore, 
the President was not allowed to act with awareness of the unlawfulness of his action.311 
Soon afterwards, the Comptroller-General disallowed the use of pre-emptive insistence 
decrees and the practice ended. This shift signalled the transformation of the Comptroller-
General from a de facto legal advisor to an independent legal overseer. 
3.  Interpretive power 
Finally, another distinctive power of the Chilean Comptroller-General is its power to 
issue binding legal pronouncements interpreting the legislation governing the 
administrative process. In contrast to the previous features of the office examined, the 
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origin of this power does not rest in colonial times nor in the Kemmerer Mission plans, 
but in legal reforms passed in 1932 and complemented thereafter. 
 
In the legislation of the nineteenth century, there is no clear precursor to this power. In 
the Ordinance of the Superior Court of Accounts and the High Accounting Office of 1839, 
we found an indication of a similar power in the hands of the High Accounting Office. It 
conferred on this official the power to ‘issue the reports that the Ministers of State and 
the High Courts of Justice may request’.312 But the scope of this power was considerably 
narrower than the contemporary. Certainly, it did not encompass pronouncements about 
the correct interpretation of legal rules governing administrative agencies. In fact, the 
provision mandated the High Accountant to consult the President of the Republic in the 
case of doubts about the ‘proper meaning to be given to laws, regulations, decrees and 
any other provisions connected with the accounts trials’.313 Presidential interpretations of 
the law were binding on the High Accountant and not the other way around. 
 
A slightly comparable power is found in the Organic Law of the Court of Accounts of 
1888. This regulation stated that it was for the Court of Accounts to issue the reports 
requested by the President within its jurisdiction. 314  It also empowered the court to 
request the advocate general (Fiscal) to give legal opinions whenever appropriate.315 
Indeed, one of the most remarkable legal minds at the time, Advocate General Valentín 
Letelier, forged his reputation as a key figure in administrative law based on his legal 
opinions given to the Court of Accounts.316 Nonetheless, despite its historical importance, 
this power is hardly equivalent to the modern broader interpretive power of the 
Comptroller-General. 
 
As with the ex-ante legality review, the decree of 1927 did not include the power of the 
office to give legal opinions. The decree of 1928 nevertheless did rule on this matter in 
Article 7, providing that it was a duty of the Comptroller-General to issue legal opinions 
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concerning budget issues whenever requested by administrative officers.317 Thus, this 
interpretive power confined itself to financial and budgetary matters. It was not a power 
of general reach. Even though these legal opinions were binding on administrative 
officers, they could appeal against these rulings before the President through the 
respective minister.318 This rule, consequently, again shows the presidential overtones of 
the organic decree of 1928. 
 
The 1932 decree, finally, included the interpretive power of the Comptroller-General.319 
But this regulation expanded it beyond financial and budgetary matters, incorporating 
issues concerning ‘the organisation and functioning of public services’ and ‘the powers 
and duties of public employees’, among other matters. This was a crucial step towards 
the transformation of the office into a legal oversight institution. These provisions 
moreover recognised its powers to interact with state officers or private petitioners in 
order to request further information or issue orders. Similarly, the law empowered the 
Comptroller-General to give legal opinions on matters concerning civil service 
employees such as salaries, pensions, retirement, and so on if ‘doubts about the correct 
application of the corresponding statutes arise’. Thus, the power of the office to give 
binding legal interpretations of administrative legality began to adopt sharper features. 
Lastly, unlike the prior legislation, the 1932 decree established that the legal opinions of 
the Comptroller-General had not merely advisory character but were ‘mandatory for the 
corresponding officials, in the concrete case or cases to which they refer’. Furthermore, 
it is important to note that the appeal to the President in case of disagreement was 
eliminated, enlarging again the separation between the Comptroller-General Office and 
the Presidency. 
II. TRANSFORMATION 
During the 1940s, the place of the Comptroller-General within the Chilean accountability 
landscape was radically transformed. On the one hand, the office was entrenched in the 
Constitution in 1943. This granted it a unique status among the branches of government. 
On the other hand, in 1945 Congress removed Comptroller-General Vigorena by 
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impeachment for deficiencies in scrutiny of the presidential powers.320 As a result of this 
event, Congress signalled that ‘a more comprehensive scrutiny of the legality of 
government decrees’ was constitutionally required. 321  Under this new legal 
accountability model, the Comptroller-General may be conceptualised as an instrument 
of congressional influence over the bureaucracy. The main task of the office in qualitative 
terms was conceived of as holding the executive to account – especially in the exercise 
of its regulatory powers. As a result of this shift, by the 1960s the institution was seen as 
a fourth branch of government by political and legal observers.  
 
Some contextual factors that characterised the Chilean political scene by the 1940s and 
1950s should be borne in mind. First, despite the concentration of power in the executive 
branch brought about by the 1925 Constitution, tensions between Presidents and 
Congress persisted, which imposed a certain restraint on executive policy-making 
power.322 Secondly, there was increasing demand by a growing middle class for ‘public 
activity in welfare, health care, education and government-owned enterprises’.323 As a 
result, this period witnessed a significant expansion in state bureaucracy. For instance, 
between 1925 and 1945, employment in the central administration almost doubled, from 
33,877 to 59,645. 324  Thirdly, mainstream political parties politically supported this 
transformation into a developmental state, especially the Radical Party, which advocated 
‘welfare state interventionist’ policies.325 Finally, the role of courts at the time has been 
labelled as ‘conservative’, by which is meant that despite an ideology of apoliticism and 
an institutional disconnection from public law matters, judges adopted reactionary 
attitudes when called into action.326 In short, then, the period reveals an expanding state 
bureaucracy responding to growing social demands, but restrained by Congress and, to a 
lesser extent, by courts. 
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A. The constitutional amendment 
A key event in the transformation of the Comptroller-General was the constitutional 
reform of 1943. It primarily aimed to reduce the powers of Congress in respect to public 
expenditure legislation, but incidentally enshrined the office into the Constitution.327 
Being the first amendment introduced to the 1925 Constitution, it was discussed and 
approved in the final years of the Second World War, together with other pieces of 
legislation concerning economic emergency. Although it was introduced in Congress 
during the term of President Juan Antonio Ríos – a member of the Radical Party – its 
rationale long preceded his administration. Indeed, the idea of limiting the powers of the 
legislature regarding public expenditure can be traced back to the anti-legislature 
arguments supporting the Constitution of 1925. In particular, a comparable bill was 
introduced into the legislative process in 1934, but Congress rejected it in the final reading 
in 1941.328 On that occasion, the parties from the Left blocked what they viewed as 
dictatorial measures that debilitated the representative assembly in favour of the 
executive. Eventually, despite the rejection, the bill was reintroduced in Congress in 1942 
by a group of senators with the support of President Ríos. 
 
Behind this proposal lay a concern about the inorganic growth of bureaucracy and the 
underfunded rise of salaries and other economic benefits to certain groups. 329  The 
assumption was that the legislative process was too prone to engaging in pork-barrel 
politics and waste, hence the powers of Congress in financial matters had to be reduced.330 
There was also a concern about illegal expenditure by the executive through the use of 
the insistence mechanism. Therefore, the bill’s objective was twofold. On the one hand, 
it was aimed at eliminating the power of Congress to introduce motions entailing 
expenditure. Only the executive was allowed to introduce bills triggering disbursement 
of monies. On the other hand, it was intended to block the use of the insistence mechanism 
– which allowed the President to override the Comptroller-General’s vetoes – in relation 
to expenditure decrees. The predicament tackled by the reform was the practice of 
ordering payments without legal backing, and once the Comptroller-General vetoed it on 
legal grounds, then the President insisted on overriding the ruling. As a result, this gave 
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rise to executive expenditure that had not been authorised by Congress. Expectedly, the 
usual excuse for this was that urgent, extraordinary circumstances required the executive 
to respond even without explicit prior legal permission. In reaction to this scenario, the 
bill abolished executive insistence in relation with expenditure decrees, but permitted 
extraordinary expenditure for a maximum of 2% of the authorised annual budget in case 
of emergency. 
 
The entrenchment of the Comptroller-General into the Constitution was an ancillary issue 
to these arrangements. In fact, the original bill of 1934 contained no provision about the 
office. The idea of entrenching this accountability institution into the Constitution was 
suggested by senators during the legislative process that concluded without success in 
1941, but the proposal remained in the 1942 bill. Thus, originally the constitutionalisation 
of the office was a parliamentarian proposal. 
 
The idea of curtailing Congress’s powers came up against robust criticism. The Socialist 
Party, for instance, criticised the motion, arguing that Congress ought not relinquish the 
tools it had to advance social justice or defend the interests of the salaried class, adding 
that the bill was a step towards legal dictatorship.331 Similarly, the Communist Party 
claimed that the definition of expenditure and finance were essential tasks of Congress. 
Liberal, Conservative, and far-right representatives, on the contrary, supported the bill, 
stressing the need for a strong executive that would be able to resist pressure from the 
political parties. 332  Despite the heated debate, there was agreement on the fact that 
excessive use had been made of the insistence mechanism by prior administrations. Yet 
government officials repeatedly claimed that President Ríos had pledged not to use his 
override power.333 Eventually, the majority considered that the restriction on the use of 
insistence in respect to expenditure decrees struck the right balance between the 
limitations imposed on Congress and the powers of the executive.  
 
The final text of the amendment contained just two references to the Comptroller-
General. First, the office and its main functions were enshrined in Article 21 of the 
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Constitution. Secondly, it was established that the Chamber of Deputies had the power to 
impeach the Comptroller-General in the same terms as to the judges of the Higher Courts 
of Justice, that is, in case of manifest dereliction of duties. The deputies introduced the 
latter aspect of the amendment during the legislative discussion, as it was not included in 
the original bill.334 This was one of the few ideas of the deputies that were ratified by the 
Senate. In the opinion of a Radical Party senator, the power to impeach the Comptroller-
General was the logical implication of enshrining the office as a constitutional organ.335 
 
Two other proposals in relation to the Comptroller-General were debated, but neither of 
them achieved enough support. The first motion was aimed at explicitly introducing 
within the functions of the office the task of carrying out legality review of the acts of the 
executive branch.336 The reasons for the rejection of that motion remain vague. While 
some regarded it as unnecessary or futile as it was of the essence of the Comptroller-
General to rule on the legality or illegality of executive decrees, others feared that this 
rule might transform the institution into a parallel Supreme Court. 337 The second motion 
was intended to block the presidential power to insist on overriding a Comptroller 
decision in the case of decrees exhibiting manifest illegalities. This was probably viewed 
as an excessive constraint on executive action. The Conservative deputy Manuel Díez 
presented both pro-Comptroller proposals, but they were rejected without detailed 
deliberation.338 
 
There was no extensive deliberation on the core provisions for the Comptroller-General. 
The argument given in support of its introduction into the Constitution was simply that 
the office did not exist at the time of the 1925 Constitution, and therefore an update of 
the constitutionally entrenched organs was needed. It was also mentioned that the 
inorganic growth of bureaucracy had given rise to gaps in the control of some newly 
created agencies, and therefore a broader remit for the operation of the office as a legal 
regulator of the administrative process and as a Court of Accounts was desirable.339 
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Although no further substantive reasons were provided, it can be argued that political 
actors assumed that, in practice, the Comptroller-General had begun to play a role of 
constitutional importance, and that this function had to be protected by constitutional 
provisions. Also, there was probably another consideration in the mind of policy-makers 
at the time. As the constitutional amendment entailed strengthening the powers for 
economic regulation of the executive, a stronger safeguard in case of abuse was needed. 
This in turn required fortifying the independence of the Comptroller-General, as it was 
the only institution with oversight powers over the administrative process.  
B. Removal by impeachment 
The impeachment of Comptroller Agustín Vigorena marked the demise of the 
technocratic model of the Comptroller-General, according to which it was a collaborator 
with rather than an external constraint on the executive.340  A prestigious public law 
scholar and office-holder since 1939, Vigorena was convicted and removed from office 
in an impeachment trial in 1945, just two years after the constitutional reform. The Senate 
passed its judgment by 23 votes against 21. As the government had no control of the 
Senate, the decision was divided across political lines, with a Conservative majority 
supporting the impeachment. In the Senate the case was discussed over ten sessions that 
took place in December 1945. This has been the only case of a Comptroller-General being 
removed by impeachment proceedings in the office’s history. 
 
The deputies leading the impeachment before the Senate were members of the Liberal 
and the Conservative Parties.341 They opened their indictment by invoking the principles 
of democracy and of separation of powers. Although conceding that the President had 
legitimate regulatory powers, they insisted that they had to be exercised within legal 
boundaries. The precise function of the Comptroller-General was to ensure compliance 
with legality, as its organic law instructed the review of constitutionality and legality of 
presidential decrees. The accusers interpreted the 1943 reform as making the office-
holder directly accountable to Congress. They asserted that even though the importance 
and functions of this oversight body were expanded, control over it was conferred to the 
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Chamber of Deputies as it could impeach the office-holder for manifest dereliction of 
duties. 
 
On the whole, the impeachment was based on accusations of passivity in the review of 
executive activity on the economic sphere.342 According to the indictment, Vigorena had 
frequently upheld presidential decrees that regulated matters reserved by the Constitution 
for congressional laws. For instance, without prior legislative authorisation, the President 
created administrative departments; regulated the internal arrangements of some other 
bodies; and expanded the powers and autonomy of the commission in charge of internal 
commerce and of setting the prices of basic goods. Furthermore, the accusers held that 
the President had unlawfully imposed taxes and duties on private enterprises. They argued 
that some other measures promulgated under international war commitments infringed 
property rights and economic liberties protected by the Constitution. Besides, the 
President exceeded legislative delegations for regulating some affairs by decrees with 
force of law. He also established mediation mechanisms in case of labour conflicts 
without prior legal delegation. Instead of vetoing such unconstitutional acts, the 
Comptroller-General endorsed them, bringing legitimacy to unlawful executive action, 
according to the accusers. Furthermore, breaching his duties, Comptroller Vigorena had 
upheld decrees of economic emergency without verifying whether the factual conditions 
for the exercise of such power were met. Moreover, he endorsed decrees that exceeded 
the limit of 2% of the yearly budget required by the Constitution. Lastly, Vigorena was 
accused of irregularities in the management of his own office. 
 
The Comptroller-General’s response was quite detailed.343 He explained why he had not 
blocked presidential decisions in the cases raised by the accusers. This required him to 
expound on rather complicated statutory schemes that gave the executive sweeping 
administrative powers. Indeed, at times, he suggested that the accusers lacked proper 
understanding of regulatory arrangements that empowered the executive branch to 
implement policy expeditiously. Comptroller Vigorena thus insinuated that the 
impeachment was grounded on oversimplifications based on archaic private law 
conceptual categories and understandings. Later, he insisted on the different role of the 
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law in private and public. In his view, while the former privileged stability, the latter 
favoured flexibility. Hence, in administrative law, statutory provisions were inevitably 
complemented by administrative regulations that could be easily adapted to social 
necessity and changing reality. According to Vigorena, the role of the Comptroller-
General in this process was crucial, and would be severely undermined if Congress 
second-guessed its legal judgments.344 
 
Two other arguments deserve closer inspection. In relation to economic emergency 
decrees, Vigorena claimed that his office was not in a position to scrutinise matters of 
fact such as the concurrence of urgent circumstances345 or the existence of strikes aimed 
at subverting public order.346 On the other hand, he fiercely argued that legality review of 
administrative action was his exclusive function, just like the judiciary’s function was to 
adjudicate private disputes. Therefore, according to Vigorena, it was illegitimate for 
Congress to scrutinise the content of his decisions. In fact, he claimed that ‘[j]udges in 
the case of disputes between parties, and the Comptroller-General in the case of 
application of administrative legality are absolutely sovereign, hence both are 
unimpeachable in this regard’.347 He cautioned that it was dangerous for Congress to 
declare that a particular interpretation of the law entailed dereliction of duties, because if 
that were the case, judges and the Comptroller-General would have to ascertain the 
opinion of the majority of Congress before deciding what was legal or illegal.348 In other 
words, Vigorena was clearly pointing to the infringement of the principle of separation 
of powers. 
 
Furthermore, Vigorena maintained that the indictment was a threat to the independence 
of his office since it risked becoming a mere echo chamber for other branches’ 
conceptions of legality.349 Contrasting the technical nature of the functions of the office 
and the political nature of the legislature, Vigorena maintained that what was at stake was 
whether the legality review function of the Comptroller-General was subordinated to the 
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‘subsequent political appreciation of a majority of Congress’.350 In his view, for the 
concurrence of ‘manifest dereliction of duties’, a factual disciplinary infraction rather 
than disagreement in legal interpretation had to be found. In sum, in Vigorena’s opinion, 
the impeachment would lead to the dominance without the counterweight of one branch 
–the legislature – upon the others – the Comptroller-General, the judiciary, and the 
executive.351 
 
The latter part of Vigorena’s defence sparked a bitter reaction in the accusers. Deputy 
Santa Cruz, for instance, argued that the Comptroller-General could not be equated to a 
judge. Moreover, he remarked that even judges were impeachable for wrong 
interpretations of the law.352 After recalling that the 1943 constitutional reform made the 
institution accountable to Congress, Santa Cruz asserted that Vigorena’s thesis amounted 
to delusions of grandeur. He said that it was unacceptable that the Comptroller-General 
had the last word in matters of legal or constitutional interpretation. The deputy went on 
to claim that it could not be right that there was no institution that could render the 
Comptroller-General accountable for his indolent attitude to reviewing administrative 
decrees.353 The accusers also claimed that Vigorena represented a weak safeguard against 
abuse of executive power. In their view, Vigorena illegitimately excused himself by 
invoking social necessity and changing circumstances for disregarding the law, and this 
was intolerable in a democratic republic.354 
 
On the Senate’s floor, the senators reiterated the foregoing arguments for and against the 
impeachment.355 The majority argued that Vigorena had shown complicity with executive 
abuse of power. A minority of moderate members claimed that the Senate should not 
second-guess the legal interpretation carried out by the Comptroller-General. More 
radical members of Congress in turn asserted that the impeachment masqueraded as a 
political attack on government by reactionary forces. Eventually, the vote went against 
Vigorena, who was removed from office. The long-term consequences of the 
                                                 
350 ibid 544. 
351 ibid 547–50. 
352 ‘Chilean Senate, 18th Extraordinary Session’ (1945) 618–9. 
353 ibid 621. 
354 ‘Chilean Senate, 22th Extraordinary Session’ (n 344) 730–5. 
355 ‘Chilean Senate, 23th Extraordinary Session’ (1945) 748–70. 
 117 
impeachment were even more important, however, since they dramatically changed the 
relationship between the Comptroller-General Office, the President, and Congress. 
C. A new conception of the office 
Two pieces of legislation enacted in 1950 and 1962, respectively, stand out in the 
transformation of the Comptroller-General. Law 9687 of 1950 crystallised changes in 
attitudes to the office by increasing congressional influence over it, whereas Law 14832 
of 1962 attempted to reduce the burden that the office was imposing on administrative 
action but without diminishing its role within the administrative process. 
1. Increasing congressional influence 
Law 9687 of 1950 strengthened the Comptroller-General to a large extent. Passed by 
Radical Party president Gabriel González, this law was originally merely intended to set 
a new remuneration scheme for the staff of the office,356 but it eventually encompassed 
further aspects that loosened the presidential bearings on the office. Moreover, the 
legislative debate spelt out new shared understandings about the institution’s role. 
 
To begin with, this law provided that the appointment of the Comptroller-General by the 
President required Senate endorsement.357 Not contained in the original bill, this was a 
remarkable change in the appointment procedure. Deputy Hector Correa (Conservative 
Party) proposed this modification during the legislative process and argued for it in the 
following terms: 
[The aim is] that the Comptroller be a personality that can gain broad 
agreement in order to be appointed… The function of the Comptroller-
General is essential for the good operation of our institutions and is 
complementary to the action of Congress, since its purpose is to ensure that 
in practice the executive complies with the laws enacted by parliament. 
Therefore, it is just logic that both the executive and Congress give consent 
to the appointment of the Comptroller-General.358 
 
Against this motion, some Radical Party members unsuccessfully complained that the 
intervention of the Senate might politicise the appointment procedure, and that it might 
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inhibit the Comptroller-General from acting against the will of the majority and, in turn, 
inhibit the Senate from impeaching the office-holder in case of abuse.359 
 
The law of 1950 also introduced some elements that provided Congress with leverage 
against both the executive and the Comptroller-General itself in the legality review 
process. The law imposed an additional duty to report to Congress immediately after the 
issuance of an insistence decree, providing that the Comptroller-General should ‘give an 
account to the National Congress and the President of the Republic of these decrees within 
30 days from their issuance, submitting a full copy of them and the supporting 
documentation’.360 Therefore, in contrast to previous regulation that required the office 
to report during the following year, according to the new law Congress had to be informed 
in the short term.  
 
In addition, after this law was instituted, all the elements of the contemporary interpretive 
power emerged. According to this legislation, the legal opinions of the Comptroller-
General would be known as pronouncements (dictámenes), and it was recognised that 
they might be issued ‘at the request of any interested party or of the chiefs of service or 
of any other authorities’.361 As a result, it was confirmed that not only public officers but 
also private parties could activate the opinion-giving power of this checking institution. 
This law also conferred the Comptroller-General with the exclusive power to provide 
legal opinions about financial and budgetary matters, issues concerning the Public 
Employment Statute, and, in general, matters that related to ‘the functioning of the public 
services that constitute the civil administration of the state for the correct applications of 
laws and ordinance governing them’. 362  The explicit reference to the jurisdiction to 
provide legal opinions emphasised the nature of expertise in legal affairs that the office 
had adopted over the years. Moreover, the remit of its legal opinions encompassed the 
most relevant issues that might be raised during administrative processes.  
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This law, moreover, concerned itself with the delimitation of the jurisdiction of the 
Comptroller-General and other public entities, particularly the Council of Defence of the 
State (CDS).363 It provided that the Comptroller-General should not intervene in affairs 
that ‘for its nature were properly litigious, or that are under the consideration of the courts 
of justice’. 364  Thus, judicial matters were within the CDS’s remit instead of the 
Comptroller-General, which should focus on administrative legality. Thus, whereas 
administrative agencies were the constituency of the latter, the courts of justice were the 
customers of the former. It can be argued that this allocation of functions strengthened 
the institutional position of the Comptroller-General in front of the bureaucracy, 
especially taking into account the following phrase inserted in the same provision: ‘Only 
the decisions and opinions of the Comptroller-General shall be taken as administrative 
jurisprudence’. This entailed that only Comptroller determinations constituted binding 
precedents on the administrative authorities. Just as the decree of 1932 widened the 
distance between the President and Comptroller-General, it can be argued that this 1950 
law further separated the oversight process (in which the Comptroller-General and 
administrative agencies operated) from the judicial process (in which courts and the CDS 
operated).  
 
In addition to issues such as rising salaries and improved working conditions (Articles 9, 
13, 15), this law increased the Comptroller’s powers of internal organisation (Article 6 
and 7), extended the time limits for conducting legality review, increased the duty to 
report to Congress (Article 5), and imposed upon the office’s staff a duty of ‘exclusive 
dedication’ in order to encourage professionalism and impartiality (Article 10). In support 
of the latter measure, the Conservative deputy Correa indicated that ‘it sought to ensure 
that Comptroller officers were absolutely independent of and impartial towards 
[executive] public services’, adding that joint positions in the executive and the 
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Comptroller-General might result in ‘an esprit de corps, a solidarity, a collegiality that 
undermine the supervisory function’ of the office.365 Thus this law and its legislative 
debate reveal a concern about strengthening the independence and the institutional 
capacities of the Comptroller-General. It indeed sought to enlarge the distance between 
the office and the executive. 
 
Finally, revealing a concern about delay, this 1950 regulation imposed on the 
Comptroller-General a duty to report to the Chamber of Deputies every six months about 
decrees whose legal review had lasted more than the time limit of 20 days established by 
law, indicating the reasons for the delay.366 As we will see, this rule reveals a pervasive 
concern about delay and sluggishness in the Comptroller-General’s decision-making 
process. 
 
In fact, the legislative debate also reveals a concern about the negative impact of 
Comptroller-General checks on prompt administrative action. Legislators voiced 
concerns that the review process might render administrative decision-making 
excessively sluggish. A case in point is the debate and eventual rejection of a motion 
proposing the automatic approval of administrative decrees in case of delay in the review 
procedure.367 During the debate, some left-wing congressmen proposed this mechanism 
as a way of unblocking the administrative process and balancing the relationship between 
the Comptroller-General and the executive branch. Some even accused the office of 
undue encroachment on administrative action and criticised the absence of arrangements 
for holding the Comptroller-General accountable. 368  Similarly, a Liberal deputy 
expressed his concerns about granting excessive power to an already powerful office. He 
censured ‘the way the Comptroller-General polemicized with public officers’ and 
claimed that the institution did not behave as a technical officer but as ‘a political 
authority that jumps into the press, [and] enters the fray to sermonize other officers 
because he is always right as he is a fourth branch of government whose resolutions 
cannot be discussed’.369 Another congressman pointed out the office’s frequent delays, 
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and argued that the Comptroller-General was not supervising; in reality it was co-
administering the country.370 
 
The majority, however, rejected the proposal and defended the role of the Comptroller-
General as an oversight body. Disapproving the automatic approval mechanism, Deputy 
Correa asked his colleagues what interest they could have in lifting the safeguards against 
illegal executive decrees, considering that those checks ensured compliance with the laws 
that Congress itself enacted. He called for a nonpartisan approach and emphasised the 
importance of ‘having an institution that is above politics giving securities to 
everybody’.371 Another Liberal deputy – García Burr – sided with him, saying that the 
Comptroller-General was ‘the defence that country and the citizens have against the 
excesses of the executive branch’.372 Similarly, a Christian Democrat senator strongly 
opposed the motion, stating that it might nullify the operation of the office: 
Comptroller-General rulings are of concern for the country as a whole; they 
concern the stability, efficacy, and functioning of the democratic regime, 
and that is the deep and intellectual foundation underlying the existence of 
the Comptroller-General: Making judgments over the constitutionality and 
legality of the decrees issued by the government. If this judging power is 
jettisoned and substituted for an automatic approval, the theoretical 
conception underpinning the Comptroller as an institutional and democratic 
body in Chile would be destroyed.373 
 
Therefore, despite admitting that delay was a real problem, the proposal was rejected 
because it might have jeopardised a vital safeguard mechanism against abuse of 
administrative power. 374  Based on a positive assessment of the contribution of the 
Comptroller-General, it was agreed that the best approach to the delay issue was to 
increase internal flexibility within the office and extend the time limits for the legality 
review procedure.375 
 
Overall, this statute shows the consolidation of the Comptroller-General as the main tool 
for legal control over the ever-expanding Chilean executive branch. The legislative 
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discussion reveals that the legislature regarded the institution as a partner in the task of 
holding the executive accountable.376 Besides, the nonpartisan tone of the debate suggests 
that the office enjoyed a fairly cross-party good reputation in Congress. In brief, by the 
1950s the Comptroller-General was increasingly perceived by political actors as an 
independent and influential branch of government. 
2.  Delay and lethargy 
Twelve years later, another piece of legislation altered important aspects of the institution. 
In 1962, the right-wing president Jorge Alessandri passed Law 14832 amid an atmosphere 
of discrediting of the bureaucracy and encouragement of private initiative. This law was 
crafted on the advice of the Comptroller Enrique Silva and former Comptroller Enrique 
Bahamonde, who closely assisted Congress throughout the drafting process. 377  The 
primary aim of this piece of legislation was to reduce the legal burden that the office’s 
scrutiny entailed for executive action. As a senator put it, the bill sought ‘to avoid useless 
paperwork, to abbreviate procedures, [and] to eliminate the procedure of preventive 
control of decrees and resolutions over matters of minor importance’.378 Therefore, an 
interest in speeding up administrative decision-making underlay the bill. 
 
During the debate, Senator Álvarez explained the political background of the bill. He 
mentioned the notable rise in the number of acts submitted for legality review. While in 
1957 the office had processed 178,451 acts, 209,218 were handled in 1958 and 221,325 
the following year. Therefore, the rate of increase was more than 10,000 decrees and 
resolutions a year. Moreover, the office was also in charge of accounts trials, the oversight 
of adherence to civil service regulations, disciplinary proceedings, and judging on ‘loads 
of requests by authorities and private parties’.379 The Comptroller-General was unable to 
cope with so many demands. 
 
Some aspects of the law stand out. On the one hand, the law granted the Comptroller-
General the power to exclude some acts from scrutiny. The excluded decrees or 
resolutions would be those regarded by the Comptroller-General as ‘non-essential’, such 
                                                 
376 ‘Chamber of Deputies, 27th Ordinary Session’ (n 356) 1211. 
377 ‘Historia de la Ley 14832’ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional) 9, 19, 30, 70, 104–5. 
378 ibid 54–5. 
379 ibid 21. 
 123 
as medical leave, paid leave, or other leave entitlements. The exclusion could be 
temporary and might be revoked at any time. In order to exercise this power, the 
Comptroller had to issue an order giving reasons supporting the measure and indicating 
substitute forms for overseeing the legality of the excluded acts. Furthermore, the office 
had to give an account to the Chamber of the Deputies each time it used the excluding 
power. 
 
On the other hand, the law granted the President the power to enact ‘decrees of urgency’, 
reducing the time that the Comptroller-General had to complete their review, as well as 
‘decrees of immediate application’, postponing a review after the enactment of regulation. 
Concretely, decrees of urgency could be issued in the case of measures that would be 
ineffective if not applied immediately. This fact had to be explicitly stated in the decree. 
The consequence of the issuance of these decrees was to reduce the timeframe for 
carrying out the review to just 15 days, or even five days in special circumstances. 
Decrees of immediate application went even further. They could enter into force with no 
prior legality check by the Comptroller-General. However, they had to be submitted to 
ex-post review within 30 days. In the case of detection of illegalities, the office would 
report to the President if the act was issued by a subordinate, or to the Chamber of 
Deputies if the decision were of presidential nature. The measures that could be 
implemented under this scheme were those related to setting prices of basic goods; 
measures of international exchange; and measures of internal organisation in the health 
or education sectors. 
 
These changes, however, did not entail a severe downgrade in the office’s role as a 
legality watchdog organisation. Rather, they represented an exercise of balance between 
legal accountability and administrative expeditiousness. Moreover, Congress took the 
opportunity to strengthen its links to the Comptroller-General. In fact, during the debate 
in Congress, the communication channels between the two institutions were fortified. For 
instance, following a motion by a Christian Democrat deputy, it was provided that under 
some conditions, congressional requests would have priority in the Comptroller-
General’s docket (Article 14). The congressional debate also reveals the institution’s 
positive reputation. One moderate senator, for example, claimed that although the 
Constitution did not provide it explicitly, the Comptroller-General had ‘become […] a 
new power of the state, that along with the other three classic powers – the executive, the 
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legislature and the judiciary – constitute the pillars of our republic’s organisation’.380 
Later, a communist deputy supported the bill, asserting that the Comptroller-General ‘has 
acted correctly many times and that the outcomes of its contribution have had 
transcendental importance for the better order of public administration and the oversight 
of irregularities’.381 He also added that authorities of the office, such as Vigorena, Mewes, 
and Silva, ‘have contributed to ensuring the prestige of the administration’. 382  A 
Conservative deputy made similar statements praising the Comptroller-General’s role 
within the Chilean political system, and emphasising that it ‘represented one of the more 
effective bodies in our democratic regime in respect to rights, the rule of law in public 
services, and the civil service’.383 
D. The Golden Age of the Comptroller-General 
1. The office under Ibáñez’s authoritarianism 
The new understanding of the Comptroller-General as a partner of Congress and a check 
on presidential power is well illustrated by the office’s performance during the second 
Ibáñez administration (1952-1958). After more than a decade of centre-left Popular Front 
alliances, Carlos Ibáñez personified an authoritarian populist leadership. 384  He 
campaigned to get rid of corruption and promised strong government to address the 
decline of public morality. In the second half of Ibáñez’s term in particular, the country 
underwent serious social unrest as the economy markedly deteriorated. In order to address 
this, Ibáñez often used executive powers declaring states of siege or zones of emergency, 
and intervened in labour conflicts. In a remarkable study on the role of the legal 
institutions on Chilean politics, Lira and Loveman observe that Ibáñez constantly faced 
legal challenges by the Comptroller-General against his authoritarian use of executive 
power.385 Ibáñez and his adherents believed that the Comptroller and other institutions 
did not allow the executive to implement his policies.386 As a result, President Ibáñez felt 
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he was ‘a prisoner of legality’ and, consequently, unable to exert control over public 
bureaucracy.387 
 
A set of events illustrates the conflicts among these branches of government. The first 
important clash took place in 1954, when Ibáñez declared state of siege while Congress 
was in recess. 388  Once legislative activities resumed, however, Congress denied its 
ratification. Initially the executive disdained the negative decision by Congress, but 
shortly afterwards, Ibáñez decided to put an end to the state of emergency by decree. This 
infuriated congressmen, since it entailed ‘overlooking the fact that Congress had already 
ended the state of siege’.389 Supporting the interpretation of Congress, the Comptroller-
General rejected the decree, stating that the state of siege had finished with the Congress’s 
declaration. Facing the threat of impeachment, Ibáñez’s Minister of Interior submitted to 
the opinion of Congress and the Comptroller-General, and clarified that the decree was 
issued in observance of the decision of the legislature, and not in exercise of autonomous 
executive power. 
 
Another example concerns decrees granting powers to administrative bodies to screen 
trade union representatives on political grounds.390  In 1955 Ibáñez enacted a decree 
commanding provincial governors to ensure that Communist Party members could not 
run for leadership in trade unions.391 This executive regulation also directed police forces 
to provide intelligence information concerning communist influence on trade unions, yet, 
remarkably, precluded any labour tribunal supervision. The Comptroller-General, 
however, rejected the decree, asserting that the oversight of trade unions was within the 
remit of labour tribunals. Unsurprisingly, the President overrode the ruling.392 Later, 
however, the Chamber of Deputies pressured the government to repeal the decree and 
eventually put an end to the policy. 
 
Similarly, in 1956 a group of Radical Party deputies initiated impeachment proceedings 
against President Carlos Ibáñez for abusing his insistence power, among other causes. 
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They argued that between 1952 and 1955, Ibáñez had issued more than 60 insistence 
decrees in order to override negative rulings by the Comptroller-General.393 Many of the 
decrees insisted upon by Ibáñez were related to irregular recruitment and promotions. 
According to the accusers, this was connected with nepotism and favouritism towards 
friends and allies. Perhaps even worse, other illegal decrees had been made in order to 
enlist supporters in the intelligence agencies, presumably so as to facilitate repression. 
Eventually, after political compromise, the impeachment was rejected. 394  Another 
example relates to accusations of corruption. Here, the Comptroller-General blocked 
unlawful endowments of state-owned land that allegedly benefited the President’s 
sympathisers. The office disallowed the decrees because they infringed on legal 
procedures.395 Despite intense negotiation and a public dispute with the government, the 
Comptroller-General maintained its position concerning the unlawfulness of these 
endowments. The office also intervened against banishment decrees. In this case, as a 
reaction to riots against the rise of charges in public transport in 1957, the executive issued 
a number of decrees banishing protesters from the main cities. The Comptroller-General 
rejected some of those executive orders because of regulatory irregularities.396 Although 
the rulings were crafted on rather narrow legal grounds, they nevertheless contributed to 
the increasing corrosion of the political legitimacy of the President. In fact, by then it was 
apparent that constant encounters with the Comptroller-General and Congress had put in 
motion an unrelenting process of political delegitimisation of the Ibáñez government.397 
 
Annoyed by the constant legal obstacles raised by the Comptroller-General,398 Ibáñez 
attempted to circumvent its supervision, especially concerning detention orders. 399 
Instead of issuing formal executive decrees – subjected to the office’s scrutiny – the 
government decided simply to issue written ‘orders’ that were not submitted to review. 
This eluded a likely negative ruling. Perhaps surprisingly, the judiciary supported this 
evading strategy, holding that under state of siege, a written order by the President and 
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the respective minister was sufficient to legitimate a detention order; it was not necessary 
to enact a formal decree. According to a contemporary commentator, this entailed that 
the detainees lost the only safeguard against abuse embodied in the legality review of the 
Comptroller-General.400 
 
Of course, there is an irony in the fact that the institution created by Carlos Ibáñez as a 
collaborator or adviser to the President in 1927 became a mechanism against Ibáñez’s 
own abuses of power in his second presidential period, 30 years later. It seems that Ibáñez 
was not aware of the new role of the institution. Indeed, compared to the governments 
before and after him, Ibáñez’s use of insistence decrees seems extraordinary. While the 
previous president, Gabriel González (1946-1952),401 had insisted upon fewer than 20 
decrees, and the subsequent president, Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964), insisted upon only 
three, Ibáñez used the mechanism more than 350 times (see above figure 4). This helps 
explain his dramatically hostile relationship with the Comptroller-General. 
2.  The fourth branch of government 
By the late 1950s, the Comptroller-General’s reputation as an institutional actor was 
already considerably high. It was no longer just an ancillary body collaborating with the 
executive in the financial arena only. The office had responded to an increasing demand 
for legality and, as a result, had consolidated itself as an independent authority exercising 
the essential functions of rule interpretation and application in the political domain. It had 
become the primary custodian of administrative legality. 
 
The new public role of the institution captured media attention. An article in March 1958 
explained the functions of the Comptroller-General to the public and outlined a profile of 
its chief officers. 402  It emphasised the independence of the office, its technical 
competence, the political neutrality of its director, and his high salary in comparison with 
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other positions within the state bureaucracy. José María Navasal – the author of the note 
and a prestigious journalist – described the Comptroller-General as the ‘highest guardian 
of legality in Chile’. He compared Chile to its neighbours, pointing out the respect for the 
Comptroller-General as a factor that explained Chilean stability in contrast to the 
generalised turmoil in the rest of the region. In addition, Navasal emphasised the way ‘an 
institution that began simply as a body reviewing fiscal accounts became decisive in every 
aspect of administrative activity’. In his view, the key aspect was that, despite occasional 
disagreement and public criticism, executive officers had accepted its rulings and 
respected its authority. An op-ed piece by Eugenio Moncía in May 1959 also pointed to 
the transformation of the office.403 He argued that the Comptroller-General had become 
‘a control power of enormous supervisory jurisdiction whose gears are intertwined within 
the structure of public administration’. Praising the appointment of Enrique Silva as a 
Comptroller-General, Moncía resorted to frequent criticism of the supposedly excessive 
power of the office. His central claim focused on the role of the institution during the 
Ibáñez administration, wondering what could have happened had not the institution 
intervened to counterweight the excesses of the executive. He recalled its independence 
and strength in resisting the attacks by the Ibáñez administration, concluding that the 
critical aspect was the judicious manner in which the office had exercised its power.404  
 
The shift in the understanding of the Comptroller-General’s role was also reflected in 
constitutional law scholarship. The literature traditionally conceived the institution as a 
mere component of the public finance system, 405  but now new approaches were 
emerging. In his leading textbook, Professor Mario Bernaschina – a Comptroller-General 
officer at the time – included it within his description of separation of powers and the 
‘four functions of government’: legislative, executive, judicial, and the oversight 
function. The latter was a check on administrative activity and consisted of securing the 
conformity of executive action to legality. In his view, this function was normally 
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allocated to an organ independent of the other branches and to the Comptroller-General 
in Chile.406  
 
A similar view could be found among political science commentators. Explaining the 
Chilean political context in the 1950s and 1960s, Arturo Valenzuela highlighted the role 
of the office. Remarkably, he defined the Comptroller-General as ‘a guarantor of 
legalism’ and ‘the most unusual branch of the Chilean government’. Providing a more 
nuanced description, Valenzuela depicted the institution as follows: ‘a prestigious 
organisation, the Contraloría commanded respect from most Chilean civil servants, who 
feared its scrupulous championship of legalism and frugality, sometimes maintained at 
the expense of rationality and fairness’.407 He also emphasised the interpretive role of the 
office by explaining that ‘[i]n a society with numerous and complex laws and sharp 
ideological division, an agency such as the Contraloría had evolved as an interpreter of 
existing legislation’.408 Focusing on the impact of the institution on local government, 
Valenzuela had previously explained that the Comptroller-General exerted a relevant 
indirect influence based on its symbolic and rule interpretation authority.409 In another 
influential work, Federico Gil provided a similar account. He defined the Comptroller-
General as ‘a very important agency in the Chilean government, and one with unique 
powers on the American continent’.410 Echoing Navasal’s opinion, he concluded that it 
‘is an alert custodian of legality and a vigorous and efficient instrument capable of 
curbing, if necessary, the excesses of a President constitutionally endowed with a great 
deal of power’.411 
 
The operation of the Comptroller-General also attracted the attention of foreign scholars 
researching law and development in the late 1960s. American scholar Steven Lowenstein, 
for example, recommended paying closer attention to new forms of legal practice taking 
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place in the country such as lawyers seeking rulings from the Comptroller-General.412 He 
expressed an upbeat view of the potential role of the office in the expansion of the rule of 
law in the country:  
In Chile, where family, friends and regional attachments demand strong 
loyalties, new, impersonal institutions governed by law are needed to which 
loyalties can be transferred; the abstract values of truth and justice, the equal 
application of law, and merit standards must gain precedence over parochial 
loyalties if development is to proceed. […] institutions such as the 
Contraloría General are examples of movement in this direction, but it will 
have to be accelerated; the legal profession, defenders of law, must lead the 
way toward equal justice and treatment under law.413 
 
Unsurprisingly, the institution attracted young professionals and academics. A 
technocratic legal elite in the Legal Department represented the essence of the 
institution.414 It encompassed academics teaching public law and other legal disciplines 
at university level. In the late 1950s, the institution changed the recruitment policy and 
hired bright young students – many of them from the University of Chile, the most 
influential higher education institution. 415  Thus, a new generation of future leading 
scholars and policy-makers was trained in the Comptroller-General. Participants 
remember it as a ‘graduate school’ in public law.416 Enrique Silva Cimma – who served 
as Comptroller-General between 1959 and 1967 – is the best expression of this 
atmosphere of academic and technocratic elite within the institution. 417  Comptroller 
Vigorena had invited him to join the office as Silva had been his legal theory student at 
the University of Chile in 1939. He started as an assistant but rapidly rose within the 
organisation. In 1945 he published a groundbreaking monograph on the institution,418 and 
in 1949 was appointed as professor of administrative law at the University of Chile. 
Following this, he was appointed Deputy Comptroller-General in 1952 and head of the 
office in 1959. Simultaneously, he was selected as director of the public law seminar at 
University of Chile. There, he encouraged the publication of monographs on public law 
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issues linked with the work of the office.419 Following Silva Cimma’s appointment, it was 
evident that more lawyers of the office were also legal academics.420 In addition, he 
participated in the creation of the Institute of Political Science and Administration – an 
innovative institution of civil service research and training.421 Lastly, he also developed 
a political career in the Radical Party, and was later appointed as a President of the 




Term in office Background 
Humberto Mewes  
 
7 Feb 1946 – 14 Jun 1952 Lawyer – Court of Appeal Judge 
Enrique Bahamonde  16 Sep 1952 – 11 May 1959 Lawyer – Former Deputy CGR 
Enrique Silva-Cimma 15 May 1959 – 31 Jan 1967 Administrative law professor – 
Former Deputy CGR  
Table 4: Heads of the Comptroller-General Office, 1946-1967 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The story this chapter has told could be described as a virtuous institutional circle.422 A 
virtuous circle in the life of a public institution would involve few internal changes and 
small substantive initial successes that might lead to enhanced prestige. This, in turn, 
might ignite greater substantive successes and further congressional willingness to 
delegate authority; this could eventually attract better personnel, and then better 
outcomes, and so on and so forth. Certainly, the experience of the Chilean Comptroller-
General in this period does not fit this description with perfect accuracy, but some core 
elements certainly seem to apply. Indeed, this chapter has traced the milestones in the 
transformation of the Comptroller-General into a consequential custodian of legality.  
 
As we have seen, at the outset the institution was conceived as a presidential tool in view 
of the far-reaching modernisation of the Chilean bureaucracy. Later, however, critical 
events changed the orientation of the institution. The 1943 constitutional amendment 
entrenched the office in the Constitution; the successful impeachment against 
Comptroller Agustín Vigorena for exercising weak supervision of executive action in 
1945 increased reliance on congressional authority; and finally, significant changes in the 
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legal arrangements of the office were introduced, reinforcing its status. All these events 
resulted in strengthening the influence of Congress on the operation of the office. Finally, 
due to the contribution of the institution to providing legal discipline for Chilean public 
bureaucracy, and especially its role in arbitrating conflicts between the legislature and the 
executive branch, it consolidated its reputation as a fourth branch of government in the 
1950s and 1960s.  
 
According to legal historian Bernardino Bravo, the Comptroller-General was able to 
resist presidential power because of its institutional autonomy, which was based on ‘its 
own internal hierarchy’. This shielded it from politically and ideologically motivated 
appointments and interventions.423 Conceiving the legislature as a passive institution 
captured by self-serving political parties, Bravo argued that the function of supervising 
administrative action rested with the Comptroller-General instead of in the dysfunctional 
legislature.424 Julio Faúndez, on the other hand, emphasised partnership with Congress. 
In his view, in this period, compliance with the office was dependent on cordial relations 
between Congress and the executive. From this viewpoint, the Comptroller-General was 
a proxy of the legislature that helped secure moderation in presidential policies. Although 
conceding some positive consequences of these arrangements, Faúndez claims that an 
important defect was the unclear rationale behind the legal accountability functions of the 
office. In his view, the Comptroller-General was not an adequate substitute for judicial 
review of administrative action. Even worse, perhaps, it might have been the main reason 
why administrative tribunals were never put into motion in the country.425 In Faúndez’s 
view, all of this would have undesirable consequences for the future government of 
Salvador Allende, as we will see in the next chapter.426 
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 CHAPTER 4. THE COMPTROLLER IN THE ALLENDE PRESIDENCY, 1970-
1973 
In this chapter, I will focus on a critical period of recent Chilean political history: the 
socialist government of Salvador Allende between 1970 and 1973. In particular, I will 
explore an idea about the contribution of nonjudicial institutions of administrative justice 
to social change, namely the distinctively functionalist idea that nonjudicial bodies of 
administrative justice could build more constructive relationships with the administrative 
state than the courts.427 This will be done by focusing on the operation of the Comptroller-
General Office under Allende’s socialist government. 
 
Functionalists could expect that an institution like the Comptroller-General would be 
highly deferential towards Allende’s collectivist policy reforms, and that it could even 
have served the regime as a legitimating device. Yet history actually shows that the office 
was a key institutional actor for the political opposition to the socialist reforms of the 
period. Moreover, although the procedures of the Comptroller-General and its legal 
mindset could appear ‘extremely deferential’,428 as a matter of fact the intervention of the 
office was quite instrumental in undermining the legitimacy of the executive branch. Far 
from the functionalist ideals of Allende’s legal advisors, the Comptroller-General was not 
merely rubber-stamping the policies of the executive. Indeed, it did not show any more 
consideration to the executive than what might be expected of judges. 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, in the early 1970s Chile did not have a fully-fledged 
system of judicial review of administrative action. At the time, the Chilean system 
combined legal review of administrative action by an autonomous administrative body –
the Comptroller-General – with partial and exceptional judicial review of administrative 
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action by the ordinary courts. These arrangements potentially left considerable room for 
action through the political process. 
 
The experience of the Allende period may suggest that a strong functionalist model of 
legal accountability is undesirable. On the one hand, this period proves that court 
substitutes such as the Comptroller-General may exhibit the same kind of reactionary 
political biases as the judiciary. For instance, Eduardo Novoa – the main legal advisor to 
Allende and a prestigious legal scholar – argued that the institution was of critical 
importance in making it impossible for Allende to successfully implement his reforms.429 
On the other hand, it may be argued that there is no substitution to the judicial role in 
structuring potential political conflicts in legal terms. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the sui generis role of the Comptroller-General and the subsequent absence of an 
articulated model of judicial review contributed to the collapse of democracy in Chile in 
1973. Julio Faúndez has argued that a problem of the Chilean political system was that it 
‘excluded courts from key areas of public policy, thus generating a dislocated legal 
system in which judges were experts in private law matters, but had no experience in 
resolving issues of public policy’.430 He also maintains that the absence of judicial review 
was a serious weakness of the legal system, viewing the Comptroller-General as an 
inadequate substitute.431 
 
This chapter will examine the clashes between the Allende administration and the Office 
of the Comptroller-General in order to evaluate the extent to which the functionalist 
expectations for nonjudicial accountability institutions were unmet by its behaviour 
during the times of crisis undergone by the country between 1970 and 1973. The first 
section will explain Allende’s political programme of radical economic transformation, 
and why the government opted for administrative rather than legislative implementation. 
The second part will then give an account of the constitutional showdowns between the 
Comptroller-General and the executive branch during the period, and show how they 
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illustrate the possibilities and limits of the powers of the office. In the conclusion, I will 
suggest that the criticisms of the role of the Comptroller-General during the Allende 
period, although sound in some respects, should not prevent us enquiring further about 
the function of the Comptroller-General as an institution of administrative justice along 
functionalist lines. 
I. THE CHILEAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM 
When the socialist president Salvador Allende took power in November 1970, the 
Comptroller-General was the main legal institution that could obstruct his policies. But 
there were few reasons to expect that the obstacles to Allende’s Popular Unity coalition 
would be insurmountable or that the Comptroller-General would be particularly hostile 
to collectivist policies. Furthermore, the absence of judicial review by a conservative or 
even reactionary judiciary may have offered optimistic prospects, at least in respect to the 
legal arena. The main difficulty, as we will see in what follows, appeared to be the 
political and not the legal process. 
A. The political context 
Chilean Marxist parties had participated in politics during most of the twentieth 
century.432 However, their most important success came in 1970, after six years of a 
mildly reformist Christian Democratic government, when Chile’s electorate decided to 
move further to the left and elected Salvador Allende. He was the first President from a 
Marxist coalition elected in the country. His Popular Unity coalition comprised disparate 
political inclinations: the moderate pro-Soviet Communist Party, the more radical and 
Cuban-inspired Socialist Party, the traditionally social-democratic Radical Party, and 
other lesser reformist political groups. Although Salvador Allende was a socialist, he had 
to make significant efforts to satisfy the different nuances that his coalition represented.433 
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Crucially, Allende was elected as a minority President. He achieved a narrow victory with 
36.2% of the vote, with the centre-left Christian Democrat candidate Radomiro Tomic 
attaining 27.8% and the right-wing candidate Jorge Alessandri 34.9%. 434  This was 
possible because there was no runoff presidential election in the Chilean electoral process. 
According to the Constitution, if no candidate obtained an absolute majority, Congress 
had to select the candidate to be appointed as President of the Republic. The Chilean 
tradition was that Congress would choose the candidate who secured more votes, but as 
this election was highly polarised, it was doubted whether the legislature would follow 
convention. After arduous negotiations with the Christian Democrats (CDP), Allende was 
ratified as President of the Republic in October 1970. However, in exchange, the CDP 
had a condition: a constitutional amendment clarifying and strengthening the scope of 
certain constitutional rights such as political participation, education, and freedom of 
expression. Yet no major changes in terms of state organisation and institutions were 
included in the bill.435 
 
Allende had no clear majority in Congress either, but neither did any of the other 
contending political groups, since initially there was no cohesive opposition. In the 
congressional election of 1969, one year before the presidential election, Allende’s 
Popular Unity coalition gained 43.9% of the vote, while the Christian Democratic Party 
and the conservative National Party secured 29.8% and 20% respectively. In the next 
election in 1973, Popular Unity – now the coalition in power – achieved 43.9% of 
preferences, while the opposition obtained 54.2% in total, with 28.5% for the CDP and 
21.1% for the National Party.436 All this meant that Allende’s capacity to pass legislation 
was rather weak at the time of taking office. In fact, his coalition hitherto controlled only 
38% of the Chamber of Deputies and 46% of the Senate.437 Consequently, party politics 
were highly unstable, with no party able to take control of Congress of its own accord. 
 
With some justification, the Popular Unity interpreted the political scenario in a rather 
sanguine way. They viewed the core of their programme as supported not only by the 
Popular Unity voters but also by a considerable sector of the Christian Democrats.438 In 
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fact, there was extensive convergence between their political agendas; the main reason 
for not striking an agreement with the CDP was the conflicting strategic views between 
the moderates and radical sectors within the Popular Unity. 439  This made Allende’s 
adherents regard their support within the population as majoritarian. 
 
Bearing in mind the fragile position of the Chilean economy at the time, it is no surprise 
that economic reform was a priority in the Popular Unity’s programme. It included the 
nationalisation of strategic natural resources and key national industries, and the speeding 
up of the agrarian land reform. Crucially, Allende’s promise was that all these reforms 
would be approved in conformity with Chilean legal procedures. In sum, he committed 
himself to pursue socialist reforms under the law.440 
 
Indeed, in contrast with the Cuban revolution that brought about a socialist regime after 
guerrilla warfare, Allende vowed to ensure a transition to socialist government within the 
traditional legal framework of the country. This strategy of non-violent, institutional 
socialist revolution was termed the ‘Chilean road to socialism’ (Vía Chilena al 
Socialismo).441 Based on a strong confidence in the flexibility of the political system and 
the docility of the legal institutions, Allende set out to introduce a number of radical 
socialist policies such as nationalisation of copper mining foreign companies, 
expropriation of the major manufacture industries, redistribution of land in the agriculture 
sector, and socialisation of the financial system.442 
B. Legal constraints 
By the 1970s, the landscape of legal institutions in Chile was multifaceted but disjointed. 
Although there was no proper public law jurisdiction, several organs of legal 
interpretation and adjudication played a significant role. Before giving more details of the 
legal confrontations that the Allende government faced, I will outline some features of 
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the four most relevant bodies at the time:443 the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, 
the Council of Defence of the State, and the Comptroller-General. 
 
As said previously, the ordinary judiciary did not possess general judicial review 
jurisdiction in Chile.444 The Supreme Court had recognised this fact in several instances. 
However, exceptionally, judges involved themselves in challenges to the executive 
exploiting the ambiguities of the legislation. First, the Supreme Court had an expansive 
view of its disciplinary powers over the rest of the judiciary, including supposedly 
autonomous administrative tribunals. In this way, the court occasionally heard challenges 
to otherwise final administrative decisions by broadly interpreting its appellate 
jurisdiction. Secondly, the judiciary could utilise criminal law and private law procedures 
for public law purposes. For instance, judges were able to initiate criminal investigations 
and order the suspension of administrative action as a collateral measure. They could also 
make interim injunctions in a private law proceeding before deciding on its jurisdiction. 
The judiciary could take advantage of its considerable independence from the executive 
and strategically exploit these procedural tools depending on the interests at stake. Yet, 
all things considered, the judiciary was seen as lacking a major role in policy-making.445 
 
The constitutional amendment that created the Constitutional Tribunal was promulgated 
in January 1970, just months before the election that brought Allende to power. 446 
However, the Tribunal initiated its operation more than a year after. The need for a 
Constitutional Tribunal arose in 1967 because of a dispute between the President and 
Congress concerning the enactment of a constitutional reform on expropriation rules.447 
At that time, due to the absence of constitutional adjudication, the Comptroller-General 
decided the disagreement pragmatically, but stated that he did not have formal authority 
to adjudicate disputes between the executive and Congress. As a result, the President 
decided to introduce a bill creating such a body with the responsibility of resolving inter-
branch disputes between the legislature and the executive. Private parties had no access 
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to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was composed of five members; three were appointed by 
the President with the agreement of the Senate, and two by the Supreme Court.448 
 
The Council of Defence of the State (CDS), in turn, was a body mainly responsible for 
litigation on behalf of state interests.449 However, it also performed an important advisory 
role to the President of the Republic. Twelve law-trained members with prestigious 
careers in the country comprised the head office of this Council. They enjoyed relevant 
tenure protections, as only the President, with the consent of the Senate, could remove 
them. Apart from the collegiate office, there were numerous lawyers in charge of 
litigating particular cases that composed the institution. Given its independence, and the 
reputation of its members, the Council played a legitimating function as well.450 This was 
particularly relevant since some pieces of legislation required the issuance of an advisory 
legal opinion by the Council before the exercise of some administrative powers. This was 
the case, for instance, for enacting requisition or intervention decrees. During most of the 
Allende period, Eduardo Novoa, a career lawyer, headed the Council. The rest of the 
Council members were of rather conservative propensities. 
 
Lastly, the Office of the Comptroller-General was perhaps the main actor in the legal 
battles between business interests, the opposition, and the executive. Legislators and 
private parties challenged administrative action before this office, especially through the 
ex-ante review procedure. The Comptroller-General operated under the direction of 
comptroller Héctor Humeres (1967-1977) during most of the Allende government and 
even during the initial years of the Pinochet dictatorship. Having entered the office in 
1949, Humeres served as Deputy Comptroller-General under the administration of one of 
the most brilliant Comptrollers, Enrique Silva, who held office between 1959 and 1967. 
The appointment of Humeres was somewhat politically controversial. When Silva retired 
in 1967, it was expected that his Deputy Comptroller-General would be appointed. But 
Chilean president Eduardo Frei delayed the nomination as he intended to nominate a 
candidate from his own party, the Christian Democrats. Some of the names considered 
by Frei as candidates were renowned lawyers such as Arturo Aylwin, Manuel Daniel, and 
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Máximo Pacheco – all Christian Democrats – and University of Chile Faculty of Law 
dean Eugenio Velasco from the Radical Party. After six months of negotiations, Humeres 
decided to send a resignation letter to the President, pressuring him to announce his 
nomination to the Senate as the new head of office. The message conveyed to public 
opinion by Humeres’ resignation attempt was that the President was politicising an 
autonomous institution by seeking to appoint an adherent as Comptroller-General. The 
President could not give support to such insinuations and eventually nominated Humeres 
to the position on 11 August 1967. Hector Humeres remained in office for almost eleven 
years, until 31 December 1977, when he resigned in the middle of an acrimonious dispute 
with some sectors within the dictatorship. 
 
Nevertheless, at the time the legal philosophy of the office emphasised a collaborative 
and enabling attitude to state action. Indeed, the 1970 Annual Report of the Comptroller-
General Office outlined a fairly progressive conception of its role within the Chilean 
system of legal accountability.451 Its approach to legal interpretation contrasted sharply 
with the formalistic approach of the judiciary. To begin with, the statement emphasised 
the institution’s permanent concern with adaptation to the evolution of the state and 
society. Then, it stated that following research and experience, the office had adopted a 
functional orientation to its mission. This meant, among other things, embracing 
purposive legal interpretation, collaborative work with public administration, and the 
promotion of the social role of the state. The statement compared administrative legality 
with private law. It argued that ‘administrative legality cannot be constructed the same 
way as private law. The essential moral or ethical content of the latter differs from the 
purposive and active character of the former, whose main role is to collectively achieve 
[…] goals oriented to the common good’. In private law, literal reading of a provision is 
only secondarily complemented by purpose and history. In contrast, the Comptroller-
General emphasised purposive interpretation, which is the most appropriate tool for 
constructing modern legislation, essentially active, often seeking to remedy emergencies, 
in which purpose dominates over the subtleties of text, and in which a changing social 
reality requires permanent adaptation of the law to circumstances. From this viewpoint, 
‘administrative legality is a means and not an end in itself’, and it has to be flexibly 
adapted to an evolving reality as far as the text and purpose allows it.  
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C. The implementation of the economic programme 
1. The legislative route 
Of course, the main obstacle to the execution of Allende’s programme was that his 
progressive agenda of economic transformation needed endorsement by the legislature. 
The beginning was promising. Early on, Allende obtained unanimity in Congress to pass 
a constitutional amendment nationalising foreign copper mining industries. This reform 
was carried out by constitutional amendment in 1971. It granted the legislature the power 
to nationalise natural resources or productive assets if the interests of the community 
required it. Also, the constitutional reform directly nationalised foreign copper mining 
industries, establishing a procedure for determining the payment of compensation to the 
owners.  
 
The operation had an important legal dimension. Indeed, the Comptroller-General played 
a significant role in setting out the compensation (if any) to be paid to the companies 
affected by the measure. Additionally, a special tribunal was set in operation to hear 
complaints by affected firms.452 More concretely, the Comptroller-General was entrusted 
with responsibility for defining the compensation to be granted to foreign companies. In 
determining the compensation, the office had to take into consideration a figure 
representing the allegedly excessive profit gained by the companies to be set by the 
President of the Republic. In other words, while the Comptroller-General was responsible 
for setting the compensation, a previous stage – determining the existence of excessive 
profits – was the responsibility of President Allende. In 1971, the Comptroller-General 
decided that in most of the cases, no compensation was owed, since the companies had 
previously obtained excessive profits (as set by the executive). Then, as expected, the 
companies challenged this decision before the Special Copper Tribunal created by the 
constitutional reform. A Court of Appeal judge, the director of Internal Revenues Office, 
and the president of the Central Bank composed this tribunal. It upheld the Comptroller-
General’s decision, finding that although the institution made minor procedural mistakes, 
they did not have an influence on the final outcome. It also held that the President’s 
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decision regarding excessive profits was of political character, so not amenable to judicial 
review.453 
 
The auspicious character of this precedent, however, may be deceptive. As the 
nationalisation measure could have a negative impact on foreign policy, Allende 
originally planned to share responsibility for it with Congress, particularly in respect to 
compensation and excessive profit estimates.454 In fact, in the original bill, the latter 
determination had a rather technical nature. First, the entire responsibility regarding the 
compensation due to the companies would be delegated to the Comptroller-General, as it 
was viewed as an independent and apolitical body. Moreover, the sympathies of the then 
chief of the office – Hector Humeres – were perceived to be with the opposition rather 
than with the executive. Secondly, legal provisions tightly structured the Comptroller’s 
discretion. Lastly, his decision could be challenged before a special tribunal. As can be 
seen, Allende did not actually want to have the direct influence on the determination of 
excessive profit that he ended up having. 
 
The opposition in Congress, on the other hand, could not politically afford to be perceived 
by the electorate as protecting foreign economic interests. As such, they had to support 
the nationalisation. However, they chose to make the executive exclusively responsible 
for its implementation and, additionally, force him to pay the cost in terms of foreign 
policy. Thus, Congress amended the bill and allocated the responsibility regarding the 
determination of excessive profit to the President instead of the Comptroller-General. As 
a result, the government shared with the opposition any political gains in terms of the 
popularity of passing the constitutional amendment by which Chile had recovered its 
most valuable natural resource. Yet the executive alone bore the costs in terms of 
international reputation as a rule-of-law compliant government. 
2. The administrative alternative: the policy of ‘legal loopholes’ 
The nationalisation of copper mining industries showed the difficulties with the 
legislative approach even when there was a chance of agreement with the opposition. 
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Perhaps this was taken into account when designing the implementation of the rest of the 
programme. Indeed, although he announced the introduction of a series of bills in 
Congress for economic reform, President Allende could not actually rely on the 
legislative strategy. He simply did not have the votes to pass such legislation. Facing this 
scenario, he decided to implement further policies via executive authority. 
 
Several factors explain Allende’s reliance on executive action. First, this strategy could 
assist negotiation with the opposition in Congress. Viewed from this perspective, it was 
a complementary rather than a substitutive course of action. Furthermore, Allende had 
confidence in the flexibility and deliberative virtues of the political system, and, perhaps 
excessively, in his own persuasive powers and leadership. Secondly, Chilean institutional 
architecture and tradition created incentives for exercising strong presidential leadership. 
The enactment of secondary legislation by the President and administrative agencies was 
largely legally accepted. Also, it was widely believed that the principle of separation of 
powers required that the judiciary should not scrutinise administrative action. Judicial 
activity was generally viewed as limited to private law and criminal law matters. Finally, 
the few forums for challenging administrative action – the Comptroller-General and a 
few special or ad-hoc tribunals – exercised their review powers, giving considerable 
leeway to executive discretion.  
 
The option for executive implementation was theoretically defended and practically 
articulated by Professor Eduardo Novoa. 455 Regarded as Allende’s key legal advisor, he 
was a well-known legal scholar, highly critical of the forms and substance of the Chilean 
legal system at the time. He condemned the liberal principles reflected in the law, and the 
bourgeois interests it protected. He supported an instrumental view of law according to 
which legal institutions should reflect the political ideas of the time, not create obstacles 
to social change. Instead, they should facilitate policy implementation by democratically 
elected political authorities. 
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Eduardo Novoa advised Allende to pursue his policies by executive action, minimising 
the potential obstacles presented by the judiciary and the Comptroller-General. 456 
Drawing on his views on the contradictory nature of the legal system, he believed that 
there was sufficient authorisation in valid legal provisions for effective executive action 
in economic matters.457 At least in the short term, it was unnecessary – according to 
Novoa – to obtain explicit enabling legal powers from Congress. This was termed the 
strategy of ‘legal loopholes’ (Resquicios Legales).458 
 
In addition to being a professor of criminal law and legal theory at the University of Chile, 
Novoa was president of the Council of Defence of the State – after a lifelong career in the 
institution. Novoa was a career member of the institution, and was appointed as its 
president by Salvador Allende in 1970. Precisely because all its members but Novoa were 
members of the opposition, this was the ideal forum for the defence of Popular Unity 
legal strategy. 
 
The main objective of Allende’s economic policy was to bring basic industries under state 
control.459 This entailed the establishment of a sector of state property for essential means 
of production, which would exist in parallel to private and mixed property sectors. There 
were three main means for achieving this goal: direct expropriation, the purchase of 
shares in private companies, and transitory executive measures (called requisitions and 
interventions). 
 
The first strategy consisted of direct expropriation of private companies. According to the 
Chilean Constitution, expropriation measures required previous legislative authorisation 
founded on public interest. An adequate compensation for the affected party was also 
mandatory under the law. Various statutes authorising expropriation could be found in 
Chilean legislation at the time. Decree Law 520, for instance, authorised an administrative 
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agency to expropriate industrial or commercial companies in the case of industrial 
standstill or disobedience of administrative mandates to produce. 460  These latter 
provisions were eventually a key piece in the Allende nationalisation policy. 
 
The second strategy entailed the direct purchase of shares in private companies by the 
Chilean main development state agency – Corporación de Fomento de la Producción 
(CORFO). The implementation of the policy involved a process of participation by both 
the directive council and the director of the agency. According to this process, only after 
an agreement had been reached within the CORFO council could the director implement 
the purchasing measures. As an economic development agency, this body had had 
extensive previous experience in selling and purchasing shares in private companies since 
its creation in 1939. The only difference from previous practice was probably the scope 
and purpose of the policy. The notorious advantage of this approach was that the 
Comptroller-General had no jurisdiction over the CORFO operations governed by private 
law, as in this case.461 Therefore, these measures did not have to go through the rigorous 
ex-ante legality review procedure of the office. 
 
Finally, the government also actively used transitory administrative measures as 
instruments for its economic policy. These measures were ‘requisitions’ and 
‘interventions’. Typically, requisitions were administrative measures established for 
dealing with shortages of basic goods in the market as a consequence of disruption in the 
production or distribution of commodities. If an authority ordered a requisition, she took 
on herself the buying and/or selling of goods on behalf of the respective firm. Of course, 
this was an unsuitable means for permanently acquiring property due to its interim 
character. However, the peculiarity in Chilean legislation up to this point was that not 
only commodities but also an establishment itself could be requisitioned. Intervention 
orders, or back-to-work decrees, on the other hand, were administrative measures 
designed for dealing with a standstill in a factory caused by industrial action or strikes. In 
this case, the administration could demand the resumption of production and appoint a 
provisional manager. Thus, as a result of this measure, the management of the business 
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would be taken over by government. Decisively, all these transitory measures had to be 
sent to ex-ante legality review by the Comptroller-General. 
 
In consequence, Allende did not have to wait for an unlikely legislative authorisation in 
order to initiate his economic policy. He could take advantage of the variety of options 
inadvertently provided by Chilean legal institutions and regulations. In its actual 
operation, however, these institutions would have to overcome quite difficult hurdles. 
II. THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL AS AN OBSTACLE 
Against the expectations of Allende and his advisors, legal institutions and particularly 
the Comptroller-General played a crucial role in paralysing or delaying the 
implementation of the Popular Unity programme. In this section, I will outline the main 
features of these disputes between the executive branch and legal accountability bodies. 
A. Nationalisation by private law means 
Once in power, the Allende government pursued its nationalisation agenda quite 
aggressively. His first tool was the purchase of shares by contracts governed by private 
law. Implementing the recently approved constitutional nationalisation clause, in 1971, 
CORFO – the main development state agency in the country – purchased shares in private 
companies that were involved in natural resources such as nitrates, iodine, iron, and 
coal. 462  The same approach was adopted for the acquisition of industrial firms. In 
February 1972, CORFO announced the purchase of shares in 91 large companies that the 
executive wanted to transfer to the state sector.463 
 
Crucially, although initially Allende pledged to introduce a legislative bill, eventually the 
scheme chosen for the massive nationalisation of the financial system consisted of the 
purchase of shares by CORFO. 464  Allende actually never introduced the bill in 
Congress.465 This nationalisation programme was implemented quite rapidly. By 1971, 
the government had taken 53.2% of private banks into public ownership. By mid-1972, 
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all small and midsize banks had become state-owned, and the participation of CORFO in 
the first and second largest banks was 71.5% and 46% respectively.466 
 
Not surprisingly, the opposition disapproved of this strategy on political and legal 
grounds. It was argued that the effectiveness of the method was based on the coercion 
used against the owners. From this viewpoint, the executive had blackmailed them, the 
threat being that worse conditions would be offered if enabling legislation were passed.467 
Besides, critics claimed that the Allende government utilised other measures to 
‘asphyxiate’ the banks, such as excessive reduction of the interest rate, withdrawal of all 
state deposits from private banks, and appointment of permanent delegates in all banks, 
and that minor irregularities were abruptly detected and penalised by state inspectors.468 
 
In addition, the opposition maintained that several aspects of the operation patently 
departed from legal standards and procedures.469 For instance, it was claimed that the 
purchase of shares did not fit the tasks assigned to CORFO by its organic legislation. The 
agency was acting outside the scope of its powers. However, the executive rightly replied 
that it was not innovating at all, as CORFO had been involved in similar operations many 
times before. Secondly, critics contended that the decision-making procedure was 
irregular because the CORFO council had not granted its consent before the director 
commenced the actions, as required. Conceding the lack of previous council consent, 
CORFO replied that the body had ratified the purchases ex-post, thus correcting the 
irregularities in the procedure. In respect to this latter charge, the Comptroller-General 
explicitly upheld the interpretation of the state agency through decision 13592 in 1971.470 
 
The most serious allegation, however, related to antitrust legislation. On 21 January 1971, 
the Chamber of Deputies set up an investigatory committee to examine the legality of the 
policy of nationalisation of banks. In fact, especial attention was paid to the risks that the 
operation posed to the formation of monopolies in the financial sector. The chief of the 
legal department of the Antitrust Commission, Waldo Ortúzar, was summoned to give 
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testimony to the investigatory commission. In his statement he claimed that the operation 
infringed antitrust legislation because it would lead to the formation of a monopoly in 
favour of CORFO.471 
 
The deputies then decided to submit the issue for further investigation to the Antitrust 
Commission itself. Nevertheless, the commission – composed of the president of the 
Supreme Court, the Superintendent of Banks, and the Superintendent of Public Limited 
Companies – did not agree with Ortúzar’s legal opinion and claimed that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the controversy since its remit did not cover state sector but only private 
sector operations.472 Due to the inactivity of the Commission, the judiciary was called 
into action. Indeed, exceptionally, the dispute was escalated to the Supreme Court by a 
disciplinary action filed against the Commission. Unsurprisingly, handing down its 
decision on 30 August 1972, the court embraced Ortúzar’s approach and ordered the 
Commission to decide the substance of the issue.473 Although the dispute returned to the 
Commission as soon as June 1973, the body did not take further action; it was only in 
January 1974 – after the military coup – that it decided to resume the investigation. 
Eventually, under new institutional arrangements, in May 1975 the successor of the 
Commission decided to file criminal indictments against the CORFO officials who 
participated in the banks’ nationalisation. As most of the prosecuted officials had gone 
into exile after the 1973 coup, the investigation did not result in actual criminal 
sentences. 474  However, the case demonstrates that even the weaker instruments for 
implementing Allende’s policies could be undermined by the courts in spite of the 
absence of formal judicial review proceedings. 
B. Nationalisation by public law means 
Decree Law 520 in 1932 played a critical role in the process of nationalisation by public 
law means. Enacted under state of exception in 1932, this regulation was the central piece 
in the Chilean regulatory architecture for the public control of the production and 
distribution of basic goods.475 From an institutional perspective, its main feature was the 
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creation of an administrative agency (later called the Directorate of Industry and 
Commerce, DIRINCO) with a bureaucratic structure under the leadership of an 
administrator appointed by the President. This executive agency was endowed with 
robust regulatory powers through which it could declare that a commodity was a basic 
good and, consequently, set a maximum price for it. Notably, the agency also had powers 
to expropriate enterprises and take over their administration in the case of defects in the 
production or in the supply of basic goods. As the activity of the agency depended on the 
government’s general economic policy, it played a passive role during more liberal 
Chilean administrations (1932-38 and 1960-70), while taking a more active approach 
between 1938 and 1952, under the influence of the Popular Front, a left-wing coalition. 
As we will see, Allende’s Popular Unity, in turn, used DIRINCO and its formidable 
regulatory powers to implement its nationalisation policies, that is, to transfer private 
enterprises to the state sector.476 
 
At the beginning of his mandate, Allende used administrative action to deal with 
situations of economic emergency. Rather than a deliberate economic policy, this was a 
reaction to external pressures from both business and workers’ mobilisation. In fact, it 
has been argued that the opposition and the economic interests it represented were 
attempting to boycott Allende’s policies. Enrique Silva, hitherto President of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, observed that ‘it was evident that the industrial infrastructure was 
underutilised, so the supply was limited in order to keep prices artificially high’.477 An 
example of this was the expropriation of Bellavista Tomé Textile Mill.478 The owners of 
the factory had decided to stop production as soon as Allende took office because of their 
fear of his economic agenda. As a reaction to this, a month into Allende’s rule, the 
executive decided to seize control of the firm, invoking Decree Law 520. This was the 
first company expropriated by the new government.479 
 
The labour movement was also pressuring the government to take increasingly radical 
action. Indeed, Novoa admitted that although the original action of the executive was 
aimed simply at dealing with the boycott of the business class and the US diplomacy, 
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workers were also demanding that every important firm be brought into the state sector.480 
Labour pressure consisted of factory occupations by the workers, which paralysed 
production and resulted in a call for public control of the firms. The reaction of the 
executive to this was complicated. On the one hand, some officials may have seen the 
occupations favourably, since they gave them hands-on experience of the challenges that 
nationalisation policy might entail.481 But, on the other hand, lacking guidelines on how 
to proceed, officials found it difficult to refuse workers’ demands even when they were 
legally unsupported.482 As Faúndez summarises, ‘[u]pon taking office, the government 
had no time to ponder the intricacies of law and the legal system. During its first months 
in office, it faced a wave of strikes, factory occupations, and land invasions that demanded 
immediate action. Its legal strategy was, consequently, largely shaped by its response to 
these events’.483  
 
The legal framework for administrative action was quite poorly defined. Administrative 
requisitions were poorly regulated by an almost obsolescent legislation, both in terms of 
procedure and substance. As a result, legal rules created unnecessary discretionary 
powers and serious risks of arbitrariness. In addition, the regime of legal control of the 
administration was also highly deficient.484 Notably, many institutional actors believed 
that in exercising its legal review powers, the Comptroller-General could assess neither 
the merits nor the factual basis of administrative decisions. From this viewpoint, this 
light-touch approach was a foundation of the Chilean system of administrative control, 
confirmed by a long-standing practice. Thus, departures from this traditional doctrine in 
subsequent decisions by the Comptroller-General were perceived as reflecting an 
ideological bias.485 
 
However, perhaps surprisingly, the initial reaction of the legal institutions was acceptance 
of the administrative instruments used by the Allende government. Responding to a 
request by the Chamber of Deputies, the Comptroller-General upheld the use of Decree 
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Law 520 as an instrument of economic policy.486 The same was true of the Council of 
Defence of the State that initially supported the legality of this strategy.487 
 
However, the political opposition fiercely resisted the use of these powers of interference 
in private business. A number of legal arguments were developed. Some critics argued 
that Decree Law 520 was unconstitutional insofar as it authorised government to take 
private property without due compensation.488 In their view, requisitions represented an 
infringement of individual rights protected by the Constitution. Others claimed that even 
though the powers could be lawful, the concrete implementation by the Allende 
administration was contrary to law. For instance, Eugenio Velasco – the former dean of 
the University of Chile’s Faculty of Law – argued that requisitions could be accepted only 
if their targets were basic goods. But these measures had to be emphatically disallowed 
if they were directed at industries, as the executive intended. Likewise, Velasco 
maintained that requisitions could be lawfully used as interim measures, but not as a way 
of transferring firms to the state sector. In respect to back-to-work decrees, Velasco 
argued that their purpose had to be to put an end to a labour conflict, not the entirely 
different goal of nationalisation of a private company. 489  In sum, there was severe 
disagreement on the use of requisitions as instruments of economic policy. 
 
Some critics focused on the attitude of the Office of the Comptroller-General. The 
influential administrative law scholar, Eduardo Soto-Kloss, for instance, strongly 
criticised the institution for upholding the legality of requisitions of industries. 490 
Inquiring into the historical foundations of the measures, he suggested that only the 
requisition of basic goods was authorised by legislation. Requisition of firms, by contrast, 
was unlawfully introduced by an executive order in 1945. Soto-Kloss criticised the office 
for not vetoing such an enabling regulation at that early stage. In addition, he condemned 
the current approach of the Comptroller-General, distinguishing requisitions that were a 
form of punishment against an economic offence from requisitions whose goal was to 
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prevent a distortion in the market. Drawing on this distinction, Soto-Kloss suggested that 
only the former was authorised by law subjected to criminal law principles. According to 
this viewpoint, requisitions could be ordered only if a seller refused to sell articles 
previously declared as basic goods. However, the measure could not be adopted as a 
general means to tackle speculation or hoarding.491 
 
Despite these doctrinal criticisms, the use of requisition continued, and the scope of the 
operation was substantial indeed. Between November 1970 and November 1972, the 
Popular Unity government issued 202 interventions and 126 requisitions, totalling 328 
such administrative measures, most of them based on Decree Law 520.492 In another 
account, it is claimed that the enactment of intervention decrees increased steadily during 
the Allende government. While only one intervention decree was enacted in 1970, 60 
were issued in 1971, 113 in 1972 and finally 219 in 1973.493 In an estimate of the impact 
of the policy on the national economy, economist Gonzalo Martner suggests that ‘overall, 
by late 1971 the state controlled an area of state property that accounted for 23% of the 
industrial gross product’ of the country.494 
 
Form of Control 
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The magnitude of the nationalisation policy affected the attitude of the Comptroller-
General towards the executive. In fact, it has been argued that the checking institution 
changed its approach to the exercise of these regulatory powers when it noticed that the 
executive was using them as a general regulatory policy.496 Thus, after initial recognition 
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of the validity of the use of these executive powers, the Comptroller-General started to 
carry out increasingly more comprehensive scrutiny. The office now began to request 
evidence of the facts invoked by the executive, and elaborated innovative doctrines to 
strike down administrative decisions. As a result, the Comptroller-General started to 
reject executive decrees in respect to economic policy more often. This was especially 
frequent with requisition orders and expropriations of industries.497 
 
However, the truth is that the Comptroller-General did not wait long to develop stricter 
scrutiny. A landmark decision was adopted in respect to the expropriation of Industria 
Lanera Austral – a textile mill – just five months after Allende took office in February 
1971. 498  According to the government, this industry was rapidly decreasing its 
production, reaching a dramatic 5% of its usual levels. The executive took the decision to 
expropriate the industry after DIRINCO officers in the region attested that the industry 
was in total standstill. Despite the fact that the CDS ratified the legality of the action, the 
Comptroller-General actively engaged in the review process. While reviewing the decree, 
the institution received a complaint from individuals close to the company asserting that 
the mill was actually not in standstill. Exceptionally, the Comptroller-General instructed 
two inspectors to verify in situ what the actual facts were. Considering the reports from 
DIRINCO, the complainants, and the inspectors, the office decided to disapprove the 
administrative resolution due to not being able to establish the existence of actual 
standstill in the production.499 Thus, against mainstream opinion, the office set aside 
administrative action based on disagreement on questions of fact. This decision was taken 
just three months after the first expropriation took place during the Allende 
administration. The executive, however, insisted on its decision since, in its opinion, the 
DIRINCO officers had properly verified the existence of industrial standstill.500 
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Also in 1971, the Comptroller-General set aside a number of DIRINCO resolutions that 
requisitioned several other textile mills.501 Again, there was a dispute about the factual 
basis of administrative action. The office repeatedly asserted that in order to approve the 
action it had to be satisfied that the conditions for the exercise of the administrative 
powers had been obtained. This required DIRINCO to display technical reports 
demonstrating that (i) there existed obstacles – not counting factory occupation by the 
labour force – to basic goods supply; (ii) the obstacle was capable of causing a shortage; 
and (iii) there was a causal connection between the shortage and the industry’s output 
decrease. As DIRINCO did not corroborate all this, the Comptroller-General proceeded 
to reject the respective resolutions. But the executive once again insisted because it 
considered that the legal requirements for exercising its powers were satisfied.502 
 
In 1972, we find several further clashes between the executive and the Comptroller-
General.503 In the legality review process, the office disapproved a number of back-to-
work decrees in order to deal with paralysis caused by industrial action. In some cases, 
the administrative action targeted state companies in the transport sector. Yet the 
Comptroller-General rejected the decrees because this sort of administrative reaction was 
useless for tackling strikes in the public sector. 504  Furthermore, in other cases, the 
checking institution held that it was against the law to issue back-to-work decrees in the 
case of illegal occupation of the factory by the workers. According to the office, in these 
cases, the only route open to the administration was criminal prosecution, not 
administrative action.505 Lastly, the Comptroller-General vetoed a decision to appoint a 
provisional manager in a manufacturing firm because there was a parallel judicial 
procedure regarding the occupation of the establishment by the workers.506 In all these 
cases, Allende and his ministers decided to insist and overrule these adverse rulings. 
Interestingly enough, the last case justified the issuance of an insistence decree due to the 
need to avoid further damage to the national economy and shortages as a result of the 
standstill of the firm. 
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Another set of cases were related to requisitions.507 The Comptroller-General rejected 
most of the decrees on grounds of incomplete supporting evidence. According to the 
office, the evidence was insufficient because DIRINCO did not demonstrate the presence 
of industrial standstill, a market shortage, or a causal link between those circumstances. 
This was the case regarding firms in the fishing, food, and beverage sectors. 508 
Nonetheless, the executive decided to insist because it disagreed with the factual 
assessment of the institution. 
 
Finally, one of the most controversial cases was probably the requisition of Industry of 
Copper Manufactures (MADECO). 509  According to DIRINCO, the requisition was 
justified because of the copper shortage. In this case, the Comptroller-General did not 
challenge the factual assessment of the administration. Instead, it focused on the 
rationality of the measure, arguing that the requisition was not a suitable means to deal 
with the shortage. The institution considered that it would be preferable for the state either 
to expropriate the firm or to purchase shares on it. Alternatively, DIRINCO could set 
production goals that the firm had to meet. According to the office, if the goal was to 
tackle a shortage emergency, these suggested measures would be preferred to a 
requisition. Moreover, the Comptroller-General made clear that requisition was an illegal 
means to achieve the goal of nationalisation of industries. Indeed, it maintained that this 
instrument was essentially transitory and a fortiori unable to sustain a takeover by the 
state.510 
 
By 1973, the doctrine of the Comptroller-General in respect to Allende’s economic policy 
was well established. Composed of a number of strict guidelines, it provided a rather 
narrow framework for administrative action. This was clearly outlined in the annual 
report for the year 1973.511 First, it stated that the executive must not issue requisitions 
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decrees as a reaction to illegal occupation of factories, because this was a matter for 
criminal law courts. Secondly, it asserted that, as requisition decrees were transitory 
measures, they could not be used for bringing industries into the state sector. In other 
words, they could not be deployed as an instrument to carry out nationalisation policy. 
Thirdly, even within their proper remit outside the nationalisation sphere, requisition 
decrees had to be precise and unambiguous. The Comptroller-General would not approve 
generic or nonspecific requisitions. Fourthly, the office imposed minimum information 
requirements to issue a requisition decree by holding that administrative agencies must 
provide evidence that there was a distortion in the distribution of commodities before 
engaging in this kind of action. Similarly, the office stated that in order to issue requisition 
or back-to-work decrees, the executive must provide evidence of either industrial action 
in the firm, standstill in the production, a reduction in production of basic goods, or the 
existence of shortage. Fifthly, the administration was not allowed to extend the requisition 
of one industry to another even if they were operating in partnership. Finally, the 
administrative authority could not put into practice a requisition if the Comptroller-
General had rejected the respective decree, even in case of urgency. In sum, the doctrine 
of the Comptroller-General in relation to economic policy revealed that the avenues for 
lawfully implementing the economic policy of the Popular Unity were practically 
blocked. 
III. THE DECREE OF INSISTENCE AND THE TIME FOR POLITICS 
However, as already seen, the Comptroller-General did not have the last word in disputes 
with the executive. In most of the cases of disagreement with the office, Allende decided 
to issue insistence decrees in order to continue with the implementation of his policies.512 
The government usually – but not always – gave reasons for the promulgation of decrees 
overruling the Comptroller’s adverse decisions. On occasion, executive officials invoked 
pressing public interests or economic interests that justified departing from legal 
technicalities, or just appealed to an alternative interpretation of the law. According to 
Eugenio Velasco – once candidate to head the Comptroller-General – insistence decrees 
had worked fairly well in previous decades, but the executive branch was now using them 
illegitimately. He maintained that the decrees were ‘utilized by the Allende government 
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to complete its illegal requisitions and “interventions” of factories, mines, shopping 
centers, and farms’.513 What Velasco was suggesting seems to be that the mechanism was 
not strong enough to deter a government determined to infringe the rule of law. 
 
 








Certainly, due to the insistence mechanism, the adverse rulings did not paralyse 
government action in relation to its nationalisation policy. Yet continuous and public legal 
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defeats enormously jeopardised executive credibility. As Allende had made respect for 
legality a core element of his political narrative, acrimonious disputes with the primary 
interpreter of administrative legality was genuinely corrosive of one of the pillars of 
Popular Unity public standing. Also, institutional criticism of Allende’s economic policy 
on legal grounds considerably increased the political costs that the government was 
incurring for its adamant attitude in respect to the scope of the nationalisation endeavour. 
In particular, legal clashes with the Comptroller-General rapidly reverberated on 
Congress. Indeed, as a result of the issuance of insistence decrees, impeachment 
procedures against the Minister of Economy, Pedro Vuskovic, were initiated in the 
Chamber of Deputies in September 1971.516  This forced the executive to soften its 
position regarding nationalisation of private business and, as a result, the Christian 
Democrats agreed with the executive to retire its support for the impeachment. The price 
to be paid was that the government pledged that legislation authorising any further 
nationalisation would be negotiated in the legislature, and that no further executive action 
entailing transfer of private companies to state ownership would take place.517 Thus, the 
legal obstacles raised by the Comptroller-General had a very significant impact on the 
political arena indeed. 
 
The Popular Unity parties, however, were unable to reach a deal among themselves to 
introduce a new bill on nationalisation of industries in Congress. The Christian Democrats 
interpreted the breach of the promise of a new bill as an act of political aggression. As a 
reaction to this, they submitted a constitutional amendment to Congress that ostensibly 
restricted the regulatory powers of the executive.518 The bill targeted every aspect of 
Allende’s economic policy, with the purpose of impeding advances via executive action 
without legislative engagement. The constitutional provisions put forward by the 
Christian Democrats declared any further government purchase of shares in private 
industries null and void. Moreover, they removed the powers to issue requisition and 
intervention decrees from the executive. Lastly, they stated that any further 
nationalisation would require an act of Congress authorising the takeover of a private 
industry.519 In consequence, these rules pushed the executive to ensure agreement in 
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Congress before taking any new action towards additional expansion of state ownership. 
Under the pressure imposed by the opposition, the executive branch was ready to propose 
its own nationalisation bill. Naturally, Allende’s proposal was far more generous than the 
Christian Democrats’ bill, but because of delays, it was evidently unlikely that the 
executive would obtain the support needed to approve the bill in the legislative process. 
 
The Christian Democrat constitutional amendment bill triggered an additional iteration 
of the clashes between the executive branch and the Comptroller-General.520 This time, 
the dispute revolved around questions of legislative procedure. During the legislative 
process there was a sharp disagreement between government and opposition in respect to 
the proper steps that had to be followed to approve the amendment in the face of a partial 
executive veto. Indeed, although Congress approved the restrictive CDP nationalisation 
bill, the executive decided to veto a number of its provisions. In addition, the President 
replaced these provisions with new ones and attempted to clarify some aspects of the 
amendment bill through supplementary provisions. However, a majority in Congress 
rejected the veto, initiating a dispute over the procedure that should be followed 
subsequently. The opposition maintained that the bill originally approved by Congress –
that is, before the executive veto – should be enacted as law in its entirety. The President, 
however, claimed that Congress’s overriding veto did not entail the approval of the 
regulation favoured by the opposition, since the Constitution required the insistence of 
Congress by a two-thirds supermajority. Otherwise, the executive argued, there was 
simply no regulation at all in respect to that matter. 
 
Additionally, the procedure to solve the disagreement was also disputed. Indeed, 
President Allende maintained that the Constitutional Tribunal should adjudicate the 
dispute, whereas the opposition believed that the only way out was to call a referendum 
in which the people could have a say. According to the opposition, the referendum should 
include disputed procedural points and also the government nationalisation policy as a 
whole. Based on a narrow reading of the constitutional rules defining the Constitutional 
Tribunal jurisdiction, the congressional opposition believed that the tribunal did not 
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possess jurisdiction in cases of constitutional amendment, but only regarding the ordinary 
legislative procedure. 
 
Nonetheless, Allende submitted the procedural dispute to the Constitutional Tribunal in 
May 1973, and some weeks afterwards the judges handed down their opinion. 521 
Supporting the congressional approach, the majority of the tribunal held that they lacked 
jurisdiction to decide this kind of constitutional dispute. Interpreting its powers 
restrictively, the ruling argued that the tribunal could intervene in respect to issues 
connected with the ordinary legislative procedure, but never in cases stemming from a 
constitutional amendment procedure. As a result, although siding with the opposition, the 
tribunal did not address the substantive point at issue over the procedure to follow in order 
to enact the reform. 
 
In a situation of dramatic legal uncertainty, the executive decided that the bill could be 
promulgated but only regarding those aspects in which there was agreement with 
Congress. This way, the executive maintained, none of the branches of government would 
be imposing its will over the others. However, this interpretation was to be challenged 
once more on legal grounds. As the promulgation was implemented by an executive 
decree, the Comptroller-General had to approve it before official enactment. In sharp 
contrast with the reticent attitude of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Comptroller-General 
took a position in respect to the substantive dispute, strongly disagreeing with the 
executive.522 In July 1973, Comptroller Humeres concluded that the executive was not 
authorised to promulgate the reform in a partial manner. According to the office, just two 
alternatives were available to the executive: either promulgation of the entire bill as 
passed by Congress, or a referendum. Otherwise, the behaviour of the President of the 
Republic was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Comptroller-General had definitely 
rejected the solution put forward by the executive to the constitutional showdown with 
Congress, exposing Allende once again to accusations of operating outside the rule of 
law.  
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As expected, this new adverse ruling was immediately used against Allende in Congress. 
Instead of initiating impeachment procedures for infringement of the Constitution, on 22 
August 1973 the Chamber of Deputies issued a declaration denouncing ‘a serious 
breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic’. 523  The deputies’ 
statement censured the executive for unlawfully attempting to promulgate only a 
fragment of the constitutional amendment. Additionally, the declaration accused the 
executive of repeatedly disobeying legal decisions from the Comptroller-General and the 
judicature. The constitutional showdowns between the executive, on the one hand, and 
the Comptroller-General and the courts, on the other, were used as a perfect excuse for 
this declaration of illegitimacy issued by the lower house of Congress. Indeed, opposition 
legislators based the declaration on the allegedly constant infringements of the rule of 
law. Critically, the declaration by the Chamber of Deputies was addressed not only to the 
President but also to the Armed Forces. Thus, a veiled call to military intervention could 
be inferred. Allende replied, saying exactly that: he accused the opposition of calling the 
armed forces to break their duty towards the government.524 
 
At this point, even Eduardo Novoa – Allende’s most assertive legal advisor – had lost 
confidence in implementing socialist reform via legal channels. Government officials 
accused the opposition and international actors of deliberately undermining the political 
and economic stability of the country. A month later, on 11 September 1973, the military 
bombed the palace of government and violently took power, ending one of the more stable 
democracies in the continent. 
IV. THE CRITIQUE OF THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL 
Exasperated by what he regarded as disloyal hostility, Eduardo Novoa – the main legal 
advisor to Allende – strongly criticised the role played by Comptroller Hector Humeres. 
Novoa, and other critics condemned the way that, in several instances, the head of the 
office had overstepped the legal boundaries of its jurisdiction.525 It is worth noting that 
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they raised similar complaints against the involvement of the judiciary, and especially the 
Supreme Court, in reviewing administrative action.526  
 
First, Novoa claimed that the Comptroller-General had scrutinised not the legality, but 
the ‘administrative policy’ underlying the decrees under examination. Second, he 
maintained that the office had questioned the factual basis of the executive decisions. He 
argued that in the legality review procedure, the Comptroller-General lacked the powers 
to evaluate the facts on which the decision of the executive was founded. He was not 
authorised to engage in fact-finding activities, or to assess the evidence presented by the 
executive. Nor was the Comptroller-General legally endowed with powers to call 
witnesses and invoke their statements against those of the executive. According to Novoa, 
these were essentially judicial powers that the office could not wield unless an explicit 
legal rule stated so. Thirdly, the Comptroller-General could not act as an administrative 
tribunal, hearing complaints against an authority filed by private parties. It was illegal for 
the Comptroller-General to require the executive to respond to these complaints, and for 
him to adjudicate in case of disagreement. Finally, Novoa accused the Comptroller-
General of elaborating legal doctrines tailored to the Allende government in order to 
undermine the implementation of their policies on ideological grounds. 
 
Eduardo Novoa was concerned about the powers and institutional structure of the 
Comptroller-General Office. He believed that the appointment procedure was not fit for 
the purpose of choosing an expert public lawyer of good judgment, able to guarantee 
impartiality in political controversies. As the Constitution required agreement between 
the President and the Senate for appointing the office-holder, he believed that there was 
a real risk of settling for the least threatening candidate: a career employee that had 
reached a high position not due to skills, but because of his seniority within the 
organisation. 
 
Novoa argued that, given the power of the Comptroller-General, this flawed nomination 
scheme was extremely dangerous, as the office-holder was granted with lifetime tenure. 
Moreover, it was extremely difficult to make him accountable in case of misconduct. His 
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decisions were strictly personal, since he could choose his closest advisors and clerks; he 
was not bound by the professional advice of the office’s staff; and he had unfettered 
disciplinary powers over every employee of the office. There was no system for airing 
employees’ complaints. It has been claimed that the impact of this autocratic model on 
the institution at large was disastrous. Critical reflection and independent judgment within 
the organisation were discouraged, while sycophants and submissive personalities were 
stimulated, resulting in an increasing environment of mediocrity. Thus, the head of the 
office held considerable internal power, and was strongly criticised for it.  
 
Even more importantly, unlike judicial decisions, the interpretations of the office 
generally had a considerable impact on executive decision-making and the citizenry as a 
whole. Furthermore, these rulings stemmed from just one person instead of a collegiate 
organisation, as was the case in the Supreme Court. Unlike the Supreme Court’s 
decisions, the Comptroller’s judgments did not result from a process of collective 
deliberation and compromise. Within the Comptroller-General’s Office, there was no 
room for dissidents. Therefore, the political persuasion of the chief of the office was 
critical for explaining and predicting the behaviour of the organisation. On top of all of 
this, the Comptroller-General took advantage of ambiguities in the legislation and 
exercised powers beyond his legal remit. 
 
Novoa suggested that the excessive powers of the Comptroller-General had had a 
detrimental impact on executive decision-making. He maintained that the power of the 
office was considerable, since the office could initiate disciplinary proceedings and 
impose sanctions on administrative officers. Given this, even ministers preferred to 
enquire into the Comptroller-General’s opinion in advance before embarking on any risky 
course of action. As these were informal consultations, it was easy for the office to exceed 
legal procedures and jurisdiction. As a result, this legal watchdog ended up invading the 
remit of the government, according to Novoa. 
 
According to this critic, the opposition of the Comptroller-General to Allende’s policies 
was quite simply ideological. He claimed that officers from the judiciary and the 
Comptroller-General believed that the law must always be interpreted in order to 
perpetuate the capitalist system. They used their institutional positions as weapons at the 
service of the bourgeois ideology. In his view, Popular Unity’s officials had ‘endured 
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every form of obstruction from the Comptroller’ and he believed that the outcomes of the 
legality review procedure could be explained only as the expression of the ideological 
sympathies of the head of the office. 
 
Novoa acknowledged that, theoretically, there were remedies for correcting the failures 
of the Comptroller-General in exercising his power. However, he argued that those 
safeguards were insufficient and ineffective. On the one hand, the office was not 
accountable to any other state organisation. The only way to complain about the 
Comptroller’s decisions was to protest to the public. On the other hand, Novoa asserted 
that the recourse to decrees of insistence, was no real remedy since Presidents reasonably 
avoided using them due to the reputational costs they imposed. They feared public 
accusations of incurring illegality or infringement of the rule of law. 
 
Although disagreeing with the policies promoted by Popular Unity, Sergio Micco has 
also adopted a critical stance towards the Comptroller-General.527 He claims that the 
office should not have engaged in merits review of Allende’s economic policy. In his 
view, the Comptroller-General should only have examined the legality and 
constitutionality of administrative action.528 Micco concedes that the executive branch 
was violating basic rule of law principles including property rights, but he maintains that 
this was no excuse for a technical body to invade the political realm in a partisan 
manner.529 In addition, he argues that the protection of individual interests against adverse 
administrative action was a function for the judiciary, and not for the Comptroller-
General.530 However, he admits that this opened up an enormous jurisdictional problem 
because of the absence of judicial bodies with powers to adjudicate such disputes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown the effective use of the Comptroller-General – what could have 
been regarded as a functionalist promise of administrative justice – as legal opposition to 
a political programme of radical progressive change. It might well be concluded that if 
there was any hope for the constructive operation of the Comptroller-General, the 
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experience of the Allende government definitively provides evidence that it was 
unfounded. Of course, defenders of the status quo and vested interests might be content 
with the results,531 but a different attitude could be expected from functionalist thinkers 
who favoured administrative state and collectivist policies. 
 
However, the chief factor explaining the crisis in Allende’s Chile was not obstruction of 
political change by legal institutions. Rather, it was the incapacity of the political process 
to deal with political conflict, open channels for compromise and negotiation, and 
eventually reach agreement.532It is undeniable that at various points legal institutions – 
particularly the Comptroller-General – were deployed for ideological, partisan purposes. 
It is also true that the institution in particular took decisions that were legally flawed. Yet 
that was not always the case. In the context of a legal system lacking judicial review of 
administrative action, it was implausible to expect a merely formalistic approach to legal 
review by an institution of central importance such as the Comptroller-General. In that 
setting, it does not seem sensible to claim that the office was overstepping its 
responsibilities when it examined the facts underlying a decision, or when it disallowed 
the use of transitory measures for implementing an all-out policy of nationalisation of 
basic industries. Furthermore, a merely formalistic review would not have enabled the 
Comptroller-General to perform the legitimating role that legal accountability is expected 
to play.533 
 
Moreover, as Julio Faúndez has suggested, the alternative to the Comptroller-General 
would have been a fully-fledged system of judicial review. For a government promising 
social change through law, there was no option to disregard any form of legal checks, and 
considering the intervention of the Supreme Court during this period and afterwards, 
judicial review would probably have been even worse. Although the Comptroller-General 
legal review implied a delay in policy implementation, it at least enabled the President to 
insist on his agenda and bring the issue into the political process in Congress. If political 
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support was then unattainable, that seems to evidence a problem with the political power 
of the government to pursue its agenda. 
 
Finally, further inquiry is needed to determine the possibilities and limits of the 
Comptroller-General as a functionalist institution of administrative justice. Although 
constitutional showdowns bring to light the remarkable aspects of an institution, it is also 
relevant to examine its operation in ordinary times. To state it in somewhat functionalist 
terms, to grasp a full picture of the Comptroller-General, it is desirable to ºtake a closer 
look at its routine interactions with bureaucracy, and at the social interests that are more 
frequently served by their processes. 
 
 CHAPTER 5. THE COMPTROLLER UNDER DICTATORSHIP, 1973-1990 
 
This chapter explores the role of the Comptroller-General during the military dictatorship 
of Augusto Pinochet between 1973 and 1990. The authoritarian regime that followed the 
1973 coup d’état in Chile lasted until 1990 and rapidly destroyed the main pillars of the 
institutional architecture of the country. Congress was closed, political activity was 
forbidden, and a full reengineering of the constitutional system was started. The adherents 
of the Allende government were persecuted, exiled, tortured, and in many cases killed. 
From the beginning of the authoritarian period, however, legal institutions – the judiciary 
and the Comptroller-General – remained almost untouched by the Military Junta. This 
was unsurprising, since the Comptroller’s Office and the Supreme Court, in Paul 
Sigmund’s words, ‘practically invited’ the military to carry out the coup d’état.534 
 
The judicial branch of government offered no resistance to political power during the 
dictatorship. Indeed, the judiciary ‘immediately accepted the new authoritarian law-
making process’.535 The courts did not provide protection against the furious repression 
unleashed immediately after the 11 September coup. In fact, most of the writs of habeas 
corpus filed on behalf of detainees were rejected (only 10 out of 5,400 were accepted). 
Judges did not exercise their investigatory powers and easily accepted the unconvincing 
explanations provided by government officials. As Constable and Valenzuela have 
argued, the ideological biases of judges and their formalistic training and narrow 
conception of the legal process seem to have been factors that explain this judicial 
docility. Similarly, Lisa Hilbink has suggested that judicial behaviour under 
authoritarianism in Chile is explained by institutional factors. She describes the judiciary 
as ‘a highly autonomous bureaucracy [that] gave strong incentives for judges to play, 
primarily if not exclusively, to the Supreme Court’.536 This resulted in conformity and 
conservatism within the institution. The Supreme Court’s hierarchical control over the 
rest of the judiciary impeded judges from developing a liberal understanding of their role 
as protectors of rights and public liberties. In terms of institutional ideology, Hilbink 
emphasises the judiciary’s anti-politics mentality, which conceived the judicial role as a 
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defence of conservative political principles. The protection of other political values was 
regarded as unprofessional, jeopardising the political neutrality of the institution. 537 
Therefore, according to Hilbink, ‘hierarchy and paternalism, an elitist disdain for politics, 
and a preference for uniformity and order over pluralism and tolerance’ were cultivated 
by the institutional arrangement and ideology of the Chilean judiciary.538 
 
Could the same charges be levied against the Office of the Comptroller-General? What 
role did the institution play in the Pinochet period? There is no consensus on these 
questions. Some believe that the office showed its independence and strength in 
extremely hostile times. A reputed historian claims, for instance, that unlike the judiciary, 
the Comptroller-General cannot be accused of being servile or obsequious to the Pinochet 
dictatorship.539 Two foreign observers seem to agree with that view, maintaining that the 
institution ‘created not a few problems to governments acting outside legality [and that] 
the military government of Augusto Pinochet was no exception, as a series of conflicts 
between the State and the Contraloría confirmed’.540  Finally, the opinion of Patricia 
Arriagada, speaking as a Deputy Comptroller-General, should be noted. On one occasion 
she held that the attitude of former Comptroller Héctor Humeres in resisting a politically 
sensitive but illegal decree by Pinochet was an epoch-making event for the independence 
of the office. 541  Yet others have interpreted this very same event, along with the 
subsequent appointments of two successive comptrollers by Pinochet, as defining the 
office as an ‘authoritarian enclave’ bequeathed to the transitional period that began in 
1990.542 As will be seen, this chapter examines events that enable us to have a more a 
nuanced evaluation of the role of the office during this period. 
 
In fact, the Chilean experience shows that the behaviour of the Comptroller-General was 
quite similar to that of courts in authoritarian regimes. For instance, the office was used 
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to ‘establish social control and sideline political opponents’.543 It was also deployed to 
‘bolster [the] regime’s claim to “legal” legitimacy’.544 Furthermore, the Comptroller-
General played a role in ‘strengthen[ing] administrative compliance within the state’s 
own bureaucratic machinery and solv[ing] coordination problems among competing 
factions within the regime’.545  Thus, differences between Comptroller-Generals’ and 
courts’ reactions to authoritarianism are hard to find. Yet this chapter also shows that the 
office had relevant clashes with the military. Despite all its collaboration, the regime was 
highly distrustful of the Comptroller’s office and actively attempted to bypass it. There is 
also evidence that Pinochet’s legal advisors regarded the legal review dimension of the 
Comptroller-General as an obstacle to the neoliberal reforms they had set out to 
implement. Moreover, it is revealing that this contrasted with their more positive view of 
the functions of the judiciary. 
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section outlines the 
collaboration between the Comptroller-General and the new regime in the months that 
followed immediately after the 1973 coup d’état. In the second section, some of the key 
clashes of the office with the Pinochet dictatorship are discussed. Here, a more self-
assertive attitude is revealed. Finally, the process of design of a new Comptroller-General 
in the new constitutional architecture of the regime is examined. As a result, an 
ambiguous attitude of the regime towards the institution will emerge. Before that, I will 
outline the most comprehensive discussion of the role of the institution yet, namely that 
elaborated by political scientist Robert Barros. 
I. A CHECK ON EXECUTIVE ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE JUNTA 
Robert Barros has produced a provocative work about the interaction between the Chilean 
military dictatorship and legality. Against conventional accounts of the Chilean 
authoritarian regime as a monocratic dictatorship centred on Pinochet, Barros argues that 
the internal operation of the Junta as an institutionalised collegiate body, governed by 
unanimity rule, prevented the emergence of a single-man dictatorship. But incidentally, 
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Barros also examines the existence of external checks on the military government.546 He 
suggests that the Comptroller-General played a crucial role in enforcing the pre-eminence 
of the Junta as a collective body over the executive branch embodied in Augusto Pinochet. 
I will later show that this view represents an unconvincing oversimplification, but in this 
section I will outline Barros’ account in more detail.  
 
The Chilean Junta comprised four members, representing the Armed and Police Forces 
of the country. General Augusto Pinochet from the Army, Admiral José Toribio Merino 
from the Navy, General Gustavo Leigh from the Air Force, and General César Mendoza 
from the National Police Force – Carabineros – comprised this collective body. 
According to an earlier command issued by the Junta itself, it concentrated the ‘supreme 
authority of the nation’.547 Later on, the Junta clarified that this authority entailed the 
exercise of constituent, legislative, and administrative powers, excluding only the judicial 
power that remained to be exercised in the form and with the independence established 
in the 1925 Constitution.548 Constituent and legislative powers were to be exercised only 
by unanimity of the members of the Junta,549 while executive power was to be exercised 
by Pinochet himself as the President of the body.550 Consequently, Barros argues that the 
Junta – not Pinochet – was the highest political body in the country above the executive 
branch. 
 
In Barros’ account, the Comptroller’s Office and the Supreme Court operated as external 
constraints on the political power of the military. Barros concedes that when there was 
unanimity among the four members of the Junta, they were able to override any decision 
taken by external checking institutions. Yet he remarks that ‘the Junta was not always in 
agreement’ and that ‘within those realms regulated by law, the Supreme Court and the 
Contraloría did present a formal limit upon the prerogative powers of the military 
regime’.551 Although this hardly created proper external accountability, Barros maintains 
that it ‘had significant consequences for power relations within the Junta’.552 
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Indeed, focusing on the institutional dynamics within the Junta, Barros’s argument is that 
the role of the Comptroller-General was to ensure that the executive respected the legal 
framework designed by the Junta: 
Since statutory law could not be modified by executive decree, the executive 
could only act beyond standing legal boundaries by first working new 
legislation through the [collegiate action of the] Junta. In this manner, by 
assuring the superiority of the statutory law over acts of administration, the 
Contraloría indirectly safeguarded the Junta’s powers before Pinochet 
within the domain of issues subject to preventive legal review.553 
 
Additionally, Barros claims that the contribution of the Comptroller-General as a 
watchdog of Junta-Executive relations was greater than that of the Supreme Court. His 
starting point is that while the target of the Comptroller-General was the executive, the 
court was focused on the Junta itself. Thus, the impact of the former was larger because 
the executive alone, that is, Pinochet, did not possess the powers ‘with which to 
unilaterally override a negative ruling by the Contraloría’. 554  In contrast, if acting 
unanimously, the Junta was able to forestall judicial intervention by exercising its powers 
of constitutional amendment. On the other hand, whereas the legality review procedure 
of the Comptroller-General was compulsory and could veto executive decision-making, 
judicial review powers could be exercised only after a private party challenged a decree-
law before the judiciary. Taking this into account, Barros concludes that the Comptroller-
General ‘placed a more significant constraint upon the prerogative powers of the military’ 
and that ‘the judiciary could not stand as a significant limit on the military regime’.555 
Moreover, he argues that the rigid Chilean understanding of both the notion of separation 
of law and politics, and the principle of separation of powers, along with the existence of 
a nonjudicial body reviewing the acts of the executive, resulted in further judicial 
inhibition in holding the government to account.556  
 
Thus, Robert Barros offers a very sanguine portrait of the legal framework of the Chilean 
dictatorship. This enables him to conclude that there were institutional and ongoing 
constraints upon Pinochet’s powers, and that ‘[t]he checks given by the Junta were 
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structured by the unanimity rule, the separation of executive and legislative powers, and 
were reinforced by the 1980 constitution’. 557  Furthermore, Barros asserts that ‘the 
Chilean dictatorship was subject to and constrained by legal institutions of its own 
making’.558  
 
Concerning the Comptroller-General in particular, Barros maintains that, in spite of its 
initial collaborative attitude, it exercised fiscal and legal oversight without ‘subsequent 
interruption during the whole period of military rule’.559 Importantly, he also downplays 
the scope of the matters exempted from compulsory legal review by the office.560 In fact, 
he describes the institution as operating under – by and large – normal circumstances and 
imposing a degree of accountability upon the military: 
During the sixteen and a half years of military rule, hundreds of thousands 
of administrative acts were submitted to the Contraloría’s legal department 
for legal and constitutional review. Each year, thousands of decrees were 
returned to ministries and agencies because of legal defects, and on many 
occasions anticipation of the Contraloría’s tremendous power caused legal 
advisors considerable anxiety. In general, the Contraloría functioned 
normally under the military government. On no occasion did Pinochet make 
use of the decreto de insistencia [insistence-decree to override comptroller’s 
veto] to force the implementation of unconstitutional and/or illegal 
administrative acts.561 
 
In the following sections, however, a more complex picture will be presented. Perhaps 
surprisingly given Barros’s claims, they will expose the Comptroller-General as being 
under significant pressure from the executive, and arguably eventually being defeated by 
Pinochet. 
II. COLLABORATION 
The Comptroller-General’s collaborative attitude during the initial years of the 
dictatorship can be illustrated by examining two aspects of the relationship with the 
government. The first aspect relates to the mutual concessions made by both bodies in 
order to re-establish normality in public bureaucracy. Indeed, while at the beginning the 
Junta granted more powers to the office, the Comptroller-General provided helpful expert 
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advice to the Junta. The second aspect that reveals the collaborative relationship between 
the Comptroller-General and the Junta concerns the passivity of the former regarding 
overt violations of human rights. The office deliberately decided not to use its powers of 
ex-ante legality review in respect to political repression, and this certainly facilitated the 
consolidation of authoritarianism at the beginning of the military rule. 
A. Mutual concessions 
1. ‘Normalising’ administration 
One of the first measures taken by the Junta once in power was to announce that the 
Comptroller-General and the judiciary were to remain untouched.562 Although the Junta 
made considerable staff redundancies across the whole public sector, the judiciary and 
the Comptroller-General were notable exceptions.563 Indeed, decree law 6, of September 
1973, explicitly declared that every position in the public sector was to be held in interim 
character, with the only exceptions being the judiciary and the Office of the Comptroller-
General. Certainly, however, the Supreme Court and the Comptroller-General retained 
powers to supress political agitators within their ranks. 
 
Former Comptroller-General authorities report that a handful of politically motivated 
dismissals took place in the office’s Legal Department – the main bureau comprised 
exclusively of about 30 legal experts (see chapter 2).564 Although recognising pressure 
from the Junta, one of them also pointed out that the then head of office – Héctor Humeres 
– reached a deal with the military according to which he could take responsibility for the 
officers who supported Allende and who remained in his institution. The same observer 
points out that for harder cases – that is, cases of individuals directly involved in political 
actions supporting the Allende regime – Humeres decided to commission them to 
provincial branches of the institution. In other cases, officers who opposed the regime 
were commissioned to posts that were isolated from the functioning of the central 
government, or they simply abandoned the institution after a couple of years.  
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Soon after the coup, Pinochet announced that the new administration would rely on the 
assistance of the Comptroller-General.565 But in order to be an effective collaborator in 
building the foundations of the new regime, the institution needed further powers. This 
was explicitly discussed a few days after the coup between the Junta and the office’s 
authorities. As a result, the Junta conferred the office with special powers. Its organic law 
was modified in order to enhance the office’s legal capabilities.566 The aim was to make 
administrative action more dynamic, regular and efficient by centralising and 
strengthening the Comptroller-General’s supervision. Concretely, these rules focused on 
three areas. First, they provided the body with full access to administrative information. 
To this end, disciplinary powers were granted in case officials refused to provide the 
requested information, and it was stated that exemption to publicity clauses did not apply 
against this oversight body. Secondly, the regulation widened the scope of the 
institution’s powers, including under its remit every type of administrative entity and, 
particularly importantly, state company. Thirdly, it granted the office the power to set up 
control units within the organisations under its supervision, and it provided that these 
departments were technically subordinated to the Comptroller-General.  
 
The Junta wished to use the institution for auditing Allende’s economic policies, 
especially the financial condition of nationalised firms. However, the outcomes were not 
as expected by the regime. Although the office found inefficiencies and even waste, it did 
not detect large illegalities in the management of the nationalised companies. According 
to one observer, the military rulers were disappointed and even frustrated at the result of 
the investigations. Additionally, the Military Junta wanted to use the Comptroller-General 
as a tool to tighten up their grip on Chilean bureaucracy. A former officer and later 
Pinochet minister recalls that hundreds of ‘ideological agitators’, allegedly responsible 
for causing chaos and misrule, could have been found at different levels of Chilean 
bureaucracy. She maintained that Pinochet, with the help of Comptroller Humeres, was 
able to fire more than 300 of these public employees from different administrative 
agencies in the country.567 
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The conferral of additional powers to the Comptroller’s Office by the Junta can be 
explained by the need to normalise the administrative structures and processes after the 
coup d’état. However, it also shows the sentiment of gratitude and respect that the military 
officials held for the Comptroller-General due to its contribution to the legal struggle 
against the Allende government, as seen earlier in Chapter 4. Additionally, as will be 
shown next, in terms of personnel, the boundaries between the government and the 
Comptroller-General were at times blurred, since officials were serving simultaneously 
on both sides of the divide. 
2. Legal advisors for the new government 
The collaborative role of the office during the period is also illustrated by the fact that 
legal experts trained in the Comptroller-General Office played a key role in designing 
and running the new legal architecture of the country. Indeed, due to expertise in public 
administration and governance, the institution was a natural source for staff that adhered 
to the new authoritarian government. First of all, the Comptroller-General generously 
deployed his power to commission officers in detached service in the executive. Thus, for 
instance, replying to a request for collaboration by the Defence Minister, Comptroller 
Humeres commissioned officers for every state secretary in order to help the new 
authorities and legal advisors with the normalisation of administrative action. Moreover, 
he promised to give prompt responses to the queries of administrators.568 
 
A former senior officer recalls that he was appalled by the fact that colleagues were 
serving simultaneously at both the Comptroller-General and the central government.569 
Numerous Comptroller officers were working as legal advisors either directly to the Junta 
or to the legislative commissions set up to draft future sector-specific legislation.570 These 
cases involved individuals that shared the ideology of the regime, but not all of them did. 
Many conceived of themselves merely as bureaucrats advising on technical legal matters. 
In fact, one former officer who served at the Comptroller-General Office at the time 
narrates the collaboration in slightly less politicised terms. He explains that the military 
needed advice on the law governing the civil administration of the country because most 
of the authorities and their advisors had experience in military matters only. Moreover, 
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he explains that his own work was focused on coordinating civil personnel that remained 
in sector-specific areas, performing similar work as before the military coup. 
 
However, the existence of political adherence – not merely technical cooperation – at the 
highest level seems undeniable. The situation of Mónica Madariaga is a case in point. She 
was a former senior Comptroller-General officer in the Legal Department, and 
afterwards, Pinochet’s chief legal aide and ultimately Minister of Justice between 1977 
and 1983. In fact, Madariaga was a key actor as a senior legal advisor at the office during 
the Allende government.571 From the beginning of Allende’s government in 1970, she 
was mainly dedicated to cases of industrial action in public enterprises. In an interview 
in 1985, she admitted that at that time she favoured a military coup in the country.572 She 
added that she took up her job in the Comptroller-General as a front-line role wherein she 
could defend the political values she supported. Madariaga is regarded as one of the 
architects of the legal doctrine used by the Comptroller-General to oppose Allende’s 
‘legal loopholes’.573 She admitted that ‘with [her] attitude, [she] defended or believe to 
be defending the legitimate property rights of the owners of industries against the 
illegitimate action of the workers, who through violent means were appropriating the 
enterprises and taking them over’.574 
 
When the coup came, Madariaga was commissioned by Comptroller Humeres to serve as 
a representative of the office in the National Commission for Administrative Reform 
(CONARA), a body set up by the Junta to give advice on administrative issues.575 She 
then moved to the presidential office of legal advice. From this position she played a 
critical role in providing reasons for rejecting the adoption of a system of rotation in the 
leadership of the Junta, thus helping to concentrate power on Pinochet to the detriment of 
the other members of the body.576 Generally, based on her acquaintance with public law 
issues acquired as an advisor in the Comptroller-General, she helped Pinochet to dress up 
in legal language his takeover of the Junta. As Constable and Valenzuela explain, ‘[w]ith 
support from conservative legal experts, who argued that the state needed a clear 
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separation of power to function effectively, [Pinochet] urged his colleagues to make him 
the chief executive, while they would act as the legislature’.577 These commentators 
emphasise the role of people like Madariaga within Pinochet’s civilian staff. Indeed, she 
is described as a ‘sharp legal factotum […] who helped construct an imposing juridical 
rationale for dictatorial rule’.578 As Pinochet’s chief legal advisor, she engaged in intense 
debates with advisors to the other members of the Junta, who occasionally opposed 
Pinochet’s wishes.579 As will be seen later, her experience in the Comptroller-General’s 
office may explain her stance regarding this institution during the deliberation of the new 
Constitution. 
 
The case of Hugo Araneda, on the other hand, illustrates the limitations in the influence 
of Comptroller officials over executive policy during the Pinochet period.580 He was the 
Deputy Comptroller-General when Allende’s government was overthrown, and was 
considered by the Junta as a candidate to be appointed Minister of Economy during those 
early days. He was a specialist in finance and the budget process, so his profile fitted the 
post. Yet as he was above all a lawyer and his economic views were traditionalistic, some 
University of Chicago educated economists rapidly took the lead, and pressured the 
government not to appoint him. Eventually, he was discarded from the shortlist, a 
‘Chicago boy’ economist was appointed, and Araneda went back to the office, where he 
retired in 1979. This shows that the influence of Comptroller-General officers had natural 
limitations when entering into conflict with the interests of the young neoliberal 
economists of the new regime. More importantly, it reveals the growing perception that 
the office represented outdated, collectivist attitudes to state action that the regime wanted 
to eradicate. 
B. The Comptroller-General’s passivity 
The office’s cooperation with the Junta in the early years of the dictatorship was not only 
carried out by active involvement in the governance of the country. It also involved failure 
to exercise its powers of legal control in respect to gross human rights violations. While 
monitoring a potentially unassailable bureaucracy and providing legal advice could be 
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viewed as forms of collaboration that were plausibly indispensable in order to normalise 
the country, the office’s docility in protecting the rights of the population had the natural 
effect of eroding its own legitimacy as the primary custodian of administrative legality. 
In what follows I will briefly explain how this institution failed to perform its ex-ante 
legality review powers in respect to crucial human rights issues, and also its weakness in 
protecting public service rules, one of the core aspects of the office’s remit. 
1. Ousting the ex-ante legality review 
At the time, as today, the main legal weapon of the Comptroller-General was the ex-ante 
legality review procedure. In fact, it was through this procedure that the office held 
Allende accountable in regards to his industrial nationalisation policy. According to this 
procedure, the most important administrative decisions had to undergo legal examination 
by the Comptroller-General before promulgation.581 
 
The legality review procedure was suspended in the months immediately after the coup 
d’état. In fact, during September and December 1973, the Junta submitted decrees to the 
Comptroller-General, but only for the record, not for legality scrutiny.582 This meant that 
the institution recorded them in its files, but did not perform a proper legal examination 
or exercise its potent veto power. As a result, during the initial months of the dictatorship, 
the main features of the legal framework of the regime were set up without legal 
challenges. 
 
However, the passivity of the office did not stop there. Another technique to avoid legal 
controversies with the government was deployed. As scrutiny of every administrative 
regulation issued by public bureaucracy would paralyse the operation of the Comptroller-
General, its organic law authorised the office to exempt from review matters that were 
‘non-essential’.583 Indeed, this provision was invoked after the coup d’état, in order to 
facilitate military repression. In fact, resolution 1100 (10 November 1973) by 
Comptroller Humeres, enacted two months after the coup, stated that decisions regarding 
national security such as arrests, confiscations, and expulsions were to be exempted from 
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legality review by the office.584  In other words, in Humeres’ view, they were non-
essential administrative matters. 
 
The impact of this measure did not pass unnoticed. In fact, in 1975, the Cooperation 
Committee for Peace (Comité de Cooperación para la Paz) requested that the 
Comptroller-General repeal resolution 1,100. 585  This Committee was a civil society 
organisation comprising several representatives of churches, with the purpose of 
defending victims of the violence during the first years of the dictatorship. In its request, 
the Committee emphasised the connection between the rule of law and the existence of 
means for legal control of administrative action. They reminded the office that the Chilean 
system relied heavily on the ex-ante review, a feature that made Chile well known and 
respected abroad, they remarked. The Committee refuted the idea that this scheme was 
valid only in times of normality – not during constitutional emergencies. The petition 
conceded that the Comptroller-General was endowed with the power to exempt some 
non-essential decisions from review, but compellingly argued that issues regarding 
constitutional rights such as personal liberty, the right to remain in national territory, and 
the right to property should be regarded as of critical importance. Therefore, the 
Committee asserted, these matters should not have been regarded as non-essential by 
Comptroller Hector Humeres. In particular, the petition was motivated by ‘irregularities 
detected in the execution of measures and by the increasing numbers of affected people, 
which makes it unfounded to assert that they are isolated or insignificant cases’.586 After 
mentioning cases of illegal arrests, expulsions, and confiscations, the petition requested 
that Humeres set aside his resolution and issue a new regulation establishing that arrests, 
expulsions, and confiscations must be submitted to compulsory ex-ante review. 
 
International organisations were also concerned with the Comptroller-General’s passive 
response to authoritarianism. Between 1974 and 1977, the Organisation of American 
States (OAS) issued several reports requiring explanations from the Chilean regime in 
relation to the situation of human rights in the country. In its first report in 1974, the OAS 
highlighted that the Comptroller-General had been ‘one of the most distinctive 
                                                 
584 Constable and Valenzuela (n 535) 129; Barros (n 24) 109 note 37. 
585 Formal Request to the Comptroller General from Cristián Precht, ‘Solicita se modifique la resolución 
1.100, de 10 de noviembre de 1973’ (1975) <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/archivos2/pdfs/MC0043515. 
pdf> accessed 27 December 2015. 
586 ibid. 
 180 
institutions of the constitutional regime of justice in Chile’.587  Although it was still 
formally functioning, the OAS inspectors reported that few essential elements of the 
institution survived, since it had temporally lost its main powers for protecting human 
rights.588 Even though the oversight body was still in operation, its supreme rule-of-law 
function had temporally disappeared, and its powers hardly went beyond the formal ones 
of a notary, the report remarked.589 In its second report on the situation of human rights 
in the country, the OAS strongly criticised the exceptions the Comptroller-General was 
affording to decrees concerning matters of importance from a human rights perspective, 
such as arrests, expulsions, and confinements.590 The OAS asked the government for 
clarification regarding the legal sources for these decisions, and details about how those 
powers had been used. However, the government did not provide any information, 
although they did reply in January 1977 explaining the allegedly legal basis for the 
exceptions to legality review. However, the OAS insisted on its warning regarding the 
unjustifiable self–restriction of an institution of such importance in the country and the 
continent for the protection of fundamental rights.591 
 
The attitude of the Comptroller-General was to some degree hypocritical. Indeed, a senior 
officer recalls that Humeres was concerned by the fact that the executive was illegally 
failing to submit to review decisions on politically motivated dismissals. The officer 
remembers that Humeres commissioned him to convince Deputy Interior Minister 
Enrique Montero either to resume the submission of this sort of decree or, alternatively, 
enact a law excluding them from review. Thus, Humeres’ main concern was not the 
substantive protection of rights, but the respect for procedural forms. The reaction of the 
government to the request was a violent refusal, suggesting that Humeres had no authority 
to impose conditions upon them. 
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Eventually, in 1977, Comptroller Humeres modified resolution 1100, that is, two years 
after the request by human rights organisations. Indeed, in July, he issued resolution 600 
stating that some national security issues were ‘essential’. As will be seen below, the 
relationship between the Comptroller-General and the government reached its lowest 
point that year, and Humeres’ decision reveals a less docile attitude. The new resolution 
included as reviewable the following acts: cancellation of nationality status, detentions 
carried out under emergency regimes, presidential pardons, prohibition to engage in 
determined professional activities, and expulsion orders on national security grounds.592 
Accordingly, some critical decisions were reintroduced within the remit of the 
Comptroller’s legal supervision. 
 
Yet in January 1978, Comptroller Sergio Fernández – a close aide to Pinochet who held 
office for only four months between January and April – reinstated the old restrictive 
criterion. He enacted resolution 113, stating that the following matters were exempted 
from legality review: detentions carried out during emergency regimes and expulsion 
orders or prohibition from entering the country on state security grounds. As will be seen 
in the following section, although he only held office for a few months, his aim was clear: 
to re-establish the docility of the office to governmental power. 
2. Purge in the public administration 
Political repression took many forms, one of which was purges in the state sector. This is 
particularly important since one of the main tasks of the Comptroller-General had 
historically been to interpret legality concerning civil service and labour protection in the 
public sector. Between 1973 and 1980, 150,000 individuals serving in the public sector 
were dismissed by the new regime. The central government was reduced by half, while 
public bureaucracy in general went from 700,000 in 1973 to 550,000 in 1980.593  
 
Unsurprisingly, the education sector was severely affected. Hundreds of university 
lecturers were dismissed for political reasons during the first years of the dictatorship. 
Indeed, in October 1973, the Junta appointed military officials with extensive powers to 
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run all universities in the country. Their task was to ‘extirpate’ Marxists who had 
allegedly spread their ideology and hatred across the classrooms. 594  A 1976 United 
Nations report examined the restructuring of the universities in the country, indicating 
that the restructuring process caused the firing of more than 200 lecturers, many of which 
were well-known for their independent political opinions.595 The report asserted that 
academics regarded as ‘nonconformist’ in teaching matters were at permanent risk of 
being removed from their jobs. It was also reported that the Comptroller-General was 
instrumental to the policy implemented by government. Indeed, the office interpreted 
university regulations as granting university presidents and deans with powers for 
dismissing academics if the ‘superior interest’ of the university required it, in order to 
ensure normal operation, or simply to restructure necessities. This contrasted sharply with 
the attitude of the office in the late 1960s, described by one observer as protective of ‘the 
universities against arbitrary governmental intervention’.596 
 
However, closer inspection of some of the cases in which the Comptroller-General 
intervened does not reveal an unremittingly subservient attitude. The office actually 
required the authorities to at least respect legal procedure and forms. For instance, with 
ruling 79534 (8 October 1973), the office registered a decree appointing pro-government 
rectors to state universities, but declared that the powers granted were illegal. It must be 
noted that at the time, the legality review procedure was suspended, so the ruling could 
not veto the executive order. Another example is ruling 87859 (3 December 1974), in 
which the Comptroller-General rejected a decree issued by the director of the University 
of Chile appointed by the Armed Forces. The decree that was questioned by the office 
dismissed university personnel as part of the crackdown on academic freedom. The office 
found that the authority failed to show that the affected functionaries were fully informed 
of the procedure against them. In other cases, the Comptroller-General enforced social 
security and employment regulations. For instance, in Ruling 6757 (28 January 1976), it 
held that the appointed director of the University of Chile was not allowed to make a post 
redundant if it was held by a woman entitled to maternity leave. Similarly, in Ruling 
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33060 (11 May 1976), the Comptroller-General found that although university deans 
possessed discretionary powers to fire personnel, they must respect labour protections. 
 
Above all, the role of the institution in these cases consisted of reminding the 
administrative authorities of the need to conform to legal formalities before taking action 
against political opponents. If there was a valid legal provision blocking a decision, the 
office pointed that out, and rejected the decree. Although this attitude reflects little more 
than a reminder that such legal provisions had to be repealed or modified in order to 
proceed with the implementation of authoritarian policies, because of its legalism the 
Comptroller-General Office was increasingly perceived by military authorities as an 
obstruction to expeditious governmental policy. 
III. HOSTILITY 
By 1977 the Comptroller-General had become gradually less passive. Not surprisingly, 
the reaction from the government was open hostility to the office. This section analyses 
the clashes between the Comptroller-General and the authoritarian regime, and the way 
they impacted on the institution’s independence. In general, it will describe the political 
tensions between Comptroller Hector Humeres and some groups within the military 
government. These frictions reached their peak in late 1977, and led to the demise of 
Humeres after ten years serving as Comptroller-General. After that, in a strategy of 
survival, the office adopted a predominantly timid attitude, avoiding public showdowns 
as much as possible. 
A. The Comptroller’s independence and the demise of Humeres 
By 1977 the institution was increasingly viewed by the regime as an obstacle to the 
profound economic reforms the latter was implementing. The government considered that 
the office was unduly interfering in the process of policy implementation. They may also 
have regarded it as troublesome and a scandalmonger in especially difficult political 
circumstances. However, there were some precedents in previous years. For instance, a 
clash occurred in 1974 when Comptroller Humeres refused to submit observations to 
Pinochet privately as the latter wished, probably in order to avoid public criticism.597 In 
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subsequent years he also had confrontations with ministers and other high-ranking 
officials in the areas of finance, economics, housing, and public health.598 
 
In 1977, a Comptroller-General investigation ended up with the Provincial Treasurer of 
Santiago being imprisoned for three months.599 The office detected that the Treasurer 
acted with discretion in reaching deals with well-resourced taxpayers, but reduced state 
revenues by around US$7,000,000. According to the Comptroller-General, in these types 
of cases, statutory regulations neatly structured treasurer decision-making, so he was not 
allowed to act on his own discretion. Neither was he allowed to use his discretion in 
cancelling or postponing the collection of tax revenue. After investigating the case and 
considering the seriousness of the infringements incurred by the officer, the Comptroller-
General recommended that the Finance Minister remove him from his position, and also 
filed a criminal action in the ordinary courts. 
 
As a result of cases like this, newspapers supporting the military regime began to harass 
Humeres.600 Various media outlets were publishing letters from the public complaining 
about the behaviour of the office-holder. As doubts about the identity of the authors of 
the letters were raised, it was suspected that government officials were orchestrating an 
offensive against Humeres. Considering the situation unacceptable, he asked the courts 
to initiate criminal proceedings on national security grounds against people harassing 
him. Yet this did not appease the critics. Hermógenes Pérez de Arce, director of a widely 
read newspaper and an influential supporter of the regime, rejected Humeres’ complaints 
and endorsed the opinion of his letter-writers. He labelled the Comptroller-General a 
‘gigantic octopus’ that made everything sluggish and paralysed decision-making. 601 
Defenders of the office, however, believed that the attacks were triggered by hostility 
against what was perceived as a statist institution that was alien to the country’s now 
neoliberal economy.602 According to the press, this was especially relevant, considering 
the discussion about the new constitutional regulation of the institution that was 
simultaneously taking place.603 
                                                 
598 ibid. 
599 Jaime Moreno Laval, ‘Contraloría-Tesorería. Criterios en pugna’ [1977] Revista Hoy 18. 
600 Jaime Moreno Laval, ‘Las querellas del Contralor’ [1977] Revista Hoy 15. 
601 Cited in ibid. 
602 ibid. 
603 See section IV below. 
 185 
 
Against this background, it came as no surprise that budget protections in favour of the 
office were eliminated in the same year. This protection dated back to the Golden Age of 
the office. In 1959, a statutory regulation had safeguarded the Comptroller-General’s 
budget against fiscal reductions, ensuring that no less than 0.39% of the expenditure 
estimated in the Annual Budget Law had to be appropriated to the office.604 The Military 
Junta modified this law in November 1974 and again in 1975 to weaken the budget 
protection.605 The Junta eventually decided to abolish the shielded budget entirely in 
November 1977. 606  As a result, a keystone institutional safeguard of the office’s 
independence was entirely destroyed. 
 
While some public opinion applauded the blitz against the office, others criticised it. An 
editorial piece in El Mercurio – the main newspaper in circulation – recommended going 
beyond mere budget modification. In fact, it encouraged a full reconsideration of the role 
of the institution within the regime.607 Yet in the same newspaper, a former Chilean 
diplomat censured the assault against the independence of the Comptroller-General.608 
He criticised the reversal of the original policy towards the office, blaming the economic 
advisors of the government for the situation.  
 
Facing growing pressure from the regime, Comptroller Humeres decided to take early 
retirement in December 1977. 609  The media reported that Humeres had told senior 
officers within the institution that his retirement had been triggered by the budget 
reduction brought about by the Junta. Indeed, as a consequence of the legal modifications, 
the office’s budget for 1978 was cut by 17% compared to 1977. In an interview in mid-
December, Humeres declared that he ‘was not tired’, and that ‘physically and mentally 
he was fit to remain in the job’.610 This suggested that the reason for retirement was 
political. Furthermore, in a very provocative statement, Humeres implicitly complained 
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about the assaults from the executive, and the shift in its approach towards the office 
based on changing attitudes to economic policy: 
[W]hen a new presidential administration begins, most of the employees are 
inexperienced and they do not adequately understand the running of public 
administration. As the Office of the Comptroller-General is the custodian of 
this knowledge about public affairs, at the beginning they turn to it. Yet over 
the years the heads of departments and senior officers acquire experience 
and then they do not sympathise with the office anymore. [Nevertheless] the 
Comptroller-General’s contribution is relevant in every country, no matter 
the degree of state intervention in the economy or in other aspects of public 
life, because this entity is the custodian of the legality of the country and 
that has been understood from liberal to socialist regimes in the past.611 
 
By 1977, Pinochet had considerably enlarged his power. Indeed, he was granted the title 
of President of the Republic, standing above his military colleagues within the Junta. He 
held the concentration of executive power, while the Junta as a whole exercised legislative 
and constituent power. However, Pinochet was also facing some difficulties. As a result 
of the political repression, there was mounting internal and international pressure on the 
regime.612 In December 1977, the United Nations passed a resolution condemning the 
Chilean regime for violations of human rights. Perhaps surprisingly, Pinochet decided to 
call a referendum asking for popular support against this act of ‘international aggression’. 
Through the plebiscite, Pinochet was seeking to counteract international pressure about 
human rights violations in the country, and also internal political disagreement within the 
military. Reflecting the manipulative rationale behind the move, the government provided 
no more than a couple of weeks for ‘public deliberation’, scheduling the referendum for 
4 January 1978. 
 
As we have seen, during the year, Comptroller Humeres had been involved in several 
clashes with the regime. Perhaps considering that his retirement was close and relying on 
opposing forces within the military regime, he decided to take a firm stance against the 
referendum. Indeed, just before the referendum – on 28 December – Humeres 
confidentially reported to the government that the respective decree ‘lacked legal 
foundations and, therefore, he could not uphold it’.613 The only alternative was to approve 
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the call as a legislative measure. However, while Pinochet himself was allowed to enact 
a simple executive decree, a legislative measure required the unanimity of the Junta. 
Humeres was aware of the impossibility of obtaining unanimity in this matter, 
considering the disagreement among the members of the Junta. In fact, two other 
members of the Junta disagreed, and forcefully rejected Pinochet’s proposal. He, 
however, had already taken a decision: ‘The people [...] must choose between the 
champion of Chile’s honour and her foreign detractors,’ he stated.614 
 
The Comptroller-General did not actually officially discard the decree that called the 
plebiscite. Rather, they returned it to the executive for reconsideration. This was a 
standard technique deployed by the office in order to initiate negotiations on the terms of 
the decree with the executive branch legal advisors. Attempting to downplay the 
controversy, the press reported that this was a routine issue, illustrating the point by 
claiming that almost 9% of the 163,277 documents submitted to the Comptroller-General 
for review in 1977 had been ‘returned’ by the office.615 Yet the reasons provided by 
Comptroller Humeres for returning the decree were not merely formal.616 The first reason 
was that this was not one of the cases foreseen by the Constitution for calling a 
referendum. As this mechanism was exceptionally permitted by the Constitution, 
Humeres rejected the use of analogical interpretations. Secondly, the Comptroller-
General argued that the executive could not hold a referendum on the ‘legitimacy of the 
government’ without the approval of the Junta. Thirdly, Humeres pointed out that it was 
illegal to make participation in the referendum compulsory, as the decree ordered in 
different ways. Finally, he asserted that there was no budgetary authorisation for 
implementing the referendum. Therefore, the Comptroller-General engaged in 
constitutional and substantive legal scrutiny of the executive decree, and his reasons were 
far from routine. 
 
As Pinochet’s advisors were aware that Humeres had filed his papers for early retirement, 
they hastened to process all the paperwork to grant the retirement as soon as possible, in 
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order to be able to appoint a new, submissive Comptroller-General.617 Of course, this was 
crucial for obtaining approval to proceed with the plebiscite. The day after Humeres’ 
announcement of the illegality of the call to referendum, Sergio Fernández – a loyal aide 
to Pinochet and then Minister of Labour – was appointed as new Comptroller-General.618 
Thenceforth, just a couple of days later, the government requested that the office re-
examine its original pronouncement on the referendum.619 In its request for reassessment, 
the executive claimed that it ‘had accepted the main recommendations and observations 
made by the Comptroller-General’.620 
 
Blatantly, Comptroller Fernández was quick to accept the government reconsideration 
request and uphold the legality of the decree. In his pronouncement, he declared that the 
Ministry of the Interior had submitted to the points raised by the Comptroller-General, 
and had consequently modified the decree at issue.621 Thus, the barriers to proceeding 
with the referendum were lifted. However, doubts concerning the real changes in the 
decree remained. Indeed, the very same day of the referendum, even pro-government 
newspapers reported that the original and the corrected decrees were identical.622 On 4 
January 1978, the referendum finally took place, and unsurprisingly the Pinochet option 
prevailed.623 The referendum was carried out under absolutely irregular conditions in 
terms of registers, political participation, and freedom of the press. 624  Despite its 
ostensible unfairness, the referendum enabled Pinochet to begin a new stage in his plan 
to design an institutional framework that would legitimate his regime in the long term. 
The position of the Comptroller-General under the new constitutional architecture was 
increasingly precarious. 
B. Neutralisation and co-optation 
From the Comptroller-General’s point of view, the consequences of the controversy about 
the plebiscite were far-reaching. A series of showdowns between Comptroller Humeres 
and the government ended with the former taking early retirement, provoking an 
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important shift in the office. The increasingly assertive attitude of the office towards the 
regime ceased, and a more timid approach was adopted. 
 
The appointment of former minister Sergio Fernández as Comptroller-General between 
January and April 1978 had a threefold reason for Pinochet: first, to approve the call to 
plebiscite; secondly, to reinstate exemptions from review to decisions concerning national 
security; and thirdly, to approve other politically relevant decrees under discussion with 
former Comptroller Humeres.625 Still, it is reported that Fernández did not interfere with 
routine operations in non-political matters, and that he did not disturb the staff. His role 
was to reduce the assertiveness of the institution rather than to start a shutdown operation. 
For instance, in exchange for the new, less assertive outlook of the office, he rewarded 
the office’s personnel by improving their working conditions in terms of salary and 
hierarchy. 
 
After Fernández, Pinochet appointed Osvaldo Iturriaga as Comptroller-General. He had 
not been a brilliant official within the institution, but he had exactly the profile the regime 
was seeking. A former colleague describes him as an unexceptional lawyer of right-wing 
convictions. Another colleague depicts him as a person of reserved personality who 
moved the institution inwards. Similarly, a government lawyer regarded him as an 
individual with weak personality. Certainly, Iturriaga represented no threat to the 
authoritarian government. Yet during the final years of the dictatorship, the opposition 
also supported Iturriaga, because there were far worse alternatives to him. In fact, some 
candidates for head of the office were overtly authoritarian, and, for age reasons, they had 
the potential to remain in office for a dozen years more, impacting the forthcoming 
democratic transition. Iturriaga, by contrast, was docile and was close to retirement. 
 
The appointment of Iturriaga also meant that the balance of power between the Junta and 
Pinochet tipped further towards the latter. Indeed, Humeres had frequently sided with Air 
Force General Gustavo Leigh, and had provided legal reasons in support of his positions 
during the continuous clashes between Pinochet and Leigh within the Junta. Leigh 
constantly opposed Pinochet’s strategies. A breaking point occurred when the former 
                                                 
625 The following account is based on interviews with a former senior Comptroller-General officer, a mid-
level officer at the time, and a senior government lawyer. 
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gave an interview to an Italian newspaper in July 1978, criticising the lack of a clear 
timetable for the end of the dictatorship. Doubtlessly, this challenged Pinochet’s 
leadership within the Junta, and in reaction, Pinochet decided to remove Leigh. Therefore, 
Pinochet’s legal advisors drafted a decree declaring Leigh disqualified from remaining in 
the body.626 The newly appointed Comptroller Iturriaga easily approved the dismissal 
decree. Controversially, however, the decree declared General Leigh medically unfit to 
continue serving in the Junta. This was suspicious grounds for removal, and Leigh 
considered challenging the decision. But the presence of the Comptroller-General and the 
president of the Supreme Court in the ceremony of appointment for the new member of 
the Junta dissuaded Leigh from following that route.627 The Comptroller-General was no 
longer a site for challenging Pinochet’s determinations. 
 
The story of Comptroller Humeres’ demise seems to confirm scepticism about the 
commitment of the authoritarian leaders to constitutionalism,628 and raises doubts about 
Barros’ account outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The events just described 
suggest that extra-institutional and institutional factors are important in the operation of 
legal accountability institutions. As Martin Shapiro has argued, the response by legal 
officials to changes from democratic to authoritarian regimes ‘may be more about the 
minds of the judges than the design of institutions’. 629  Particularly in hostile 
circumstances, the contribution of these bodies to the respect of the rule of law and the 
protection of human rights depends, to a large extent, on the political leadership of its 
authorities.630 At the institutional level, the foregoing story raises questions about the 
monocratic structure of the Comptroller-General. The design of single-headed institutions 
has been traditionally explained in terms of institutional energy. However, even though 
monocratic institutions might entail valuable higher activity levels and flexibility, they 
can also be more easily co-opted by the political institutions overseen by them, especially 
under conditions of political authoritarianism. My previous account of the interactions 
                                                 
626 Madariaga (n 413) 92–3. 
627 Cavallo, Salazar, and Sepúlveda (n 575) 200. 
628 See, for instance, Mark Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’ (2015) 100 Cornell Law Review 391, 
431–2. 
629 Martin Shapiro, ‘Courts in Authoritarian Regimes’ in Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (eds), Rule by 
law: the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes (CUP 2008) 331–2. 
630 ibid 332. 
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between the office and the military suggest that the latter risk held true in the case of the 
Chilean Comptroller-General under the Pinochet dictatorship. 
IV. THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
Just a few days after the coup d’état, the Military Junta commissioned a group of jurists 
for the task of studying, elaborating, and proposing a draft for a new Constitution.631 By 
December 1973, the Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución (Commission for 
the Study of the New Constitution or CENC) was operating with eight permanent 
members, all lawyers who sympathised with the new regime. The primary ideas for the 
new Constitution were based on reactions to the Allende government. 632  Members 
suggested proposals such as the proscription of Marxist parties and individuals, 
introducing a runoff presidential election to avoid minority governments, and to 
strengthen the constitutional protection of property rights. Other ideas focused on 
reinforcing the position of the Supreme Court by creating administrative tribunals under 
its supervision, and allocating broad constitutional review powers to the Court instead of 
the Constitutional Tribunal. Lastly, in legal accountability matters, it was also necessary 
to confer to the Comptroller-General the power to enforce its own decisions to forestall 
executive noncompliance. This set the tone for the discussions in the years to come. The 
new Constitution was ratified by another plebiscite plagued by procedural irregularities 
in September 1980, and it entered into force in March 1981. 
 
This final section will examine the view of the authoritarian regime about the role of the 
Comptroller-General in the new constitutional framework. For this purpose, it will 
provide an account of the discussion about the office’s powers and functions in the 
drafting committee. Also, it will briefly look at the amendments introduced in 1989 in the 
negotiations between the government and the opposition. 
A. The debate over the Comptroller-General 
At the outset, there was no clear blueprint for the new constitutional features the 
Comptroller-General should possess. The office had been granted constitutional status in 
1943, but these constitutional provisions were rather patchy. As an illustration, the 
Constitution did not provide for the ex-ante legality review procedure – its most 
                                                 
631 Barros (n 24) 88 ff. 
632 See Barros (n 31) 226–7. 
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distinctive institutional feature. In these circumstances, the initial task was to design rules 
that better reflected the actual role of the office in Chilean political arrangements. 
However, there was no consensus beyond this broad purpose. 
 
Two conflicting forces seem to have been on display during the discussion. On the one 
hand, some participants wished to see constitutional provisions that recognised the 
Comptroller-General as a main branch of government comparable to the executive, the 
judiciary, and Congress. This position reflected recent history, especially the role of the 
office during the Allende period. Thus, for these participants, the new Constitution ought 
to reinforce the current powers of the institution and, furthermore, enhance them in order 
to bring legal recognition to the fact that this organisation was the main administrative 
justice body in the country. On the other hand, however, there were forces strongly 
opposing the Comptroller-General. The antagonism to it stemmed from its association 
with the interventionist state that preceded the Pinochet regime, and also from its recent 
controversies with the military regime. The lack of a well-defined rationale underpinning 
the Comptroller-General also caused scepticism about its real contribution to public 
governance. From this perspective, it was recommended that the Constitution should 
allocate judicial review powers to the ordinary judiciary, and suppress the office’s legal 
accountability functions. In what follows, both views will emerge, and we will see that, 
remarkably, neither of them eventually prevailed. 
 
The first mention of the Comptroller-General in the discussion was incidental. It occurred 
when the Commission was examining the future arrangements of the judicature, 
specifically whether administrative tribunals were to be created.633 This issue had been 
debated especially fiercely in Chilean constitutional doctrine since the enactment of the 
1925 Constitution. This time, the Commission was considering whether to create 
administrative tribunals under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or simply to grant 
judicial review powers to the ordinary courts. 634  As these issues had an evident 
connection with the Comptroller-General, the commissioners invited administrative 
                                                 
633 See 289th session, 3 May 1977. 
634 There were two groups of advisors to the CENC in this area. One group was working on a proposal for 
the regulation of the judiciary in the constitution, while another group was working on legislation about 
administrative tribunals. The former proposed to make it explicit in the constitution that the administrative 
tribunals were subordinated to the Supreme Court, whereas the latter preferred to leave the issue to 
legislative definition. See also 295th session, of 26 May 1977. 
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lawyers early on to give evidence about the impact of the proposed administrative 
tribunals on the powers of this institution. Although it was not a straightforward 
statement, the response pointed to the elimination of the ex-post legal review powers of 
the office.635 
 
The debate continued in the following sessions as a discussion on whether the 
Comptroller-General or the Supreme Court was the best mechanism for legality review 
of administrative power. While some commissioners wanted to make it explicit in the 
Constitution that legal review of administrative action was under the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, others rejected the idea of ‘transforming the Supreme Court into a sort 
of Comptroller-General’.636 As expected, the commissioners who backed the conferral of 
judicial review of administrative action to the Supreme Court invoked the rule of law 
principle, arguing that it required the highest instance of legal control in the country to be 
the Supreme Court. In turn, the commissioners opposing the transfer of powers from the 
Comptroller-General to the Supreme Court explained that this might impinge on 
administrative action, as it would probably encourage private litigation. Furthermore, it 
could overload the Supreme Court docket. 
 
Suddenly, however, former Comptroller-General officer Mónica Madariaga – then 
Minister of Justice – interrupted this debate, and required the Commission to suspend its 
deliberation on the judiciary in order to focus exclusively on the Comptroller-General.637 
A new priority for the CENC was set: they first had to define the new role of the 
Comptroller-General, and only afterwards consider the features of the judiciary. In her 
internal communication, the Minister pointed out that this institution had thus far 
successfully filled in for the lack of administrative tribunals in the country. She added 
that this merited defining its powers before examining the administrative tribunals, 
making sure that its specialisation, capabilities, and efficiency would not be impinged. 
The rules concerning the institution should be made more precise and up-to-date, and its 
                                                 
635  The proposal, however, also considered collaboration of the Comptroller-General with the 
administrative tribunals for facilitation of access to information. It is noteworthy that the proposal 
envisioned a mechanism of insistence – similar to that of the Comptroller – as taking place in the future 
judicial review procedure. See 290th session, 10 May 1977. 
636 Commissioner Raúl Bertelsen was strongly for it, whereas commissioners Sergio Diez and Luz Bulnes 
were against. See 297th session, 14 June 1977, and 303rd session, 5 July 1977. 
637 See 306th session, 19 July 1977. 
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enforcement powers strengthened. The message seemed clear: whatever the concrete 
features of the future administrative tribunals, they must not weaken the powers of the 
Comptroller-General. Quite the reverse: the powers of the office must be reinvigorated. 
 
The commissioners half-heartedly welcomed the ‘invitation’ from the government to 
prioritise the Comptroller-General, and interpreted their new mandate in narrow terms as 
consisting of just delimitating the remit of the administrative tribunals vis-à-vis the 
Comptroller-General. Their first step was to analyse a dated proposal drafted in 1973 by 
the Comptroller-General Office, in which a set of new constitutional provisions were 
recommended. 638  Probably the most controversial aspect of this document was the 
request for new disciplinary powers to deter noncompliance. The commissioners reacted 
with distrust to these ideas. They regarded them as technically deficient and thought that 
the proposition did not clarify the functions of the office in relation to other public 
institutions such as the judiciary, the Constitutional Tribunal, and Congress. Moreover, 
the document was unable to set limits on the insistence mechanism, one of the most 
debated aspects of the institution during the Allende period. 
 
Comptroller Hector Humeres then submitted an up-to-date document to be discussed in 
the following sessions.639 In presenting the proposal, he set out the background of his 
position, emphasising that the Junta had thus far enlarged the office’s powers. Humeres 
explained that the office reflected the synthesis of two disparate public law traditions: the 
French and the American. According to Humeres, the institution was characterised by its 
independence, unity, and general character. He also pointed out the professional and 
technical nature of the office, and concluded by outlining the main innovations of his 
proposals. First, he recommended strengthening the enforcement powers of the office by 
granting it disciplinary powers over the entire public administration. Secondly, he 
suggested endowing the institution with explicit ex-post powers to annul administrative 
decisions, something the office had in fact been doing for a long time. In this respect, he 
hinted at a division of labour between the Comptroller-General, which was in charge of 
annulment cases, and the judiciary, responsible for state liability cases. During the 
exposition, Minister Madariaga emphatically supported Humeres’ stance. She found it 
                                                 
638 See 306th session, 19 July 1977. 
639 See especially the 307th session, 19 July 1977, and 309th session, 2 August 1977. 
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more worrying to grant annulment powers to the judiciary than to grant them to the 
Comptroller-General, since the latter had experience and technical and legal capabilities. 
Her concern was also that the judiciary did not possess robust knowledge of 
administrative law, so they tended to adjudicate cases by applying private law doctrines, 
with dysfunctional outcomes.  
 
The Commission, however, was not entirely convinced by Humeres and Madariaga’s 
arguments. Although they admitted the contribution of the Comptroller-General to 
checking abuse during the Allende administration, the commissioners feared that the 
institution had become too powerful and unfettered a body. It was very clear for them, 
for instance, that the insistence mechanism – which was a limitation on the Comptroller-
General’s powers – should be retained in the Constitution. They opined that ‘in a moment 
of discrepancy between the administration and the Comptroller-General, the government 
stance should prevail’.640 According to some commissioners, the risk of illegal action was 
symmetrical. While it was certainly possible for the President to engage in illegal actions, 
so was it for the Comptroller-General, and they preferred to place their trust in the 
executive than in the oversight institution. Furthermore, there was opposition to 
conceding ex-post annulment powers to the office. According to most of the 
commissioners, this belonged to the judiciary, not the Comptroller-General, as they were 
judicial functions. It was also argued that it was inconvenient to grant the same body ex-
ante and ex-post powers. Besides, the Commission was uncomfortable with conferring 
disciplinary powers, since this could entail a severe restriction on the hierarchical control 
within public administration. Consequently, the Commission’s uneasiness was triggered 
by the office’s potential invasion of the remits of both the executive and the judiciary. 
They definitely did not wish to create an accountability superbureau. 
 
Scepticism rose even further after hearing the opinions of administrators and experts who 
were asked to give evidence before the Commission.641 Predictably, they rejected the 
                                                 
640 See 308th session, 27 July 1977. 
641 See sessions 310 to 316, which took place between 3 August and 20 September 1977. Among the expert 
witnesses were the director of the Office of National Planification (ODEPLAN), the director of the National 
Commission for Administrative Reform (CONARA), the Minister of Economy, the Vice-President of the 
National Development Agency (CORFO), the chief legal advisor of the Central Bank, the directors of the 
Agencies of Supervision of banking and financial services respectively, the Minister of Finance, and the 
President of the Council of Legal Defence. Finally, some public law professors were also heard by the 
commission. 
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proposals of giving the Comptroller-General merit review powers. Some of them were 
worried about the possibility of the office meddling with the management and particularly 
the privatisation of state enterprise. The invitees admitted that the Comptroller-General 
had not hitherto interfered with the government’s policy reforms, but a reason for this 
was that the Junta had the powers to overrule any decision with which it disagreed, and 
they feared that in the near future this might not continue. Several invitees said that the 
powers given to the Comptroller-General after the 1973 coup were only justified for the 
exceptional circumstances of the moment. Those powers, it was felt, should be removed 
soon, and certainly they must not be introduced into the Constitution. Similarly, as they 
regarded the Comptroller-General as a component of an interventionist state, they were 
concerned about keeping such a social-state element in the new neoliberal constitutional 
architecture of the country. Finally, concerns were also voiced about usurpation by the 
Comptroller-General of functions corresponding to other branches of government, such 
as the judiciary and Congress. Some invitees accused the office of attempting to transform 
itself into an Administrative Tribunal, or even an Administrative Supreme Court.642 They 
feared that the Comptroller-General could be an excessively severe judge of the 
administration, 643  one invitee claiming that its interference had provoked sluggish 
administrative decision-making, since administrators were fearful of being sanctioned by 
the office for making a wrong decision.644  
 
At that point, the Commission had already reached consensus about the ideal features of 
the institution in the new constitutional architecture. Soon, a formal communication was 
received, in which the Junta let the Commission know its preference for a minimalist 
approach to the regulation of the office.645 Moreover, the Commission strongly rejected 
the idea of Minister Madariaga recognising the power to engage in purposive 
interpretation of administrative legality. 646  This led Madariaga to confess that while 
working in the office during the Allende period, she had narrowly interpreted the law in 
                                                 
642 See, respectively, the opinions of the President of the Council of Defence of State in the 313th session, 
and Professor Evans in the 314th session. 
643 See the opinion of Professor Jorge Guzmán in the 316th session. 
644 See the opinion of Minister of Finance Sergio de Castro in the 313th session. 
645 See 317th session, 27 September 1977. 
646 See 318th session, 28 September 1977. 
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order to sabotage government programmes. 647  However, she asserted that this legal 
boycott must not happen against the current authorities. 
 
Raúl Bertelsen – a conservative constitutional-law scholar – was the strongest and most 
articulated critic of broadening the role of the Comptroller-General in the new 
Constitution. He maintained, for instance, that the office ‘was born and grew in an era in 
which the Chilean state was increasingly interventionist, in the negative sense of the term, 
that is, meaning socialising, enervating [individual] initiative’.648 He perceived a risk in 
enhancing an accountability body that corresponded to a socialist or interventionist 
conception of the state, because this might entail ‘introducing a distorting factor in the 
[new market] economy’.649 According to Bertelsen, the role of the Comptroller-General 
should consist of supervision rather than control. In his view, whereas ‘supervision’ 
entailed a fire alarm role, that is, monitoring administrative action and reporting 
misconduct to political or judicial bodies, ‘control’ meant having the last word in matters 
of legal interpretation.650 In a previous session, he even suggested the replacement of the 
Comptroller-General with a weaker mechanism such as an ombudsman in charge of 
monitoring the administrative process on behalf of Congress.651 
 
Thereafter, the discussion turned to the regulatory details, as a new minimalist proposal 
was introduced.652 Furthermore, the idea of establishing safeguards for the independence 
of the Comptroller-General was questioned. Jaime Guzmán – a close adviser to Pinochet 
– argued for enhancing the influence of the President in the appointment and the removal 
of the head of office.653 He maintained that a more flexible approach was needed, since 
the removal of a Comptroller through impeachment was highly unlikely. As can be seen, 
                                                 
647 See 319th session, 4 October 1977. 
648 See 319th session, 4 October 1977. 
649 See 319th session, 4 October 1977. Bertelsen reiterated this argument many times during the debate. In 
the 321st session, for instance, he maintained that ‘[we] want to react in Chile against undue state 
interventionism, [but] there is a risk that if we do not proceed also against this excessive control, we will 
find ourselves with a fresh administrative apparatus, yet a supervision system operating according to old-
fashioned categories’. 
650 See 319th session, 4 October 1977. 
651 See 308th session, 27 July 1977. 
652 See 321st session, 18 October 1977. 
653 See, especially, the 322nd session, 25 October 1977, and the 326th session, 9 November 1977. It is worth 
noting that, perhaps surprisingly, Bertelsen argued for maintaining strong securities against political 
interference. 
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the Commission was already convinced that the main task in the design of the institution 
was to reduce the risk of paralysis in executive decision-making. 
 
Yet this distrust was not fully crystallised in the new Constitution. Even though the 
Commission was persuaded that the Constitution should provide for a minimum role for 
the Comptroller-General, eventually the position of the office was strengthened in the 
definitive provisions compared to the 1925 Constitution. First, a new chapter of the 
Constitution was dedicated to the office. Besides, not only the financial powers but also 
the legality review powers of the Comptroller-General were given constitutional status. 
Secondly, the new Constitution provided that the basic organisation of the office could 
only be modified by a legislative super-majority. This entrenched the existing statutory 
arrangements governing the institution. Finally, the 1980 Constitution established that a 
former head of office should be selected as an appointed senator. This recognised that the 
office played a political and not merely technical role in the country. These later reforms 
severely restricted the chances for future reduction of the powers of the institution. As a 
result, perhaps ironically considering the commissioners’ views about the office, in the 
1990s the Comptroller-General was perceived as a strong component of the authoritarian 
legacy of the military rule. 
B. The Comptroller-General in the 1989 constitutional reform 
Following the timetable set by the Junta, in 1988 a plebiscite took place in order to decide 
whether Pinochet’s rule should continue for a further period of eight years or a new 
civilian government should be elected. In a historical decision, the outcome of the 
plebiscite favoured the latter option. This meant that a new election had to be held in 
order to vote for a civilian President. In this election, the centre-left opposition obtained 
victory again. However, as the constitutional architecture was absolutely unfit for the new 
democratic regime, months before the end of Pinochet’s formal rule in 1989, 
constitutional negotiations began between the victorious coalition and moderate groups 
within the authoritarian regime. Two aspects of the accorded reforms had an impact on 
the Comptroller-General’s functions: the broadening of judicial review by the ordinary 
courts, and the incorporation of the office into the Council of National Security. 
 
As previously stated, since 1925 the Chilean Constitution had denied general judicial 
review powers to the ordinary courts. Although they were never established by the 
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legislature, the Constitution provided for special administrative tribunals to hear 
complaints against administrative action. Despite doctrinal agreement on the need for 
some form of judicial review of government action, the original text of the 1980 
Constitution did not innovate in this matter. In fact, even though the Commission drafted 
provisions allocating judicial review powers to the ordinary judiciary, the Junta removed 
these powers of legal control from the ordinary courts and returned to the old formulation, 
stating that special administrative tribunals would hear the complaints against 
administrative agencies. This entailed that, in the Constitution enacted in 1980, the 
ordinary judges remained without general jurisdiction to adjudicate these types of 
cases.654 
 
During the 1989 negotiation, this issue was part of the compromise. Negotiators were in 
agreement on granting judicial review powers to the ordinary courts and, as a 
consequence, eliminating any reference to ‘the special administrative tribunals’ from the 
Constitution. Overcoming the Junta’s reluctance, the legal profession and the courts 
rapidly understood that the modification had automatically recognised the jurisdiction of 
the judiciary, with the exception of cases explicitly allocated to special tribunals by the 
statutory provisions. The important point is that this new scenario was the origin of the 
jurisdictional clashes between the Supreme Court and the Comptroller-General that 
ensued from 1990 onwards, and it brought about further uncertainty in terms of the 
legality review functions of the latter.655 
 
The office had a more central role in the discussions about the National Security Council 
(COSENA), a key authoritarian institution in the original scheme designed by Pinochet. 
In the initial framework, this body was conceived as the institution responsible for 
guaranteeing that the political values of the Pinochet regime would not be wiped out under 
the new democratic administration. This was an authoritarian organisation, comprising a 
majority of military members, which was able to overrule decisions by the elected 
branches. Indeed, COSENA had the ambiguous power to ‘make representations’ to any 
constitutional authority in case some event, decision, or issue could seriously impinge the 
                                                 
654 Arturo Aylwin, ‘Efectos de la reforma del art. 38, inciso 2o, de la Constitución Política sobre régimen 
de los contencioso administrativo’, La reforma constitucional de 1989. Estudio Crítico, vol 13 (Cuadernos 
de Análisis Jurídico 1990) 46. 
655 See Chapter 8. 
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institutional basis of the nation or compromise national security.656 COSENA’s seven 
members were four generals and three civilians: the President of the Republic, the 
President of the Senate, and the President of the Supreme Court. As this gave a dangerous 
majority to the military, it was a priority for the opposition and future government to 
modify the membership and powers of this institution. 
 
The negotiators agreed to introduce a civilian majority of five to four into the Council, 
incorporating the Comptroller-General and the President of the Chamber of Deputies as 
civilian elements. However, the Junta rejected this proposal.657 It proposed instead the 
incorporation of just the Comptroller-General into the Council, and to raise the quorum 
to make decisions. Although the opposition considered this solution unsatisfactory,658 an 
agreement was eventually reached, and as a result, the Council ended up being a half-
military, half-civilian body that was able to politically overrule decisions by the elected 
branches.659 Arguably, this negotiation reflected the vague position of the Comptroller-
General within the institutional framework of the transition. On the one hand, it was 
included within COSENA as representing a civilian power. However, on the other hand, 
opposition politicians viewed the Comptroller-General with scepticism at that time, since 
it represented the ‘legal profession’ rather than the people or the citizenry.660 Moreover, 
the negotiation revealed that the military regime seemed particularly comfortable with a 
civilian ‘counterbalance’ represented by their former allies, that is, the Supreme Court 
and the Comptroller-General. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the role of the Comptroller-General during the Pinochet 
dictatorship during 1973 and 1990. The picture drawn by this chapter reveals convoluted 
interactions between the office and the authoritarian government. Three periods have 
                                                 
656 The power to ‘make representations’ was particularly worrying, since that was the expression used by 
the law in relation to the power of the Comptroller-General to veto administrative decisions. In other words, 
it could be easily interpreted as a veto power against any constitutional body, including Congress and the 
President. 
657 Francisco Cumplido, ‘Reformas al poder de seguridad’ in Universidad Diego Portales (ed), La reforma 
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been identified. First, the office collaborated with the regime during the early years of the 
regime. New powers were granted to the office in order to normalise administrative 
processes; numerous Comptroller-General officials worked in detached service or 
otherwise in the new government, and legality checks were lifted to facilitate repression. 
Then, when the legitimacy of the regime was under attack because of national and 
international pressure, the Comptroller-General took a more assertive approach. It 
attempted to reinstate legal accountability procedures, oversaw the economic policy of 
the dictatorship, and to a degree resisted overt co-optation in the appointment of its chief 
authorities. Of course, the new political assertiveness of the Comptroller-General 
depended on alliances with key actors within the regime. As expected, considering the 
authoritarian nature of the regime, the response against the institution was strong. Thus, 
in the last period, the Comptroller-General returned to passivity. The regime and its 
advisors not only neutralised the operation of the office for the rest of the dictatorship, 
turning it inwards; they also attempted to ensure that no further powers were granted to 
the office in the new Constitution. Against the original desires of the Comptroller-General 
and some high-ranking officers within the government, the commission responsible for 
drafting the new Constitution concluded that the role of the office should be diminished 
rather than enlarged.661 
 
Different forces may explain these disparate stages in the Comptroller-government 
relationship. On the one hand, the initial collaboration was probably due to overt 
ideological adhesion to the military coup d’état and the authoritarian government that 
followed. The office’s expertise and its embeddedness in administrative structures also 
explain why the Junta kept it untouched in these initial times. In the second stage, on the 
other hand, the Comptroller-General asserted its powers in view of the weakness of the 
Pinochet regime because of internal and international pressures. The Comptroller-
General also attempted to show the institutional relevance of his office when critical 
decisions about its future were being adopted by the regime. The final stage of renewed 
passivity, to conclude, may be explained by the need for institutional survival, but also 
by the personality and ideological allegiances of the new head of the office. 
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At the institutional level, the Office of the Comptroller-General ended up with a pervasive 
uncertainty as to the rationale behind its functions. This vagueness existed during the 
Allende period and even before that. Although its political legitimacy did not suffice to 
transform itself into a Chilean version of the Conseil D’Etat, the very ambiguity and 
uniqueness of the institutional features of the office helped it to survive authoritarian 
times. 
 
 PART III CONTEMPORARY FUNCTIONS 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
 
This part examines the role of the Comptroller-General once Chilean democracy was re-
established after the military dictatorship that ruled the country until 1990. Despite the 
absence of significant formal reform, the institution’s orientation has shifted in important 
ways. Once a lethargic, obscure, and introspective accountability agency, it has become 
a major and visible institutional player in legal and political disputes. The office is now 
perceived as a relevant, impartial institutional player that provides broad access to 
interests seeking to influence executive policies and decisions. The different political 
context and the monocratic, personalistic character of the office explain the manner in 
which the office has been transformed. This period shows the institution’s adaptation to 
the demands for legal and political accountability. 
 
The period comprises the full terms of four Comptrollers-General that held office: 
Osvaldo Iturriaga (1978-1997); Arturo Aylwin (1997-2002); Gustavo Sciolla (2002-
2007); and Ramiro Mendoza (2007-2015). In this brief introduction, I will sketch the 
main characteristics of each administration and the way they reveal the transformation of 
the office during this period. 
Comptroller-General 
 
Term in office Background 
Osvaldo Iturriaga 12 April 1978- 
31 March 1997 
 
Lawyer – Former Deputy CGR 
Arturo Aylwin 2 April 1997- 
11 Aug 2002 
Lawyer – Administrative law 
professor – Former Deputy CGR 
 
Gustavo Sciolla 12 Aug 2002- 
19 July 2006 





10 April 2007- 
April 2015 
Lawyer – Administrative law 
professor – Practitioner 
 
Jorge Bermúdez 17 Dec 2015- Lawyer – Administrative law 
professor – Practitioner 




After two decades of dictatorship, a democratically elected President of the Republic – 
President Patricio Aylwin – was sworn in in 1990. No doubt this was a vast change for 
                                                 
662 Noemi Reyes and Patricia Arriagada were acting as Interim Comptrollers-General in the periods running 
between July 2006 and April 2007, and April and December 2015, respectively. 
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the country; yet Chile was still under the enormous influence of Pinochet’s constitutional 
architecture. Notably, he remained Commander in Chief of the Army, and the 
Constitution drafted under his rule was still in force with a few amendments. As the 
country permanently feared a possible new coup d’etat, the political establishment 
adopted a manifest attitude of compromise and negotiation with authoritarian forces.663 
The Comptroller-General at the time was usually perceived as an authoritarian enclave, 
that is, an institution representing undemocratic elements and practices at odds with the 
political principles governing the new regime. 664  Yet under closer inspection, the 
institution seems to have adopted an introspective but moderate role in line with the 
profile of the head of the office.  
 
In the later days of the dictatorship, Osvaldo Iturriaga adopted a clear policy of 
institutional retreat. It consisted of avoidance of public confrontation with other branches 
of government, less interaction with the press, and a focus on routine decision-making 
rather than high-stakes cases. Importantly, this new introspective attitude continued 
during the early years of the transition.  
 
The office’s opacity conspired against initiatives of the executive branch in the early years 
of the transition from dictatorship. In fact, the newly recruited legal staff within the new 
democratic executive branch had limited knowledge of the Comptroller-General’s 
importance and functions within the policy process. Indeed, having had little government 
experience for the previous 17 years, for them the institution was almost totally unknown. 
They were mystified, for instance, when Iturriaga rejected the first presidential decrees 
and administrative resolutions on legality grounds. In order to address these deficiencies, 
the executive departments were in urgent need of strengthening their ties with the office. 
In addition to inexperience, a further problem was that the Comptroller-General was 
staffed overwhelmingly with former adherents to the authoritarian regime. According to 
observers, taking advantage of their ties to the office, opposition parties threatened to 
paralyse some of the most prominent policies of the new administration. Moreover, the 
                                                 
663 Loveman (n 322) 310–1. 
664  Santiso (n 27) 109. For definitions of the notion of ‘authoritarian enclave’, see Manuel Antonio 
Garretón, Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America (University of 
North Carolina Press 2003) 47–8. 
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government’s legal staff had limited public law training, and the political opposition 
rapidly exploited this weakness. 
 
Against this background, it does not seem surprising that frequent clashes between the 
executive and the Comptroller-General ensued in the initial years of the transition. By 
mid-1991 – only a year into the transition from dictatorship – executive officials believed 
it necessary to evaluate the impact of the Comptroller-General on the regulatory process. 
665 Thus the Presidency ordered the ministries to report on their experiences with the 
process of legality review carried out by the office. Generally, the opinion was that even 
though the relationship was good overall, ‘difficulties have arisen in relation to certain 
administrative acts’. Numerous ministries reported problems with the legality review, 
including the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Ministry of Public Health. Although they affected valuable policy goals, those legal 
determinations appear to have been enforcing legitimate legal constraints. Most of them 
simply insisted on the need to enable legislation before initiating administrative action, 
and frequently the government subsequently achieved the respective statutory 
authorisations. Admittedly, nonetheless, in some cases a hint of conservative political 
bias can be easily detected. But despite his conservative political views, it cannot be said 
that Comptroller Iturriaga was entirely biased against the new democratic regime, as 
illustrated by the Advisory Committee Case, in which the office constrained the political 
activities of the Army early on, supporting the democratic president against Pinochet’s 
interests.666 
Arturo Aylwin 
On 31 March 1997, after heading the office for 19 years and two years before reaching 
the age limit of 75, Comptroller Osvaldo Iturriaga retired. This provided the opportunity 
for the first appointment of a Comptroller-General by a democratic government in three 
decades. President Eduardo Frei nominated Arturo Aylwin. A moderate former Deputy 
Comptroller-General, he had served in the institution since 1957, that is, from the golden 
age of the office. Like many other elite students at the time, he joined the institution just 
after graduation from the law school, and after that he held several senior positions within 
                                                 
665  Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency, ‘Evaluación de trámite de decretos supremos en 
Contraloría General de la República’ (1991). 
666 Ascanio Cavallo, La historia oculta de la transición: memoria de una época, 1990-1998 (Uqbar Editores 
2012) 36–7. 
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the office. Just before the coup d’etat in 1973, he was a close aide to Comptroller Humeres 
and director of the office’s Municipalities Division. Although he continued serving in the 
office during the dictatorship, he decided to adopt a lower profile during the authoritarian 
period. After the end of the military regime, Aylwin was a top candidate to head the 
institution, but the fact that his brother – Patricio Aylwin – was the President of the 
Republic rendered his appointment politically impossible. In 1997, however, he was 
holding the post of Deputy Comptroller-General, so his nomination was seen as a natural 
seniority promotion and received cross-party support. Indeed, after a very fast 
deliberation in the Senate, Aylwin was sworn in as the new Comptroller-General in April 
1997. He was politically pragmatic and moderate. He had a good reputation within the 
institution, and was viewed as a capable scholar in academic circles. 
 
At the time, commentators were raising questions about the role of the Comptroller-
General in the policy process in economic terms. As a reaction to technocratic criticism 
that it was a retrograde institution,667 the office sought to align itself with international 
standards and attempted to stress more decisively its auditing functions. In fact, Arturo 
Aylwin took office with a firm conviction of the urgency of introducing reforms to the 
institution. His agenda was filled with the language of economic efficiency and 
effectiveness, administrative reform, and state modernisation. In line with the spirit of the 
time, his focus was on auditing.668 However, because of his age, he would be heading the 
office for just five years, so he was in no position to lead ambitious reform. His 
interventions had to be targeted and, consequently, he favoured piecemeal reform over 
comprehensive transformation. In his view, the office should shift decidedly to auditing 
and avoid formalistic legality review as much as possible. Moreover, he was unwilling to 
promote changes in the office’s teams and leadership. As such, he retained the same 
conservative staff that had run the office since the dictatorship. In other words, under 
Aylwin, the former conservative head of office was replaced by a centre-left figure, but 
looking further down the line, one will find that most of the senior posts remained held 
by strong right-wingers. 
 
                                                 
667 Mario Marcel, ‘Las opciones para la reforma del estado en Chile’ in Salvador Valdés (ed), Reforma de 
Estado, vol II: Dirección Pública y Compras Públicas (Centro de Estudios Públicos 2002) 271; Faúndez, 
‘The Fragile Foundations of Administrative Legality - Chile between 1932 and 1973’ (n 22) 94. 
668 Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (OUP 2010). 
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Decisively, he wanted his new conception of the institution to be expressed in legislation. 
By the end of his mandate, Comptroller Aylwin had already made sure that the law was 
approved in Congress, yet its implementation would be the responsibility of his successor. 
But law 19817 of 2002 did not represent the major overhaul that many had been waiting 
for. It instead represented a pragmatic and short-term compromise between the interests 
of the executive in minute simplification of the legal review process and improving 
probity at the local level, and the interest of the Comptroller-General in seeing its auditing 
functions recognised in the statute book. Despite Arturo Aylwin’s noteworthy efforts in 
reaching agreement on these reforms, in the end they were hardly sufficient in view of 
the demands and expectations of much of the political establishment. The Comptroller-
General remained conceived as a somewhat awkward obstacle to the much-needed 
modernisation of the administrative process. 
Gustavo Sciolla 
In 2002, during the government of socialist president Ricardo Lagos, the mandate of 
Comptroller Aylwin came to an end. Aged 75, the Constitution required him to retire. 
The tradition was to fill the position with the former Deputy Comptroller-General.669 In 
other words, as an indication of inter-institutional comity, the President of the Republic 
was expected to nominate an incumbent from the institution’s own ranks in strict 
hierarchical order. This tradition could be traced back some 50 years with just one or two 
exceptions in times of crisis. However, the executive was unwilling to honour this long-
established practice since Jorge Reyes, then Deputy Comptroller-General, was considered 
an open supporter of the Pinochet dictatorship and the existing opposition.670  
 
Eventually, with the agreement of the Senate, President Lagos appointed Gustavo Sciolla, 
head of the Division of Toma de Razón and third-ranked within the office’s internal 
hierarchy.671 Lagos intended the new head of the office to reform it from within, and 
foresaw a relation of collaboration bearing in mind Sciolla’s affinities with the Christian 
Democrats, the main party in the governing coalition. Like previous Comptrollers, Sciolla 
had spent his entire career in the office. Just as Iturriaga had entered into the Comptroller-
                                                 
669 ‘Contralor Aylwin espera que su sucesor sea Jorge Reyes, pese a reparos del Gobierno’ Cooperativa (26 
March 2002); ‘Sucesor de Aylwin: Lagos realiza sondeos por Contraloría’ El Mercurio (11 July 2002). 
670 Santiso (n 27) 109. 
671 ‘Asume G. Sciolla: Inédito cambio de mando en Contraloría’ El Mercurio (12 August 2002). 
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General in 1951 and Aylwin in 1957, Sciolla had begun working in the office in 1964.672 
As such, he had a trajectory encompassing more than three decades within the body. The 
expectation was that his knowledge of the institution would enable him to continue the 
changes initiated by Aylwin, maintaining a cordial relationship with the executive. Yet 
unlike his predecessors, Sciolla did not come from the prestigious Legal Department, 
which used to be the source of the office’s elite. Instead, he predominantly served in a 
low profile division, responsible for examining more routine decision-making. 
 
However, the expectations for Arturo Aylwin’s successor were high. The new 
Comptroller-General should consolidate and ideally enlarge the transformation of the 
office. He should also strengthen the democratisation of the institution by removing the 
authoritarian elements that Aylwin had been unable to eradicate. Therefore, the 
appointment of a suitable individual to carry out these momentous tasks was of critical 
importance. Unfortunately, according to many of the observers, the decision of President 
Lagos to nominate Gustavo Sciolla as Comptroller-General was largely off-target, and 
the period that followed is now almost unanimously recalled as wasted years in terms of 
the transformation of the institution. 
 
Sciolla did not promote further reform within the institution; more seriously, the 
Comptroller-General set itself on a collision course with the government. The main 
incident concerned expenditure issues. 673  In addition, other legal opinions of the 
Comptroller-General were regarded as serious threats to the executive branch. The 
executive complained that the office was invading its sphere of action in a number of 
ways. A series of rulings that struck down administrative decisions in the domain of 
internal disciplinary measures was particularly upsetting for the executive. 674  As a 
response, President Ricardo Lagos decided to cut off every channel of communication 
with the Comptroller-General. 
 
By 2005, the negative reputation of the Comptroller-General had extended to public 
opinion. The institution was perceived as a source of red tape and the epitome of the 
defects of bureaucracy. In an influential survey concerning the perception of public 
                                                 
672 Emilio Filipi, La clase política chilena (Pehuén Editores 2006) 185. 
673 Santiso (n 27) 111. 
674 As illustration, see rulings 1137 (2005) and 23824 (2003). 
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leaders about the degree of modernisation of several state institutions conducted in 
2005,675 the score obtained by the Comptroller-General was remarkably low, averaging 
2.2 points out of 5. The perception of opposition political leaders was particularly 
negative, as they evaluated it with only 1.8 points, while government leaders granted it 
2.3 points and independent leaders 2.6. The perception of the office was especially weak 
compared to other institutions. In fact, the average score was 3.1, almost one full point 
above the Comptroller’s mark. Commenting on the results, Mario Waissbluth – the author 
of the study – concluded that ‘an anachronistic and “Weberian” comptroller will believe 
that every innovation is in principle a threat to the current legal status quo, and that could 
slow down modernising efforts’.676 According to Waissbluth, public sector unions and 
the Comptroller-General were the primary obstacles to state modernisation. In the case 
of the latter, its legal protections, independence, and anachronism were singled out as 
factors accounting for its distrust of innovations in governance.677 In his conclusion, 
Waissbluth asserted that Chile could not afford, in the twenty-first century, to have an 
office that had been adequate in the 1950s but not any longer.678 
 
Against this backdrop, a major constitutional amendment was approved in 2005.679 The 
purpose of this reform was to introduce an epoch-marking transformation in the 
Constitution bequeathed by the Pinochet dictatorship.680 The core of the amendments 
focused on reducing the autonomy of the Armed Forces, eliminating the appointed 
senators, and strengthening the Constitutional Tribunal. Not surprisingly, the 
Comptroller-General was also affected by the reform. In a probable reaction to the 
experience with Comptroller Sciolla, the amendments focused on the head of the office 
rather than on its powers, structure, and procedures. Indeed, the new constitutional 
provisions introduced three modifications to the Comptroller-General. First, new 
requirements for holding office in terms of age, legal training, and citizenship rights were 
incorporated. According to the new provisions, a person must be at least 40 to be 
appointed as Comptroller-General, and he or she needed at least ten years of legal 
                                                 
675 Mario Waissbluth, La reforma del estado en Chile 1990-2005. Diagnóstico y propuestas de futuro 
(Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial Universidad de Chile 2005). 
676 ibid 63–4. 
677 ibid 73–4. 
678 ibid 100. 
679 Law 20050 (18 August 2005).  
680 Francisco Zuñiga (ed), La reforma constitucional (Lexis Nexis 2005). 
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experience. Secondly, the appointment procedure was modified. According to the new 
provisions, the quorum for consent of the senate was heightened from a simple majority 
rule to a 3/5 majority. This super-majority requirement strongly reinforced the position 
of the opposition in the Senate in respect to the appointment of the Comptroller-General. 
Finally, the reform eliminated the security of life tenure for the Comptroller by 
establishing a non-renewable appointment for a fixed term of eight years. Although the 
amendments’ rationale is not entirely apparent, it seems that they aimed to foster cross-
party support for the appointment of the Comptroller-General, and to promote a younger 
leadership capable of reforming the institution.  
Ramiro Mendoza 
15 years of democratic politics had shown that leadership within the Comptroller-General 
was critical for bringing about reform. However, it had also revealed the institution’s 
tendency to inertia, and the fact that external forces may be needed in order to break 
traditions of isolation and unresponsiveness. Thus, in 2007 and again in 2015, the 
executive decided to promote the appointment of outsiders in order to enhance the 
chances of reformation of the office. However, on both occasions the executive faced 
insurmountable difficulties in having its favourite candidate endorsed by the political 
opposition in the Senate. As a result, the agreement reached during the appointment 
process involved selecting an outsider, but one who was palatable to the opposition. Thus, 
the view of the Comptroller-General as a safeguard against executive encroachments on 
individual rights and Congress prerogatives – rather than as a collaborator – was 
reinforced. Indeed, from then on, the institution seems to have been increasingly 
responsive to non-governmental interests. 
 
In 2007, Comptroller Gustavo Sciolla reached the age limit of 75 years, and again the 
process of appointment gave rise to political controversy. Disappointed by the 
performance of Sciolla, the executive was now convinced that the priority for filling the 
position should be to appoint an outsider lawyer, but the opposition was unwilling to 
support the nomination of a candidate sympathetic to centre-left ideas. On the contrary, 
they were seeking the appointment of somebody who could guarantee that the office 
would serve as a counterbalance to executive power. After a first setback in the Senate, 
where the executive failed to gather support for his preferred candidate, the minister in 
charge of the nomination sought the appointment of a lawyer with a profile that could be 
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favoured by the right-wing opposition. The executive nominated Ramiro Mendoza, who 
was a centre-right academic and law firm associate. Drawing on the intellectual tradition 
of Catholic libertarianism, his academic work revealed a degree of political hostility to 
state action and distrust of administrative power; at the same time, he could be described 
as a pragmatist based on his extensive work as a practitioner. Unsurprisingly, the Senate 
easily confirmed Mendoza in April 2007, and after a prolonged interval, the Comptroller-
General now had a permanent head of office. For many, Mendoza represented a long-
expected opportunity to reform and modernise the office.681 
 
Aged 49 years, Mendoza was the youngest Comptroller-General to be appointed in 40 
years, and he was the second outsider appointed in the office in half a century. Moreover, 
as we have seen, he took office at a time of dire relationships between the institution and 
the executive. Given his first opinions and his support for opposition ideas, the executive 
expected a somewhat aggressive style from the new Comptroller.  
 
In Mendoza’s era, the Comptroller-General not only acted as a check on administrative 
action, but also as an instrument for other political actors – especially congressmen – to 
hold the executive to account. Thus, it is no surprise that a senior government official 
pointed out Mendoza’s personal political skills as key to understanding his period as the 
head of office. For such officials, unlike his predecessors, Mendoza was able to cleverly 
attract sympathy from a broad range of political actors by providing them with a ‘balanced 
diet’, that is, listening to their demands attentively and satisfying them with moderation 
and equilibrium. He did not pay attention exclusively to one single sector, and 
consequently this strengthened his institutional position. Critically, Mendoza’s robust 
networks allowed him to keep at bay the threats of impeachment thrown at him on several 
occasions. 
 
Comptroller Mendoza also initiated a new dynamic of revolving doors between the public 
and private sector and the Comptroller-General Office. In fact, after a few months, 
Mendoza reorganised the internal staff, bringing in external lawyers.682 As expected, this 
attracted considerable criticism, especially within the office. Some senior officials 
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complained that the institution had lost experienced personnel who had been forced to 
retire and that their younger replacements were unable to cope with the challenging job 
of reviewing complex legal materials. For others, however, this change in the staff might 
have prompted a fairly self-assertive approach in the office, as the more experienced 
officers allegedly had a more docile attitude when it came to delicate issues, whereas the 
new younger personnel had a bolder approach to legality review. 
 
Mendoza also intended to broaden access to the office for private parties. One remarkable 
measure consisted in making public the database containing the entire jurisprudence of 
the institution. Before this, the decisions of the office were public, but access to the 
systematic digital record of them required a fee, even for administrative bodies. This 
single reform revolutionised access to the office’s decisions, and attracted the attention 
of private practitioners who felt invited to use the institution as a further forum for 
challenging state action. As one interviewee put it, Comptroller-General opinions had 
always served as guidelines for bureaucrats, but now practitioners could also utilise them. 
Furthermore, Mendoza introduced a new, broader criterion for access by issuing a new 
pronouncement determining the rules governing requests for an interpretive opinion from 
the Comptroller-General.683 
 
Over time, Comptroller Mendoza gained a strong reputation in public opinion as a 
protector of administrative probity. The media usually depicted him as a modern, 
efficient, and clean political arbiter in inter-branch conflicts.684 Moreover, he was highly 
regarded by practitioners. As an illustration of this, he ranked as the most prestigious 
public lawyer in the country in polls organised by private law firms for two years in a 
row.685 This complemented the perception of the institution as a defender of private rights 
against administrative encroachment. 
 
                                                 
683 Ramiro Mendoza, ‘Exposición de clausura del seminario en “Conmemoración de los 85 años de la 
Contraloría General de la República"’ (2013) 78 Revista de Derecho Público (U. de Chile) 19–20. See 
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685 See ‘Ranking Leading Lawyers Chile 2013’ Qué Pasa (20 November 2013); ‘Ranking leading lawyers 
Chile 2014’ Qué Pasa (26 November 2014). 
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As a consequence, Mendoza’s strategy marked a stage of maturity and a new self-
assertive orientation for the Comptroller-General. While traditionally the office viewed 
politics as something totally separate from its role, there was now a continuum between 
its functions and the political process. Former Comptrollers-General seem to have 
avoided calls from politicians and forcefully defended their independence from political 
pressures. This, however, contrasted heavily with Mendoza’s style. As one collaborator 
puts it, Mendoza was proud of his cross-party support in the political establishment and 
his vigorous interactions with them. To be fair, although this contrasted with recent 
Comptrollers – notably Iturriaga and Sciolla – it did not depart too radically from the 
experience of the Golden Age of the Comptroller in the 1950s, as examined in previous 
chapters.  
 
To conclude, there was no doubt a degree of change in the Mendoza period. This was not 
formal reform, but transformation in practices and attitudes. At the very least, confirming 
previous expectations, the outsider character of Mendoza did in fact prompt a shift in the 
main constituencies of the office, creating more room for legislators and private parties. 
*** 
Although the long-standing aspiration of the enactment of a fully-fledged organic law 
was not realised in this period, it is undeniable that the institution experienced a notable 
transformation. In the early 1990s, Comptroller Iturriaga continued his inward approach 
and confined himself mostly to routine monitoring of compliance with administrative 
legality. This was probably a survival strategy, as the transition entailed severe clashes 
between conflicting political forces. Just as the judiciary did,686 the Comptroller-General 
adopted a strategy of institutional quietism. Later, the office tried to dispel the negative 
public reputation of bureaucratic obstructionism by assuming a collaborative approach to 
its legal functions in relation to control of executive power, and embraced auditing as its 
main purpose. In this sense, it was embracing the neoliberal reforms of public 
administration occurring elsewhere. But this new outlook did not survive Comptroller 
Aylwin’s mandate, and very soon, new bitter clashes between the office and the 
presidency took place. As a result, the executive branch was determined to initiate a more 
decisive reform agenda. This new attitude was well-reflected in the appointment of 
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outsiders as heads of office, breaking a long-standing convention of seniority 
nominations. The external energies brought by the new Comptroller-General reconnected 
the institution to external constituencies, especially political actors, media, and legal 
practitioners. As a result, the office has become a prestigious legal arbiter in a variety of 
spheres, purportedly protecting values of probity, legality, and impartiality.687 
 
The very logic of the democratic transition is one explanation for this transformation, but 
the personalistic, monocratic nature of the institution also helps explain this adaptation of 
the Comptroller-General’s Office to new demands. However, clarification of its 
functions, routine operation, and the delimitation between its functions and those of the 
judiciary is still pending – these are precisely the themes of the following chapters. 
 
 
                                                 
687 In this sense, the current Comptroller-General seems to have somewhat met the expectations of the 
observers who in the 2000s promoted a more active legality-oriented role for the office in mediating 
political disagreements that were hampering effective congressional oversight over executive action; see 
Siavelis (n 25) 202. 
 CHAPTER 6. REVIEWING EXECUTIVE RULEMAKING  
 
This chapter explores the role of the Chilean Comptroller-General in overseeing 
administrative discretion in the rulemaking process. In the rulemaking domain, the 
Comptroller’s role as an internal check on discretion appears in its strongest form.688 It is 
distinctive of this autonomous office that it intervenes in the administrative process, 
reviewing in advance the conformity of proposed administrative regulation with legality. 
Arguably, this feature makes the Chilean institution particularly influential within the 
administrative process and a quite exceptional mechanism in comparative administrative 
law. 
 
The office examines thousands of acts every year, but in this chapter I will focus only on 
the interactions between the Comptroller-General and the executive in relation to 
administrative rules and regulations. This is what is often called secondary legislation 
elsewhere, that is, regulations enacted by executive departments under powers delegated 
by the legislature.689 Generally speaking, these rules are legislation-like acts that govern 
with general and permanent effect the interactions between the bureaucracy and private 
individuals or groups. The Comptroller-General also reviews individual decisions prior 
to their entering into effect – for example, the award of contracts, the hiring of staff, or 
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. This dimension of its work is remarkably 
important for a number of purposes, such as prevention of corruption and cronyism. 
Nonetheless, because of space limitations, these acts will be excluded from this analysis. 
As said, the examination carried out in this chapter will focus exclusively on 
administrative rulemaking. 
 
To some extent, the role of the Chilean Comptroller-General in this regard echoes the 
functions performed by a number of public institutions elsewhere. For instance, the 
Comptroller’s review process resembles the work of the French Conseil d’Etat in its 
consultative role. Jumping in at the very end of the administrative process, it closely 
examines the drafts of rules pointing out mistakes, illegalities, inconsistencies, and so on. 
In contrast with the French case, however, the Chilean institution not only provides advice 
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and makes recommendations, but can also entirely impede the promulgation of a rule if 
it is regarded as unlawful. Although rarely exercised in modern times, this veto power 
has an enormous upstream impact on the interactions between the Chilean bureaucracy 
and this checking institution. Similarly, the Comptroller’s internal nature and its function 
as a supervisor of the regulatory process may attract comparisons to other nonjudicial 
review mechanisms that have mushroomed elsewhere in the last few decades in the wake 
of neoliberal reform of public administration.690 Yet a couple of elements of the Chilean 
case differentiate it from most of those legal devices. On the one hand, although Chile 
has not been immune to NPM policies, the practices of internal review developed by the 
Comptroller-General largely predate the neoliberal policies of the last few decades. In 
fact, its practices of legal control grew in the midst of the development of the Chilean 
interventionist state in the first half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, while 
most meta-regulation mechanisms have focused on cost-benefit analysis and the 
reduction of regulatory burden, 691  the Comptroller-General has remained centred on 
problems of administrative regularity, legality, and efficacy. So far, policy 
recommendations involving the introduction of meta-regulation mechanisms in Chile 
have overlooked the possibility of giving a role to this office,692 yet the allocation of this 
kind of task to the institution cannot be completely ruled out.693 
 
As will be seen, the mission of the Office of the Comptroller-General is to ensure not 
only respect for law but also compliance with procedural ideals. It might be argued that 
the ideals animating the work of the institution are reasoned administration, good 
government, and generally a well-functioning administrative process. Paraphrasing 
Sunstein’s description of OIRA in the United States,694 it could be said that the Chilean 
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Comptroller-General is ‘a guardian of a well-functioning administrative process’, or more 
precisely, its defenders would like us to believe it is. In order to reveal the actual role of 
the office in the rulemaking process, this chapter will take a close look at those day-to-
day interactions that take place in the shadow of the veto power. The task of dealing with 
backstage stories will be carried out by analysing dozens of interviews of administrative 
officials, Comptroller reviewers, and practitioners. Going beyond the law in the books 
and paying attention to the law in action, I will reveal how the regulatory encounters 
between those officials unfold, and how they could be assessed in terms of their 
contribution to the final outcome of reasoned, accountable, and effective administrative 
action. 
 
A complete account of this mechanism requires looking at the informal practices that 
have emerged behind the formalities of the toma de razón procedure. Indeed, informal 
rules and procedures have developed and filled the gaps left by the formal regulation of 
the process.695  Executive officers report that a rejection by the Comptroller-General 
imposes a high cost on them. In particular, when the decision under review is a regulation 
with general effects, a rejection may entail a political cost because opposition parties, and 
the regulated industries, will denounce the government for infringing the rule of law. 
Furthermore, for the legal advisors, a rejection will negatively impact on their credibility 
before the political authorities. This means that they make every effort to avoid a negative 
response by the Comptroller-General. In these cases, an informal dialogue between the 
office and the primary decision-maker may develop. The checking institution might then 
request specific changes to the administrative rule or even policy modifications. The real 
world of the toma de razón procedure takes place here. It is an almost completely 
unexplored area by scholars, only dimly understood even by most public officials. 
I. SCRUTINY MEETINGS 
Most of the comments received during the interviews conducted with practitioners and 
executive officers for this investigation were made in relation to experiences with 
                                                 
695  Most of them can be seen as what Helmke and Levitsky has termed ‘complementary informal 
institutions’. In their view, these informal institutions ‘shape behavior in ways that neither violate the 
overarching formal rules nor produce substantively different outcomes. Often, they are seen to enhance the 
efficiency or effectiveness of formal institutions’. See Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (eds), 
Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Johns Hopkins Univ Press 2006) 13–
4. 
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Committee IV and Infrastructure and Regulation Department (DIR), as these are the 
internal offices with primary responsibility for legal tasks. The interviews with 
Comptroller officers, however, were conducted with officers working at these levels, but 
also at higher levels including former Comptrollers-General. In the interviews, the 
dynamics of the meetings between reviewers, government lawyers, and practitioners were 
repeatedly discussed. In what follows, I outline the main features of these scrutiny 
meetings.  
 
After basic preliminary filters, an officer – usually called a ‘reporter lawyer’ – initiates 
the process within the respective department, DIR, or Committee IV. Regularly, this 
officer is a junior lawyer who must conduct direct legal review of an administrative rule, 
draft a report, and propose an outcome – approval, disapproval, or modification. The 
reporter is often specialised in certain areas of law or in some defined regulatory schemes. 
She has to report back to the committee chief, with whom she usually can discuss doubts 
and define strategies. The result of their work is subsequently supervised by the chief or 
deputy chief of the division and could eventually be reviewed by the Comptroller-General 
himself. Therefore, the basic work routine consists of a chain of internal reviews 
comprising at least two levels of internal debate. These loops spark repeated discussions 
within the office. 
 
The most likely preliminary outcome of the review process is the need to make 
amendments to the rule. It is most often the reporter lawyer who would discuss this 
directly with the rulemaking agency. After reaching an internal decision about the merits 
of the examined rule, the reporter calls the regulators and points out the defects she detects 
in the proposed regulation. Then, she convenes a formal meeting in order to discuss the 
terms of the amendments that need to be introduced. Until this point there is no formal 
decision made by the Comptroller-General Office, that is, no reasoned decision indicating 
the errors or illegalities in the rule is issued thus far.  
 
The meetings where the legal boundaries of administrative power to make rules are 
discussed are somewhat informal. As the meetings take place in the premises of the 
institution, the reviewers host these conventions. They are normally bilateral gatherings 
attended only by one or two Comptroller officials and the officials representing the 
ministries. Only exceptionally do meetings adopt a multi-lateral character, gathering 
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representatives of diverse administrative agencies simultaneously. Most frequently, 
Comptroller officials meet them separately. Meetings with representatives of private 
interests also take place independently. 
 
These meetings represent the core of the review process carried out by the Comptroller-
General. Executive officers point to these meetings as the critical moment in their 
interactions with the checking institution. Not surprisingly, the formal regulations at the 
constitutional and legal level do not mention this stage of the process at all. Arguably, 
these discussions take place in the shadow of the law. However, they may also embody 
the ultimate rationale of this accountability arrangement. Administrative regulations that 
have successfully gone through the Comptroller review are stamped with a seal reading 
‘Tomado de Razón’, meaning ‘Approved by the Comptroller-General’. But behind this 
simple seal, a long process of discussion, explanation, reason giving, persuasion, and even 
compromise usually unfolds. 
II. LEGALITY CONTROL AND ITS COSTS 
The primary function of the legality review process is to perform legal control over rules 
proposed by the executive branch. In other words, in line with the original mission of the 
Comptroller-General, the main aim of this reviewing mechanism is to ensure that the 
exercise of regulatory powers by executive officials does not overstep its legal bounds. 
Performing this function, the office has to subject administrative rules to review in order 
to verify whether they have been enacted in conformity with the authorising statutes and 
legality in general.  
 
When looking at this aspect, the first issue that arises is whether this legality review 
procedure is just a mere rubber stamp for executive actions. This would be consistent 
with well-established ideas about the pervasiveness of one-man rule, presidential 
authoritarianism, and executive dominance in the Latin American region.696 From this 
viewpoint, the legality check would not represent a real threat to executive law-making 
powers, since the office would be prone to endorsing most of the actions promoted by the 
                                                 
696  See Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010: The Engine Room of the 
Constitution (OUP 2013); Mariana Mota Prado, ‘Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: 
The Relationship between the Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil’ in Susan Rose-
Ackerman and Peter L Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011). 
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executive branch of government. Moreover, scepticism towards the office authority could 
be based on the belief that its administrative character makes it unlikely for it to depart 
from executive conceptions of legality. As institutional location tends to shape 
interpretations of law, 697  one may be wary of allocating the task of ensuring that 
regulators exercise power within the boundaries of law to an administrative agency. To 
put it slightly differently, this checking office might well act as a subordinate organisation 
that could be performing functions on behalf of the executive – especially advisory 
functions – but hardly ever against presidential political will. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the prevailing view in the Chilean context. On the 
contrary, the Comptroller’s legal review is usually viewed as an excessively cumbersome 
obstacle to administrative decision-making. The constitutional independence of the office 
and an internal culture of control may explain the institution’s fairly assertive attitude to 
legal review. Although the Comptroller’s officials view themselves as part of the 
administrative machinery, rather than as judicial personnel, they do not necessarily align 
with the policy preferences of the presidency. Furthermore, executive officials constantly 
complain that the office unduly interferes with their discretionary decisions. 
 
In interviews conducted during this investigation, one government official said that the 
Comptroller-General invades the discretionary domain legitimately granted by the law to 
the executive. In his view, this is particularly acute in the rulemaking process. The 
Comptroller-General reduces the discretionary margin of the executive by imposing a 
legalistic and even literalist conception of public powers. In some cases, the restrictive 
conception of legality denounced by this official is based on the institution’s own 
precedents. Executive officials report that on occasion, the Comptroller-General requests 
them to repeat practically verbatim the wording of the authorising statute, thus limiting 
the space for innovation and experimentation. According to another official, what is 
especially threatening is that this attitude is not necessarily expressed in formal adverse 
decisions but through informal interchanges with Comptroller officials. He maintains that 
this makes the Comptroller-General’s views more pervasive and hostile than judicial 
rulings, since the latter are more sporadic, fragmented, and public. 
                                                 
697 Trevor W Morrison, ‘Constitutional Alarmism’ (2011) 124 Harvard Law Review 1688, 1747; Daintith 
and Page (n 70) ch 1. 
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Officials explain that this formalistic examination may also have serious consequences 
for their work, as the existence of even formal, minor errors undermines their professional 
credibility in the eyes of their political superiors. This leads executive officers to avoid 
contradicting the opinions of the Comptroller-General and to try to reach agreement in a 
more private, confidential setting. This may entail initial objectives being declined, and 
policy-makers may eventually settle the argument by adopting means and policy goals 
more palatable to the reviewing office. 
 
The delay and conservative effect of the legality review process echo criticisms voiced 
against the ‘ossification effect’ of different forms of supervision – especially judicial 
review – on the rulemaking process in the United States.698 Ossification of the rulemaking 
process refers to the phenomenon of amplified inertia in the creation of rules by 
administrative agencies as a result of detrimental institutional hurdles imposed on 
regulators. The source of this regulatory lethargy may be located in the judicial or 
legislative branch, or even in the presidential office itself. Reluctance to undertake 
innovative rulemaking projects, to update old rules, and to design more flexible rules in 
the future have been reported as possible consequences of regulatory ossification.699 
 
In Chile, a case of disagreement about an environmental regulation may illustrate the 
threat of ossification. The rule under review was intended to modify a regulation, enacted 
by a previous administration, implementing a decontamination policy in a small city.700 
Although it did not affect the substance of the regulation, the new rule was aimed at 
correcting a number of technical deficiencies in the regulation in force. The change was 
therefore apparently quite simple. However, the reviewer adamantly opposed the new 
rule. Apparently, as he was the official responsible for reviewing the previous regulation, 
he did not see the point of further changes. According to the executive official in charge 
of the negotiation, his position was quite surprising and even irrational, since it was not 
based on reasons of legality. Initially, the negative position of the reviewer could have 
                                                 
698 Richard Pierce, ‘Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking’ (1995) 47 Administrative Law Review 
59; King, Judging Social Rights (n 3) ch 9. 
699 Thomas O McGarity, ‘Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process’ (1992) 41 Duke Law 
Journal 1385, 1396. 
700 The original rule was introduced by decree 113, published on 24 October 2013, whereas the modification 
was made by decree 80, published on 4 September 2014. 
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impeded the introduction of beneficial changes to the former dysfunctional rule. The 
obstacle here would have been the existence of the mandatory ex-ante legality check. 
However, the administrative official conceded that the reviewer was eventually – after 
almost a year of discussions – convinced of the benefits of the changes, and even provided 
some insightful comments to make the rule more effective. When all is said and done, 
however, the promulgation of the rule was certainly not denied, but it was considerably 
delayed and its content modified. 
 
An executive officer working on housing and urban planning issues also expressed a 
negative view of the Comptroller’s effects on rulemaking. She pointed to delay and 
ossification as the more serious problems with the review process for her office. Despite 
the fact that the official timeframe for Comptroller revision is 15 days, when the entire 
process of review, meetings, and corrections is taken into account the review process for 
some rules can take more than a year. Although the process can be sped up on exceptional 
occasions, it is not unusual that the regulatory delays create problems for an 
administration that will govern for only four years without re-election. Therefore, 
executive advisors protest that key political opportunities for reform are missed. This 
official complained that she had ended up discussing and negotiating every regulation 
word-by-word. During long and exhausting meetings, the reviewers request a clear 
articulation of the objective of the rule, they go on to examine its adequacy, and then they 
examine in detail every provision in the regulation. They require the executive to exhibit 
specific legal support for each proposed provision, and clear definitions of the terms used 
in the regulation. After receiving the comments in a meeting, a painstaking process of 
email communication is triggered in which digital drafts are discussed.  
 
An advisor to the executive indicates that a major problem is that legislation is already 
quite defective, and administrative rules could provide some remedy to this. In other 
words, administrative rules could compensate for the deficiencies of a legislative process 
whose outcomes are prone to ambiguity and unprincipled compromise.701 Yet, because 
the regulatory requirements imposed by the Comptroller-General are so high and strict, 
opportunities to find solutions to these regulatory imperfections are missed. Another 
                                                 
701 For a defence of delegation in similar terms, see Jerry Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using 
Public Choice to Improve Public Law (Yale University Press 1999) ch 6. 
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consequence of what is perceived as an obstructive review process is the use of the 
equivalent to what have been called ‘non-rules’ in the US context.702 In other words, 
executive agencies use instruments that are not subject to legality review in order to 
regulate their respective sectors. This route effectively circumvents Comptroller-General 
interference, but also completely eliminates the positive contribution of the review 
process to rulemaking. Nonetheless, the use of less formalised standards is not always 
possible. Sometimes it is a statute that requires the Comptroller’s preventive check. If the 
political escalation of a dispute with the office is also impossible, the agency will 
probably abandon the policy or seek explicit legislative authorisation. In the latter case, 
the most likely scenario will be that they seek legislative authorisation through 
appropriation legislation in the annual budget law. This alternative is notoriously inferior 
to ordinary legislation because of diminished deliberation, short time limits, and opacity.  
III. REASONED DECISION-MAKING 
Another task of legality review may be associated with one of the overarching goals of 
administrative law: reasoned administration. 703  In the previous section, I discussed 
legality in the narrow sense of verifying the existence of prior legislative authorisation 
before taking administrative action. However, a more ambitious notion of administrative 
legality may require not only previous permission by the legislature but also the 
satisfaction of more demanding requirements of rationality and justice. In fact, to an 
important extent, one of the promises of bureaucracy as a political ideal is rational 
administration. In this sense, administrative activity may be associated with science and 
expertise, and with decisions backed by evidence and justification.704 This is consistent 
with the belief that administrative action should not merely be a blind implementation of 
the will of the elected branches, either the executive or the legislature. On the contrary, it 
should be able to make an independent contribution to governance in terms of what may 
be called bureaucratic justice. 
 
                                                 
702 Pierce (n 48) 62. 
703  Jerry Mashaw, ‘Small Things like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reasons and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State’ (2001) 70 Fordham Law Review 17; Jerry Mashaw, ‘Public Reason and 
Administrative Legitimacy’ in John Bell and others (eds), Public law adjudication in common law systems: 
process and substance (Hart Publishing 2016). 
704 For a critical discussion of the association of science and rationality with administration, see Edley (n 
10) ch 2 & 3. 
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One way to ensure this justice element in administrative rulemaking is to promote 
deliberative procedures in which explanations are requested and reasons are given. From 
this perspective, the ultimate goal would be to ensure that public authorities take 
rationally justified decisions. Setting up instances of questioning and discussion inside 
government may help to produce better-justified administrative decisions in the first 
place. Reflecting on the operation of the Conseil d’Etat inside French administrative 
processes, Hamson highlights some of this. He asserts that ‘the value of this preliminary 
and informal discussion, or of the help which it gives in bringing into focus the real 
elements of the problem and illuminating the solution’ is of the highest importance for 
the action of the institution.705 Although this refers to the Conseil’s internal deliberation, 
the same phenomenon takes place in the ‘internal’ interchanges between reviewing and 
reviewed officers. But does the legality review performed by the Chilean Comptroller-
General have any connection with this dialogic ideal?  
 
There are some signs of this sort of contribution in the action of the Comptroller-General. 
A government lawyer, for instance, provides a detailed description of the meetings during 
the revision process in a fairly dialogic mood. She describes them in terms of a series of 
workshops where pieces of draft are discussed. In these meetings, a group of lawyers 
representing diverse views on the issue share opinions about ways to make the rule 
stronger. Comptroller lawyers focus on ambiguous provisions and ask for explanations 
of the intention behind the regulation and its component provisions. As we have seen, 
although in less positive terms, other executive advisors have also stressed the need to 
explain to the Comptroller-General the goals of the proposed regulation and the way they 
fit the legal framework of the respective sector. 
 
The discussion develops in informal terms without written opinions being released. This 
often entails that executive officials have to take their own notes about the observations 
and comments of their reviewing counterparts. The observations are not simply 
formalistic, one official indicates. When explanations provided by the executive satisfy 
the reviewers, the debates are settled at the meeting itself. But frequently, the discussion 
prompts changes in the drafts. The tenor of the conversation is professional and there is 
consensus that the technical level of the reviewers’ work is high. In fact, one executive 
                                                 
705 Hamson (n 9) 62. 
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advisor describes the meetings as a discussion between experts, and even claims that it is 
always possible to persuade the counterpart if a well-crafted legal argument is articulated.  
 
At the end of the meeting, executive officials are invited to withdraw the regulation in 
order to introduce the modifications requested. However, the executive and the reviewing 
officials might discuss under the understanding that some issues are non-negotiable. 
When the issues are politically sensitive, the disagreements can be escalated to the 
Minister and superior officials within the Comptroller’s office, and could reach the 
Comptroller-General himself. However, elevation is an exceptional practice since it may 
entail a high political cost for government or damage the professional reputation of 
government officials. 
 
Another senior government lawyer claims that she has personally drawn positive lessons 
from the legality review process. She perceives it as a reason-giving process and 
highlights the instrumental benefits of it. In her account, the examination helps the 
primary decision-maker in the sense of being forced to exercise self-discipline and to 
clarify her ideas about the aim of the proposed rule and the justifications for it. A sentinel 
effect or anticipatory reaction seems to be operating here: anticipating the review, the 
decision-maker is more diligent than she would otherwise be.706 The review may also 
sharpen the focus on the legal dimensions of the policy being implemented. 707  This 
executive official does not think that it is the reviewer who provides beneficial insights, 
but rather the process itself that provides an opportunity to improve the legal quality of 
the rules enacted by the executive branch. All of this undoubtedly may help to make 
stronger rules. 
 
Another government official working in the environmental protection sector also stresses 
the deliberative benefits of the review. Reflecting on her experience, she admits that the 
process was time-consuming and that the checking office took a long time to review the 
                                                 
706 Adrian Vermeule, ‘Second Opinions and Institutional Design’ (2011) 97 Virginia Law Review 1435, 
1464–5. For an empirical analysis of ‘anticipatory reactions’ to the scrutiny of rules, see Stone Sweet (n 
159) 122, 238; Page (n 174) 163–4; Meg Russell and Philip Cowley, ‘The Policy Power of the Westminster 
Parliament: The “Parliamentary State” and the Empirical Evidence: The Policy Power of the Westminster 
Parliament’ (2016) 29 Governance 121, 123. 
707 For a discussion of connection between legality and focus, emphasising its individualistic dimension, 
see King, ‘The Instrumental Value of Legal Accountability’ (n 75) 130. 
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rule. But, in her view, this seems to be reasonably explained by the complexity of the 
issue under examination. She says that as the regulation involved a variety of sectors such 
as transport, economy, and sanitation, among others, the reviewers needed time to 
understand the rule and its implications. In her experience, the entire process took six 
months, during which questions were asked, explanations given, and consequently 
corrections made. Although the process was concentrated on lawyers, on occasions 
technical assistance was needed to clarify the scientific aspects of the provisions. Career 
corps within the Comptroller-General Office and the respective ministry conducted most 
of the discussion without politicians’ intervention. Overall, this advisor’s experience was 
positive and she even describes the review as a rewarding learning process.  
 
However, there are also more sceptical views of the deliberative virtues of the legality 
review process. One senior executive official, for example, complained that the 
Comptroller-General provides no reasoning. He maintained that the institution does not 
engage in a real dialogue; rather, it imposes its opinion in an acutely authoritarian manner. 
Other executive advisors shared this negative view. One expressed her frustration with 
the institution’s unconstructive opinions. She explained that she had given reasons and 
arguments, written memos explaining her position, and had long, tiring meetings with the 
reviewers, but the office remained unmoved. Apart from accepting the formal rejection 
of the proposed regulation, the only alternative was to withdraw the rule and introduce 
the amendments suggested by the office. Similarly, another officer protests that the 
Comptroller-General practically has unfettered discretion and adopts an arrogant attitude. 
In his opinion, the regulatory improvement after the review process is nonexistent. 
Finally, as a reaction to negative attitudes in the meetings, some advisors have chosen to 
obtain a formal rejection in order to understand what is actually underlying the position 
of the office. However, they have been disappointed by the lack of reasons for the 
decisions taken by the reviewing office, as it expresses its opinions in an obscure, laconic, 
and sometimes even cryptic manner.708 
 
Executive officials suggest that stringent examination of executive regulations is 
sometimes based on a sense of professional superiority to government lawyers. 
                                                 
708 Also highlighting the negative side of the process, it has been argued that the review carried out by the 
Comptroller inhibits the development of stronger internal controls at the primary decision-maker level; see 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (n 3) 105. 
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Comptroller reviewers see themselves as technically superior in matters of administrative 
law to advisors within the executive branch. However, perhaps more importantly, they 
see themselves to some extent as exhibiting superior professional integrity. We can 
illustrate this with Fontana’s distinction between government and civil service lawyers.709 
According to this view, while Comptroller officials would constitute a form of civil 
service lawyers characterised by a commitment to more permanent ideals of executive 
legality, their executive counterparts would be seen as political lawyers who are prone to 
adopting more partisan and short-sighted conceptions of the requirements for legality. As 
a result, Comptroller lawyers may tend to adopt a patronising attitude, and be reluctant to 
engage in genuine deliberation and discussion. 
IV. EXECUTIVE COORDINATION 
Centralised executive legality review may also perform intra-executive coordination 
functions.710 Taking advantage of its centralised nature and multi-sectorial jurisdiction, 
solving coordination problems within the executive branch could be one of the roles of 
the Comptroller-General. Facing a fragmented, heterogeneous, and often insufficiently 
professionalised bureaucracy, a centralised overseer like the Comptroller-General may 
facilitate inter-agency coordination and communication. Moreover, exploiting its 
strategic institutional location, it can aggregate perspectives and information from a broad 
range of actors within the bureaucracy. In addition, as a centralised overseer, the 
Comptroller-General could facilitate accountability from the bureaucracy to the head of 
the executive, and consequently political accountability from the executive to the 
people. 711  In the end, in a presidential regime like Chile, the institution politically 
responsible to the people is the presidency, and there must be channels to monitor that its 
subordinate bureaucratic apparatus is implementing its policy preferences. 
 
The view of the Chilean Comptroller-General as a remarkable institutional instrument of 
centralisation – in the Latin American region – is not entirely new. In a seminal 
monograph in the 1970s, Arturo Valenzuela suggested that the institution possessed an 
                                                 
709 David Fontana, ‘Executive Branch Legalisms’ (2012) 124 Harvard Law Review Forum 21, 28. 
710 Sunstein, ‘The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities’ (n 691); Adrian 
Vermeule, ‘Local and Global Knowledge in the Administrative State’ in David Dyzenhaus and Thomas 
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indirect and symbolic, but still relevant, centralising force affecting municipalities in 
Chile.712  Furthermore, some decades later, Angell, Lowden, and Thorp depicted the 
Comptroller-General as a powerful influence in the centralising forces operating in the 
country that contrasts sharply with its neighbours.713 Yet the function of the Comptroller-
General as a centralising force can also be detected beyond the interactions between 
central and local governments in Chile. It is also apparent within the central government 
itself. The contribution of the office at the level of rulemaking operates in two ways. On 
the one hand, the Comptroller-General’s review process seems to facilitate monitoring 
over the ministries by the presidency. In this sense, the institution may prevent ministries 
and other administrative agencies from promulgating major rules without the prior 
knowledge of the presidential office. On the other hand, the Comptroller-General might 
strengthen inter-agency collaboration, preventing potentially myopic perspectives from 
prevailing in the regulatory process. 
 
In relation to the former perspective, an advisor to the presidency explains the role of the 
Comptroller’s review as a sort of fire alarm of ministerial insubordination. This official 
indicates that his office detected that ministries were sidestepping presidential control 
over rulemaking by directly submitting administrative rules to legal review without due 
regard to clearance procedures at the presidential office level. The reason for this is that 
the presidential office devoted most of its capacities to the legislative process, and 
therefore was unable to monitor all the rules produced by the rest of the executive branch. 
Only the most important of them were routinely overseen. As this threatened the internal 
standing of the presidential office within the administrative rulemaking process, the 
reaction was to use the Comptroller-General as a fire alarm for potential ministerial 
insubordination. Thus, the presidential office strengthened its links with the Comptroller-
General in order to minimise adverse direct contact between sectorial agencies and the 
checking office. In other words, without the Comptroller stage, ministries and agencies 
could more freely promulgate rules without any engagement with the presidential 
advisors. The existence of the office therefore gave the presidency a chance for detection 
of unexpected promulgation of major rules and provided it with leverage to control the 
administrative rulemaking process. 
                                                 
712 Valenzuela (n 409) ch 2. 
713  Alan Angell, Pamela Lowden, and Rosemary Thorp, Decentralizing Development: The Political 
Economy of Institutional Change in Colombia and Chile (OUP 2001) 80–1. 
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More often, the role of the Comptroller-General is simply to act as a convenor and 
coordinator, solving disputes between sectorial ministries. An example of this function 
took place in relation to a recently introduced food labelling regulation that triggered a 
bitter controversy between the Public Health Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations. The Public Health Ministry was proposing an aggressive labelling policy 
alerting customers to the components of unhealthy foodstuffs, while the Foreign 
Relations Ministry forcefully expressed its view that the policy could damage the 
international image of the country or, even worse, cause litigation with foreign companies 
at international trade forums. However, the dispute was eventually successfully arbitrated 
at the Comptroller’s Office during the legality review process. Another example also 
relates to Public Health Ministry regulations. However, in this case, the rule – proposed 
by the ministry – was concerned with safety conditions in the workplace. Only after 
submission of the rule to Comptroller review did ministry officials become aware that the 
Ministry of Labour was proposing rules with similar objectives. The Comptroller-General 
then convened meetings between the respective ministries to reach a unifying regulation 
on the matter. The executive official interviewed indicated that in this type of case, the 
Comptroller-General performs a beneficial coordination function, facilitating joint action 
between different administrative offices. 
 
A former Comptroller-General interviewed for this investigation emphasised this aspect 
of the work of the office he was commanding. He stated that, in his opinion, the office is 
not a sort of administrative tribunal. Instead, drawing a parallel with regulatory agencies 
supervising regulated industries, the institution is a ‘regulator of public administration’. 
Speaking specifically about the legality review process, he said that Comptroller 
interventions aimed to enhance the legal quality of administrative rules by remedying 
‘systemic deficiencies’. By this, he was suggesting that the function of the Comptroller-
General was to introduce a panoramic perspective into the sectorial rules. In his terms, 
this was a ‘legal quality coordination task’.  
 
V. INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATION 
A very valuable goal of modern administrative law is giving a voice to outsiders. Since 
at least the 1970s in the Anglo-American world, models of administrative law as a system 
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for interest representation in governmental processes have been put forward.714 Interest 
group representation in the policy process may take different institutional forms, such as 
consultation and participation rights at the administrative level, appointment in 
administrative bodies, or broad standing to challenge decisions in judicial review 
proceedings. The ultimate aim would be to facilitate external insights in order to have an 
impact on administrative decisions, simultaneously improving and legitimating executive 
action. 
 
Generally, there are no participation rights in the administrative process in Chile. Neither 
are there broad standing rules for participating in the administrative process or 
challenging administrative actions before courts. As such, the question arises whether the 
Comptroller-General may meet the need for interest group representation in the Chilean 
rulemaking process. 
 
Comptroller-General review does not seem to promote interest representation at the front-
line decision-maker level. In fact, some regulators complain that the ex-ante review 
process does not provide incentives to increase outsiders’ participation in the 
administrative process. They indicate that because the office is indifferent to consultation 
practices that take place before its review, it does not encourage the use of participatory 
devices at earlier stages of the rulemaking process. An advisor in the urban planning 
sector expresses frustration at the null impact that participatory processes have had on the 
Comptroller’s scrutiny. He explains that while the Ministry of Urban Planning and 
Housing had spent months setting into motion a modern consultation process before 
enacting a rule, this was totally dismissed by the Comptroller-General. In fact, the office 
did exactly the same as it would have done had no consultation process taken place. As a 
result, the advisor suggests that there is no point in engaging in this kind of initiative, as 
it only adds an additional layer of delay. Another government lawyer, who also engaged 
in innovative consultation processes, said that she was surprised when the reviewer 
requested the submission of the entire record before handing down its pronouncement on 
the legality of a new executive decree. She was also disappointed when she later found 
that this was a mere formality, as the reviewers did not look at the actual stakeholders’ 
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opinions. It appears, in consequence, that the Comptroller-General has not adapted to the 
use of these consultation and participation mechanisms in administrative rulemaking. 
 
A possible explanation for the office’s disinterest in interest representation at the front-
line level might be that it prefers to concentrate it at its own facilities. A former senior 
Comptroller official reported that the participation of industry in the legality review 
process is a key factor for the office. In his view, they bring information to the office, 
helping to detect discrepancies and disagreements. He mentioned three cases as 
illustrations: a case about digital TV regulation, the food labelling case already 
mentioned, and general price-setting procedures in regulated sectors such as 
telecommunications and energy. The widening of access in later years, according to this 
official, has been critical in detecting and remedying administrative abuse. It is 
noteworthy that the cases he mentioned all involved rules affecting well-resourced 
corporate interests.  
 
A senior official concedes that private intervention has risen in the last ten or 15 years, 
which coincides with the shift from state provision towards regulatory oversight in 
utilities. She asserts that this enhanced private participation is a reflection of the legitimate 
interests of the industry in using as many forums as possible to advance and protect their 
interests. Likewise, a Comptroller official claims that some interest groups have 
permanent teams monitoring matters under examination at the Comptroller-General 
Office. For instance, he highlights the ongoing participation of pharmaceutical companies 
and industries affected by environmental regulations. Another senior official within the 
Comptroller-General argues that sometimes the office is pushed to hear the regulated 
industries as a result of requirements for fairness. He explains that the institution often 
listens not only to executive officials but also to the views of legislators who defend 
administrative rules that may have an economic impact on business. These 
parliamentarians provide additional support for a prompt approval of the rules proposed 
by the ministries. According to this officer, this means the Comptroller-General needs to 
hear the affected parties as well. The office needs to know the reasons they have to oppose 
the regulations affecting them. He indicates that, as the meetings with representatives of 
industry are immediately published on the Internet, there are no reasons to be suspicious 
of capture by the industry. Moreover, information gathered in this way may enhance the 
capacity of the office to make better decisions, he suggests.  
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The foregoing discussion already reveals the limitations of the Comptroller-General as 
an interest representation mechanism. First, interest representation is used essentially in 
an instrumental manner in order to collect more and better information regarding the rule 
under analysis. The scope of participation extends only to what is needed by the office 
for performing its own functions. As a senior official explains, interest groups often go 
to the Comptroller-General to make their voice heard, but they lack procedural rights. He 
points out that even though their views are taken into account in the review process, the 
institution lacks capacities to give a reasoned response to each of them. Second, the nature 
of the mechanism forces interest representation to be excessively legalistic, that is, the 
voices of the affected groups are expressed in terms of rules and laws, lacking the nuances 
of broader political discourses and technical perspectives. An attorney advising in 
regulated markets explains that the impact of the ex-ante review is enormous but not 
always positive. He complains that Comptroller decisions at this level are excessively 
legalistic; they lack technical expertise and are unprincipled. As a result, they are heavily 
prone to opportunistic exploitation by regulated industries. Third, many relevant 
administrative rules avoid the legality check and, accordingly, the Comptroller-General 
cannot be used as a forum for interest representation at all. Indeed, a number of 
practitioners interviewed for this investigation indicated that the ex-ante legality review 
process was not their favourite route to express their views or challenge administrative 
actions. While admitting that she has used the mechanism, one practitioner asserts that 
most of the rules that actually affect the industries acting in the most dynamic markets 
are exempted from the Comptroller’s ex-ante legality check. Fourth, it seems that there 
is an imbalance among the interests heard by the office. While representatives of business 
may use this forum when convenient for the defence of their interests, advisors to less 
well-resourced groups are barely aware of the existence of legality review as a forum to 
express views on regulations affecting their interests. There is agreement among most of 
the interviewees that the office is quite impartial, but this dominance of some interests 
over others may at least signal the risk of ‘epistemic capture’, in the sense that the 
‘perspectives [of the office] might well be shaped by the limited class of people to whom 
they are listening’.715 Finally, the procedure suffers from opacity and lack of adequate 
disclosure requirements. This inhibits outsiders’ participation and creates space for 
                                                 
715 Sunstein, ‘The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities’ (n 691) 1860. 
 235 
institutional capture by repeat players. Although meetings of senior officers with interest 
groups are regularly published online – as required by regulations of lobbying – 
exchanges of documents and interactions at lower levels remain unpublished. 
Experienced actors use FOI instruments to access documents provided by counterparts, 
but this route seems excessively cumbersome and appears to remain skewed towards 
well-organised groups. A significant overhaul seems to be needed in this area. Some 
models can be found in reforms to OIRA in the 1990s that triggered formalisation of 
procedures and increased public disclosure requirements and restrictions in ex-parte 
communications.716 
VI. PREVENTING LITIGATION  
Arguably, the existence of ex-ante checks may help to shield administrative acts against 
future judicial review challenges. This is one of the justifications for having a system of 
preventive revision at the French Conseil d’Etat, for instance.717 In the French context, 
this internal checking system developed largely because an increasingly dysfunctional 
legislature delegated power to the executive branch of government. Thus, along with its 
judicial functions, the Conseil d’Etat matured as a technical counsellor to government. 
The dual nature of the Conseil – as an advisory body and as a court718 – appeared to be 
particularly helpful in providing legal knowledge at the stage when the primary decision 
is taken. Indeed, as former counsellor Nicole Questiaux suggests, this institution ‘is able 
to anticipate the problems that could arise in litigation while dealing with so far 
uncontested texts’.719  
 
The Office of the Comptroller-General also performs a double function. The institution 
takes action prior to the promulgation of administrative rules, but it can also declare the 
illegality of administrative decisions that have been already promulgated, through the 
exercise of its interpretive power. In this sense, there may be some space for transferring 
its expertise from ‘quasi-judicial’ adjudicatory functions to its advisory role during the 
ex-ante review process. Furthermore, in this institution there is no separation between the 
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personnel and offices responsible for these diverse tasks. In this case, however, the 
tension between advice and supervision seems to be somewhat skewed towards the latter 
aspect of executive legality interpretation. 
 
The Comptroller-General, nonetheless, does not monopolise adjudicatory powers in 
relation to administrative disputes. After a long history of disagreement over the existence 
of judicial review of administrative action in the country, it has only been since 1989 that 
the ordinary judiciary has possessed explicit legal accountability powers over the 
executive branch. Moreover, the Comptroller’s legal interpretations themselves could be 
challenged before the judiciary. Therefore, as the Comptroller-General lacks the last word 
in questions of law, it may be unclear the extent to which its ex-ante legal review powers 
contribute to avoiding litigation. 
 
The perception of actors operating in this context, nonetheless, is that the Comptroller-
General does deter excessive litigation in matters of administrative law and particularly 
in rulemaking. A former Supreme Court justice with long experience in administrative 
disputes said, for instance, that judges show deference to the Comptroller’s 
determinations of law. They ‘respect the technical opinion’ of the office and ‘assume the 
correctness of what it says,’ he reported. Moreover, he expressed his belief that the 
Comptroller-General helps to reduce litigiousness against administrative actions. Another 
former Supreme Court justice with a similar background, emphasising the uniqueness of 
the mechanism, said that ‘the existence of ex-ante legality review, despite its narrow 
scope, to some extent has prevented the rise of judicial disputes over administrative acts’. 
He went on to explain the deterrent effect of this checking device: ‘If one knows that the 
Comptroller Office – an autonomous body, staffed with good lawyers – examined the 
legality [of administrative decisions], then one does not waste time suing the state 
claiming that a decree is wrong. One only would do that when there is [a] very relevant 
[violation of law]’. He concluded, therefore, that ‘somehow the Comptroller’s review 
impedes that challenging decrees before the courts become a matter of routine’. 
 
An executive senior advisor provides a concrete example. He mentions an ambitious 
regulation on animal rights that was a campaign pledge of the President to animal rights 
groups. The decree was repeatedly rejected by the Comptroller-General on legality 
grounds. The government lawyer conceded that the enabling legislation in this case may 
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actually have been insufficient, but he also said that the political pressure was difficult to 
resist. Be that as it may, he was happy with the outcome, because if promulgated, the 
decree could have opened enormous room for litigation. He said that ‘animal rights 
groups would have sued local governments on grounds of illegal inaction as the decree 
established too ambitious duties without enough financial support’. In other words, 
without Comptroller ex-ante review, the decree might have triggered a judicial dispute 
with unpromising results. 
 
A practitioner and former senior official at the Comptroller Office shares these views. He 
says that ‘litigiousness against administrative rules in Chile is rare and this is due in part 
to the Comptroller’s ex-ante review’. A reviewer in the office expresses a similar idea. 
He maintains that in spite of the delays the preventive review causes, it actually makes a 
positive contribution because it minimises waste. He says that while without prior legality 
check, rulemaking could be more expeditious, reducing processing times at the high cost 
of an increasing number of judicial review challenges. He believes that excluding the 
legality review process would increase litigiousness since the quality of the work of front-
line decision-makers tends to be poor. In his opinion, government lawyers take legal and 
constitutional violations frivolously, but legality review prevents errors from remaining 
in the final administrative rules. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the role of the Chilean Comptroller-General in administrative 
rulemaking. I have paid close attention to the practices of deliberation, reason-giving and 
veto that occur in the shadow of the formal rules. This sort of law-in-context perspective 
seems particularly suitable for researching a setting in which interactions take place with 
a high degree of informality. Moreover, this point of view may help to remedy the overly 
legalistic and formalistic approaches usually adopted in relation to public law in the Latin 
American region. 
 
The review process under examination in this chapter may be compared to well-known 
institutions acting elsewhere. Like some of its counterparts in more developed 
jurisdictions, the Comptroller-General somewhat contributes to the following 
dimensions: (i) increasing compliance with legality; (ii) bringing into focus legal 
dimensions that could have been neglected by primary decision-makers; (iii) enhancing 
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coordination within the executive branch of government; (iv) facilitating representation 
of interests in administrative rulemaking; and (v) preventing excessive litigiousness. Yet 
this family resemblance to successful institutions cannot fully account for the resilience 
of the institution amid everlasting calls for change and even abolition. Indeed, the office 
performs these functions with only limited success. 
 
There may be something distinctively Latin American that might explain the persistence 
of this mechanism. At least two factors seem to emerge as suitable candidates. On the one 
hand, the Comptroller-General has offered a countervailing power to the potential 
dominance of the executive branch in an institutional context characterised by weak 
supervision by courts and even weaker supervision by the legislature. The office, to put 
it differently, compensates for the perceived threat of executive authoritarianism and the 
dysfunctionality of the other branches of government in reacting to it. On the other hand, 
the Comptroller-General also seems to perform a compensation function in relation to 
bureaucracy. In a context of an unprofessionalised and fairly balkanised bureaucratic 
apparatus, the Office of the Comptroller-General has symbolically embodied the values 
of administrative integrity and legality. Simultaneously, it has worked as an effective 
repository for institutional memory and administrative expertise. This latter dimension of 
the office has legitimated and strengthened administrative action. Even though I am not 
convinced that this administrative justice arrangement achieves the right mix of rules, 
discretion, and accountability, the factors just sketched out may help to explain the fear 
of reforming it, especially when viewed against the backdrop of institutional fragility that 
unfortunately seems to characterise the Latin American region. 
 
 
 CHAPTER 7. THE COMPTROLLER AND DISPUTE-RESOLUTION 
 
The development of nonjudicial forms of legal redress is one of the distinctive features 
of contemporary administrative law.720 They have mushroomed everywhere along with 
the expansion of the welfare state.721 These new institutional devices have been designed 
to overcome the perceived shortcomings of traditional models of judicial review of 
administrative action. The creation of court substitutes has not been the only option for 
legal designers. Public law systems have also adapted traditionally ‘triadic’ judicial 
structures 722  in order to address the modern challenges raised by the growth of the 
administrative state.723 Adjudicatory institutions that deviate from the classic model have 
been designed in order to cope with problems of massive administrative justice, poorly 
resourced litigants, and polycentricity, among others.724  
 
The development of the Comptroller-General can be located within that broader 
phenomenon. Writing in 1977, Eduardo Soto-Kloss described the office as an admirable 
innovation of Chilean public law, comparing it to ombudspersons and other institutions 
designed to remedy the limitations of traditional judicial review.725 Although he directed 
his praise towards the ex-ante legality review procedure, it may be argued that his point 
was of broader scope. He was conceiving the institution as a remedy to overcome the 
weaknesses of judicial review and not merely as a body operating inside government. 
Looking at the comparative landscape, Soto-Kloss claimed that contemporary 
administrative law had an urgent need to react to the tardiness of judicial mechanisms. In 
contrast, he portrayed the Comptroller-General as a ‘dynamic, promptly and possibly 
effective’ device for administrative justice. Certainly, there are evident ideologically 
motivated overstatements in these words. They were uttered in praise of the controversial 
behaviour of the office during the Allende period and expressed during the first months 
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of the Pinochet dictatorship. However, they may still have anticipated possible routes that 
the institution could have navigated. Indeed, Soto-Kloss’s claims raise some interesting 
questions. Has the office become a court substitute? What functions does it perform in 
this regard? For which weaknesses of judicial review could it compensate? 
 
In the late 1970s, the institutional position of the Comptroller-General in relation to 
dispute-resolution was less controversial than today. At that point, although highly 
criticised in some circles, the dominant doctrine was that ordinary courts lacked general 
judicial review powers. Therefore, under such a setting, the position of the office as a 
court substitute was strengthened. In 1989, however, this scenario changed.726 As a result 
of the negotiation of constitutional reforms to facilitate the transition from dictatorship to 
democracy, the judiciary was granted powers of judicial review of administrative action. 
This was done by dropping the reference to administrative tribunals in the Constitution.727 
With dispute-resolution powers having been granted to courts in public law issues, why 
does the Comptroller-General continue to perform a function in this domain? What is the 
distinctive contribution of the Comptroller-General as an institution of administrative 
justice? 
 
In marked contrast to its counterparts elsewhere,728 the Chilean Comptroller-General is 
to an important extent concerned with individual legal grievances. In this sense, the 
Chilean office resembles an ombudsman, as it provides an additional forum for airing 
complaints against administrative action (or inaction). In the previous chapter I explored 
this issue in respect to ex-ante legality review in the rulemaking process. In this chapter, 
I examine the functions of the office in its ex-post function of handing down interpretive 
opinions. Here, the comparison to courts is definitely more straightforward. 
 
Addressing the previous questions, this chapter examines the use of complaint-handling 
procedures in the Comptroller-General. The chapter thus focuses on the individualised 
aspect of legal accountability. I will deal with issues of independence, impartiality, 
expertise, access, procedural flexibility, and the impact of Comptroller-General 
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procedures and remedies for individuals’ grievances. The aim is to assess whether the 
institution provides significant redress for aggrieved individuals. In other words, this 
chapter will examine how the office fares as a venue for legal and social accountability, 
that is, as an institutional platform for challenges to government decisions by private 
parties.729 
I. INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY, AND EXPERTISE 
One of the main possible advantages of nonjudicial institutions of legal accountability 
over ordinary courts is that they provide innovative forms of handling the trade-offs 
between independence and impartiality on the one hand, and expertise on the other. Their 
defenders claim that nonjudicial institutions represent a superior form of administrative 
justice by securing sufficient independence while keeping larger degrees of expertise. 
 
The administrative state entails a large concentration of power in public bureaucracy. 
This in turn creates enormous asymmetries of power between the administration and the 
citizen and a special need for grievance machinery capable of handling the specific kinds 
of disputes that stem from the exercise of bureaucratic power. The establishment of these 
dispute-resolution bodies results in difficult questions of institutional design. The trade-
off between independence and expertise seems particularly salient among them. As John 
Allison explains, these kinds of adjudicatory institutions must satisfy demands of both 
independence and expertise. He states that independence is required to secure citizens’ 
trust in ‘impartial adjudication of administrative disputes despite the enormous power of 
the state administration’.730 On the other hand, in order to secure administrators’ trust and 
their ultimate compliance, adjudicators must possess sufficient expertise, that is, 
knowledge of ‘the complexity of administrative needs, the threats to administrative 
efficiency, and the adequacy of non-judicial controls over the administration’.731 Thus, as 
stated above, there is a tension between these two goals that must be satisfied by the 
designer, as the adjudicatory institution ‘must be sufficiently associated with the 
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administration to understand its activities, and sufficiently detached so as not to be 
partial’.732 
 
Comparing the operation of the market, the political process, and the legal process, Neil 
Komesar has similarly highlighted the fact that adjudication secures independence and 
impartiality at the cost of reducing expertise by narrowing access to information.733 He 
explains that the institutional isolation of adjudicators increases the costs of participation 
in litigation when compared to the market and the political process. Costly participation 
screens information out of the adjudicatory process and causes informational shortages 
in courts. To put it slightly differently, here Komesar is emphasising the trade-off between 
independence and some forms of expertise. He claims that ‘that insulation separates 
judges from a great deal of information about the desires and needs of the public’.734 The 
limited information possessed by adjudicators adversely affects their expertise or 
competence, understood as their ability to ‘investigate, understand, and make the 
substantive social decisions that may come to them’.735 Of course, this raises a thorny 
dilemma for institutional designers: 
The adjudicative process hears and considers less, but is more evenhanded 
in what it hears and considers. The price of evenhandedness is most 
dramatically revealed in that important range of social issues where the 
adjudicative process hears nothing – a significant disability traceable to the 
high cost of participation. This tradeoff between information and 
evenhandedness is among the most difficult issues in institutional choice.736 
 
Adrian Vermeule has applied Komesar’s insights to impartiality-expertise trade-offs in a 
somewhat more limited institutional setting. Pointing out the limits of independence, he 
explains that ‘the bias of decision makers can be reduced only by reducing the information 
they hold or their incentives to invest in acquiring new information’. 737  However, 
sometimes a degree of impartiality may need to be sacrificed at the expense of expertise. 
For although better-informed actors may be prone to biases, they may also ‘have 
indispensable specialized knowledge’.738 Generally, Vermeule suggests that institutional 
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designers have to deal with such trade-offs by optimising all the institutional values at 
stake. One example is allocating the task of investigation and prosecution to information-
rich but weakly independent administrative agencies,739 but then requiring an internal 
separation of functions within the organisation in order to secure a degree of independent 
decision-making. Thus, this arrangement may be further improved by putting in place 
substitute protections such as ex-post thin judicial review.740 
 
As Elliot has claimed, independence is a critical feature of accountability institutions. In 
his view, there must be tension, or distance, between the adjudicatory body and the body 
being held to account. 741  Yet the question is how to find the right ‘measure of 
independence’ in light of the requirements for expertise. According to Peter Cane, this 
accommodation between independence and expertise is behind the introduction and 
permanence of ‘administrative tribunals’ in the United States. To explain the function of 
these institutions, Cane contrasts the respective orientations of the administrative and the 
adjudicatory processes. He claims that ‘[a]dministration, like politics, is primarily 
oriented towards the promotion of social goals whereas adjudication is primarily oriented 
towards the protection of the interests of individual members of society’.742 Drawing on 
Komesar’s insights, it could be argued that these divergent orientations are due to their 
different institutional features and their informational capacities. Thus, whereas 
adjudication has a preference for individualised forms of participation, 743  the 
administrative process tends to give priority to social interests.744 Against this backdrop, 
Cane suggests that administrative adjudication may represent a halfway house between 
administration and adjudication: 
Embedded tribunals enable the demand for adjudication of disputes between 
citizens and government to be met without relinquishing too much control 
of the programs out of which the disputes arise; they facilitate maintenance 
of the integrity of government policy objectives while at the same time 
providing an outlet for individual grievances.745 
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In other words, administrative adjudication is designed so that a sufficient degree of 
independence is granted while retaining an appropriate level of expertise, that is, an 
understanding of the policy goals underlying administrative action. In sum, this model 
represents one way in which independence and expertise could be optimised. 
 
It is not entirely clear, however, whether expertise plays to the benefit of government, as 
Cane and Allison seem to suggest. Harry Arthurs, for instance, has argued that judicial 
oversight – arguably the most independent form of accountability – may not entail a more 
robust scrutiny of administrative action than expert but less independent nonjudicial 
forms of accountability. In his view, the latter arrangements are ‘more likely than the 
courts to address the substance, rather than the technicalities, of discretion abuse’.746 
Similar insights can be collected from Hamson’s study of the Conseil d’Etat, which 
simultaneously highlights the body’s close proximity to the administration and its 
superior assertiveness in comparison with the English high court. 747  This is a case, 
therefore, of expertise leading to more intrusive legal scrutiny of administrative action. 
 
What is the situation in the Comptroller-General Office in relation to independence, 
impartiality, and expertise? As we have seen, the office is robustly independent in the 
more legalistic sense of the term, that is, in terms of appointment, tenure, and removal of 
the office-holder.748 With the exception of life tenure, the rules governing the office are 
currently similar to those for members of the higher courts. From this point of view, there 
is no notable difference between the two forums for dispute-resolution. 
 
In a broader sense of independence, however, the office is considerably less isolated from 
the administrative process and the executive branch than are courts. A combination of 
numerous accountability functions in the office such as audit, ex-ante review, opinion-
giving, and dispute-resolution tasks makes the institution much closer than courts to 
administrative action. In addition, the office is characteristically conceived as operating 
within administration. As a former head of the Comptroller’s Legal Department has 
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pointed out, the Comptroller-General is autonomous yet it is located inside the 
administration.749 In his view, its peculiar insertion within administration requires the 
institution to have a ‘close, robust and profound knowledge of the administrative milieu 
and the real problems that take place in it’.750 As a result, unlike courts, the office is 
expected to possess an acute consciousness of the internal law of the administration. 
 
By contrast, the Chilean judiciary has been historically characterised by its isolation and 
autonomy. 751  Although there have been attempts to increase its connections and 
responsiveness to broader interests in the last 20 years, progress has been quite limited.752 
In relation to the administrative process, in particular, the distance is particularly 
significant. There are no generalist administrative courts in the country, and the 
specialised public law panels in the higher courts are the exception. Specialised panels 
were only created in the Supreme Court in 1995,753 and in the last 50 years just two 
Justices who could be considered specialists in administrative law have been appointed. 
The lack of expertise is exacerbated considering that the Court has 21 members, and, even 
worse, because of the internal rules of procedure, one of the mentioned specialists never 
sits on the public law panel. When asked about the Supreme Court’s knowledge of the 
administrative rulemaking process, a Justice declared that their approach was essentially 
formalist. In his view, Supreme Court justices did not have an understanding of the ‘law 
in action’ and the reality of legal operations beyond the books. He said that in their 
adjudicatory functions, they just turn a blind eye to administrative reality. 
 
Informal networks also explain the proximity between the Comptroller-General office 
and the administrative process. The Comptroller-General himself has historically held 
routine meetings with Presidents and Ministers, and his subordinates directing sub-
departments within the office follow the same practice of keeping ongoing contact with 
ministries and heads of departments. The Comptroller-General also pays personal visits 
to congressional committees quite frequently. Comptroller officials, moreover, frequently 
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receive telephone calls from members of Congress interested in specific policy areas or 
trying to speed up administrative decisions. Staff of the office admit that this form of 
‘telephone justice’ is practised quite openly, but they claim that it does not affect their 
impartiality. In sharp contrast, members of the judiciary keep their contact with Congress 
and the executive branch on strictly formal terms. Their form of communication is almost 
exclusively formal, institutional memorandum. Most of these features distinguish the 
Office of the Comptroller-General from the judiciary in terms of its distance from 
executive policy-making. However, they also broaden their sources of information and 
thus increase their expertise. 
 
In one aspect, Comptroller-General officers and members of the judiciary appear to be 
alike. Both groups embody bureaucratic cadres who have developed a strong feeling of 
belonging after possibly decades serving their respective institutions. This represents an 
acute element of institutional isolation and independence in both organisations. However, 
professional isolation seems less severe in the case of the Comptroller-General Office. 
First, the office’s workforce comprises not only lawyers but also a broader spectrum of 
professions. In some sub-departments, lawyers work alongside engineers, accountants, 
and architects, among others. Secondly, there has been a historical practice of 
commissioning Comptroller officers for detached service in ministries and other 
administrative departments. This has given officers proximity to the other side of the 
divide. In the historical chapters of this thesis we have seen how this practice has taken 
place.754 Despite the fact that detached service commissions are rarely used today, there 
are increasing instances of ‘revolving doors’ between administration and the office of the 
Comptroller-General. In fact, it is not uncommon to find Comptroller-General officers 
who were recruited after experience in the ‘active administration’ side and vice versa. 
There are even cases of people leaving the office for the executive branch and then being 
recruited to the Comptroller-General again. This is a third factor that lessens the isolation 
of the office. In sum, echoing Latour’s findings in his study on the making of law in the 
French Conseil d’Etat,755 the experience of the law inside the Comptroller-General is less 
autonomous than appearances may suggest. 
 
                                                 
754 For the work of Comptroller-General staff in executive functions during the Pinochet regime, see 
Chapter 5. 
755 Latour (n 11) 126. 
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The foregoing point raises a set of complex questions: do close interactions between the 
Comptroller-General and administrative power adversely affect its impartiality? Does it 
entail excessive responsiveness to social policy? Does it genuinely increase its expertise? 
Has expertise entailed enhanced trust by administrators? Has it entailed greater deference 
to administrative determinations? 
 
Despite divergence in terms of familiarity with administrative activity, perceptions of bias 
in the decisions of the Comptroller-General are not drastically different from the 
perceptions of judicial attitudes. Lawyers with litigation experience in the office say that 
Comptroller adjudicators behave in an impartial manner when conducting procedures. 
Furthermore, they report that they perceive a subtle anti-administration bias in the sense 
of the stringency of the office’s scrutiny. Some lawyers also indicate that it is easier to 
find excessive acquaintance between lawyers and the officials in the judiciary. In the 
Comptroller-General, in contrast, officers may be ‘happy to listen but always keep and 
show distance and that is good’ – as one interviewee put it. A number of other observers 
pointed out the seriousness and professionalism of Comptroller-General rank-and-file 
officers. 
 
When asked about the impartiality of front-level officers in the office, a litigant reported 
a similar experience. She said that they are experts in keeping an inscrutable face, which 
– in her opinion – reveals some form of impartiality. In her account, they never express a 
view for or against the question at stake. Yet looking at the cases escalated to higher levels 
within the office, the same lawyer expresses a more nuanced view. She says that higher 
authorities within the office have their own agenda and that this fact is less transparent 
than in the courts. In her view, at this level the Comptroller-General is more prone to 
clientele-ism and cronyism than courts, since the latter have worked in recent years to 
eradicate this kind of practice. She points out that as the portfolio is relatively small, the 
same attorneys repeat themselves in different cases, bringing about undesirable 
acquaintance. Perhaps more importantly, she indicates that policy considerations pollute 
decision-making at the higher levels of the office. She argues that ‘there are cases that 
must be solved in one direction because otherwise it would not be viable…they have to 
protect institutional structures and official policy choices’. This lawyer concludes that 
whereas in routine cases front-line officers are impartial and adopt a legalist approach, in 
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high-stakes cases – where higher authorities in the office may get involved – impartiality 
becomes an issue. 
 
Similarly, another practitioner remembers a meeting in which an acting Comptroller-
General said that there were political limitations to his action. Due to the office’s 
institutional location, there are some no-go areas; that is, at some points the office cannot 
obstruct the exercise of administrative powers. Another lawyer offers a similar 
perspective, claiming that the institution uses legality quite flexibly. The office applies 
legality more strictly during some periods or in relation to some bodies, and can be more 
lenient at other moments or in relation to different organisations. The office, in other 
words, adjusts legality depending to circumstances. 
 
However, it is unclear how this attitude compares to the judicial one. For instance, another 
lawyer suggests that the Comptroller-General is more ‘juridical’ than the Supreme Court; 
its decisions are more ‘purely’ legal than decisions adopted by panels in the higher courts. 
While the Comptroller-General follows precedents and applies administrative law, the 
content of courts’ decisions depend on the judges who are sitting in the bench on the 
specific day. In his view, there is much more variation and unpredictability in the courts 
than in the Comptroller-General. Moreover, he points out the high risk of cronyism in the 
operation of specialised tribunals compared to the Comptroller’s procedures. 
 
Anticipating our next theme, another lawyer manifested his preference for litigating in 
the Comptroller-General instead of in courts for considerations of process, but not 
impartiality. He said that both the courts and the Comptroller-General have a pro-
administration or pro-government bias, but the latter is faster and less formalistic. As 
such, it is convenient for the government lawyers ‘to bring everything into the judiciary 
and get the cases out of the Comptroller-General’. On this account, then, both institutions 
are equally either impartial or biased. 
 
A human rights lawyer expresses doubts about the impartiality of the office in ‘sensitive 
cases’. Having a mixed experience litigating in the office, he indicates that human rights 
cases are always politically controversial with government and this makes him reluctant 
to trust in the Comptroller-General. However, he points out that the same is true in the 
judiciary. Overall, he believes that the Comptroller’s attitude is more receptive to 
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institutional than individual concerns. As such, when institutions raise human rights 
issues, the institution may respond well, but he is less confident about the reaction in 
cases of individual grievances. However, as we will see below, factors other than 
impartiality may explain the unresponsiveness of the Comptroller-General to human 
rights cases. 
 
In sum, perceptions of partiality or bias do not seem to be a barrier to creating trust in the 
Comptroller’s decision-making and promoting its use by litigators. While limited 
impartiality does not discourage the filing of complaints against administrative action in 
this office, there are other factors that positively contribute to the rising use of the office 
as a dispute-resolution forum. Perhaps surprisingly, superior expertise seems to be one of 
them. 
 
Many regulatory lawyers see the Comptroller-General as a ‘boutique court’ in which they 
can file their complaints against regulatory agencies. They perceive that their chances of 
winning a case are higher in this office than in the judiciary. The key factor for them is 
its superior expertise in regulatory law compared to courts. In their view, increased 
expertise enables the institution to exercise a more searching examination of 
administrative action and to be less prone to accept at face value authorities’ invocation 
of the public interest. This opinion of a lawyer illustrates the point well: 
[These] are regulated markets with a very complex technical component in 
which legal procedures before courts to challenge administrative decisions 
are extremely brief […] Hence, the timespan for the court to examine the 
issue is too little. The judges will not have time to study how the telecom 
sector works, or how the water-supply system works… For this reason, we 
opt for using the Comptroller-General as it possesses a specialised technical 
knowledge. The Comptroller-General has all these specialised departments 
that participate, for instance, in price-setting procedures. Then, they can 
grasp the logic of economic regulation that courts usually can’t. And when 
you go to the Comptroller-General for instance because of a 
telecommunications dispute, or challenging the guidelines for a competitive 
bidding process, or a rule by the electricity and fuels regulatory agency… 
they are into that… They are lawyers but they have much specialised 
knowledge… If you go there, you make sure that the analysis will be more 
thorough than in courts. Furthermore, in courts – not because of deference 
but because of sheer ignorance – the decisions of the authority tend to be 
protected. If the authority says ‘this has an impact on the population’, judges 
rule in favour of the administration. In contrast, the Comptroller-General is 
accustomed to legality control. That is their job… [In sum,] because they 
have little time, because issues are very complex, and because it is easy [for 
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the authority] to explain the problems in terms of headlines such as ‘this will 
affect the general interest’, courts do not go deeply into these issues. The 
Comptroller-General, in contrast, exercises a more probing scrutiny. 
 
Similarly, another lawyer working in regulatory settings claimed that administrative 
legality is better applied in the Comptroller-General than in courts. He explains that ‘not 
necessarily you will get better outcomes, but you will have a better discussion’. In his 
view, ordinary judges cannot grasp the subtleties of administrative law. In contrast, the 
epistemic capacities of Comptroller officials are far better in disputes with a highly 
technical component such as price-setting, urban-planning law, environmental law, and 
administrative legality more generally. In this lawyer’s view, the office is an intermediate 
point between a specialist tribunal and the generalist court. Numerous other lawyers 
interviewed supported this observation. 
 
It was not only regulatory lawyers who expressed a preference for the Comptroller-
General on expertise grounds. A civil society activist with experience of more than 1,000 
urban planning cases expressed a generally positive opinion of Comptroller-General 
officials in similar terms. ‘They are serious people,’ he said. In his view, Comptroller 
officials have superior expertise to judges. They know the intricate discipline of urban-
planning law and can understand the dynamic regulatory environment that is caused by 
constant administrative rulemaking. He highlights the capacities of the office to 
understand these processes. In his opinion, the expertise, independence, and autonomy of 
the office is fundamental to promoting trust in the institution by an NGO like his. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, an animal rights litigant also mentioned the office’s expertise as a 
factor in her successful use of the Comptroller-General. She explained that her NGO uses 
courts only in cases against private parties – in particular, criminal law. However, in 
complaints against state action, they use the Comptroller-General. This activist said that, 
compared to courts, ‘Comptroller officers involve themselves in a more methodical 
examination of the cases and are more thorough in the application of law’. In addition, in 
her experience, courts avoid ‘political issues’, that is, conflicts with administrative 
authorities, and as a result they rarely grant leave. However, she also indicates that while 
their success record is high in local government cases when using the Comptroller-
General procedure, it is less so when it comes to challenging executive rules at the central, 
and therefore more political, level. 
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Many of those opinions consequently echo reasons provided elsewhere for establishing 
institutions of administrative adjudication that could supplement judicial adjudication. 
Cane reminds us of the rationale provided in Britain for this kind of machinery in these 
terms: ‘courts were perceived as lacking relevant and necessary expertise to resolve 
disputes about the operation of complex regulatory and welfare programmes’. 756 
Something quite similar could be said to explain the preference for using the Comptroller-
General instead of judicial review in Chile. 
II. ACCESSIBILITY 
Another of the primary reasons often provided for setting up nonjudicial grievance 
machinery has been the need to overcome the traditionally narrow access to courts. 
Gellhorn, for instance, points out various factors that may block the courts’ gates: 
financial requirements, willingness to litigate, justiciability issues, and legal 
entitlements.757 To overcome such restrictions in the judicial sphere, the designers of 
these bodies must make sure that ‘complaints should be generously received with an 
absolute minimum of formality’. 758  Patrick Birkinshaw likewise argues for taking 
nonjudicial mechanisms seriously, emphasising that the court’s ‘impact is problematical 
when there is limited access to them or where they are seriously curtailed in what they 
can address’.759 Looking specifically at the ombudsman technique, Seneviratne contends 
that these institutions ‘are useful for filling gaps in systems for redressing wrongs’ and 
emphasises the importance of cost, as they ‘are free to the users of the schemes’.760 In 
sum, reduction of cost and legal hurdles is one of the aims of nonjudicial forms of dispute-
resolution in the administrative domain. 
 
The Comptroller-General seems to satisfy some of these requirements. Let us start with 
the legal obstacles to the judicial process. In Chile, there is no unified access to judicial 
review of administrative action; that is, there is no ‘umbrella procedure’ for challenging 
administrative determinations. There are numerous remedies with varying conditions for 
                                                 
756 Cane, ‘Understanding Administrative Adjudication’ (n 720) 283. 
757 Gellhorn (n 77) ch 1. 
758 Gellhorn (n 2) 427. 
759 Birkinshaw (n 76) 2. 
760 Mary Seneviratne, Ombudsmen: Public Services and Administrative Justice (Butterworths LexisNexis 
2002) 11. 
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their use.761 These procedures require representation by a lawyer. In addition, they are 
subjected to fairly restrictive rules about standing to sue. In the broadest judicial remedy 
available against administrative decisions, only individuals who can claim a private right 
or a personal, direct, and existing legitimate interest at stake are allowed to sue. Here, 
interests are conceived as pecuniary losses or as having a direct adverse effect upon an 
entrepreneurial or personal activity of the claimant.762 There is no broad, public law 
model for judicial review of administrative action in the rudimentary Chilean regime. To 
put it slightly differently, the Chilean model is still a rather drainpipe-shaped process.763 
 
Not surprisingly, the narrow passages to judicial review exasperate litigants. One lawyer 
complains that the Supreme Court has dramatically reduced the chance for requesting a 
court to quash an administrative decision. He believes that the only path that remains 
relatively more open is seeking damages. Similarly, a lawyer practicing in immigration 
law claims that ‘in terms of remedies and due process immigration system is a disaster’. 
She goes on to say that even though the remedies may be effective, they are too restrictive. 
For instance, a special judicial writ to appeal against a removal order has to be filed within 
24 hours in the Supreme Court, which is located in the country’s capital, and requires 
legal representation. As such, people in remote areas have no chance of obtaining legal 
protection. As this tool is so narrow, the avenue most often used to obtain redress is the 
habeas corpus writ – a remedy designed for a totally different purpose. A similar 
experience is recounted by a lawyer in the Office of Legal Aid in Human Rights, an 
administrative department responsible for providing free legal advice and advocacy. He 
states that judicial remedies are not as broad as one may expect, indicating that the use of 
the judicial process is contingent on circumstances, as there is a variety of remedies, 
depending on subject matter, that determines the tribunal, procedures, and deadlines. In 
these circumstances, the use of the Comptroller-General appears attractive for three 
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reasons: it is cheaper; it does not require legal representation; and its topical cover is 
wider. 
 
In fact, the economic and professional dimension of access is a critical factor for NGOs 
that possess no legal staff. As the president of an influential NGO explained, the primary 
factor for prioritising this institution is its cost-effectiveness: ‘Going to the Comptroller-
General is free and going to the courts is very expensive and we are a poor institution’. 
As an additional advantage, he also pointed out that they do not need to hire a lawyer. 
Similarly, an animal rights activist reported that the need for legal representation has been 
an insurmountable obstacle for their use of courts and, conversely, a critical consideration 
for challenging administrative action in the Comptroller-General. Both organisations 
have occasional informal advice by lawyers, but most of their actions are based on non-
lawyer activity – architects and students respectively. Less stringent requirements in 
terms of financial and legal resources, therefore, seems to explain the use of the office in 
these cases. 
 
However, financial and legal resources alone cannot fully explain access to the Office of 
the Comptroller-General by less well-resourced groups. The capacity to frame problems 
in terms suitable for treatment in the Comptroller-General provides a critical advantage 
in the mobilisation of the office in litigation strategies. Lisa Vanhala has examined this 
factor – legal framing capacity – in the French context, explaining the hypothesis of 
associates’ capacity to frame legal mobilisation in these terms: 
Groups that frame the problems they seek to address through a legal lens 
will be more likely to rely on legal tools, including litigation. Groups that 
are skeptical of law or perceive it as serving only elite interests will be less 
likely to litigate.764 
 
As will be seen in what follows, while for some groups the use of the Comptroller-General 
appears obvious and natural, for others it is something inconceivable. This does not 
depend on legal resources, but on the capacity to identify the institution as an adequate 
forum for obtaining redress and frame the issues accordingly.  
 
                                                 
764 Lisa Vanhala, ‘Legal Mobilization under Neo-Corporatist Governance: Environmental NGOs before the 
Conseil d’Etat in France, 1975–2010’ (2016) 4 Journal of Law and Courts 103, 115. 
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The lawyers in the Office of Legal Aid in Human Rights, for instance, chose to channel 
their cases to the Comptroller-General instead of to the judiciary after inviting law 
professors to give talks on administrative law. Only then did they realise that they could 
utilise the office for airing complaints against administrative action. Similarly, the animal 
rights activist mentioned above became aware of the advantages of the Comptroller-
General due to the advice of one member who was a lawyer in an administrative 
department within the executive. She was not allowed to litigate herself because of 
professional constraints, but she taught other members of the organisation how to use this 
forum. Later, they continued to use this complaint mechanism successfully without 
lawyer assistance, due to the initial advice provided by a public law expert. 
 
A totally different scenario is revealed in relation to other groups that, despite possessing 
legal resources, do not use the Comptroller-General because of inability to frame their 
concerns in terms appropriate to resolution by the office. For example, a lawyer practising 
for an environmental protection NGO said that he was not aware of the office’s 
jurisdictional remit or its procedures. He also pointed to his lack of previous experience 
as a reason for not using the Comptroller-General as a litigation platform. Surprisingly, 
after a while he admitted that the office is well-reputed as grievance machinery by 
architects with concerns in urban protection matters. He said that ‘people who have 
suggested us going to the Comptroller-General are lay people…if there is an architect the 
first thing that comes to his mind is going to the Comptroller-General’. A lawyer serving 
in a human rights public institution reported similar experience. Despite having won some 
relevant cases in the Comptroller-General, he could not recall the details of them and 
explained that their focus was instead on judicial litigation. Yet another lawyer who 
participated in those cases eventually recalled that the person in charge of initiating the 
proceedings in the Comptroller-General was actually the erstwhile in-house lawyer – an 
expert in administrative law – and not the human rights litigation specialist in the office. 
This explains why the litigant did not have memory of the cases and, more importantly, 
why he lacked the capacity to frame the dossier of the office in terms suitable for 
administrative adjudication. This is not unreasonable, since many interviewees said that 
one of the most important factors for litigation in the Comptroller-General is framing the 
case in terms of strict legality and on the more technical concepts of administrative law. 
Many lawyers with long experience said that the office would very likely disallow cases 
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framed in terms of constitutional principle and human rights. In their accounts, to be able 
to go to the office, one has to frame the issue in terms of strict administrative legality. 
 
A final illustration concerns immigration law. A lawyer trained in a foreign country, 
working in a legal clinic at a university, said that they had not used the Comptroller-
General as a complaint mechanism because of unawareness of its functioning: ‘it has to 
do with lack of experience of our office and the academics in charge of the clinic... I am 
not a Chilean lawyer, so I do not have experience and I come from a country where this 
institution does not exist. We haven’t found the way and the advantages of filing a case 
in the Comptroller’s Office,’ she declared. In sum, in contrast to public lawyers with 
expertise in administrative law, experts in environmental law, human rights law, and 
immigration law were unable to recognise the office as a relevant actor in handling 
complaints against administrative activity. This of course reveals a severe problem with 
visibility, but it also exposes the lack of ‘legal framing’ capabilities that affects these 
groups. 
III. PROCESS AND OPERATING METHODS 
Writing about the causes that might explain the emergence of administrative adjudication 
in the Anglo-American world, Peter Cane points out that judicial procedures ‘were 
considered too formal and elaborate, and their operations too slow and costly. As a result, 
courts were unattractive and inaccessible to all but the most wealthy, educated and self-
confident citizens’. Moreover, ‘because of the nature of judicial procedures, litigation in 
the courts could be unduly disruptive of the conduct of government business’. 765 
Responding to these deficiencies, nonjudicial bodies encapsulate a promise of informal 
and flexible procedures that may enhance administrative justice.766 Does Comptroller-
General procedure fit this description of flexible and informal administrative justice 
arrangements? 
 
Litigants explain that compared to judicial procedures, processes before the Comptroller-
General are indeed informal. However, they have some important shortcomings as well. 
Although they are described as a faster route to justice, Comptroller complaints 
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procedures are essentially secretive. Also, they are paper-based procedures. However, 
lawyers generally have broad access to front-line reviewers for expanding their arguments 
or explaining them in detail. As said above, the reviewers listen to the parties, but they 
are very discreet and avoid releasing information to them. Finally, according to litigants, 
the office’s internal decision-making procedures are quite opaque. 
 
A lawyer serving in the Human Rights Legal Aid Office explains how, in her experience, 
the performance of the Comptroller-General is superior to courts in public employment 
cases because of procedural advantages. In particular, she pointed to the benefits of 
litigating in the office in terms of speed. While a case in the judiciary may take five years 
at the very least, timeframes are much reduced in the Comptroller-General. Moreover, 
administrative defence in the courts is led by the Council of Defence of the State, an 
institution that possesses enormous experience and resources in the forensic realm. As a 
result, procedures are complex and protracted. Finally, she emphasises that prolonged 
judicial litigation entails a delay that is terribly exhausting to the people who are 
represented by her office.  
 
Likewise, for many other lawyers, the main advantage of the office’s procedure is reduced 
waiting times. Even a lawyer who expressed very critical opinions about the institution 
said that he eventually advises his clients to use the Comptroller’s Office in the context 
of limited judicial resources for handling regulatory issues. He said that ‘it is the forum 
where you can obtain a sufficient analysis of the question and in less time’. While a 
procedure in the Comptroller-General may take one year, judicial litigation can take more 
than five years. Also, there are no tight time limits to appeal to the Comptroller-General. 
Deadlines are more generous than in the courts, so the office is viewed as a flexible tool 
for exploring different litigation strategies combining administrative and judicial routes. 
 
As suggested above, less time-consuming procedures are highly correlated to the lack of 
participation of the Council of Defence of the State (CDS) in Comptroller-General 
procedures. This was highlighted by a lawyer in the Office of Legal Aid and confirmed 
by regulatory lawyers. The defence of state interests by this institution produces 
protracted litigation; this theme is well known in administrative law literature. For 
instance, in his classical work, KC Davis acutely criticised the procedural obstacles raised 
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by government in litigation.767 As such, it is not surprising that the decentralised nature 
of legal defence of administrative agencies in the Comptroller-General may significantly 
reduce timeframes. Moreover, in the case of conflicts in long-term relationships, litigation 
in the Comptroller-General allows the parties to avoid involving a third party – the CDS 
– in the controversy, which may also be seen as an advantage for them. 
 
Indeed, avoiding disruption of regulatory relationships is pointed out as a crucial factor. 
According to numerous actors, the procedure before the Comptroller-General is perceived 
as less disruptive to ongoing regulatory relationships than judicial procedure. This echoes 
Coglianese’s disturbance theory of disputing within the regulatory process.768 In his view, 
contrasting with theories suggesting that parties in regulatory contexts tend to avoid 
litigation in order to keep the ongoing relationships undisturbed,769 the mobilisation of 
courts actually depends on the type of litigation deployed. The most important point is 
that some litigation strategies may have a small adverse impact on the relationship, and 
may even have some advantages for the agencies and the regulated industries.770  
 
In our case, with the availability of two alternative forums for challenging administrative 
action, actors in established regulatory relationships seem to prefer the Comptroller-
General to the courts. They perceive this route as less harmful to the ongoing relationship. 
One lawyer says that industries do not use constitutional writ of protection – a typical 
judicial route – for complex regulatory challenges, as framing the case in constitutional 
rights terms risks caricaturising the problem and also risks the professional integrity of 
the firm. In his view, this context has led them to use the Comptroller-General as a more 
sophisticated forum for debating these regulatory issues, which also enables them to avoid 
harming their long-term relationship with the regulator. He indicates that ‘big companies 
do not want to have “issues” with the regulators in courts, and the Comptroller-General 
is perceived as a less conflictive forum in the public opinion’. This legal counsellor insists 
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that regulated industries do not want an adverse impact on their relationship with 
government and regulators. Likewise, another regulatory lawyer explains: 
Judicial review [on constitutional grounds] is not a trump card unless you 
have a very clear case. And also [it may be disruptive] if you have to keep 
an ongoing relationship with the regulator, the judicial route may be too 
violent…the Comptroller-General is less confrontational as it is like their 
own regulator… Bringing a judge in is as if you want to engage in real 
fight… Moreover, the agency may need to hire a barrister if they are 
challenged in courts, while they defend themselves directly if the case is 
litigated in the Comptroller-General. Finally, press coverage is more 
intensive in the courts than in the Comptroller-General. 
 
Similarly, another regulatory lawyer indicates that industries permanently operating in a 
regulated environment perceive litigation in the Comptroller-General as much less 
aggressive compared to courts. In his view, the reason for this is that it is natural for the 
public body to interact with the Comptroller Office, but not to go to the courts. He even 
mentions that regulators and regulated industries sometimes agree to bring a dispute to 
the Comptroller-General as a gentleman’s agreement. As such, both commit themselves 
to respecting the outcome, whatever it is.  
 
This is consistent with accounts provided by legal advisors in regulatory bodies. One 
government lawyer mentions two reasons for her preference for discussing challenges in 
the Comptroller-General instead of courts. First, the procedure is not judicial, which gives 
her some flexibility. Secondly, as it is not a judicial trial, she knows she will be asked to 
report and her brief ‘will have some weight’.771 Crucially, this legal advisor admits having 
used ‘gentleman’s agreements’ as a way of resolving disputes: ‘Sometimes I have to 
apply very ambiguous rules and then I have to take the risk and adopt an interpretation…if 
the regulated party disagrees, I say “let’s go to the Comptroller-General” [despite the fact 
that] sometimes we win but sometimes we lose’.772 Hence, her opinion points to the use 
of the Comptroller-General as a kind of arbitration mechanism that is less time-
consuming and may provide greater flexibility than the judicial process. 
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Finally, a government lawyer operating in the health sector expressed his preference for 
litigating in the Comptroller-General in similar terms. His main concern was the inability 
of court to grasp regulatory problems. In particular, he believed that judges apply private 
law doctrines that may not be suitable for appropriately resolving the cases. In contrast, 
he said that ‘with the Comptroller-General we work in the same public law sphere and 
that means that we speak the same language’. Furthermore, echoing previous opinions of 
litigants, he held that courts are increasingly more responsive to public opinion, especially 
in the environmental domain, suggesting that the Comptroller’s Office may be more 
sympathetic to agency positions. Nevertheless, he contends that they win most of the 
cases in the judiciary in any case. In sum, this regulator’s preference for the Comptroller-
General is linked to mindset proximity as well as procedural benefits. The main point, 
however, is that lawyers’ intuition that litigation in the office could be perceived as less 
disturbing to regulatory relationships seems to be confirmed.  
IV. FINALITY AND IMPACT 
Arguably, one fundamental feature of legal adjudication of disputes is finality. Legal 
institutions perform a settlement function, according to which disagreements among 
parties about an issue are authoritatively decided independently of the desirability of the 
decision’s content.773 From this viewpoint, it has been argued that the idea that legal 
institutions ‘could merely provide an opinion that can be accepted or ignored – like the 
advice of a law officer – misconceives the nature of legal authority in the modern state’.774 
The outcomes of nonjudicial institutions of administrative justice, however, tend to be 
less suitable for sharp descriptions in terms of finality. The manner in which they perform 
their dispute-resolution functions is sometimes more flexible and adaptable. Walter 
Gellhorn, for instance, has explained that an external critic ‘is more concerned with 
advising about what should be done next than with allocating praise or blame for what 
has already been done’.775 In other words, they ‘are adviser[s], not commanders. They 
rely on recommendation, not on compulsion’.776 
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Although stressing the importance of finality or impact, Mark Elliot also puts the question 
in less binary terms when examining the operation of nonjudicial accountability bodies. 
With apparent tones of optimising language, he claims that their outcomes ‘must be 
imbued with a sufficient degree of impact’. More concretely, Elliot argues that ‘[a]n 
accountability institution whose findings or recommendations can be ignored with 
impunity is not an effective accountability institution: to hold a public body to account 
must entail something more than the expression of a view that can readily evaporate into 
the ether’.777 Consequently, these institutions must ‘have clout, effective accountability 
being impossible if the output of the process is so readily dismissible as to have no 
meaningful impact’.778 One possible implication of this is that, in order to assess the 
effectiveness of these institutions, it is especially necessary to go beyond the formal 
allocation of powers. One needs to examine their real-world influence and impact on 
bureaucratic behaviour. 
 
This is a well-known problem with the ombudsman technique, as they characteristically 
lack ‘coercive remedial power’.779 Indeed, these institutions have a softer power that does 
not normally include a quashing effect. They are empowered to ‘form judgements, 
criticise or vindicate, make recommendations as to remedies and corrective measures, 
and report on but not reverse, administrative action’.780 However, it has been suggested 
that in some circumstances their rulings may have a greater impact on administrative 
activity than their judicial counterparts. Although they lack formal legal authority, their 
cooperative and persuasive strategies of legal control may have a real influence on 
bureaucracies’ daily operation by deploying cooperation and persuasion tools. 781  In 
addition, even administrative departments that have had great exposure to judicial 
decisions may not be highly shaped by judicial directives. Research in the UK has 
suggested that ‘extensive and prolonged exposure to judicial scrutiny’ does not diminish 
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unlawful decision-making agency action. 782  At times, agencies struggle to translate 
judicial decisions into their own administrative processes. Against this backdrop, it is 
sometimes suggested that nonjudicial bodies may be more able to penetrate and infuse 
legality values into the bureaucratic culture of administrative agencies. 
 
In Chile, one crucial difference between Comptroller-General decisions and judicial 
rulings is that the former are seen as creating a permanent precedent that will govern the 
public body behaviour in an ongoing manner, while the latter are viewed as decisions 
applicable only to the case at stake. Moreover, we have already seen that some 
government lawyers perceive the office as speaking the same language as theirs and even 
as sharing a similar bureaucratic ethos. This shared mindset may facilitate the impact of 
the office on administrative activity and compliance with its rulings. 
 
Among legal advisors at least, the perception is that Comptroller-General legal 
interpretations are highly complied with. Interviewees in the central administration 
reported that they ordinarily obey the office’s rulings. An advisor in the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Planning said that they obey the rulings while they are in force. He 
remembered just one instance in which the decision was not implemented. Despite having 
disagreed with the Comptroller-General in many instances, this officer declared that they 
had never challenged its opinions in the courts. In his account, when the cases are 
judicialised, it is because private groups complain about Comptroller decisions before the 
judiciary. He illustrates the situation by indicating that they compile Comptroller-General 
interpretive opinions about urban development and disseminate the information among 
the local units of the ministry. Also, the ministry and the Comptroller-General jointly 
publish guidelines on urban planning case law and organise joint workshops for public 
officers and stakeholders. This officer highlights that there is nothing comparable in 
relation to judicial rulings, although they also take those decisions into account when 
exercising their regulatory powers. 
 
Other government lawyers report similar experiences of internalising Comptroller-
General guidelines and precedents for future action. One central government advisor, for 
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instance, reports having examined Comptroller-made case law in order to ensure the 
uniform creation of sub-departments within ministries by administrative action. An 
advisor to a public health department recalls applying and citing Comptroller-General 
precedents in the department’s enforcement actions. In her opinion, the use of 
Comptroller-backed criteria strengthened their decisions to impose sanctions on regulated 
actors. Similarly, a lawyer serving in a municipality remembers taking into account 
Comptroller precedents in order to tailor regulations restricting the use of plastic bags in 
shops at the local government level. These examples suggest a decent level of penetration 
of legal interpretations by the Comptroller-General into the activities of administrative 
agencies. 
 
In contrast, judicial review does not seem to have a clear feedback channel into the 
administrative process. The Council of Defence of the State (CDS) plays the main role in 
litigation against the state, but has little interaction with administrative agencies outside 
of episodic lawsuits. A member of the Council says that there is scarce contact with 
administrative officers beyond particular lawsuits. Furthermore, he sees no point in the 
Council becoming an advisor to administrators to learn from previous litigation 
experiences. In his view, the administrative process requires substantive policy advisors, 
and the Council is merely an expert in law and process. Moreover, he conceives judicial 
cases as unique, discrete, and unrepeatable experiences that are difficult if not impossible 
to translate into permanent knowledge for administrators. In sum, there is no concern 
about producing guidelines or similar materials that compile CDS experience in litigation 
in courts in order to draw lessons from the administrative process. 
 
Nonetheless, this rather sanguine view of the influence of the Comptroller-General on the 
administrative process must be tempered when considering problems with enforcing the 
office’s decisions. In fact, even though the Comptroller-General possesses binding 
adjudicatory powers, the institution is beset with finality problems. As will be seen, some 
problems are related to the constant judicialisation of its findings and decisions, while 
other difficulties revolve around the implementation of its rulings. 
 
Lawyers in regulatory departments readily claim that they have always conceived of 
Comptroller-General interpretive opinions as binding. Some admit, nevertheless, that 
sometimes they may delay or even defy the implementation of some rulings because of 
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supposedly practical or even political obstacles. In contrast to judicial procedures, where 
there is a party pushing to have the decision implemented, some suggest that in the 
Comptroller-General, monitoring is more flexible. Yet they concede that they are risking 
disciplinary sanctions if they disobey the rulings, and some report that they have 
witnessed disciplinary proceedings because of non-compliance. Therefore, disobedience 
does not go totally unpunished. 
 
In other cases, public bodies directly challenge adverse Comptroller-General rulings in 
judicial review proceedings, entailing indirect disobedience of the office. Indeed, even 
though administrative bodies are bound by the Comptroller-General’s legal 
interpretations, in a number of cases they have challenged these interpretations in court. 
Let me give some examples that might illustrate particularly well the problems of finality 
in this respect.  
 
In Defendamos la Ciudad v Municipalidad de Las Condes, an NGO working in the 
domain of urban heritage protection requested that the Comptroller-General rule on the 
legality of an administrative authorisation to build a group of towers in a hitherto green 
area in Santiago. Opposing the construction in the area, the NGO maintained that the 
administrative bodies in charge had misinterpreted their powers and the by-laws 
governing the neighbourhood. The office ruled in favour of the claimant, ordering the 
administration to invalidate the authorisation granted to the respective real estate 
company and the owner of the piece of land. 783  The defeated parties, however, 
successfully challenged this legal interpretation in the courts. The Santiago Court of 
Appeals overturned the Comptroller-General ruling, arguing that it had overstepped its 
powers as it could rule on matters of formal legality only. 784  In other words, 
controversially, the judicial decision suggested that the Comptroller was not allowed to 
engage in substantive examination of the legality of administrative decisions.785 For this 
purpose, however, what is crucial is that from the perspective of the NGO that filed the 
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initial complaint with the Comptroller-General, the final outcome of this saga seems 
largely disappointing. 
 
Similarly, in Aguas Andinas S.A. v Municipalidad de Providencia, a privatised utility 
company complained about a municipality in the Comptroller-General. The complaint 
sought to quash the municipality’s interpretation that the claimant could not build on a 
piece of land that the latter owned, as it was protected as a green urban area. The 
Comptroller-General ruled in favour of the utility company, declaring that the public body 
was imposing undue burdens on the complainant since the declaration of the protected 
area had expired.786 However, the municipality did not accept the rulings and challenged 
it before the courts, arguing that the Comptroller had violated its ‘rights’. Siding with the 
municipality, the Supreme Court overturned the Comptroller’s ruling, framing the dispute 
in completely different terms.787 While the Comptroller-General focused on the burden 
imposed by the municipality on the private company, the Court centred on the public 
service nature of the activities performed by the utilities company and the initial public 
destiny of the piece of land that it owned.788 As a result, it upheld the municipality’s 
position and impeded the works in the protected green area. Once again, the initial 
decision by the Comptroller-General was totally futile in light of the later intervention of 
the Supreme Court. 
 
Finally, in Municipalidad de Zapallar v Contralor Regional, the interpretive 
disagreement between the Supreme Court and the Comptroller-General adopted a 
particularly sharp character. The case concerned a local tax to be paid by investment 
corporations to municipalities. The activities of these organisations focused on making 
investments for their own private members without engaging in services for the general 
public. Thus, not being involved in commercial services, they argued that they did not 
have to pay duties that taxed for-profit activities. In 2010, the corporations obtained a 
significant victory in a landmark case in the Comptroller-General, which interpreted the 
tax legislation narrowly in order to rule that these corporations were under no duty to pay 
local taxes.789 The ruling had an enormous impact on municipalities’ budget, as they were 
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losing a substantial source of income. Attempting to forestall an imminent funding crisis, 
in 2012 the Chilean Association of Municipalities requested that the Comptroller-General 
revisit its ruling, but the office confirmed its previous decision in favour of the investment 
corporations.790 Then, as a last resort, the municipalities decided to bring the case to court 
to challenge the legality of the interpretation of the respective statute. The judiciary had 
actually been interpreting this piece of legislation for years in parallel to the Comptroller-
General, holding exactly the opposite position. The Supreme Court had been maintaining 
that the corporations had to pay this local tax, as they were included in the cases indicated 
by the relevant legislation. In the case under comment, the Supreme Court rejected a 
preliminary argument raised by the Comptroller-General that municipalities were bound 
by its rulings and henceforth had no standing to sue. More importantly, the Court held 
that municipalities were entitled to challenge Comptroller-General legal interpretations 
that might adversely affect their interests. The judges also argued that the Comptroller-
General had to ‘bow down’ to judicial precedents when they had been uniform and 
remained so over time. In other words, the Court strongly stressed its superiority as the 
last word in matters of interpretation of administrative legality.791 In consequence, once 
again, a later negative judicial ruling frustrated the initial victory by the complainants. 
 
These foregoing cases illustrate the problems of finality for the Comptroller-General, as 
the judiciary subsequently overruled the initial determinations of the administrative 
adjudicator. Thus, from the perspective of Comptroller users, the initial victories seem 
largely pyrrhic. In fact, many private lawyers criticised the practice of public bodies 
disobeying Comptroller-General rulings by challenging them in courts. Many 
interviewees say that the real legal authority of the office’s decisions and interpretations 
ultimately depends on whether public bodies seek judicial review and whether the judicial 
interpretation of the law concurs with that of the Comptroller-General. For instance, an 
interviewee representing telecommunication companies, who had won landmark cases in 
the Comptroller-General for millions of dollars, complained that they were trying to 
enforce the rulings for years to no avail. The administration eventually decided to 
challenge it in the courts, considering the Supreme Court stance against the Comptroller-
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General interpretations, and they actually overruled the initial criterion.792 Likewise, an 
interviewee who is a member of a NGO litigating urban planning cases criticised the 
practice of many municipalities who act in tandem with urban developers to challenge 
negative Comptroller-General decisions paralysing construction works. In his view, 
continuous judicial review challenges have undermined the effectiveness of the Office of 
the Comptroller-General in the urban protection domain. 
 
The other side of the coin is the problem of enforcing Comptroller-General decisions in 
courts. Some cases illustrate the difficulty with judicial implementation of its rulings, as 
courts have rejected their enforceability in some circumstances. In one groundbreaking 
case, the administrative agency in charge of agriculture and livestock affairs (Servicio 
Agrícola y Ganadero, SAG) used to charge a fee to issue a phytosanitary certificate for 
use in international trade. Exporters challenged this practice, arguing that unless a legal 
provision expressly said so, the administration was not allowed to charge fees for its 
services. They filed their complaint with the Comptroller-General, who eventually upheld 
their position.793 Consequently, in order to comply with the ruling, SAG reformed its 
practice and stopped charging fees.794 Yet this was not enough for the exporters, who 
wanted the money already paid to the administrative agency to be returned. Therefore, 
based on the Comptroller-General’s opinion supposedly declaring the illegality of the 
levies charged, they brought a case to court seeking compensation. After years of 
litigation, in some cases the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Comptroller-General 
and ordered the restitution.795 In other cases, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Comptroller-General statement was just an opinion and could not be invoked as a 
definitive reason to claim compensation.796 According to the Court, claimants had to 
initiate a judicial process anew in order to obtain financial relief in a case like this. In 
practice, this decision entailed that the ruling of the Comptroller-General declaring the 
retroactive illegality of the payment orders by SAG was unenforceable in courts. These 
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cases illustrate the enormous problems derived from the lack of proper coordination 
between the Comptroller-General and the judiciary. This deficiency has had an adverse 
effect on the former’s legal authority and finality, as well as on certainty and predictability 
more generally. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The dispute-resolution function of the Comptroller-General is its most controversial 
feature. Some observers have argued that the engagement of the office in adjudicatory 
functions is unlawful. Others have suggested that it is an undesirable development linked 
to former Comptroller Ramiro Mendoza (2007-2015) and his links to the private sector 
and business. It has also been said that this power can encompass formal review only, as 
the Comptroller-General is forbidden to engage in substantive legal review or right-based 
reasoning. Finally, commentators have claimed that any form of legal adjudication by this 
office is too far a departure from the true aim of the institution, which should be limited 
to ensure financial regularity. In this chapter I have gone beyond these criticisms to 
inquire what the hypothetical benefits of the office performing these dispute-resolution 
functions are, and, more importantly, whether there is evidence that the advantages could 
be realised in practice. 
 
It has been argued that the Comptroller-General may offer four types of advantages as a 
dispute-resolution mechanism. First, it represents a different mixture of impartiality and 
expertise to that of courts. While providing a reasonable degree of impartiality, it also 
possesses a superior expertise based on its proximity to the administrative process. The 
office’s expertise, somewhat surprisingly, seems to facilitate a more rigorous scrutiny of 
administrative action. Indeed, its expertise is often mentioned as one of the reasons for 
complainants’ preference for litigation in the Comptroller-General. Secondly, as a 
checking institution, it promises legal relief to aggrieved parties who otherwise would not 
have access to courts. According to experienced litigants, they use the office because it is 
an inexpensive forum, as it does not require representation by an attorney. However, to 
access the Comptroller-General, the capacity of the aggrieved party to frame the issue in 
the language of administrative legality might be even more important. Thirdly, the office 
also seems superior in terms of procedural flexibility. Its decision-making process is 
faster than that of the courts, and, above all, its proximity to the administration is 
translated into a dialogic approach that is perceived as less disturbing to ongoing 
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regulatory relationships. Finally, Comptroller-General determinations seem to be 
attentively listened to and followed by regulators. Although compliance problems are not 
unheard of, in at least some regulatory domains administrators’ consciousness of legal 
doctrines developed by the office is greater than their awareness of judicial rulings. 
However, clashes with the judiciary and problems of jurisdictional delimitation have 
recently undermined the legal authority and finality of Comptroller-General judgments. 
This latter aspect will be examined in detail in the next and final chapter. 
 
 CHAPTER 8. THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL AND THE COURTS 
 
In this chapter I discuss the problem of delimitation of functions between the 
Comptroller-General and ordinary courts. In the last few decades, the issue of who has 
the last word in relation to the law governing administrative action has repeatedly arisen. 
This has raised difficult questions about values such as the separation of powers and the 
rule of law, and the limits between judicial and administrative functions in the 
contemporary state. Against that backdrop, this chapter examines whether judicial bodies 
and the Comptroller-General have developed relationships of collaboration, competition, 
or indifference. Once the judiciary’s review powers were constitutionally recognised at 
the end of the dictatorship in 1989, the legal accountability dimension of the office overtly 
entered into a collision course with courts. It comes as no surprise, thus, that the ordinary 
judiciary could sometimes be seen as an adversary of the Comptroller-General Office. 
Indeed, they often interact as competitors rather than as collaborators. A leading Chilean 
scholar has called this a ‘crisis in the system of control of the administration’.797 In Chile, 
as in other jurisdictions, the degree of subordination or coordination of the administrative 
dispute-handling machinery with courts is of prime importance. Thus, drawing 
boundaries among diverse legal accountability institutions might well be viewed as a 
critical task, and this chapter will examine such a problem. 
 
The question this chapter seeks to address is where to draw the boundaries between the 
legal accountability functions performed by the Comptroller-General and courts. Are 
Comptroller determinations reviewable by courts, or should they be immune from judicial 
review? Could courts order the office to uphold or reject an administrative regulation in 
the ex-ante legality review procedure? Should judges rule on matters already decided by 
the Comptroller-General? Should they enforce or implement the office’s rulings? This 
chapter will argue against formalist approaches to understanding the functions of these 
institutions, and will propose a flexible principle of coordination that balances the virtues 
and limitations of both legal accountability arrangements. 
I. THE BOUNDARIES PROBLEM 
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A. Some Historical Examples 
Problems of demarcation between the Comptroller-General and the judiciary as 
mechanisms for policing administrative conformity with legality have been a prevalent 
feature of discussions in Chilean public law at least since the 1940s. We have already 
seen this in the debate about the impeachment of Comptroller Agustín Vigorena in 1945 
for his unconstitutionally weak supervision of executive action (see chapter 3). One of 
Vigorena’s justifications at the time was that Congress was misconceiving the role of his 
institution. He argued that unlike courts, the Comptroller-General Office had to adopt a 
public law approach to legal interpretation of regulatory statutes. By this, he meant an 
approach that departed from private law categories, favouring stability and private rights 
in order to give priority to administrative flexibility and the achievement of social 
objectives in a rapidly changing society. Although this argument did not gain 
congressional endorsement, the contrast between the office and courts in terms of a 
public-private law distinction resonated in discussions in the coming years. 
 
Indeed, we found analogous ideas about the distinction between the functions of the 
Comptroller-General and the judiciary’s in an influential policy statement issued by the 
former institution in 1970 just before President Allende’s inauguration (see chapter 4). 
The office contrasted its purposive approach to legal interpretation with the judiciary’s 
rather formalistic attitude. From this viewpoint, the Comptroller’s interpretation was 
concerned with adaptation to reality and oriented towards facilitating the collective 
missions mandated by legislation, whereas judicial interpretation focused on private law 
with special concern for the ethical or moral content of the rules and their textual meaning. 
In the law administered by the Comptroller-General, that is, administrative law, purpose 
prevails over the subtleties of text, and it should be constructed with a view to the 
demands of a changing social reality. 
 
These views on the contrast between Comptroller-General and the judiciary appeared 
again in the discussion about the design of the office in the context of the Pinochet 
Constitution in the late 1970s (see chapter 5). During the debate the Comptroller-General 
defended the distinctive contribution of his office against sceptical attacks by the 
commissioners. He proposed a distribution of functions with the judiciary by allocating 
annulment powers to the Comptroller-General, and powers to award compensation for 
torts to the courts. According to this proposal, public law remedies would be assigned to 
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one institution and private law remedies to the other. At the time, other participants 
insisted that what was characteristic of the Chilean system was the use of private law 
doctrines by courts and administrative law by the Comptroller-General, and alerted 
against excessive reliance on judicial review of administrative action as it could adversely 
affect the administrative process. More than anything, however, this debate reveals acute 
confusion and even obfuscation over the boundaries between the two institutions’ legal 
accountability functions. 
B. Controversies Concerning Ex-Ante Legality Review 
The discussion about what constitutes an adequate relationship between the two 
institutions has continued in recent decades. Since 1990 there have been several 
constitutional clashes between the Comptroller-General and different Courts of Appeals. 
Following the pertinent constitutional rules, these controversies have been resolved by 
the Senate in four cases. All these cases have concerned judicial challenges to 
Comptroller-General determinations in the ex-ante legality review procedure, and all of 
them were decided against the judiciary despite vigorous appeals to judicial supremacy. 
 
The first modern constitutional disagreement between the two institutions took place in 
1988, during Pinochet’s military dictatorship and therefore without an operational 
Senate.798 The case originated when the Office of the Comptroller-General vetoed an 
order by the General Directorate of Water (GDW) that granted an administrative 
concession to a private firm. As the decision paralysed the economic undertaking of the 
beneficiary of the concession, the party brought the case to the judiciary. In Sociedad de 
Servicios Urbanos del Litoral S.A, the Court of Appeal of Santiago upheld the petition 
and ordered the Comptroller-General to approve the administrative concession in the 
terms decided by the GDW as primary decision-maker. The office, however, brought the 
dispute with the Court of Appeals to the Military Junta, which had the jurisdiction to 
resolve controversies between political and administrative authorities, on the one hand, 
and the higher courts, on the other. Because of internal divisions, the Junta could not 
reach agreement as to whether the Comptroller-General was under the supervision of the 
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courts, and left the issue undecided. As a matter of fact, however, the judicial position 
prevailed and the Comptroller-General surrendered. 
 
In 1993 – now in a democratic setting – an even larger controversy between the two 
institutions arose. The clash involved two cases. In one of the cases, the Comptroller-
General rejected a concession decree by the GDW and the beneficiary went to court to 
challenge the office’s legal opinion. The claimant was seeking a judicial injunction to 
force the office to endorse the decree. In the second case, the Comptroller-General had 
approved a Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications decree setting prices for 
telephone services, but the regulated industry in question was unsatisfied and sought a 
judicial injunction ordering the Comptroller-General to veto the decree. Thus, in one case 
the complainant was seeking an order against the office to uphold a decree, while in the 
other the complainant was seeking an order to strike down a decree. In these 
circumstances, the Comptroller-General decided to bring both controversies to the 
Senate, which was now the body responsible for resolving jurisdictional disputes between 
politico-administrative authorities and higher courts.799 In a cross party, 16-8 vote, the 
Senate sided with the Comptroller-General, declaring that the judiciary lacked review 
powers in respect to the ex-ante legality review decisions of the office.800 The Senate 
stated that judicial scrutiny of the Comptroller’s review process would lead to judicial 
invasion into functions exclusively allocated to the latter by the Constitution. In the 
opinion of Congress’ upper house, accepting judicial review in this case would entail 
infringement of the principle of specific jurisdiction of public bodies, and could 
undermine a number of constitutional mechanisms specifically designed by the 
Constitution to govern the relations between the Comptroller-General, the executive 
branch, and Congress. 
 
In the meantime, the Comptroller-General had to repeat its objection to judicial overreach. 
In this new case, a functionary of the National Institute of Farming Development 
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challenged a Comptroller decision upholding a resolution that dismissed him. In other 
words, he petitioned the Court of Appeals of Santiago to order the office to reject a 
dismissal decree that the institution was willing to uphold. As the Court accepted 
jurisdiction to consider the complaint, the Comptroller-General decided to bring the 
controversy to the Senate in July 1994. After an intense debate, the Senate decided against 
the judiciary in a 25-15 vote in June 1995.801 Two main arguments were given in favour 
of the Comptroller-General. On the one hand, it was argued that the ex-ante legality 
review procedure was an internal, inter-organic process integrally regulated by the 
Constitution, which was unreviewable by the ordinary courts, in the same way as any 
other process of an inherently political nature. The debate reveals a strong concern for 
judicialisation of political and, particularly, congressional processes. On the other hand, 
it was maintained that the rights to remedy and access to justice for the affected individual 
remained unaltered, since the petitioner could seek direct judicial review of the dismissal 
decision regardless of the Comptroller’s judgment. Naturally, senators representing the 
minority position – i.e. favouring the judiciary over the Comptroller-General – put 
emphasis on the latter aspect of the problem, claiming that rights to remedy and access to 
courts should prevail over considerations of institutional integrity.802 
 
Despite the consistency of the two previous decisions by the Senate, the judiciary insisted 
on its jurisdiction to examine the legality of Comptroller-General determinations in the 
ex-ante legality review procedure. In November 1997, the latter filed a new request to the 
Senate to declare its immunity from judicial review. Initially, considering the previous 
cases, the Comptroller-General requested that the Senate declare that previous judgments 
had general, permanent effect. However, the Senate stated that this was a jurisdictional 
decision and, therefore, it applied to the case at stake only. Thus, according to the Senate, 
conflicts between the two institutions have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Having 
failed in its initial petition, the Comptroller-General requested a pronouncement on the 
merits. The new petition was based on two cases. The first involved a deadline extension 
for a construction company carrying out public works for the Housing and Urban 
Planning Service, which was rejected by the Comptroller-General. The firm challenged 
the negative decision in court, invoking rights to property. In the second case, a police 
                                                 
801 See Diario de Sesiones del Senado (331st ordinary session, 3rd [31 May 1995] and 4th [9 June 1995] 
sittings). 
802 See especially the opinions expressed by Senator Otero. 
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officer complained against a dismissal decision on disciplinary grounds brought by the 
Investigatory Police Service and supported by the Comptroller-General. The final 
decision by the Senate was adopted in May 1998, and again it favoured the position of 
the Comptroller-General. 803  This time, the vote was 30-7 – reflecting bipartisan 
agreement. For the majority position, in addition to previous arguments, it was 
emphasised that the Senate had to harmonise and coordinate different institutions and 
procedures with equivalent constitutional authority, and that this equally promoted the 
value of legality.804 The aim was to recognise institutional plurality and avoid the creation 
of hegemonic legal interpretation in the hands of the judiciary. Others also pointed to the 
need to avoid the obstruction of ongoing political and administrative processes by 
introducing potentially conflicting veto points. The minority, on the other hand, warned 
of the risk of leaving affected individuals in a position of vulnerability without means to 
challenge government actions in a properly judicial forum.805 Also, they emphasised the 
administrative nature of the Comptroller-General in contrast to the impartiality, 
professionalism, and competence of the judiciary. From this latter perspective, they 
stressed that only courts should conclusively decide on matters of legal interpretation and 
rights. 
 
That was not the last instance of a jurisdictional dispute between the Comptroller-General 
and the courts. In 1998, the Comptroller’s Regional Office in Magallanes rejected a 
decision by an intendant – the representative of the central executive in the region – that 
extended a contract involving the management of a duty-free area in a Southern region of 
Chile for 30 years. The reason for rejecting the contract renewal was that it did not comply 
with competitive bid process requirements for public contracts. The affected firm –
Sociedad Administradora Zona Franca de Punta Arenas Ltda – went to court in order to 
challenge the decision to subject the contract to review. According to the claimant, the 
intendant’s decision was exempt from legality review check as the contract was governed 
by private law. Once the judiciary decided to entertain the legal action, the Comptroller-
General once again brought the case to the Senate. The Senate adopted exactly the same 
position as before, declaring that judicial scrutiny of ex-ante legality review process was 
                                                 
803 See Diario de Sesiones del Senado (337th extraordinary session, 10th [22 April 1998] and 11th [5 May 
1998] sittings). 
804 See especially the opinions expressed by senators Silva, Hamilton, Bombal, and Boeninger. 
805 See especially the opinions expressed by senators Aburto, Zurita, Novoa, and Chadwick. 
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unconstitutional.806 This time, however, the decision was adopted on more partisan lines, 
but with a surprising outcome. In fact, pro-government senators sided with the 
Comptroller-General, while opposition senators favoured the judiciary. The irony is that 
in the case that caused the initial petition to the Senate, the Comptroller-General had 
rejected a contract involving the intendant, that is, an authority representing the central 
government. 
 
In this case, the position in favour of the judiciary was more forcefully articulated, 
whereas the arguments for the Comptroller-General remained the same. Several senators 
argued that this case could be distinguished from previous precedents since the issue here 
was whether the Comptroller-General was allowed to define its own jurisdiction. The 
office was accused of scrutinising an act that was outside its jurisdictional domain. It was 
argued that if an individual challenged this assertion of power, it was for the court – as 
an impartial third party – to have the last word on determining the legality of state actions. 
They maintained that the protection of individual rights and judicial supremacy were the 
cornerstones of the Constitution, and they trumped considerations of institutional balance 
and inter-institutional comity. Finally, they asserted that the Comptroller-General’s 
autonomy and special function did not shield it from judicial review. It was an 
administrative body equivalent to the rest of the institutions composing the executive 
branch, and therefore its decisions were entirely amenable to judicial supervision. As 
seen, however, these arguments failed to convince a majority in the Senate. 
 
In 2000, the Comptroller-General filed what is thus far its final request to the Senate in 
relation to the ex-ante legality review procedure. The case involved the rejection of an 
urban plan for the commune of Santiago, which would allow certain industries to continue 
operating in an area formerly protected by an inter-communal plan as a green zone. The 
Comptroller-General based its negative decision on the fact that a communal plan could 
not modify a more general, regional plan. The affected industries – Inmobiliaria La 
Laelina, Establecimientos Químicos Oxiquim S.A., and Montajes Industriales Yungay 
S.A. – challenged the determination in the Court of Appeals of Santiago, which decided 
                                                 
806 See Diario de Sesiones del Senado (339th extraordinary session, 37th [5 May 1999], 38th [11 May 1999] 
and 40th [18 May 1999] sittings). For commentary, see Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, Tratado de derecho 
constitucional. Gobierno, vol V (Editorial Jurídica de Chile 1997) 164–8. 
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for the claimants.807 Invoking the previous Senate pronouncements, the Comptroller-
General brought the case to the Upper House of Congress, claiming judicial invasion on 
constitutional grounds.808 However, the case was eventually withdrawn from the Senate, 
as the lawyers representing the Comptroller-General in courts were unable to appeal the 
case to the Supreme Court and the judicial judgments became final.809  
 
In conclusion, four consecutive Senate decisions have unequivocally favoured the 
position of the Comptroller-General in these constitutional disputes with the judiciary.810 
As said, these cases concerned the ex-ante legality review procedure, which is a 
mechanism with explicit constitutional regulation and standing. Ex-post dispute-
resolution functions, however, appear to be exposed to greater contests with the judiciary. 
C. Controversies Concerning Dispute-Resolution 
As suggested, rivalry between these two legal institutions remains. Many new cases 
involve judicial review of Comptroller ex-post adjudicatory decisions, that is, concerning 
the office’s dispute-resolution role. In fact, we have already examined, in chapter 7, many 
instances in which the Comptroller’s legal opinions when resolving disputes between 
administration and private parties have been variously challenged and overturned in 
courts. In these cases, contradictory views on the distinction between these two functions 
have been expressed. Sometimes, both institutions were distinguished in terms of form 
and substance. Accordingly, on this position, whereas the Comptroller-General could 
aptly examine legal formalities, only the courts were legally justified to judge on legal 
substance and rights. 811  On other occasions, perhaps surprisingly, the Comptroller-
General conceived of its own tasks in terms of protection of individual rights against 
excessive state action, while the judiciary instead emphasised collectivist ‘public service’ 
                                                 
807 Inmobiliaria La Laelina, Establecimientos Químicos Oxiquim S.A., and Montajes Industriales Yungay 
S.A v Contralor General de la República [1999] Santiago Court of Appeals 4308-99. 
808 Ruling 2951 [2000]. 
809 For the case’s background, see Patricio Herman, ‘La Ex Concertación Ayudó a Lucía de Pinochet 
« Diario y Radio Uchile’ <http://radio.uchile.cl/2016/04/07/la-ex-concertacion-ayudo-a-lucia-de-
pinochet/> accessed 7 December 2017. 
810 Yet courts have continued to challenge Comptroller-General determinations as they see Senate decisions 
as not constituting binding precedents; see Letelier (n 191) 292. 
811 See Defendamos la Ciudad case, in chapter 7. 
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considerations.812 The distinction between the two organisations, therefore, has been 
considerably unclear. 
 
A recent significant case illustrates the problems of delimitation of the scope of judicial 
review for adjudicatory Comptroller determinations.813 In September 2017, a panel of the 
Santiago Court of Appeals quashed a ruling by the Comptroller-General that had ordered 
the invalidation of pensions in favour of a group of employees of Gendarmería de Chile 
– the Chilean agency for prison services. The pensions were allegedly granted by 
unlawful means, taking advantage of the generous, special pension scheme that benefited 
Armed Forces institutions, including Gendarmería. The case sparked indignation among 
the public because it involved the former partner of a member of Congress, and also 
because it unveiled the unfair disparity between the meagre defined-contribution pension 
scheme for ordinary citizens and the defined-benefit scheme for the Armed Forces. The 
Court ruled that even though the Comptroller-General was allowed to state the illegality 
of an administrative action, the office lacked enforcement powers to invalidate it directly. 
According to the Court, in order to enforce his declaration of illegality, the Comptroller 
had to initiate a judicial action before the judiciary. From this viewpoint, only the primary 
administrative agency and the courts were allowed to invalidate administrative actions on 
legality grounds. Therefore, in this case the Comptroller-General was unlawfully 
invading the legitimate sphere of action of another public institution. Moreover, the Court 
maintained that the Comptroller-General’s action was in fact imposing a sanction upon 
the affected pensioners without a due process of law that could only be secured by judicial 
review. As a result, the court quashed the Comptroller’s ruling and upheld the suspected 
pensions. The judgment was not unanimous, however. In a dissenting opinion, Justice 
Rojas criticised the route used in this case to challenge the Comptroller’s judgment, as it 
was a writ of urgency that did not allow for a fully-fledged debate focused on legality. 
Besides, he argued that it was against common sense to deny enforcement powers to the 
office by requiring it to seek judicial implementation of its rulings. In essence, the 
dissenting opinion emphasised the distorting effect of judicial invasion of a process of 
                                                 
812 See for example the Aguas Andina case, the Municipalidad de Zapallar case and the Servicio Agrícola 
y Ganadero case, in chapter 7. 
813 Juan Carlos Estay Vergara v Contralor General de la República [2017] Santiago Court of Appeals 
19580-17, esp. par 23-6. 
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legal scrutiny possessing its own internal logic and integrity within the administrative 
process. 
 
The Comptroller-General has recently decided to bring these kinds of controversies to an 
impartial forum that will be able to draw a boundary between judicial and administrative 
jurisdictions. Indeed, in November 2016 the Comptroller-General brought to the 
Constitutional Tribunal a jurisdictional dispute with a first-instance ordinary court under 
Article 93 n 12 of the Constitution.814 The issue under discussion was a long-standing 
interpretation by the office about social security provisions concerning General 
Directorate of Civil Aviation (GDCA) personnel. In a lawsuit involving an enormous 
figure for the public purse, GDCA Unions requested that the courts declare that the 
pension scheme applicable to the GDCA personnel corresponded to that of the Armed 
Forces, and not the ordinary one. This interpretation went against a well-established 
doctrine by the Comptroller-General in at least seven previous rulings. The office stated 
that the judiciary was constitutionally banned from issuing ‘general and abstract’ 
interpretations of social security provisions in the public sector, as this was within the 
domain of the Comptroller-General. According to the institution, judges were allowed to 
adjudicate concrete cases, but they were not entitled to issue interpretive declarations. 
 
Ultimately, the Constitutional Tribunal unanimously decided for the Comptroller-General 
in January 2017.815 The Tribunal, however, was unable to draw a clear line between the 
interpretative space of the Comptroller and that of the courts. The ruling suggested that 
the Comptroller-General was an administrative body with exclusive powers to engage in 
‘abstract and general’ interpretation of administrative legality. Judicial actions could only 
succeed if the Comptroller-General had created uncertainty in the interpretation of 
administrative legality by issuing a ‘legally objectionable opinion’. Otherwise, only the 
legislature could overrule administrative jurisprudence created by the Comptroller-
General. In sum, the Constitutional Tribunal seemed to support strongly the interpretive 
authority of the office vis-à-vis the judiciary even in the dispute-resolution domain. This 
                                                 
814 According to the Constitution, while disputes between ‘higher’ courts and political and administrative 
authorities are to be resolved by the Senate, the Constitutional Tribunal must resolve disputes between 
‘inferior’ courts and political-administrative authorities. 
815 Constitutional Tribunal Decision (2017) Rol 3283-2016-CCO. 
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amounted to the establishment of a duty to place substantial weight on the Comptroller’s 
interpretative views. 
 
A similar dispute is still pending in the Senate.816 It is an analogous case in which GDAC 
civil staff requested the courts to issue a declaration that the Armed Forces pension 
scheme applied to them. This declaration would contradict well-established precedents 
set by the Comptroller-General stating that the ordinary pension scheme applies to these 
employees. However, after winning at the Court of Appeals, their claim had already 
reached the Supreme Court. As such, the dispute now has to be considered by the Senate, 
since it involves the higher courts. The main argument of the Comptroller-General in this 
case is that the judiciary has no power to issue ‘general and abstract’ declaratory 
interpretations in relation to the administrative process, as this power is exclusively 
allocated to his office. In addition, the Comptroller concedes that his interpretations could 
be judicially challenged, but argues that in this case he had not participated in the lawsuit 
and thus had no opportunity to defend his legal powers. Despite the previous judgment 
by the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court has adopted an aggressive stance, 
defending its position as the final interpreter of administrative legality in the country.817 
In its response, the Court argued that there was no jurisdictional clash as the spheres of 
both institutions were mutually autonomous. Whereas the Comptroller-General acted as 
an administrative interpreter that sought to secure the uniform implementation of the law 
within the domain of the executive branch, the judiciary was focused on resolving 
concrete and discrete disputes with the purpose of protecting rights. In the Court’s view, 
action in one area had no influence on the other, and therefore the Senate should not 
decide in favour of the Comptroller-General. Above all, the response of the Supreme 
Court emphasises that the judiciary is the ultimate protector of rights against 
administrative encroachment, including the Comptroller-General as one of the potential 
sources of administrative abuse. 
 
                                                 
816  Chilean Senate (Bulletin S-1913-03). See also José Antonio Pérez Aliste v Dirección General de 
Aeronautica Civil [2016] 29 Santiago Civil Court 4071-12; [2016] Santiago Court of Appeals 4049-16; 
[Pending] Supreme Court 76325-16. 
817 For media reports, see ‘Contralor Bermudez advierte intento de crear gobierno de los jueces’ La Segunda 
(4 January 2017) 8; ‘Poder Judicial eleva tono frente a Contraloría por caso DGAC: argumentos son 
“preocupantes y agraviantes”’ Diario Financiero (6 January 2017); ‘Vocero de la Suprema: “Me parece 
preocupante que una autoridad (contralor) se exprese de ese modo”’ El Mercurio (7 January 2017). 
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Before concluding, it seems convenient to examine what is going on behind these high-
profile constitutional cases in order to capture a more nuanced picture of the interactions 
between the two offices. Indeed, although the cases that have attracted more publicity 
suggest confrontation between the two institutions, when we look at the routine practice 
we find much less hostility, and more signals of partnership and comity between the two 
legal accountability mechanisms. Certainly, the Comptroller-General very rarely 
mentions judicial precedents in its decisions, but front-level reviewers in the office reveal 
that they do consider judicial doctrines when making their own decisions. One of them 
stated that there is a great respect for the judiciary but also a recognition that both 
institutions work in separate domains. For him, as both institutions conduct their affairs 
using different procedures, it would be undesirable to directly apply their counterpart’s 
doctrine. Yet he admitted that ‘many times we consider decisions made by the courts, and 
we take that into account to avoid deciding exactly the opposite [to the judiciary] as this 
could generate considerable harm’. This opinion clearly reflects how considerations of 
comity take place within the Comptroller-General decision-making process. Similarly, a 
senior reviewer in the office maintains that, despite appearances, the relationship with the 
judiciary ‘in general is good’. He says that both institutions have different perspectives 
on things, but they also collaborate. As an illustration, this officer recounts cases in which 
courts were flooded by claims, the Comptroller-General responded by signalling a way 
out of the problem, and the courts rapidly followed the proposed solution. Members of 
the judiciary also seem to assign weight to Comptroller-General determinations. A 
Supreme Court judge stated that before joining the judiciary, he thought that judges rarely 
pay due respect to the precedents set by the office. However, after years of experience 
reviewing lower tribunals’ decisions, he believes that ordinary judges do assign 
substantial weight to the opinions of the office out of respect for its expertise and 
experience. These statements suggest that in practice, the polarisation between the two 
institutions is less dramatic than a quick glance at high-profile cases might indicate. They 
also hint that a sensible principle of coordination between the two mechanisms may be 
found and implemented. 
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D. Formalist Approaches and Conceptual Obfuscation 
1. Judicial and Administrative Functions in Organic Law Article 6 
The most obvious criteria deployed to delimit the functions of the two institutions is the 
‘administrative’ versus ‘judicial’ functions distinction. Article 6.3 of the Comptroller-
General Organic Law offers support for this approach. Originating from the first decades 
of operation of the institution, this provision supposedly provides criteria for delimitation 
with courts in respect to ex-post legal interpretation: 
The Comptroller-General shall neither intervene nor report on issues that 
either by their nature are of litigious character or that fall under the domain 
of the courts of justice, or that fall under the remit of the State Defence 
Council, notwithstanding the powers that, regarding judicial matters, this 
law grants to the Comptroller-General (emphasis added). 
 
This provision seems to clarify the issues to a considerable extent. Yet in reality it presents 
insurmountable problems. First, when the provision was enacted, courts had no public 
law jurisdiction. Thus, using a historical criterion, the remit of courts in relation to public 
law litigation should be almost non-existent. Second, although there may be some clear 
instances of matters properly judicial such as adjudication of private contracts, private 
torts, family law issues, or criminal law matters, all other matters remain radically 
undetermined. Finally, the criteria offered to topical delimitation is entirely question-
begging. Since ‘litigation’ and ‘judicial domain’ are notions already present in the 
question to be posed, they are unhelpful as an answer to allocating matters between the 
Comptroller and courts respectively. 
 
An additional weakness of this legal provision is that it creates opportunities for 
manipulation. As the administrative-versus-judicial conceptual division used here is 
inherently vague, the Comptroller-General sometimes invokes this provision in an 
unprincipled manner to avoid making judgments when faced with a difficult or 
uncomfortable matter (see Table 8 below). This is not an unusual reaction from the office; 
it infuriates litigants,818 undermines the integrity of the legal system, and could entail the 
obstruction of access to legitimate and meaningful forms of redress. Above all, this result 
suggests that we should avoid the use of spatial distinctions that could create undesirable 
                                                 
818 In interviews, lawyers representing all sorts of interests – from human rights lawyers to regulatory 
lawyers – complained against this practice of the office. 
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accountability gaps. An adequate principle of coordination between the Comptroller-
General and the judiciary – as will be suggested below – requires more flexibility and an 
emphasis on functionality. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Judicial nature of the issue 256 327 395 700 796 708 710 494 
No previous adverse action or inaction 690 1660 1000 902 970 913 815 745 
Issue within the remit of another body 1158 2039 2609 2923 1930 1583 1597 2104 
Other
819
 1446 904 1455 1437 1641 1533 1365 984 
Table 8: Grounds for Abstention
820
 
2. Chilean Doctrine 
Chilean academic debate has made a limited contribution to the clarification of the 
boundaries between the judiciary and the Comptroller-General’s Office. It has simply 
echoed the arguments deployed in the Senate, the courts and the Comptroller-General. 
Attempts at explaining the principles that should guide the relationship between the two 
bodies have been infrequent, and insufficiently articulated. Here, I briefly reconstruct 
their essential positions in order to highlight the core insights that they reveal. 
 
Enrique Silva developed the most sophisticated articulation of the interactions between 
the Comptroller-General and courts. Writing in the late 1950s as Comptroller-General, 
he argued that the creation of administrative tribunals must not entail the elimination of 
the legality review powers of the office. 821  In his opinion, both machineries were 
compatible and even necessary. On the one hand, both forms of review took place at 
different moments. While the Comptroller-General’s ex-ante review powers occur before 
the promulgation of an administrative decision, judicial review was characteristically a-
posteriori. On the other hand, Silva explained that whereas the Comptroller-General 
intervention was compulsory and ex officio, judicial review was contingent, as it was the 
affected parties that triggered it. Still, Silva admitted that the office’s ex-post 
interpretative opinions were a more complex issue. In fact, the Comptroller-General had 
been acting as an alternative forum for hearing complaints against administrative action 
in absence of administrative tribunals. Yet he asserted that the independence of the office 
                                                 
819 For instance, issue already adjudicated, insufficient information, out of remit, etc. 
820 Source: Comptroller-General Annual Reports. 
821 Enrique Silva, ‘Los Tribunales Administrativos y la Contraloría’ El Mercurio (19 November 1959). This 
piece is included in Junta de Gobierno (n 240). 
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reduced the scope for conflicts with judicial determinations. More importantly, affected 
parties could challenge its legal judgments in the judiciary in any case. Silva concluded 
that as Comptroller, determinations were not final, as they did not affect the judicial 
sphere. Similarly, Urbano Marín has emphasised the similarities of both institutions and 
argued for a complementary relationship. He maintains that judicial review and 
administrative legality review are compatible as long as both functions are performed 
with objectivity and independence.822 In his view, both contribute to the enterprise of 
providing uniform interpretations of the law governing administrative action. Yet 
unfortunately he does not point to any delimitation criteria and, therefore, does not clarify 
the problem of how to resolve clashes between the two organisations.  
 
Pedro Pierry, in turn, expresses a concern for protecting the Comptroller-General’s sphere 
of action. For him, there is a risk of judicial invasion that could threaten the institutional 
benefits of administrative legal accountability. Considering both ex-ante and ex-post 
control, he emphatically opposes judicial review of Comptroller determinations. In 
particular, he expresses fears that judicial review could have a corrosive effect on the 
office’s ‘administrative jurisprudence’, that is, the set of precedents carefully and 
sensitively developed by the office over the years.823 Judicial overreach could adversely 
affect certainty and predictability from the point of view of administrative authorities and 
private individuals alike. In Pierry’s view, this problem is especially serious considering 
the institutional weakness of the judiciary due to its lack of judicial specialisation and the 
use of procedural forms that discourage consistent decision-making. 824  Thus, Pierry 
suggests that the Comptroller-General should remain as having the last word in respect 
to the ex-ante review process, and courts should restrain from invasive scrutiny of the 
office’s legal interpretations.  
 
Lastly, Alejandro Silva Bascuñán has also argued for a sphere free from judicial scrutiny 
for the office, especially in the ex-ante review procedure. 825  This commentator has 
defended the Senate decisions against judicial attempts at judging the lawfulness of the 
                                                 
822 Marín (n 211). 
823 Pedro Pierry, ‘Los tribunales administrativos’ (2000) 2 Revista de Derecho del Consejo de Defensa del 
Estado 97, 106. 
824 ibid 113. 
825 Silva Bascuñán, Tratado de derecho constitucional (n 798) 230–9; Silva Bascuñán, Tratado de derecho 
constitucional. Gobierno (n 806) 164–8. 
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legality review procedure. On the one hand, he argues that these are proper jurisdictional 
controversies as they consist of disagreements between two constitutionally autonomous 
organisations that cannot be resolved by just one of them.826 Thus, the intervention of an 
impartial adjudicator is needed, and in this case the impartial third-party must be the 
Senate. On the other hand, Silva Bascuñán explains that issues of scope, content, and 
procedure of the ex-ante legality review are ‘outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
judiciary’. 827  According to this author, these sort of issues consist of ‘problems of 
constitutional organisation that are beyond the remit of the judiciary’, defined by the 
Constitution as the adjudication of civil and criminal disputes. Silva Bascuñán’s argument 
echoes some forms of non-justiciability doctrine. Consider, for instance, Robert 
Summers’ definition of political questions as ‘issues which, under relevant constitutional 
structure, other branches of government might resolve’.828  
 
Other academic commentators, however, have defended a more activist role for the 
judiciary in controlling the Comptroller-General Office. Their assumption is that courts 
must conclusively decide questions of law, and that the Comptroller-General is ultimately 
an administrative organisation that might represent a threat to individual rights. The 
position most critical of the Comptroller-General Office is that of Eduardo Soto-Kloss. 
Commenting on a case in which neighbours complained against a construction permit 
that benefited a construction firm, Soto-Kloss argued that the adjudicatory functions of 
the Comptroller-General are no longer justified, as now the judiciary has full jurisdiction 
to hear judicial review claims. 829  The office thus has to refuse to hear complaints 
concerning ‘judicial issues’, according to Article 6 of its Organic Law. In his view, 
disputes over rights are issues paradigmatically for the courts – administrative institutions 
are absolutely banned from entertaining such controversies. Therefore, he finds that in 
urban-planning law cases, in which a planning license is at stake, the Comptroller-General 
‘radically’ lacks adjudicatory powers. Arguing against Senate decisions, Soto-Kloss has 
also claimed that the institution has no immunity against judicial review in ex-ante 
legality review cases. 830  In sum, he gives absolute primacy to courts over the 
Comptroller-General. 
                                                 
826 Silva Bascuñán, Tratado de derecho constitucional (n 798) 235. 
827 ibid 239. 
828 Robert S Summers, ‘Justiciability’ (1963) 26 The Modern Law Review 530, 536. 
829 Soto-Kloss, ‘Urbanismo, Contraloría General de la República y Tribunales de Justicia’ (n 785) 140–3. 
830 Soto-Kloss, ‘¿Una contienda de competencia?’ (n 800). 
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In a similar vein, examining the ex-ante legality review procedure, Iván Aróstica has 
defended the broad right to challenge Comptroller-General determinations in courts. He 
claims that it is for the courts – not for an administrative institution – to ascertain what 
the law ultimately is. He admits that the Constitution only provides for executive 
challenges to Comptroller-General judgments (either via insistence decree or through the 
Constitutional Tribunal). Yet he maintains that this must not entail that a private 
individual or public employee is not entitled to a right to overcome, for instance, the 
Comptroller’s decision to reject a decree that benefits her. 831  In Aróstica’s view, 
Comptroller decisions are administrative actions, as amenable to judicial review as any 
other primary administrative decision. 832  He denies that the ex-ante legality review 
procedure was exhaustively regulated in the Constitution, entirely excluding judicial 
supervision over the institution. Besides, he asserts that the office’s autonomy cannot 
entail that its determinations are immune from judicial scrutiny.833 Aróstica suggests that 
the establishment of restrictions on judicial control of administrative action is a feature 
that characterises the French model of administrative law, but is foreign to Chilean 
constitutional practices.834 He concludes that conceding privileges or immunities to the 
Comptroller-General is contrary to the rule of law and the unending struggle against the 
abuse of administrative power. Aróstica adopts a similar position in relation to judicial 
review of ex-post interpretative opinions. He argues that affected parties have a 
constitutional right to bring complaints to the courts and that the judiciary has no 
jurisdictional restrictions on entertaining public law complaints. Therefore, in his opinion, 
the idea that the Comptroller-General has the last word as interpreter of administrative 
legality is unfounded.835 Aróstica’s position is distinctively linked to a strong conception 
of the right to remedy against adverse administrative action, but seems quite insensitive 
to institutional dynamics and adverse unintended consequences. 
 
                                                 
831 Aróstica, ‘El trámite de toma de razón de los actos administrativos’ (n 798) 151–2. 
832  Similarly, Alejandro Vergara has maintained that the Comptroller-General’s autonomy does not 
preclude judicial review of its determinations, as it is an administrative institution like any other and 
consequently subjected to judicial supervision; see Vergara (n 178) 108. 
833 Aróstica, ‘Sobre el recurso de protección y la representación del contralor. Reflexiones acerca de una 
contienda de competencia’ (n 800) 748. 
834 ibid 753. 
835 Aróstica, ‘Notas sobre los dictámenes de la Contraloría General de la República’ (n 223) 549–51. 
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Finally, other scholars have suggested that this area of law can only be streamlined by 
deliberate legislative action, as it is too convoluted as it currently stands. Raúl Letelier, 
for instance, accepts several functions for the office’s interpretive opinions, such as 
adjudication concerning Civil Service regulations, defining jurisdictional boundaries 
between administrative bodies, and helping to reinforce internal control mechanisms. 
However, he expresses doubts as to whether the Comptroller-General should be used as 
a dispute-resolution mechanism, and is especially sceptical of the benefits of allowing 
administrative agencies the right to challenge Comptroller determinations in courts.836 
Nevertheless, he concludes that current statutory law does not give one right answer in 
relation to the limits between judicial and administrative legal accountability functions. 
The office’s organic law is particularly ineffective in providing authoritative guidance for 
drawing the boundaries. As a result, Letelier suggests that only future legislative action 
can resolve the dilemma, either by transforming the Comptroller-General into a proper 
administrative tribunal or confining its functions exclusively to advice-giving on non-
controversial matters.837 In a similar vein, Juan Carlos Ferrada calls for legislative action 
by arguing that both the Comptroller’s adjudicatory activities and current practices of 
judicial review in ordinary courts are irregular, damaging, and unlawful. In his view, the 
only appropriate solution would be proper administrative justice machinery carefully 
designed by the legislature.838 
 
In this traditional debate, the similarities and contrasts between both institutions have not 
been examined with enough thoroughness. At times, excessive emphasis has been put on 
the unhelpful ‘administrative-judicial’ divide, and at other times the importance and the 
interests of the case at issue have obfuscated the need for understanding. Nevertheless, 
some lessons could be drawn from this brief attempt at reconstruction. First, both 
institutions perform different but compatible and possibly complementary functions. 
They have the common purpose of rendering public administration legally accountable, 
but they attempt to achieve the objective by adopting diverse approaches. Besides, both 
institutions possess recognised constitutional authority and are reciprocally autonomous. 
Therefore, their relationship should be one of coordination and comity rather than of one’s 
subordination to the other. Secondly, subservience to judicial review might undermine 
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the most evident benefits of the Comptroller-General, that is, the generation of internal 
administrative law jurisprudence that has secured a degree of certainty and predictability. 
This is especially important for the ex-ante legality review, as it has an internal nature 
and possesses its own bespoke institutional protections. Thirdly, judicial review is still 
needed, as the Comptroller-General might be located too closely to the administration 
and, consequently, there is a reasonable risk of bias against individual interests. Thus, it 
seems sensible to make an effort to strike a balance between judicial review’s institutional 
inclination towards rights protection and the Comptroller-General’s responsiveness to the 
demands of the internal legality of the administration. To elaborate an adequate principle 
of cooperation, these insights must be enriched with comparative experience and a more 
analytically robust framework. 
3.A functional approach 
Peter Cane has provided such a framework. In his rigorous study of administrative 
adjudication, he has identified a number of ways in which administrative (or nonjudicial) 
adjudication has been differentiated from judicial adjudication.839 These approaches have 
attempted to reveal in which sense administrative adjudication supplements the work of 
courts. On the one hand, he recognises three conceptualist or formalist approaches. The 
first is based merely on historical considerations, as it understands judicial functions in 
the terms used before the consolidation of the administrative state (i.e. the 19th century). 
The second perspective, in turn, operates on the basis of the public-private distinction, 
with private law strongly linked to disputes between citizens and public law associated 
with disputes between citizens and government, and with statutes. A final formalist 
approach is essentialist in nature and conceives of judicial power as the activity of 
‘find[ing] facts, ‘ascertain[ing]’ law, and apply[ing] law to facts in order to make a final 
and enforceable decision about (theoretically) pre-existing rights and duties’.840 Cane 
explains that when used – as in Australia – these formalist criteria have resulted in ‘a 
large, complex and internally inconsistent body of case law’.841 To this, it might be added 
that they offer extremely limited room for experimenting with and accommodating new 
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forms of adjudication that could satisfy urgent demands for legality in the administrative 
state.  
 
As an alternative, Peter Cane describes a more flexible and pragmatic functional approach 
to articulating the interactions between administrative and judicial adjudication. It focuses 
on two aspects. On the one side, this perspective looks at whether ‘separation of powers’ 
values – rejection of undue concentration of power and protection of individual rights – 
are protected. On the other, in order to assign adjudicative power legitimately to 
nonjudicial bodies, it gives decisive weight to the possibility of reviewability, that is, to 
ensure that ‘the work of the non-judicial body [is] subject to review by a judicial body’.842 
Overcoming the limitations of formalist categories, this functional approach provides a 
more suitable framework for managing the virtues and limits of contemporary forms of 
administrative adjudication and the much-needed coordination with the judiciary. 
II. SHORTCOMINGS AND ADVANTAGES OF HAVING TWO ALTERNATIVE 
FORUMS 
Before moving to the development of a principle of coordination between courts and the 
Comptroller-General, I will examine the institutional costs and benefits of the existence 
of alternative forums for legal accountability. I suggest that in the Chilean context the 
coexistence of both institutions appears to be an inevitable feature of the constitutional 
framework of the country, but might also be justified on substantive grounds. 
A. Defects 
The Comptroller-General has evolved as a separate institutional structure that asserts a 
protected, exclusive sphere of jurisdiction in public law matters. Yet this type of 
arrangement generates considerable difficulties. As Carol Harlow has explained, a large 
defect of the existence of an exclusive public law jurisdiction alongside a private law one 
is that it brings about ‘sterile jurisdictional litigation which distracts attention from 
substantive issues’.843 She further explains that ‘[t]his is due to the difficulty in devising 
jurisdictional criteria which are at once precise and rational’. 844  In her view, both 
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functional and organic tests to select the forum fail to satisfy the basic requirements of 
clarity, simplicity, and certainty.845 
 
There are further complications with a delimitation of jurisdictional boundaries that is 
indeterminate. The discussion on forum shopping in the United States might be 
illustrative. Although the source of the jurisdictional confusion there revolves around 
issues of territorial boundaries, research on the defects detected in that system might shed 
light on similar problems in the case of litigation in the Comptroller-General and courts. 
Forum shopping is caused by the availability of multiple forums for litigation, a situation 
which in turn creates an opportunity for litigants’ attempts to have their actions tried in a 
particular court or jurisdiction where they anticipate they will have the greatest chance of 
success.846 The phenomenon has a number of negative consequences. 
 
A first problem with the existence of alternative uncoordinated venues is that it threatens 
inter-institutional comity. In public law, the idea of comity refers to the institutional value 
governing the relationships among public institutions, which demands that the decisions 
of other institutions be treated as authoritative.847 In other words, comity is an attitude 
towards decisions adopted by a first authority that entails that the reviewer should refrain 
from undermining her capacity to exercise her authority in respect to the decision. As 
McGarity explains, the existence of multiple forums might create a situation that forces 
one authority into the position of issuing orders that directly conflict with those of its 
institutional partners.848 As a result, inter-institutional comity is severely undermined. 
 
Secondly, the existence of disagreeing forums might also endanger attempts by 
administrative agencies to apply policy energetically and uniformly across the country.849 
Administrative authorities might behave in an ‘unduly timid’ fashion when confronted 
with the chance of the most unsympathetic institution reviewing the legality of its 
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policies.850 Furthermore, as McGarity indicates, even a successful defence in one forum 
does little to ensure the evolution of a uniform policy, as other parties in later litigation 
can race to different venues to obtain conflicting interpretations. In the Chilean case, the 
problem is exacerbated by the absence of a sufficiently powerful adjudicator of last resort. 
 
Thirdly, jurisdictional litigation resulting from venue indeterminacy creates unjustifiable 
costs. Above all, it might disproportionately affect thinly financed public interest 
groups.851 The fairness and efficacy of such arrangements have been questioned, since 
‘costly expenditures for the rendering of threshold determinations, irrelevant to the merits 
of the case’ will be especially harmful for the ‘party that can ill-afford the cost’.852 
Moreover, in addition to the costs for the parties, there will be costs for the adjudicatory 
institutions administering the system. Similarly, it has been claimed that alternative forum 
indeterminacy ‘overburdens certain courts and creates unnecessary expenses as litigants 
pursue the most favourable, rather than the simplest or closest forum’.853 Also, as a result 
of potentially contradicting forums, firms might face overwhelming uncertainty, as there 
will be ‘a strong possibility that the agency, a competitor, union, or public interest group 
might obtain a contrary ruling from another [adjudicator] sometime in the future’.854 
 
Last but not least, the problem of jurisdictional demarcation can also raise ethical 
questions about the operation of the legal system. The ambiguity in the venue provisions 
might cause ‘a problem of fairness as it entails manipulations of the rules of precedents 
applicable to the matter’.855 Consequently, it may corrode citizens’ confidence in the 
objectivity and impartiality of legal institutions and the substantive law they apply. 
Equally, these flawed arrangements may raise questions about the ethical representation 
of clients, as the attorneys appear to be exploiting the loopholes in the system. 
B. Advantages 
Perhaps surprisingly, the concurrence of different forums exercising jurisdiction to make 
determinations on an issue could also bring about some benefits. Some of these 
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advantages relate to broadening access to remedies to the affected parties, while others 
have a more systemic character. 
 
Venue plurality could enhance the position of claimants and ‘serve the legal system’s 
goal of remedying injury’. 856  From this viewpoint, it might not be illegitimate for 
claimants to seek the more convenient forum among many, considering that numerous 
other rules and social factors tend to favour the defendants – which is probably 
particularly true in some domains of state action. This is the case, for example, on 
occasions where parties have taken into account the expertise of the forum, and have tried 
to avoid the prejudices found in alternative sites.857 Similarly, the availability of multiple 
forums may contribute to the development of pluralistic forms of justice. In this sense, it 
has been argued that forum shopping ‘can enhance the possibility of pluralistic methods 
of remedying wrongs’.858 This perspective is particularly attractive in contexts in which 
dissatisfaction has been traditionally expressed in relation to judicial processes and 
outcomes, as in the domain of administrative justice. 
 
There are two additional potential benefits deriving from the availability of multiple 
forums. On the one hand, venue diversity can have a ‘percolating function’, that is, it can 
allow for experimentation and provide the final adjudicator ‘with the opportunity to 
observe how several [venues] have resolved difficult questions before deciding them for 
itself’.859 On the other hand, the existence of disagreeing forums may serve a ‘signalling 
function’ in the sense of alerting users that there is divergence on an interpretive legal 
issue and, therefore, signalling that it deserves special attention.860 Both functions assume 
the legitimacy of divergent legal interpretations deriving from different institutions. Later 
I will suggest that the different institutional characteristics of the Comptroller-General 
and courts lead them to adopt distinctive interpretative approaches. 
 
As seen in previous chapters, in the Chilean case the co-existence of two institutions with 
overlapping jurisdiction is an unintended consequence of a haphazard historical 
development. The availability of multiple venues is not the result of a careful and 
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deliberate design weighting benefits and costs. Moreover, legislation and precedents 
leave little room to change the current scenario, which generates a lot of space for forum 
shopping litigation. It is true that only deliberate legislative action could remedy this. 
However, a reasonable principle of coordination between both institutions could be 
implemented by judicial action, improving the overall situation considerably. This could 
probably be crystallised by legislative activity in the future as well. The next section will 
outline this principle for enhancing the coordination between the Comptroller-General 
and courts. 
III. THE NEED FOR A PRINCIPLE OF COORDINATION 
An appropriate principle of coordination between courts and the Comptroller-General in 
their respective legal accountability functions needs to give adequate weight to their 
comparative advantages and weaknesses. 861  I suggest here that such a coordination 
principle should have two parts. On the one hand, it must secure to the ex-ante functions 
of the office a sphere of action sufficiently protected from judicial review; on the other 
hand, the principle must counsel courts to exercise judicial restraint in reviewing the ex-
post issuance of interpretive opinions by the Comptroller-General. This arrangement 
could secure a satisfactory mixture of the advantages of both legal accountability regimes, 
and minimise their defects. 
A. High Deference and the Ex-Ante Legality Review Process 
The ex-ante review procedure has a number of comparative advantages over judicial 
review. If judicial review of decisions adopted in this capacity were allowed, the benefits 
associated with this accountability mechanism would be adversely affected. Besides, the 
institution is not a primary decision-maker, but a reviewer.862  Like the courts, it is 
engaged in tasks of legal interpretation and application, with independence of the 
administrative agency and primary responsibility for policy implementation. Moreover, 
the right of the affected parties to complain in court would not be severely affected in any 
case, as they could challenge the primary administrative body’s action or inaction directly 
without involving the Comptroller-General. Indeed, Comptroller-General determinations 
do not shield the actions of administrative agencies, and affected parties could take them 
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to court anyway. Lastly, there are other constitutional mechanisms for challenging the 
office’s opinions, such as the decree of insistence and the complaint before the 
Constitutional Tribunal (see Chapter 2). 
 
The first aspect in which the Comptroller-General’s ex-ante review seems superior to 
judicial review is its flexibility. With a few adjustments, the following description of the 
advantages of OIRA rule-making review vis-à-vis judicial review in the US could aptly 
apply to the work of the Chilean office: 
OIRA’s flexibility advantage inheres in its ability to engage in expeditous, 
two-way communications with a rulemaking agency. If a court has a serious 
question or reservation about the adequacy of an agency's treatment of an 
issue, it can communicate that concern only by holding the agency action 
arbitrary and capricious, typically a year or more after the agency issued the 
rule. The agency can respond only by taking further formal action on 
remand, typically a year or more after the judicial remand. In some cases, 
this lengthy and cumbersome communication process proceeds through 
multiple iterations. After several years of such attempts to communicate, the 
court and the agency often discover that each has misunderstood the other. 
By contrast, OIRA typically communicates its questions and concerns 
within a week or two of receiving an agency proposed final rule, and the 
agency often responds to OIRA's satisfaction within a week or two 
thereafter. If the written communications are unclear, as is often the case, 
OIRA and the agency can clarify their questions and answers, respectively, 
though oral communications. The OIRA review process always is 
completed in a small fraction of the time required for completion of the 
process of judicial application of the duty to engage in reasoned 
decisionmaking.863 
 
Likewise, the communication between the Comptroller-General and primary agency is 
expeditious and informal, allowing the establishment of a process of dialogue and 
discussion that could more likely lead to some form of understanding. The process is also 
considerably shorter than conventional judicial review. I have discussed the details of this 
process in chapter 7. Permitting judicial direction of this legality review process could 
seriously undermine its integrity by formalising and judicialising it. 
 
A second advantage of ex-ante legality review could be articulated in terms of expertise. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, Comptrollers-General possess more appropriate 
training and socialisation than ordinary judges, and due to their larger experience with 
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administrative rules and decisions, they can understand technical matters more quickly. 
Judges, in contrast, would probably struggle to understand technicalities, as they review 
administrative rules only sporadically.864 Thus, expertise in this case leads to efficiency, 
as the review is fastest and will probably produce better outcomes using fewer resources. 
 
A third aspect that reveals an advantage of the Comptroller-General over courts is the 
mandatory and ongoing nature of ex-ante review. In contrast, judicial review is contingent 
on the existence of an external interest sufficiently resourced and affected to engage in 
litigation. As Metzger and Stack explain, 
[Judicial review] happens only episodically in agency life…the vast 
majority of agency actions and decisions, including those that lead to the 
adoption of a particular rule or policy, will never be subject to review. For 
any given agency, much less for any given bureau within an agency, a 
judicial decision validating or nullifying its analysis comes only 
infrequently and unpredictably.865 
 
In contrast, ex-ante legality review by the Comptroller-General takes place in a less 
accidental manner, as it is generally mandatory since only ‘non-essential’ administrative 
action is in principle excluded. Besides, it operates independently of the external interests 
triggering it. 
 
A fourth advantage of ex-ante legality review is precisely its operation before 
promulgation. This feature prevents that some forms of illegalities become irremovable 
before any legal challenge occurs. It also allows rapid reaction and rectification in case 
agency action purports to transgress its legal margins. Judicial review, on the contrary, is 
inevitably late. Echoing standard descriptions of the limitations of judicial control of 
administrative action, Metzger and Stack indicate that ‘judicial review […] necessarily 
operates ex post, sometimes many years after the agency has taken the action. This means 
that even for the relatively few actions that are subject to review, any remedy of a 
violation of external administrative law comes at a time very distant from the 
violation’.866 Therefore, ex-ante review offers an earlier and probably more effective 
check against administrative abuse. 
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The previous feature, however, could also lead to a serious shortcoming if Comptroller-
General legal interpretation were overly stringent. In this latter scenario, this mechanism 
could provoke timid administration and inaction. Due to its administrative ethos, 
however, the office could represent a more constructive approach to the interpretation of 
statutes governing administrative action. From this perspective, the Comptroller-General 
could facilitate legal articulation of administrative activity without incurring the risk of 
sclerotic decision-making. In fact, as will be discussed in the next section, serving as a 
source of dynamic statutory interpretation could be an additional advantage of the 
arrangement.  
 
The main disadvantage of ex-ante legality review is its lack of appropriate private party 
participation and opacity.867 However, this weakness is remedied by the possibility of 
challenging administrative rules by regular judicial review once they have been through 
the preventive scrutiny process. In fact, the ex-ante legality review does not preclude later 
challenges if the regulation is eventually promulgated. The main problem appears when 
the Comptroller-General has rejected the rule, as in this scenario only the President can 
challenge the office though the insistence procedure or by bringing the case to the 
Constitutional Tribunal. Private parties who would benefit from the action cannot 
challenge negative Comptroller opinions. Yet they could ultimately challenge executive 
inaction in courts. 
 
To conclude, this analysis gives support to the consistent judgments of the Chilean Senate 
in favour of the Comptroller-General in relation to the autonomy of the ex-ante legality 
review procedure. This legal accountability arrangement promises a series of benefits that 
could be undermined if energetic judicial supervision were exercised. It is recommended 
that courts be required to exercise especially high restraint in reviewing this mechanism. 
Judicial review should be confined to cases amounting to action outside the Comptroller’s 
jurisdiction or where a purported exercise of authority is a sham. This solution is not 
exposed to criticism, usually voiced through strong forms of deference, as the 
Comptroller-General Office is itself an independent review institution, and judicial 
review remains open in relation to the primary decision-makers. 
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B. Deference and the Dispute-Resolution Process 
The Comptroller-General’s dispute-resolution function is substantially more similar to 
judicial review than its ex-ante legality review function. Several of the advantages 
mentioned above do not apply to this aspect of the office’s work. Here, for instance, legal 
judgments are episodic as they are triggered by party petitions; pronouncements have a 
corrective rather than preventive nature; and the process is more formal and less dialogic 
than in the ex-ante legality review procedure. Moreover, there is no special arrangement 
in the case of disagreement between primary decision-makers in the executive branch and 
the Comptroller-General. In other words, the insistence decree and the appeal to the 
Constitutional Tribunal do not apply to the dispute-resolution function of the office. 
Therefore, it is worth questioning whether judicial oversight is more strongly justified in 
relation to this dimension of the office’s operation. 
 
However, as I have shown in the previous chapter, the Comptroller-General Office 
performs a dispute-resolution function in a manner that complements the judicial review 
conducted by ordinary courts. The office’s adjudicatory role is different, and to some 
extent superior, in terms of expertise, speed, broader access for the affected parties, and 
flexible legal effects. In other words, the institution can better adjudicate cases involving 
complex regulatory statutes; unlike courts, it can do it in months instead of years; it offers 
a forum for challenging the legality of administrative action for groups that do not 
regularly use the judicial process; and their legal interpretations could be more easily 
modified if the circumstances change. 
 
It is worth highlighting the latter point. Due to their diverse institutional structure, the 
Comptroller-General and courts have also different interpretive approaches. This attribute 
of the office could help satisfy important requirements of the contemporary 
administrative state. Reacting against rigid principles of statutory construction based on 
private law, it has been argued that the contemporary regulatory state demands new 
techniques of statutory interpretation. One of the problems requiring new principles of 
interpretation is statutory obsolescence. As Sunstein put it, ‘[s]ometimes statutory 
construction is informed by an effort to ensure integrity and coherence in the law by 
updating obsolete statutes…by interpreting them in a way that takes account of changing 
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conditions’. 868  The Comptroller-General could perfectly collaborate in this task of 
dynamic statutory interpretation, breaking with the apparent dilemma of choosing 
between courts and the primary administration. Indeed, it has been claimed that courts 
should hardly ‘be charged with issuing dynamic, updating interpretations of obsolete 
legislation’ and that this task should be allocated to administrative agencies ‘because of 
[their] relatively greater information about current conditions, superior technocratic 
expertise, and heightened political responsiveness’.869 However, an institution combining 
some institutional features of both administration and courts – independence, rule 
interpretation competence, greater information capacities, non-myopic viewpoints, 
technocratic expertise, and orientation to the achievement of social objectives – could be 
an even superior alternative or at least a valuable complement. A similar function has 
been played by the Conseil d’Etat in France, which itself combines administrative and 
judicial functions. As Bell has shown, it has developed some form of law-making function 
by adjudication, thus filling gaps in legislation.870 Similarly, Edley has viewed the French 
institution as an adequate structure for exercising a more flexible sort of scrutiny that he 
calls ‘sound governance review’, instead of an overly legalistic examination of 
government action. 871  To this end, he emphasises the mix of legal and non-legal 
components in the organisation. Likewise, Cane has argued that, because of its 
institutional location and the mindset of its personnel, the Conseil d’Etat ‘seems to have 
at least the potential to strike that balance more in favour of social than of individual 
interests’. 872  More importantly, we have seen this argument playing a role in the 
Comptroller-General’s own characterisation of its functions, and observers value the role 
of the institution in providing dynamic statutory interpretation in view of a dysfunctional 
legislative process. Some of the canons to be taken into account in performing this task 
could be the following: giving weight to presidential direction, allowing more flexible 
constitutional interpretation, mitigating agency tunnel vision, ensuring hierarchical 
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control over subordinates, and paying attention to the contemporary political milieu, 
among others.873 
 
The preceding advantages justify giving the Comptroller-General an enhanced role as a 
legal accountability institution, also in respect to its dispute-resolution function. Yet 
without a more robust institutional framework deliberately establishing it as an 
autonomous structure, those advantages do not support the idea of making the institution 
entirely immune from judicial review. Moreover, some shortcomings detected in the 
institution warrant giving the courts a supervisory role. A first limitation of the office is 
its relative opacity in comparison to courts, especially in terms of media coverage and 
comparability with judicial institutions elsewhere. A second limitation is the existence of 
poorly defined participation rights – for instance, in relation to rules of standing and 
intervention provisions. This feature explains the rapid response capacities of the office, 
but it could be inadequate for the adjudication of cases of constitutional nature. Thirdly, 
the office’s supposedly public/collective interest orientation could offer an inadequate 
remedy for cases in which marginalised groups or individuals are involved, and, 
conversely, court proceedings could potentially provide a more suitable setting for these 
disputes. Lastly, although the institution enjoys an enhanced status in the Chilean political 
system, the expressive effect of its rulings and its constitutional authority is not exactly 
comparable to that of the judiciary. This might also justify having courts as an alternative 
check for cases that may require greater sensibility to the expressive dimension of legal 
adjudication. 
 
To put it slightly differently, the Comptroller-General must have a leading role in the 
development of administrative law review, while courts should retain primary 
responsibility for adjudication of constitutional nature.874 But this does not entail a hard 
separation of functions between the two institutions. Their separate roles should not be 
conceived as a matter of autonomous spheres of action but as two complementary 
perspectives in the common task of securing legal accountability for government action. 
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A formalistic implementation of a spatial conception of administrative and judicial 
functions would be practically unfeasible and normatively undesirable. Therefore, a more 
adequate relationship between the two institutions should be incarnated in a flexible 
principle of judicial restraint based on independence, institutional competence, and 
expertise. In brief, courts should remain in the position of having the last word in matters 
of legal interpretation in relation to dispute-resolution – especially in view of their 
constitutional authority and expressive functions – but they should be prepared to accord 
substantial weight to Comptroller-General determinations out of respect for its 
constitutional independence, institutional competence, and expertise.875 
 
Although there may be certain overlap among them, three grounds for judicial deference 
to Comptroller-General determinations can be identified. First, constitutional 
independence entails that courts must assign weight to the fact that the institution is not a 
primary decision-maker, but an independent legality review institution operating in 
partnership with courts. This feature demands a special form of comity on the part of the 
judiciary to avoid undermining the scrutiny role of the first reviewer. Secondly, the courts 
should afford deference to the Comptroller-General on grounds of ‘institutional 
competence’. Judges should pay attention to whether their structure and procedures equip 
them to decide the matter better than the administrative adjudicator. They have to take 
into account, for instance, whether their investigative techniques are suitable for the 
problem at hand and the potential limitations of their processes.876 Finally, courts must 
place especial weight on the views of the Comptroller-General when the latter has greater 
expertise. The typical source of expertise for the office is ‘specialised adjudicative 
expertise’, which could be defined as the type of expertise that ‘is gained chiefly through 
adjudicative experience, training and repeated exposure to one area of administrative 
decision-making (and in some areas through educational or research experience)’.877 The 
Comptroller-General’s experience within the administrative process, its greater access to 
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information, and the special training in administrative regulations for its staff are all 
reasons to place considerable weight on its determinations.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the problem of delimitation of functions between the 
Comptroller-General and ordinary courts from a number of different perspectives. I have 
looked at historical controversies, legal precedents, constitutional arguments, and 
doctrinal discussion. Eventually, a somewhat bewildering picture has emerged in which 
some criteria appear to be assumed but rarely thoroughly articulated. We have seen that 
the institutions have been distinguished in terms of, among other criteria, public-private 
law, political process versus judicial supremacy, abstract interpretation versus concrete 
dispute-resolution, collective interests versus rights considerations, and administrative 
versus judicial functions. An inclination towards understanding the proper domain of 
these two institutions in spatial terms has been pervasive but manifestly unhelpful. 
Having analysed the functions of both institutions in terms of comparative institutional 
advantages and drawing on comparative-law insights, this chapter has suggested that a 
spatial approach is unfeasible and unattractive. Instead, I recommend a principle of 
coordination that secures a protected functioning for the Comptroller-General in respect 
to its ex-ante operations, requiring courts to exercise high deference, and subjects it to 
judicial review in relation to its dispute-resolution functions, stressing the need for 
judicial restraint on grounds of constitutional independence, procedural advantages, and 
adjudicatory expertise. 
 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Conducting a socio-legal study of the role of the Comptroller-General in the Chilean 
administrative process, this dissertation has explored the limits and possibilities of the 
idea of nonjudicial legal accountability. Stress has been placed on internal nonjudicial 
forms of administrative justice. The story told by this thesis suggests that the office has 
provided an overall positive contribution to meeting the demands of legality in the context 
of a growing administrative state. More importantly, this thesis has outlined some 
rationales that may guide the future action and reforms of this institution. 
I. OVERVIEW 
In Part I of the thesis, I laid the groundwork for the core chapters of this study. In Chapter 
1, I began by briefly introducing the problem of the interaction between state bureaucracy 
and legality in the Latin American context. Outlining the evolution of the views about the 
relevance of legality in the processes of development and democratisation in the region, 
I stressed the importance of the idea of horizontal accountability. Developed by leading 
scholar Guillermo O’Donnell, this notion illustrates the need to explore a series of 
institutions and processes often overlooked when studying traditional branches of 
government. I suggested that O’Donnell highlighted an important area of study but that a 
more fine-grained analysis was required. Drawing on political science and legal literature 
about accountability processes, I distinguished three types of tasks that nonjudicial 
institutions of administrative justice could perform. These are the political accountability, 
pedagogic, and contestability functions. While the first function highlights how these 
bodies help secure bureaucratic responsiveness to political authorities, the second 
function focused on strengthening administrative capacities within the executive branch, 
emphasising efficacy, accuracy, and institutional memory. The contestability function, in 
turn, relates to the need to broaden the sites in order to consider challenges to 
administrative action or inaction on legal grounds brought by affected parties. In this 
introductory chapter, I also stressed two kinds of risks posed by nonjudicial legal 
accountability arrangements: authoritarianism and excessive intrusiveness. 
 
In addition, in Chapter 1, I reviewed current studies about the ideal of administrative 
justice and different institutional arrangements that attempt to materialise it. Two lessons 
drawn from these studies stand out. On the one hand, the most interesting current research 
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projects look at administrative justice institutions in their context, trying to ascertain how 
these processes work in real-life contexts, how officials and users perceive them, and their 
impact. On the other hand, remarkable studies such as Mashaw’s Bureaucratic Justice 
have emphasised the importance of imagining alternative institutional articulations of 
bureaucracy as a political ideal. Mashaw’s fictional bureaucratic justice superbureau, for 
example, aspires to incarnate ideals of institutional capacity and symbolic legitimation in 
one hybrid body.878 Mashaw’s crucial insight is that these institutions and processes could 
be developed inside out, that is, they may grow out of administrative processes and 
practices themselves instead of being externally imposed. These methodological and 
theoretical insights have inspired the methods and the intellectual concerns behind this 
thesis. 
 
Turning to the case study under examination, in Chapter 2 I outlined the main institutional 
features of the Chilean Comptroller-General, in terms of structures, procedures, and 
powers, in order to provide the legal background for the subsequent chapters. The Office 
was described as an inherently hierarchical and centralised organisation. Appointed by 
the President with Senate super-majority confirmation, the office holder can only be 
removed from office through impeachment, which has occurred only once, in the early 
years of the institution. The single-headed character of the office entails a strong reliance 
on the personal traits of its chief authority. In sharp contrast to Comptrollers and Auditors 
General elsewhere, early on this agency adopted the role of official interpreter not merely 
of financial regulations but of administrative legality in general. Currently, the Chilean 
Comptroller-General both conducts audit oversight and performs broad-ranging ex-ante 
and ex-post legality review functions. The Comptroller-General has also played a primary 
role as an anti-corruption watchdog. Accordingly, I have suggested that, somewhat 
echoing Mashaw’s bureaucratic justice superbureau, this institution operates as a multi-
tasking institution of internal administrative justice.  
 
Unlike courts and despite its independence, the Comptroller-General operates in routine 
and close contact with public officials in all sorts of administrative decision-making 
procedures. The body has been mandated to exercise compulsory ex-ante legal review of 
                                                 
878 Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (n 1) 226; Nicholas R Parrillo, ‘Introduction. Jerry Mashaw’s Creative 
Tension with the Field of Administrative Law’ in Nicholas R Parrillo (ed), Administrative Law from the 
Inside Out: Essays on Themes in the Work of Jerry L Mashaw (CUP 2017) 13–4. 
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most of the administrative decisions taken by executive officials. As a result, the channels 
of interaction between primary administrators and the Comptroller-General Office are 
abundant and remarkably broad. The embeddedness of the office gave it a hybrid – quasi-
judicial and quasi-administrative – character, which could be appealing to sceptics of 
external review mechanisms. The Comptroller-General furthermore operates as a 
generalist interpreter of administrative legality. Its organic law granted the office ex-post 
power for interpreting the numerous, often vague, inconsistent, and sometimes obsolete 
pieces of legislation governing administrative agencies. We have seen that legislators, 
judges, politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups or individuals usually request the 
institution’s intervention in order to clarify controversial points of law. The office’s 
rulings are binding for the administrative officers, and over time have become a dense 
corpus of precedents that have allegedly enhanced the coherence and predictability of 
administrative action. Despite the tremendous veto power that might be exercised by the 
Comptroller-General through its ex-ante review procedure, this institution does not have 
the last word. By the decree of ‘presidential insistence’, the President is allowed to 
override adverse Comptroller-General determinations.  
 
The task of Part II of the thesis was primarily historical reconstruction. Going beyond 
formal arrangements, this part of the case study offers a contextualised account of the 
origins, development, and main crises the Comptroller-General underwent during the 
twentieth century. In Chapter 3 I reconstructed the origins and growth of the Comptroller-
General in the context of the emergence of the administrative state in Chile. I explained 
that the creation of the institution occurred as a consequence of the broader concentration 
of political power in the executive branch brought about by the Chilean Constitution of 
1925. At the time, the Comptroller-General was conceived as a bureaucratic body 
subordinated to the President and whose primary purpose was the improvement of 
administrative effectiveness. Combining local and foreign influences, the organisation 
reflected a technocratic mindset and reacted against the perceived damaging oligarchic 
practices of the political class. Later, however, a series of constitutional events caused a 
sharp shift in the institution’s animating ideals. As a result of its entrenchment in the 
Constitution, a remarkable impeachment procedure against the head of office, and the 
weakness of the judicial review of administrative action, the values of independence, 
impartiality, and legality began to take a preeminent place in the institution. The Office’s 
new outlook and rising reputation required additional legal powers and protections, and 
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gradually made the organisation more attractive to an elite of young professionals. 
Crucially, this virtuous circle also entailed a more assertive attitude towards control of 
executive power. Thus, notwithstanding the imperfect understanding of the Office’s 
rationale, it was undeniable that by the late 1960s the Comptroller-General had become 
a major actor in Chilean constitutional politics. 
 
In Chapter 4, I examined a critical juncture for the current understandings of the 
Comptroller-General. This period was the presidency of Salvador Allende (1970-1973), 
who attempted to implement a transformative economic agenda of industrial 
nationalisation by administrative action. Constrained by the restrictive nature of the 
political process, a fragile legal framework, and the radical demands by his supporters –
not to mention the volatile geopolitical context of the Cold War – President Allende 
attempted to implement a piecemeal nationalisation policy that heavily relied on strong 
executive power and docile legal controls. Compared to the judiciary, the Comptroller-
General appeared to be a legal accountability body with a more responsive approach to 
collectivist policies and administrative needs. However, as this chapter shows, especially 
due to exercising ex-ante legality review of expropriation and requisition decrees, the 
office significantly eroded the reputation of government. In fact, although the executive 
repeatedly resorted to insistence decrees in order to override the Comptroller’s adverse 
decisions, this strategy harmed Allende’s credibility as a democratic, law-abiding 
president. Allende’s government protested, claiming illegitimate partisan use of the 
Comptroller-General by a reactionary opposition. Although it is undeniable that some 
officials used the institution to undermine Allende’s government, on balance the majority 
of the office’s rulings reflected bona fide and reasonable legal interpretations. They 
required prior authorising legislation for the use of administrative power, consistency 
with legislative purpose, and decisions based on evidence. In general, these doctrines 
reiterated legal standards applied by the office to previous administrations. In addition, 
this form of legal scrutiny took place in a context of a general lack of jurisdiction by the 
ordinary courts, and in any case could be overridden by the executive. In short, this 
chapter suggests that it is unfounded to describe the behaviour of the Comptroller-General 
as reflecting naked political bias against the Allende government. 
 
The historical part of the thesis closed with Chapter 5. Here, I examined the second most 
controversial period for the office in its historical trajectory: the Pinochet dictatorship. I 
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argued that to understand the role of the institution during the authoritarian period, we 
need to distinguish three periods. At the beginning of the military dictatorship, the office 
was used as a tool for asserting military control over civil bureaucracy. During these early 
years, the institution was strengthened and had a large influence on civil administration. 
Yet in terms of legal control, the institution focused on procedural regularity and 
formalism, taking a submissive attitude that facilitated repression and human rights 
violations. Later, as internal and international pressure on the military rulers increased, 
the office adopted a more intrusive approach, repeatedly colliding with part of the 
governing elite. Here, the legal accountability aspect of the institution resurfaced. By the 
late 1970s, however, Pinochet was intervening in the operations of the Comptroller-
General, appointing a new head of the office, reflecting the further concentration of power 
in his hands. Consequently, the institution retreated to a survival strategy, and largely 
focused on the bureaucratic dimension of its work, avoiding further constitutional clashes 
with the military. Perhaps surprisingly, the regime’s hostile attitude towards the 
Comptroller-General was not entirely reflected in the constitutional rules approved in 
1980. Furthermore, to some extent the Constitution of 1980 improved the institutional 
standing of the office. More importantly, reflecting the legacy of the 1925 Constitution 
and uneasiness in respect to the functions of the Comptroller-General, the new 
Constitution was unable to provide a clear framework for the administrative justice 
machinery in the country. 
 
Lastly, Part III of the thesis examined the contemporary Comptroller-General, with the 
aim of revealing how its distinctive instruments for controlling administrative power 
unfold in real-life contexts. I introduced this part by describing the role of the institution 
in the process of re-democratisation. I explained that the last three decades have seen the 
institution returning to its critical position in the constitutional politics of the country. 
This process of accommodation and adaption has taken place without major formal 
reforms. Its key elements are the flexibility provided by an ambiguous institutional 
framework, and the energy and flexibility that the office possesses as a result of the 
concentration of power in the top ranks.  
 
In Chapter 6, I focused on the Comptroller-General’s ex-ante legality review procedure 
and drew heavily on interviews with government and Comptroller-General officials. The 
chapter centred primarily on review of rulemaking. The purpose of the chapter was to dig 
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beneath the formal features of the procedure in order to capture the real operation of the 
office and the functions that it performs. The starting point was the traditional idea of 
legality review as simple verification that a previous legislative rule has been followed. 
Against fears that this kind of review process might serve as a mere tool for legitimation 
of executive power, especially in a context of exacerbated presidential government, it was 
suggested that the scrutiny reveals quite a demanding probe for administrators. In fact, 
some civil servants criticised the device, complaining that it ossifies rulemaking, 
inhibiting administrative experimentation and policy innovation. Thus, the ex-ante 
legality review process is not confined to mere formalistic verification of legal 
authorisation. The interviews considered in this chapter also revealed potential 
contributions to reasoned administration and deliberation, participation of affected 
parties, internal coordination within the executive branch, and prevention of litigation. 
All these aspects of the office show a complex view of the interactions between the 
Comptroller-General, government officials, and third parties. The picture that emerges 
sheds light on the benefits and limitations of the mechanism, and explains why actors 
seem reluctant to engage in far-reaching reform, wishing either to abolish the organisation 
or transform it into a fully-fledged administrative tribunal. 
 
In Chapter 7 I examined the second primary legal power of the office: the ex-post power 
to issue binding legal interpretations. In this chapter I also adopted a qualitative approach 
to the analysis. I explained that this power fulfils many of the functions of administrative 
adjudication reported in comparative literature. Above all, the power has been used as a 
dispute resolution mechanism that strikes a different balance between independence and 
expertise than that represented by the judiciary. I suggested that to an important extent 
the Comptroller-General is less independent from the executive branch than courts, as the 
office has pervasive links with public administration. However, this particular mix of 
independence and expertise has reinforced its reputation in the view of users and 
administrators alike. Moreover, at least in some policy areas, the Comptroller-General is 
perceived as offering less expensive, faster, and more flexible ways to resolve disputes 
between administrative agencies and affected parties. Finally, perhaps the main 
deficiency of the device relates to its weak finality or authority, as Comptroller-General 
decisions are challengeable in the courts, and especially because the boundaries between 
both institutions remain vague. 
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Finally, in Chapter 8, I inspected more closely the problem of delimitation between the 
Comptroller-General and courts. Here, I reconstructed a series of constitutional 
controversies regarding the boundaries between the two legal accountability institutions. 
I examined cases discussed in the Chilean Senate and the Constitutional Tribunal, and 
analysed debates among Chilean scholars. Acknowledging that without deliberate 
legislative action, any solution would remain contested and probably unsatisfactory, I 
proposed a flexible principle of coordination that may articulate in a sensible way the 
interactions between the two organisations. This principle recommends that both 
institutions continue performing legal accountability functions in relation to 
administrative action, but suggests robust judicial deference towards Comptroller-
General determination, especially strongly in the context of ex-ante legality review. To 
arrive at this principle of coordination, the chapter examined the comparative advantages 
of the Comptroller-General and the judiciary. It was argued that the office has advantages 
in terms of enhanced expertise, flexibility, speed, and accessibility. In combination with 
judicial review in ordinary courts, these features seem attractive components in a system 
of administrative justice. 
 
In this thesis, I have suggested that a number of factors might explain the endurance of 
this institution despite numerous forces that have promoted its abolition or radical 
transformation since its establishment in the early decades of the twentieth century. One 
concerns the Comptroller’s ability to deal with conflicts between the legislature and the 
executive branch. A second factor relates to its capacity to enlarge the sites for external 
contestation of executive action on legality grounds as a reaction to the limitations of the 
judiciary. A third factor concerns the role of this institution as a mechanism for realisation 
of bureaucratic values such as compliance with legal rules, stability and political 
neutrality, and the preservation of institutional memory, among others. Last but not least, 
the institutional features of the organisation are a critical element for explaining its 
strength, as it has evolved as an ‘administrative justice superbureau’, which possesses 
constitutional authority, is structured in a monocratic way, concentrates legal and non-




Admittedly, the findings of this dissertation suffer from a number of limitations. To begin 
with, the limited previous empirical research on the office has been an important 
limitation of this thesis. Considerable effort has been put into reconstructing events and 
stories and gathering data about past and contemporary real-world operation of the office. 
This lack of information is explained by legal academia’s traditional excessive reliance 
on rules and formal arrangements at the price of overlooking actual practice. Moreover, 
political scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of legality in bureaucratic 
institutions in the Latin American context. Lastly, the lack of clear counterparts elsewhere 
has conspired against the involvement of foreign researchers, who could have brought 
less myopic disciplinary approaches. 
 
Furthermore, due to the highly contextual nature of the research conducted in this thesis, 
analogous institutions in the Latin American region have not been paid enough attention. 
I relied on the received knowledge that the Chilean institution is quite unique in the 
region, but this assumption could be challenged by further empirically informed research. 
When case studies have already been done, the next step is to compare and contrast the 
institutions and attempt to explain the convergence and divergence among them. 
III. POLICY REFORMS 
I argue that a principle of coordination could inject rationality into current jurisdictional 
controversies affecting the relationship between the Comptroller-General and courts. 
However, it is undeniable that only legislative action could entirely overhaul the Chilean 
system of administrative justice. The core difficulty in such a course of action is the 
position of the Comptroller-General as a quasi-judicial, quasi-administrative institution 
of legal accountability. The problem is twofold. On the one hand, the abolition of the 
office seems to risk losing its highly desirable features, especially in terms of legal 
accountability and administrative effectiveness. On the other hand, transforming it into a 
court of justice could also entail losing or diminishing the positive consequences that its 
nonjudicial features seem to have had for the Chilean system. The question, in other 
words, is whether it is possible to reform the Comptroller-General without excessively 
judicialising it.  
 
Nevertheless, a brief list of incremental changes could be suggested for future reform: 
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Leadership. The monocratic character of the Comptroller-General has been always been 
a controversial feature of the office. In the Allende period, critics singled out this 
characteristic of the institution as having the most damaging effect from a democratic 
point of view. Recently, it has also been suggested that introducing a collegiate top 
structure could reduce the body’s arbitrariness and improve its rationality. However, 
being a single-headed organisation has given the Comptroller-General remarkable 
degrees of institutional energy and flexibility that would be entirely lost if transformed 
into a council. It would destroy the distinctive ‘tribune’ character of the office that has 
enabled it to effectively navigate turbulent times in the political domain. Rather, the way 
to reduce the authoritarian tendencies of the institution is to strengthen the bureaucratic 
component of the organisation. 
 
Bureaucratic values. A worrying aspect of the institution is the degree of control of the 
head of office over his subordinates. It is here where a collegial element has to be 
introduced into the Comptroller-General Office. The ideal to be pursued here is to create 
a cadre of elite administrators that could deliberate and disagree among themselves, and 
improve and scrutinise administrative action. My suggestion echoes Breyer’s 
recommendation for modernisation of the administrative process through the creation of 
an organisation comprising a technocratic elite: ‘a mission oriented [group of 
administrators], seeking to bring a degree of uniformity and rationality to decision making 
in highly technical areas, with broad authority, somewhat independent, and with 
significant prestige…composed by civil servants who are following [a] career path, 
would draw strength from its ability to harness several virtues inherent in many 
administrative systems: rationalization, expertise, insulation, and authority’. 879  This 
would require the strengthening of career protections and the independence of civil 
servants; formalising internal structures and procedures to promote collegiate 
deliberation; and encouraging diversity of experiences and professional backgrounds. 
 
Separation of ex-ante and ex-post legality functions. I suggest introducing a divide 
between the ex-ante legality review and the ex-post dispute-resolution functions of the 
Comptroller-General. This proposal is partly inspired by the model of the French Conseil 
                                                 
879 Breyer (n 10) 61. See similar recommendations in Hood and others (n 690) 212. 
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d’Etat, whose consultative and judicial sections are institutionally detached from each 
other despite sharing a similar organisational culture and outlook.880 This change could 
also allow further changes in order to respond to serious due process concerns without 
unduly affecting the environment of dialogue with administration. However, it would be 
desirable that a future ex-post section of the Comptroller-General be modelled on 
inspectorial rather than adversarial processes. 
 
Transparency and reason-giving. Opacity of procedures and vagueness of outcomes are 
pervasive problems in the Comptroller-General’s current arrangements. This provides 
undesirable opportunities for capture by special interests and harmful strategic behaviour. 
Echoing early deficiencies in other scrutiny regimes such as Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review in the US, the Comptroller-General currently seems 
to be shaping rules and decisions in ways that are fairly opaque for the public. Future 
reform has to avoid the transformation of the ex-ante review process of major 
administrative rules and decisions into an additional site for back-channel participation 
of special interests. Therefore, ex-parte communications with persons outside the 
executive branch have to be heavily formalised. Following reforms in the OIRA in the 
1990s, future changes should establish that oral communications can be directed only to 
the Comptroller-General, granting civil servants representing administrative agencies the 
right to be present at any such meetings. In addition, following the example of OIRA, the 
Comptroller-General should be required ‘to forward to the relevant agency all written 
communications from outsiders and to maintain a log, available to the public, of both 
written and oral communications involving these parties’.881 Finally, after promulgation 
or a decision not to proceed, the Comptroller-General should be required to disclose all 
written communications between itself and the agency. Furthermore, future reform 
should impose on the Comptroller-General a duty to state reasons for its adverse 
decisions, at least in the context ex-ante review of major rules and decisions. The priority 
should be that Comptroller statements provide a concise and clear reasoning supporting 
its legal interpretations and findings in order to guide future administrative action and 
facilitate understanding by private parties. 
 
                                                 
880 Freedeman (n 11) 92; Bell, French Legal Cultures (n 11) 172–5. 
881 Kagan (n 711) 2286–7. 
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Judicial Review. We have seen in Chapter 8 that Organic Law Article 6 offers insufficient 
guidance on delimitation between the spheres of action of courts and the Comptroller-
General. Furthermore, it assumes a formalistic distinction between administrative and 
judicial functions. Thus, I suggest making it a rule to establish specific conditions in 
which affected parties can challenge Comptroller determinations in courts. These 
conditions should be confined to questions of law, and clear cases in which the body has 
acted outside its jurisdiction. 
IV. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Several dimensions of the work of the Comptroller-General could be subject to further 
research. One is the relationship of the office with members of Congress and politicians 
more generally. This aspect emerged in several interviews with Comptroller-General 
officials. They said that politicians used their powers to request information concerning 
administrative processes, and also to initiate investigations. They also stated that 
politicians and members of Congress went to the Comptroller-General to represent their 
constituencies – community groups that needed to obtain benefits for their 
neighbourhood, for instance – and sometimes to accelerate administrative rules that 
implemented legislation that they sponsored in the legislative process. Qualitative 
research into this aspect of the office could ascertain the reasons why politicians use the 
office, the effectiveness of this function, the risk of the politicisation of the office, and 
the way the office uses this interaction to reinforce its standing vis-à-vis the executive 
branch.  
 
Similarly, future research could investigate the role of the office at the local and regional 
level. The interaction of the Comptroller-General with the 340-plus Chilean 
municipalities is substantially different from the interaction it has with the more compact 
and centralised executive branch. With some of them, the office seems to have built quite 
constructive relationships, but with others – apparently the larger ones – there seems to 
be more friction. Taking advantage of the office’s larger access, communities seem to use 
the office to adjudicate disputes between them and municipalities, and also with private 
companies operating under municipal permits. Finally, the office’s role as a central 
interpreter of administrative legality may have special importance, as the degree of 
political and administrative fragmentation is remarkable, but legal practices seems to be 
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quite uniform across Chile – a country stretching 4,300 kilometres in length. The 
hypothesis here could be that the Comptroller-General has acted as a centralising force. 
 
Another aspect of future research on the office should focus on particular policy areas 
such as human rights, anti-corruption and transparency, urban planning, and economic 
regulation. Research should use comparative institutional analysis – comparing courts 
and the Comptroller-General – to examine the advantages and shortcomings of the 
Comptroller technique in concrete policy areas. For instance, in some areas the expertise 
of the office might well be lower, inviting enhanced judicial involvement, while in other 
areas the need for dynamic, speedy decision-making could suggest a need to prioritise the 
Comptroller-General, with minimal, light touch judicial review. Empirically informed 
research into concrete policy areas could refine the findings of this thesis. 
 
A further aspect that was touched on in this dissertation but could be examined more 
deeply by future research is the process of legitimation of the office within the Chilean 
political process. In other words, one future line of research concerns the factors that have 
contributed to the legitimation, or social acceptability, of this checking institution in the 
Chilean political system. Looking at the process of reputation-building and the 
development of robust institutional autonomy might shed light as to whether strong 
institutions can succeed in weak institutional contexts such as the Latin American one. 
Yet future studies should also look at the junctures in which the office retreated and lost 
public reputation.  
 
Recently, Alan Angell has praised the office’s contribution to the struggle against 
corruption, wondering how other Latin American countries could adopt a similar 
institution.882 This raises the question of whether this institution could be exportable to 
neighbouring countries. The Comptroller-General Office was never deliberately designed 
as an institution of legal accountability. Its current shape emerged as an unintended 
consequence of historical contingency and political accommodation in the context of 
‘small country governance’, that is, benefiting from its proximity among different groups 
within the governing elite. Put differently, it may be said that the office has grown in a 
                                                 
882 Alan Angell, ‘Democratic Governance in Chile’ in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R Scully (eds), 
Democratic governance in Latin America (Stanford University Press 2010) 296. 
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functional or non-rationalistic manner.883 The institution adapted in a context of constant 
clashes between the executive branch and Congress in order to provide legal supervision 
over an expanding bureaucracy. Rather than a mechanical, direct legal transplant of an 
institution from one legal system into another, the development of the Comptroller’s 
Office in Chile reveals a story of successful institutional cross-fertilisation understood as 
incremental internal legal evolution fitted to a domestic context.884 All this suggests that 
transplantation to other legal systems might be inherently difficult, but it recommends 
exploring whether similar indigenous institutions could grow and adapt in similar ways, 
incarnating internal administrative law values. 
 
To conclude, the underlying issue this thesis has attempted to address is the ways in which 
public administration and legality interact. The thesis highlights the fact that legality and 
bureaucracy are not necessarily two opposing forms of social ordering. On the contrary, 
administrative action is shaped by legality as an enabling constraint. Administration, in 
turn might develop its own, distinctive forms of legality, that is, instances of what has 
been called ‘internal administrative legality’. In addition, this thesis emphasises the 
diversity of the institutional forms that legal accountability can adopt in different legal 
cultures or traditions, and the way excessive focus on convergence may eclipse the 
plurality of legal forms that may have silently evolved over time in different jurisdictions. 
In this sense, this thesis is a reaction to court-centred studies on the law and politics. It 
also reacts to studies that focus on convergence on judicial institutions and practices by 
revealing a particularistic development of forms of legal control of bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, it reacts against assumptions that the existence of strong courts should be 
equated with higher stages of legal institutional development. 
 
 
                                                 
883 Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, ‘Rationalism in Public Law’ (2013) 76 The Modern Law Review 
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884 John Bell, ‘Mechanisms for Cross-Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe’ in J Beatson and Takis 
Tridimas (eds), New directions in European public law (Hart Publishing 1998). 





1.  Senior Legal Advisor of Presidency Office 
 
11.09.2014 
2.  Senior Legal Advisor to Regulatory Departments within the 
Executive, and Senior Officer in the Comptroller-General 
13.09.2014 
3.  Senior Legal Advisor to Regulatory Departments within the 
Executive, and Senior Officer in the Comptroller-General  
22.09.2014 & 03.11.2015 




5.  Legal advisor to the Treasury Solicitor’s Department (Consejo 
de Defensa del Estado)  
 
12.09.2014 
6.  Senior Legal Advisor of Presidency Office 
 
22.09.2014 
7.  Former Chief of Staff of the Comptroller General  
 
20.10.2014 




9.  NGO director (urban protection) 
 
20.10.2015 
10.  NGO attorney (human rights) 
 
21.10.2015 
11.  Former Chief of Staff of the Comptroller General  
 
02.11.2015 




13.  Senior Legal Advisor of Presidency Office 
 
04.11.2015 
14.  NGO attorney (Women’s rights) 
 
05.11.2015 
15.  Senior Legal Advisor of Presidency Office 
 
04.11.2015 








18.  In-house Lawyer in Regulated Industry 
 
11.11.2015 
19.  Senior Legal Advisor to Human Rights Institution 
 
11.11.2015 




21.  Former Senior official in the Comptroller-General 
 
16.11.2015 




23.  Former Senior official in the Comptroller General and Former 




24.  Senior Legal Advisor to Santiago Municipality 
 
18.11.2015 
25.  Former Senior official in the Comptroller General 
 
19.11.2015 








28.  Former Senior official in the Comptroller-General 
 
20.11.2015 
29.  Legal advisor to the Treasury Solicitor’s Department (Consejo 
de Defensa del Estado) and senior member of the judiciary 
18.04.2016 & 19 04.2016  
 
30.  Senior Official in the Comptroller-General 26.04.2016 
 
31.  Official in the Comptroller General 
 
07.04.2016 








34.  NGO activist (animal rights) 
 
02.05.2016 
35.  Legal Advisor to Human Rights Institution 
 
25.04.2016 




37.  NGO attorney (environmental) 
 
13.04.2016 & 18.04.2016 
38.  Senior Legal Advisor of Presidency Office & currently Attorney 
at a law-firm 
 
06.04.2016 
39.  Senior Legal Advisor of Presidency Office & currently Attorney 
at a law-firm 
 
21.04.2016 
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